Envisioning Education in a Post-Work Leisure-Based Society

A Dialogical Approach

Eugene Matusov

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

When I started teaching future teachers at the University of Delaware about 23 years ago, I was faced with a puzzling phenomenon. Like many other teacher educators (e.g., Pinar & Grumet, 1976), I wanted my students to learn from good and bad teachers they had experienced or observed in their past. I asked my undergraduate students to remember their good and bad teachers and to provide instances or events of their distinct teaching, characterizing these teachers as good or bad. In addition, I asked them to develop a reflective analysis of why they judged these teachers as good or bad and what made these teachers good or bad from my students' point of view. My students usually liked this exercise. They provided many keen observations on their past teachers and a thoughtful analysis of what made these teachers "good" or "bad." Good teachers were often portrayed as knowledgeable and passionate learners of their academic subject who deeply and personally care about their students. Good teachers were interested in their students: how they think and feel about the studied topics, what was going on in their lives, and so on. Good teachers allowed their students to deviate from the prescribed assignments and school rules and made the assignments and classroom rules situationally meaningful, fair, and compassionate for their students. In contrast, bad teachers were portrayed as dull, disinterested, distrusting, and uncaring, if not even mean, at times. Bad teachers were rigid with the prescribed assignments and school rules and did not want to change them regardless of circumstances or a lack of meaning for their students. So far, so good.

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However, when I provided my students with diverse problematic scenarios, asking them what they would do as future teachers if they faced these situations, they often proposed pedagogical actions similar to those that they had described as actions of their bad teachers in their past. For example, in a scenario of a first-grader, advanced in math, who does not complete his math assignments because "the assignments are boring," as the boy tells, most of my students would punish the boy with bad grades rather than diversify the assignment to make it interesting and challenging for the boy. My students justified their pedagogical decision by fairness to the other students and compliance with the universal school rules. They often described the boy in the scenario negatively as a disrupter of the classroom discipline, a troublemaker, a beggar for adult attention, a kid who tries to take advantage, and so on, rather than as a good learner of math who needs a different type of instruction. Many of my students were concerned about their professional reputation in the eyes of the school administrators, parents, and other students. They were also concerned about the amount of work and their own pedagogical mastery should they take the other pathway of the development of an individualized assignment for the boy.

My puzzlement grew when I provided them with their own descriptions and analyses of good and bad teachers that my students had experienced in their past. However, my students refused to see any parallel between their descriptions of their own bad teachers and their proposed pedagogical actions! As one student of mine eloquently put it, "We didn't like it [the pedagogical actions of their bad teachers in the past], because we were students. We didn't understand what was good for us. Students often try to take advantage of their teachers and lazy out of schoolwork." "So, they [those bad teachers] were actually good? Right?" asked I. "No, they were bad teachers. But now, as we're learning to become teachers ourselves, we've realized that it [i.e., actions of bad teachers] was necessary," replied one of my students. "So, are you saying that it's necessary to be a bad teacher when you become a teacher?" I continued challenging their position. "No," they replied, "it's not like that." However, they could not explain to me, and apparently to themselves, what exactly they meant. The frustration was growing in the classroom. It was not their frustration with the apparent contradiction between their judgments as former students and their proposed pedagogical actions as future teachers, but rather their frustration with me, their professor, who kept challenging them in a Socratic dialogue. It was very rare when a student or two could see this contradiction at all. And even worse, my students' rather oppressive pedagogical actions, in my judgments and their own judgments as past students, were not only limited to given scenarios but often spilled out to their teaching practicum of working with real and not just imaginary children.

I was frustrated and struggled with this paradox for a few semesters. How come my students could not see the obvious contradiction? Why couldn't they see a discontinuity between their portrayal and critique of their past bad teachers and their willingness to do exactly the same when they faced a problematic situation as future teachers? Were they stupid?! Guided by a Socratic pedagogy, I worked hard to develop a smart intellectual argument, a smart intellectual provocation, a smart intellectual twist to help them realize that they contradicted themselves. I tried to apply my new creative ideas in class, but nothing helped. I consulted with my colleagues, teacher educators, but in vain. I felt pedagogically helpless.

Then, one day, I turned my puzzle around. Instead of asking myself why my students could not see the obvious *discontinuity* between their past student school experience and their current proposed pedagogical actions as future students, I asked myself what the *continuity* was between their experiences as students in the past (and the present) and them imagining themselves as future teachers. The answer came to me immediately: it was their survival. In their past (and present), they had tried hard to survive as students in their schools—now, they were trying to imagine how to survive as teachers. If I were correct, the survival made their apparently conflicting experiences continuous and, thus, non-contradictory!

Hence, in order to help my students see the described contradiction, I needed to move them away from their survival mode. Reflecting on my students' current classes, including my own, I came to the conclusion that all their classes were mostly driven by survival—survival to pass successfully their classes and get good grades. The survival mode was masterfully calculated, designed, and induced by their teachers, including me, and built into their school experiences via an elaborate system of rewards and punishments by grade marks, tests, exams, assignments, and classroom management. But not only school life; life outside school, with its jobs, bureaucracies, and obligations is highly driven by what can be broadly called "survival." Survival is omnipresent in our society, if not our historical existence as Homo Sapiens for the last 300,000 years of our biological, cultural, and historical existence on planet Earth. It has created a powerful ideology. I will develop this central theme of the book later.

In order to move my students away from the grip of survival, I had to change the pedagogical regime of my classes and introduce ontological, rather than intellectual, provocations. “Ontological educational provocations” challenge the students’ lives rather than just a state of their reason (Matusov, 2009). Descriptions of my experimentation with my pedagogical regime away from designing students’ survival mode can be found in this book and elsewhere (Matusov, 2015; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Here I will introduce my ontological provocation challenging my students’ survival mode as future teachers.

At the beginning of the semester, I started one of my class meetings with the following activity (Matusov, 2009, pp. 359–360). I gave my students small index cards and asked them to describe their immediate response to the following situation in one or a few words or a drawing. “You come to a class, any class, and see a note on the door, ‘The class is canceled.’” I asked my students not to write their names on the card. After the students finished, I asked one of the students to collect the cards, mixed them up, and read with an intonation intended by the authors. Meanwhile, I drew pictures of three big faces on the class blackboard: smiling ☺, neutral 😐, and frowning ☹ (see Fig. 1.1). I invited my students to code their replies using these three pictures. The students liked it. Often the card comments go like that, “YES!!!,” “Sleep!,” “Thank GOD!,” “Friends,” “Relief,” “Party!,” and so on. Rarely, there were neutral comments, “No class,” “I wonder why.” Even rarer (if ever in some classes), there were upsetting comments, “Too bad…”, “I’m disappointed.” The tally under the smiling face was getting an overwhelming majority of the comments.

So far, my students did not find anything surprising about it. So, I problematized it for them, “Folks, I found this result a bit strange,” I pointed at the tallies under the three faces. “You seemed to hate school but want to be teachers. Why?! I can understand a chemistry student who hates school but wants to become a chemist, so she decides to suffer a bit more in college. But you want school, which you hate, to be your profession. You hate school as students but want to be teachers. Are you sadists? Do you get pleasure from torturing your future students?!” My students usually protested. “No,” exclaimed they, “we don’t hate school. We like school. We are just happy to do other things for a change.” “OK,” replied I, trying not to let them out of my hook. “Let’s test your hypothesis. Imagine that you go to see a movie with your friends that you heard was good. You come to the cinema and see a note posted, ‘The movie is

Fig. 1.1 The future teachers' reaction to the statement "The class is canceled" (Matusov, 2009, p. 359)

canceled today.' You are happy because you can go back home to sleep. Would it be like that?" The students agreed that they would NOT be happy. So, I continue, "So, why are you so happy when a class is canceled but upset when a movie is canceled?" Some students replied, "Because school is boring. It is such a chore." I summarized, "So, deep down you do not like school. Why do you want to become teachers? Why do you want to spend a huge chunk of your life to create boredom and a chore for your students?" The mood in my class usually changed. My students became quiet and super-attentive. I sensed that some of my students started sinking into despair, so I gave them a hand.

I asked, "What kind of teacher do you want to be? Do you want to be a teacher whose students are happy when she or he gets sick, and the class is canceled? Or do you want to be a teacher whose students are upset when their class is canceled? Or some kind of other teacher – what this teacher might look like?" Many students enthusiastically jumped into this discussion.

They started dreaming. They started exploring their professional desires. They were excited and not just anxious about their choice to become a teacher. I sensed that in this discussion, they became free from the tight grips of their existential survival. Maybe just until the end of the class. They wanted to be good teachers, not just surviving teachers. They wanted to explore what it meant to be a good teacher for them. Their genuine teacher education began.

And then a student asked, "But is it possible to be a good teacher?!" She meant whether it is possible to be a good teacher, not just for one moment, for one student, in one topic,—but at all moments, for all students, for all curricular topics. Well, maybe not always,—not all movies are good,—but enough for the teacher's students to be excited about his/her teaching and to be looking forward to it. As an enthusiastic Progressive teacher, chasing for the Holy Grail of comprehensively good teaching (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019, Chapter 2.3), back then I answered positively to the students' profound question, citing to the students my favorite Progressive educator and psychologist Jerome Bruner, "…any subject could be taught to any child at any age in some form that was honest" (Bruner, 1986, p. 129). "We just need to find an honest way of teaching!" I told my students. My answer was optimistic, within a grasp of any teacher who wants to be good and knows how to do that.

Gradually, I started abandoning my Progressive beliefs and their unrealistic and dangerous optimism (see my criticism of Progressive Education in Matusov, 2015, 2020b, submitted). I started realizing that the survival mode powerfully and inescapably penetrates the core of human life. Until its grip on human existence is not weakened, good exciting teaching and good exciting education can exist only on the margins and in small local oases of institutionalized education. Let me illustrate this point with the following example.

One of my pedagogical experimentations involved the Open Syllabus pedagogical regime, where my students were engaged in designing their own curriculum, organization, and instruction for the class with my help (Matusov, 2015). For example, I created a Curricular Map—a list of curricular topics relevant to the class that students could amend with their own relevant topics. At the end of each class, the students chose which to study next. Initially, I tried this pedagogical regime with elective courses for my education undergraduate and graduate students. It worked well for a few students but did not work well for many other students. Thus, one undergraduate student who stopped attending our class wrote to me in an email,

> In short, I am having a terrible semester. I have bit off more than I can chew in having a part time job and taking 2 honors classes as well as extracurricular activities. When I miss class it is because I am either working extra hours at work or I am cramming for my next exam. I realize I have not been the ideal participant in our class but I can assure you I do really enjoy our EducXXX class and the topics we discuss. Urban education is a passion of mine and I looked forward to this class until I became so stressed this semester. It [is] probably obvious to you, as well as to myself, that because of our open syllabus and "no grades" policy, that I have used this class as a cushion for my heavy workload. I apologize because I know I have taken advantage of what was supposed to [be] beneficial to my learning and our class. I don't know how to make up for the class time that I have missed except to tell you that I really have enjoyed what I have been there for and that I have tried to use webtalk [i.e., a class online forum] to understand the days I missed. I hope you see that when I am in class I enjoy participating and have a lot to offer (email, November, 2012). (Matusov, 2015, pp. A198–A199)

Later, at the end of the semester, the student reflected on this phenomenon a bit more. She said that if this class had grades, she would have allocated sufficient time and effort for it but probably enjoyed it much less. She was puzzled why she was spending time and energy on things that she did not much care about and did not spend time on things she cared about a great deal. She asked rhetorically, "Why the hell did I miss such wonderful opportunities in our class to learn and grow?!" She was very upset with herself calling it "self-betrayal" and "self-sabotage" of her own genuine education and passions. Unfortunately, she was not alone in this experience.

In my analysis, this student perceived her genuine education, in which she could have freedom to pursue her passions, education that she could have owned, as a frivolous luxury that she could not afford because of survival and necessity demands of her life: work, preparation for exams, and so on. To some degree, I agree with my student's perception that genuine education, addressing a student's interests, curiosity, personal growth, is a frivolous luxury. The Greek word "school" (σχολείο) literally meant "leisure" (σχολή) (Arendt, 1958). Genuine education is a form of leisure.

At the same, as I will argue in the book, genuine education as a form of leisure—education that is not driven by survival and necessities—is a fundamental existential need of humanity. I found the insights by psychologist Abraham Maslow to articulate what constitutes authentic education and its conditions. Following Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, leisurely education belongs to the top of the pyramid—the existential need for self-actualization and self-transcendence (Maslow, 1943). This top need becomes prioritized after the four bottom needs—physiological, safety, love/belonging, and esteem, the needs that Maslow called "deficiency needs" (or "d-needs")—are mostly satisfied. This prioritization of needs may not be true for each person in each situation, but it seems to be true on a societal level. From the dawn of humanity, our social prioritization has overwhelmingly been on d-needs. The *existential* needs for self-actualization, self-fulfillment, self-realization, and self-transcendence—what I call "ex-needs"—have remained peripheral and frivolous preoccupations outside of the socially valued and recognized main life, although some philosophers, theologians, and intellectuals argued for them for thousands of years. In modern society, the ex-needs are viewed as peripheral, limited to either very young, very old (retired people), or the rich—i.e., people who can afford carefree leisure. The more society satisfies d-needs, the more societal opportunities for ex-needs can emerge. And the reverse seems to be true: when people are preoccupied with d-needs, it is often more difficult for them to engage in ex-needs.

I argue that leisure is the human condition of the existential needs to be fully realized in a post-work society (cf. Arendt, 1958). Leisure allows people to transcend their nature, their given culture, their given society, their given psychology, their given social roles and positions, their necessities, and their d-needs. By "leisure," I do not mean just free time, just being free from work or chores; I do not mean re-creation, a restoration of workers' emotional, physical, and psychological well-being; nor do I mean the establishment and maintenance of a high social status based on an opposition to the work culture, common for the rich of the so-called "leisure class" (Veblen, 2007).

By genuine leisure, I mean the realization of people's existential needs for self-actualization, self-fulfillment, self-realization, and self-transcendence. Genuine leisure requires people's unconditional well-being and an unconditional safety net, resources for their creativity, a social environment of people with similar and dissimilar leisurely interests, good health, and education promoting people's authorship. Genuine leisure requires different societal cultural values and a different organization of the society (e.g., economy, politics), which I am going to discuss in this book (see Chapter 5).

In the Age of d-needs and necessities, in which we have been living now, education, in general, and institutional mass education, in particular, is usually viewed as instrumental and technological. Education is often viewed as *a means* for goals belonging to some other human spheres, such as the economy, upward social mobility, maintaining the middle class, upper-class distinction, nationalism, hegemonic ideology, reproduction of culture, patriotism, social justice, equality, democratic participation, citizenship, social cohesion, health, safety, and so on. This educational servitude is an instrumental aspect of modern education. A technological aspect of education manifests itself in making students predictably and reliably arrive at the important curricular endpoints, preset by the society, school authority, educational experts, employers, politicians, teachers, parents, and at times even students themselves. These preset curricular endpoints can be certain knowledge, like the atomic structure, or certain skills, like reading or addition of fractions with different denominations, or certain dispositions and attitudes, like punctuality or unconditional commitment to any assignment ordered by the authorities.

In contrast, in the Age of Leisure, when genuine leisure will dominate over survival, labor, and work—i.e., over satisfaction of d-needs,—I expect that education will be primarily intrinsic: education for education's sake, where its process will take priority over its outcome. Intrinsic education is about promoting people's authorship in particular practices. In contrast to instrumental education, people do not want to shorten their intrinsic education (Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017). Instead, they consider intrinsic education as an important part of life itself. Of course, currently, intrinsic education exists on the margins of modern education both institutionalized and informal. There have been pockets of intrinsic education (often rather distorted) throughout the history of education here and there—mostly for well to do people (but not always). However, these pockets, or oases, remain as such in time and place and scope because they are embedded in the otherwise necessities-based society. However, this may (or may not) change in the not very distant future.

Rapidly increasing computerization, automatization, robotization, telecommunication, and advances in AI—both Artificial Intelligence (machine intelligence replacing people) and Augmented Intelligence (machine intelligence enhancing human intelligence)—may reduce an economic need for human labor and work (Markoff, 2015), an economic phenomenon, which is often referred as "technological unemployment" (Keynes, 1930 / 1963). Although this can be a very painful process, it may create economic conditions for the emergence of the Age of Leisure in a "post-work" society, a possibility that is not guaranteed in itself but based on people's political will. In this Age, genuine leisure will become the dominant way of being for people in a "post-work" society. I put the word "post-work" is the quotation marks, because I expect that jobs, d-needs, and necessities will remain but on a limited scale and they will not dominate mainstream societal cultural values, social relationships, and practices as it has been now and in the past (Chapter 4).

* * *

The book is started with my description, analysis, and critique of modern mainstream institutionalized education with its hegemony of instrumental technological education that suppresses and disvalues intrinsic education (Chapter 2). As I will argue, this instrumental, technological, education is mostly based on pattern recognition and pattern production (mediated or unmediated) rather than on meaning-making. This form of education makes learned knowledge mostly conventional (like language patterns) rather than conceptual (Matusov, 2020a). I criticize conventional instrumental education for its systematic creation of alienation of students from their education, authorial agency, and life itself. I also discuss a necessities-based society that generates and supports this type of education.

The rest of the book is devoted to my vision, analysis, and discussion of education in the Age of Leisure in a "Post-Work" Society, the concept of leisure, and the Leisure Age, a "post-work" leisure-based society, and the role of education in it. I will argue that the dominant type of education in this "post-work" leisure-based society will be intrinsic education as a form of authentic leisure. I will discuss intrinsic education as the promotion of peoples' voices and authorship in diverse practices of the people's choices. I will argue that intrinsic education is an existential need and, thus, a fundamental human right. I will distinguish two major types of intrinsic education: (1) intrinsic education aiming at promotion of creative authorship and (2) intrinsic education aiming at promotion of critical authorship. The creative authorship type of intrinsic education sees educatees as active culture-makers, contributing to the transformation and creation of culture. The critical authorship type of intrinsic education views education as the critical deconstruction of all available values, testing ideas, and examining life, self, and society (cf. Socrates' motto, "the unexamined life is not worth living"). Based on my analysis, I expect that education in a "post-work" leisure-based society will be a hybrid of these two types of intrinsic education and instrumental education, with intrinsic education being dominant.

In my envisioning, analyzing, and critical discussing of the Age of Leisure in a "Post-Work" Society, I will start with the *alienation* crisis generated by the d-needs-, survival-, and necessities-based civilization. Together with some philosophers and economists (e.g., Aristotle, Arendt, Gorz, Keynes), I will argue that the core of this alienation is rooted not in capitalism, as many Marxists argue, but in the nature of work itself. I see capitalism with its liberal democracy as an imperfect, but the best, economic and political form of organization of the d-needs-, survival-, and necessities-based society.

In contrast to Marx and Marxists, I envision a different hybrid form of leisure and work, organized by capitalism. In this hybrid, leisure will dominate the economy and societal politics (for a discussion of the latter point, see Graeber, 2014; Rifkin, 2014). I will critique the Marxist notions of equality and equal participation in leisure and economy in favor of diversity and uniqueness. I envision that with technological advances and political will, more and more people will be able to involve themselves exclusively in leisure and fewer and fewer people will be needed for the economy and societal management (see Chapters 3–4). I also will consider some dystopian scenarios for technological unemployment that may or may not lead to the emergence of a leisure-based society. In my judgment, these dystopian scenarios are important warnings that even when the right economic conditions emerge, a leisure-based society is not guaranteed.

I spend significant space in the book discussing the notion of leisure. Leisure is the key to understanding intrinsic education because intrinsic education itself is a form of leisure among other forms. Also, of course, leisure is the core concept for the Age of Leisure in a "Post-Work" Society. As I already mentioned above, the concept of leisure involves a lot of distortions being embedded in the necessities-based civilization. Thus, leisure is often understood as the absence of labor/work, carefree time, rest, recreation, a lifestyle of the rich, some types of self-medication (e.g., recreational drugs), partying, sports, gaming, meditation, religion, and so on. Based on existing literature, I carefully consider these types of candidates for leisure. My conclusion is that what defines genuine leisure is not a type of activity or its absence but a person's relationship to it. I define genuine leisure as self-actualization, self-realization, self-fulfillment, and, probably most important, self-transcendence. In a leisure-based society, other d-needs are subordinated to leisure. In the book, I have abstracted four major distinct but at times overlapping spheres of leisure: play, education, hobbies, and relational hanging out with other people. I provide examples of leisure in each sphere and analyze self-actualization and self-transcendence that define genuine leisure in each one of them.

Based on a Bakhtinian philosophical framework of ethical dialogism (Bakhtin, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1999; Matusov et al., 2019), I argue that leisurely self-transcendence is not only a personal, but a societal, ethical, and deeply dialogic process. Self-transcendence inherently involves a transformation of social relations and a transcendence of the given culture and the given society. Self-transcendence involves not only recognition and evaluation of the person's authorship but also questioning of this authorship by others and the self in a special process of the person's taking responsibility for the authorship (Matusov, 2011; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016).

In the necessities-based civilization, genuine leisure remains in some enclaves, for some people, and emerges sporadically. In short, in the necessities-based civilization, while remaining a fundamental existential aspiration, leisure does not shape human life very much and is often viewed as a frivolous luxury for spoiled people. Thus, there has been a lot of distrust of leisure, seeing it as personal or a societal decadence or even a deviancy leading to criminality (Smith & Raymen, 2018). There is a common belief that Necessity is the mother of all inventions. In the book, In Chapter 7, I consider, analyze, and try to address this critique and worries about leisure. Taking these concerns seriously, my conclusion is that these concerns can be challenged with counterevidence and counterarguments, but resolving this debate, if it will ever be fully resolved, may require testing in a society characterized by a proliferation of genuine leisure.

I expect that it will only be when the economic need for human labor to maintain and promote the economy drastically drops, when the so-called technological unemployment becomes a common presence, and when the political will for providing sufficient unconditional well-being for all people prevails,—genuine leisure may become the major force defining the personal and social values of the society and human life. However, I also envision that necessities and instrumentalism will remain in a leisure-based society. In the book, I consider two major spheres of necessity and instrumentalism: economy and governance. I argue that genuine leisure on a mass and sustainable scale is not possible without providing all people, without exception, with unconditional sufficient well-being, which is often known as "universal basic income," freeing people from their struggles for and worries about survival and from spending a lot of their time on labor and work. All people will be eligible for universal unconditional income, those with or without jobs and regardless of other wealth they might have. I argue that this well-being should go beyond securing people's life by providing shelter, food, health, clothing, and so on, but that it also should address all four d-needs (i.e., "deficiency needs"), spelled out by Maslow: physiological needs, safety needs, relational needs, and esteem needs. Being relatively free from d-needs promote, but does not guarantee, genuine leisure. Actually, the reverse is also true: even when d-needs are not fully satisfied, leisure is still possible, although it is often difficult.

In Chapter 6, I consider two major problems for this project of mass leisure. First is that "sufficient" well-being is a subjective category. What is sufficient for one person may not be sufficient for another. Also, leisure may require different resources for different people (and different types of leisure). This creates a force for some people either to abandon leisure entirely or compromise it by searching for extra income on a job market and thus engaging in necessities (e.g., earning extra income through work in addition to their universal unconditional income). Second, although the economy would require fewer and fewer people engaged in work, it will still need people. My solution for these two problems is different from the Marxist one demanding that all people work for some very limited number of hours, which I found undesirable and leading to totalitarianism. I envision a society where a growing number of people will be exclusively involved in leisure, a shrinking number of people will be exclusively involved in labor/work regulated by capitalism, and some number of people will be in-between. I propose that the job market of capitalism is an imperfect mechanism for balancing between the economic demands for human labor and the unconditional income that the society can afford to distribute to all of its members.

My proposal is based on two major economic and one major psychological assumptions. First, the economy and productivity will continue growing through increasing robotization, computerization, automatization, and development of AI. Second, the need for human labor will continue dropping. Third, that the more income people will have in a leisure-based society, the less they will be inclined to abandon or compromise their genuine leisure. The more the economy produces, the higher universal unconditional income can be. This, I believe, will ease pressure on people to abandon or compromise leisure in search of extra income (in addition to their universal unconditional income). It will go along with lessening the need for human labor. Thus, a growing economy with lessening demand for human labor will "automatically" reduce the pool of people seeking jobs in the process of an imperfect capitalist market of self-regulation (see Chapters 4 and 6).

In my view, the major problem of governance in a leisure-based society is a tension between leisure and civic duties of engaging in collective decision-making and democratic politics. I expect that this tension can be resolved on the personal and contextual levels by each person. Guided by a Bakhtinian philosophy of dialogism (Bakhtin, 1999), I envision a shift from representative democracy to dialogically deliberative democracy, away from political parties. My proposal is highly influenced by a jury deliberation process and the Quakers' decision-making framework. I argue that in a leisure-based society, democratic governance should be based on deliberative dialogism instead of a winning-based politics of manipulation. At the same time, I acknowledge that the latter is both also necessary and unavoidable—it should be managed and contained (see Chapter 6).

Leisurely education is primarily the intrinsic, nurturing of people's authorship in diverse practices of their choice. It is based on a dialogic meaning-making process. In a Bakhtinian framework, meaning is not located in a self-contained statement but rather in a particular dialogic relationship between one person asking a question of his/her interest and another person genuinely replying to it. Thus, meaning-making education starts with a student asking a question, pursing an inquiry or interest, addressing a puzzle, or sensing some tension. Together with my colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane, I have abstracted two distinct types of intrinsic education, which can overlap at times (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019). One type of intrinsic education primarily focuses on nurturing *creative authorship*—i.e., leisurely constructing new meanings, new cultural values and practices, new knowledge and skills, new relationships, and so on. This is intrinsic education as culture-making (cf. Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009). The other type of intrinsic education involves promoting *critical authorship*—leisurely examining life, self, world, and society (and education itself) through a critical dialogue of testing ideas, considering alternatives, revealing the boundaries of truths. This type of leisurely education reflects Socrates' motto that the unexamined life is not worth living (see "Apology" in Plato & Riddell, 1973). Leisurely education for creative authorship is primarily constructive and productive, focusing on production of new ideas, objects, practices, skills, subjectivities, voices, and so on. In contrast, leisurely education for critical authorship is primarily deconstructive and unproductive, focusing on doubts and boundaries of one's ignorance—"learned ignorance" (Nicholas, 1954) (see Chapter 8).

I expect that people will pursue their leisurely education not so much because they want to achieve some important results for some other spheres of their life but as a way of living their life itself. In contrast to modern ubiquitous instrumental education, leisurely education is not so much about *becoming* but rather about *being* (cf. Maslow). I argue that leisurely education is mostly intrinsic, existing for its own sake, and not so much instrumental, although instrumental aspects may be present as well—I discuss this issue in Chapter 9 and in the Conclusion (Chapter 10). Leisurely education does exist now at the periphery and the margins of modern institutionalized and informal education and I describe and analyze its instances to have glimpses of what might be possible in the future in the Age of Leisure in a "Post-Work" Society. I conclude my book by considering the necessity for and possible shapes of institutionalized leisurely education by contrasting the principles of the existing institutionalization of (mostly instrumental) education with the principles of future institutionalization of leisurely education.

The purpose of this book is to envision societal conditions for genuine "school-leisure" education—what kind of society, breaking down the grip of a mode of survival and necessities, may support it. I immediately realize that my (en)visioning lenses are blurred by my life, my experiences, my imaginations, my reflections, and my ideologies rooted in my upbringing in the modern necessities-based society. Also, despite my honest efforts to educate myself in diverse fields, which were very new for me, like studies of leisure, economic futurism, alternative modes of democratic governance, and so on, I am aware that my expertise is those areas is very limited. In part, I try to do "reverse engineering": by considering leisure-based education, I try to envision a society that may fit and support leisurely intrinsic education. My envisioning of this education is based on my conviction that education cannot be separated from the type of society, in which this education is embedded. Thus, in my project, I had to envision the Age of Leisure and its "post-work" society. My critical vision has been based on analysis of issues in contemporary mainstream and innovative education, the existing innovative experimentation with educational and democratic practices (including my own), historical, sociological, and critical studies of education and leisure, my creative imagination of alternative educational and societal practices, and my critical analysis of emerging issues.

* * *

My book is both utopia and not utopia. It is utopia in the sense that my vision of future education and society is "out of this place" (literally, "utopia" in Greek[1]), out of this time, out of this culture, and even out of this civilization. It clearly represents a big break, a big discontinuity, with the human 300,000-year-old past. Also, it is a utopia in the sense that I wanted to envision what is desirable rather than what terrible things might happen in the future (i.e., dystopia), which is unfortunately also possible in a "post-work" society (see, for example, Blacker, 2013).

Envisioning the future is an inherently human endeavor and it is unavoidable (Harari, 2015). As a famous Irish writer, Oscar Wilde, said, "A map of the world that does not include Utopia [evtopia] is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is

[1] Etymologically speaking, the Greek word "utopia" means "out of the place," "not from this world." Utopia can be bad, "bad new place," which is colloquially called "dystopia." Or it can be good, "good new place," which, probably, should be called "eutopia." In the book, I will use the word "evtopia" as a good utopia to disambiguate pronunciation with the word "utopia."

always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias" (Wilde, 1910, p. 27).

However, often this envisioning the future is conservative and unimaginative, based entirely on extrapolation of the past. This extrapolative envisioning of future assumes that nothing or not much eventful happens in the present or in the future beyond the unfolding of germs or seeds rooted in the past and the present. In this approach of predicting the future by extrapolation from the past, nothing (or little) unexpected is expected. Of course, an extrapolation from the past is very important and also unavoidable as it feeds our imagination. But, in my view, any extrapolation from the past has to be transcended in envisioning the future. I see the primary value of envisioning the future, rather than predicting it, is in imagining and considering possibilities that may start guiding our current and future actions to change the world. Using words of American philosopher David Danaher, I want to be an axiological imagineer, "I will imagine different possible futures and explore their consequences for human value, meaning, and flourishing ('axiology' is the philosophical term for the study of value; 'imagineer' is a term sometimes used to describe a creative engineer — one who imagines and develops some unusual concept or idea)" (Danaher, 2019, p. 3). Also, any envisioning the future inspires and promotes new imagination in a dialogic response to it. I hope that my utopian envisioning can also stimulate this collective and dialogic imagination.

At the same time, my book is not a utopia in the sense that my envisioning is not "a perfect 'place' that has been designed so there are no problems".[2] I see this book not as a blueprint for the design of future education and a future leisure-based society but rather as an invitation to my readers—a dialogic provocation—for a critical dialogue on the fate of education and our civilization, their challenges, and their possibilities. Christopher Yorke contrasted the teleological, blueprint evtopianism with the horizontal evtopianism. The later involves focuses on unfinalizable, constantly shifting horizons of desire for humanity (Yorke, 2016). My book belongs to the horizontal evtopianism.

My evtopia is a "critical evtopia" as proposed by Kathi Weeks, "By refuting both the equation of utopia with the static and complete

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utopia.

blueprint and the reduction of the utopian [i.e., evtopian] impulse to the dream of human perfection and the will to social control, the critical utopia [evtopia] broadens the possibilities of utopian [evtopian] expression and expands the understanding of utopian [evtopian] projects" (Weeks, 2011, p. 211). I also hope to inspire practitioners—first of all, educators but not only—for their future experimentation in their practices, critiquing current practices and values, and imagining a better future and better values. As Rutger Bregman (2016) wrote about his book, I can apply it to my book as well, "This book isn't an attempt to predict the future. It's an attempt to unlock the future."

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CHAPTER 2

Necessities-Based Society and Technological Education

Many philosophers have argued that since the emergence of our species Homo Sapiens about 300,000 years ago, we have been living in *the Age of Necessities and Survival* (e.g., Arendt, 1958; Aristotle & Jowett, 2000; Marx, 1857 / 1973). In most human activity, ingenuity, creativity, culture, social relations, and communication have been driven by the concerns of physical, biological, cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological survival. This Age has pushed forward instrumentality and technology—developing means and tools that address these powerful and ubiquitous survival needs and necessities through labor and work. In this part, I argue that up to recently, people have been the first and primary technological means in the Age of Necessities and Survival. Informal and then formal, institutionalized, education has emerged in response to this human instrumentality.

People as Smart Machines

The first smart machines were people. The first machines were people. "Basically, we are trained and prepped to become more like machines" (Yang, 2018, e-version). Technological education arguably molds people to become smart machine-like creatures. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines "machine" as, "a piece of equipment with moving parts that does work when it is given power from electricity, gasoline, etc.," and immediately adds, "a person or group that does something efficiently, quickly,

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or repeatedly like a machine."[1] Even the word "computer" was initially referred to as a person who made various calculations[2]. In my view, historically, the relationship should be probably inverse: "a machine is a piece of equipment with moving parts that does something efficiently, quickly, or repeatedly like people who act like machines." But, this sounds circular. To avoid this circularity, I focus on a functional, rather than structural, definition of a machine: instead of defining what a machine is made of (e.g., parts)—its structure, I focus on what it does—its function. I define machine like quality in the following way.

A "good machine" is a piece of equipment, animal, person, or a group of people that/who is able to:

1. Predictably arrive at a particular desired effect, well defined, and preset in advance. The result can be different. It can involve arriving at a specific desired temperature (e.g., a heater, refrigerator, microwave), or moving people (e.g., a car, ship, airplane, horse, rickshaw, human carrier), or depositing to or withdrawing money from a bank (e.g., bank teller, ATM), and so on.
2. Extinguish any of its own desires and goals except ones that are aimed at an effective, efficient, and successful accomplishment of #1. A machine, with its own desires and goals unrelated to its primary function defining it as a machine, would interfere with its primary function and will be viewed as unreliable, inefficient, and malfunctioning.
3. Be replaceable with another similar machine with regard to the function it does.
4. Be reliably reproduced on demand.

The first two principles define a technological practice that Aristotle (2000) called "poïesis." *Poïesis* is a practice, in which its goal, the desire, the outcome, and the definition of quality are predefined and preset before the practice itself. Aristotle's own example of such a practice-as-*poïesis* was shoemaking because a shoemaker knew the goal, the outcome,

[1] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/machine.

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer. I am thankful to Sergeiy Sendler for directing me to this fact.

and the quality of his activity before he (it was a man in the time of Aristotle) started working on the shoes. From this point of view, the shoemaker was a human machine, as defined above. A technological practice, *poïesis*, involves machines.

Aristotle contrasted practice-as-*poïesis* with practice-as-*praxis.* In *praxis*, the goal, the desire, the outcome, and the quality emerge in the activity itself and do not preexist it. Fashion shoemaking, involving the design of new shoes that previously did not exist, maybe a *praxis*. When a shoe-designer, starts a new shoe design, he or she may not know in advance what it may be, what constitutes "a good new shoe," what this new show may look like, and so on. A new desire in customers has to be generated for this new design to be a success. It seems like Aristotle did not mean fashionable shoemaking when he made the shoemaking example of *poïesis*. Instead, he seemed to talk about "mass production" of shoes, based on a traditional shoe design. However, we can plausibly speculate that in Aristotle's time, any shoemaking involved some improvization, individual signature, creativity, diversity—what I call "authorship"—beyond mere competence. But these qualities were apparently not crucial for or were overlooked by Aristotle when he discusses *poïesis*. It brings up in me a suspicion, which I will develop later, that the boundary between *poïesis* and *praxis* may not always be clear-cut, either then or now.

The power of a *poïesis*, a technological practice, is in its scalability—it can grow by combining more and more technological practices in a system together, like Lego blocks. It can get complicated and expansive. Also, it can be moved from one place to another place, from one community to another community, from one society to another society, from one culture to another culture, from one historical time to another historical time. Discussing *poïesis* (without mentioning this term), French sociologist Bruno Latour characterized it as involving "immutable mobiles." He defined the latter as "objects [and subjects — EM] which have the properties of being *mobile* but also *immutable*, *presentable*, *readable* and *combinable* with one another" (Latour, 1986, p. 6; emphasis original). *Poïesis* generates power by amplifying and diversifying the "cunning reason" (cf. Hegel) of instrumental actions and, thus, by being able to subjugate non- or lesser-technological communities. One prominent example of such power is the production of military weapons, colonization, and imperialism that might not have been possible without networks of technological *poïesis*-practices (Latour, 1996). The interdependence of technological practices makes them simultaneously vulnerable at a short-run time and adaptive at long-run time as war, natural disasters, and revolution cataclysms have shown so far.

The power of human machines is in their potential "universality" and "smartness." A human being can potentially specialize in becoming any human machine—"universality." Also, a human can mobilize his or her *objective subjectivity* (Matusov, 2017; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019)—i.e., feelings, perceptions, emotions, cognition, relations and so on—to effectively and reliably arrive at the preset effect in the face of adversary and changing circumstances—"smartness." Of course, human smart machines have their own limitations (Kahneman, 2013; Matusov, 2017). One person acting like a machine cannot achieve as much as an assembly of human machines based on a division of labor. And an assembly cannot achieve as much as an equipped assembly of human machines. Strictly speaking, for already thousands of years many human societies evolve *a technological cyborg*—a hybrid of tools, equipment, animals, and human assemblies acting like a machine. Let's consider a modern human smart machine embedded in such technological cyborgs in detail.

I argue that a modern human smart machine[3] is constituted by the following three mutually related aspects: "knowledge," "skill," and "pedagogy." "Knowledge" is defined by a symbolic discourse alienated from people—instructions and explanations—that directs both an individual human smart machine and the cyborg machine toward a well-defined preset effect. "Skill" is the individual human machine's ability to read and enact the "knowledge" correctly to achieve the preset effect. "Pedagogy" is a way of shaping humans into individual human machines creatures able to acquire and read "knowledge" and "skills":

> …present-day schooling the way it is… came from about 300 years ago, and it came from the last and the biggest of the empires on this planet ["The British Empire"]. Imagine trying to run the show, trying to run

[3] A modern human smart machine is contrasted with a traditional human smart machine, common for preindustrial traditional societies. The former is characterized by standardization: increasing attempts to eliminate any aspects of artisanship, creativity, and apprenticeship—i.e., praxis subordinated to poiesis—from human smart machinery. A traditional human smart machine still actively exploits human authorship to produce more or less (i.e., highly imprecise) desired outcomes preset in advance. It limits the quality and power of the immutable mobiles and technological networks.

> the entire planet, without computers, without telephones, with data handwritten on pieces of paper, and traveling by ships. …. They created a global computer made up of people… called the bureaucratic administrative machine. …. They made another machine to produce those people: the school. The schools would produce the people who would then become parts of the bureaucratic administrative machine… They must know three things: …good handwriting, because the data is handwritten; …read[ing]; and they must be able to do multiplication, division, addition and subtraction in their head. They must be so identical that you could pick one up from New Zealand and ship them to Canada and he would be instantly functional. The Victorians … engineered a system that was so robust that it's still with us today, continuously producing identical people for a machine that no longer exists. (Mitra, 2013:28-2:55)

Let me now discuss the essence of this pedagogy (and broader education) that makes these smart machines out of people in modern schools.

Divorced from Goals and Interests

Playwright William Shakespeare came up to his desk, picked up his feather pen, dropped it in an inkwell, and wrote, "Performance Objective: By the end of this play, the audience will experience catharsis of love without borders, will pour tears about killed young lovers, and will shame meaningless family feuds. The Kingdom Performance Standards: 3.1.2 promoting catharsis, 4.7 appreciation of love, and 2.5.1 critique of antisocial behavior." This is how the genius Shakespeare started his famous masterpiece, *Romeo and Juliet*.

Reader, you would be shocked and will laugh in disbelief! But, this is how many Department of Education officials, school administrators, teacher accreditation organizations, and education professors in the USA, and, probably, in many other places, recommend and even demand pre- and in-service teachers to write their lesson plans (see, for example of such "by the end of the lesson" recommendations here: http://www.teaching-esl-to-adults.com/best-esl-lesson-plans.html or just Google on this phrase). Some of my readers might object my critical sarcasm toward performance standards in education that teaching is not like playwriting. Does not education have its well-defined objectives, teacher accountability, instructional strategies, state-defined curriculum, research-based evidence, best practices, and so on and so forth? These readers might argue that teaching is more like technology, more like science, or even more like good medical practice. In such practice, a particular lack of understanding or skill in a student is diagnosed through careful diagnostic testing and then addressed through the teacher's smart, precise instruction. Like in medicine, the best instructional practices and technologies have to be based on educational standards grounded in solid research evidence established in labs and in vivo (see for this discussion in, Hammersley, 1997; Hargreaves, 1996, 1997; Matusov, 2015). But I disagree with these readers, and this chapter is dedicated to building my argument for this disagreement.

In this ubiquitous *technological* approach to education, learning is viewed as transmission, acquisition, discovery, or even (co-)construction of self-contained, standalone, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions that can exist by themselves, outside of particular people and circumstances. People are viewed to be mutually replaceable with regard to knowledge, skills, dispositions, attitudes, and so on. For example, the knowledge of 2 + 2 = 4 is assumed to be independent of people who "have this knowledge" and why they "have" it—knowledge is viewed as "a thing to have." The knowledge of 2 + 2 = 4 is assumed to exist in the same way for everybody who "possesses it." It is objective and independent of human subjectivity—human desires, values, goals, feelings, social relations, questions, inquiries, doubts, interests, laughter, seriousness, and so on. The knowledge exists "out there" twice: first in the natural world itself and then as discovered and stored by people. The body of knowledge exists in and of itself outside of people—locked in library books, manuals, instructions, guidelines, textbooks, charts, teaching instructions, school curricula, and, of course, nowadays, on the Internet, as "immutable mobiles" (Latour, 1987). Of courses, to unlock library texts, instructions, guidelines, and so on, there are needed to have people who can "read" these texts—"read" in a predictable and mutually replaceable way. In education, students have to receive, acquire, discover, or reconstruct preexisting knowledge that humanity has reliably worked and learn how to "read" texts full of knowledge. Although the proponents of a technological approach to education may admit that people can legitimately use self-contained, standalone, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions differently (usually in the students' remote future), they still insist that the minimum competence promoted by education equalizes and homogenizes all of them.

The Technological Approach to Education and Its Failure

Elsewhere (Matusov, 2011a), I argue that both the mainstream conventional and some innovative institutionalized education is shaped by a technological approach. This technological approach to education focuses on guiding students along some well- (or ill-) defined trajectory to arrive at preset curricular endpoints (i.e., educational standards, Ravitch, 1995). A technological approach requires the teachers to specify what their students "will know or [be] able to do *by the end of a lesson*" (or course, academic term, school career) (Taubman, 2009). In an *instructionalist* version of the technological approach common in many conventional schools, the students' trajectory is seen as well-defined; this trajectory is usually (but not always) viewed as being universal and lock-step development. The teacher's instructional decisions are similarly guided by unilateral, universal, decontextualized, scripted, and "research-based best practices" (e.g., Hargreaves, 1996, 1997; Hunter, 1982; Hunter & Hunter, 2004; Slavin & Madden, 2001). By contrast, in a *constructivist* version of the technological approach used in some innovative schools and classrooms, the students' learning trajectories are often seen as ill-defined. These trajectories are negotiated between the teacher and the students, usually requiring a contextual, interactional, and often unique artistry of teaching. Constructivist technological teachers thus often promote the students' own learning activism, and collaboration between the teacher and the students while arriving at the preset curricular endpoints (e.g., Brown, 1997; Brown, Ash, & Rutherford, 1997; Brown & Campione, 1994).

However, I insist that in whatever version (instructionalist or constructivist) it is found, a *technological approach to education* (a.k.a. Education 1.0) assumes that all students will and should arrive at some preset curricular endpoints. It is important to reiterate that such preset endpoints may be broadly defined. It could be that a teacher is not so much promoting a lock-step, scripted curriculum, but rather may have in mind certain preset "curricular standards" such as knowledge, skills, dispositions, or attitudes (Taubman, 2009). For example, a teacher may promote collaboration with students in the discussion of an interpersonal problem in a classroom, but may ultimately be most concerned with ensuring that a student takes away from this discussion the teachers' preset attitude that it is wrong to "bully" someone (Smith, 2010). The curricular endpoints are known in advance and determined outside the scope of the students' affinities, desires, aspirations, goals, social emergent dynamics, and total selves. As a result, this approach inhibits (and often diverts) students' agencies in the targeted practices so the students stop seeing themselves as legitimate and eager participants in them (Hammer & van Zee, 2006).

In contrast, the notion of intrinsic education for a*uthorial agency* (a.k.a. Education 2.0)—i.e., education focusing on promoting the student's authorial agency as the main purpose of the teaching and learning practice,—is incompatible with preset curricular endpoints. Elsewhere, my colleagues and I defined the notion of "authorial agency" as a person's creative transcendence of the given—cultural, physical, biological, political, institutional, social, personal, etc.,—recognized by others and/or the self in a dialogue (Matusov, 2011a; Matusov, Smith, Soslau, Marjanovic-Shane, & von Duyke, 2016; Matusov, von Duyke, & Kayumova, 2016). While having preset curricular endpoints promotes and requires standardizing the learning process, guidance, and its outcomes; it is incompatible with the notion of authorial agency (Taubman, 2009). The very notion of authorial agency is essentially based on value-, goal-, and problem-defining processes,[4] creativity, unpredictability, and voice (Lobok, 2001), education-for-an-unknown-future, production of culture[5] (Berlyand, 2009a; Bibler, 2009), novelty, surprise by the self and the others (Berlyand, 2009a; Bibler, 2009; Matusov, 2009, 2011c; Miyazaki, 2007, July), freedom and legitimacy for non-participation (Greenberg, 1992; Neill, 1960), learning on-demand of the ongoing activities (rather than on demand of the teacher or tests), and contribution to self and others within and outside the school practices (Collins & Halverson, 2009). Intrinsic education (i.e., Education 2.0) focuses on promoting students' authorship and students' unique voices.

These differences between the authorial and technological approaches are exacerbated by the fact that students are legally bounded to be in K-12 school. They are also obligated to have certificates of educational credentials (e.g., high school diploma, bachelor, master, and doctoral

[4] This focus on goal and problem-*defining* processes can be contrasted with a more conventional focus on problem-*solving* (cf. Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999), which imply goals and problems firmly preset by others in advance and not negotiable by the student (which is usually set monologically and pre-planned by the teacher).

[5] In contrast to education as reproduction of ready-made culture, education-for-well-known-past (or education for poorly foreseen future rooted in the past), aka Education 1.0.

degrees) for entering many professions vital for people's economic survival and professional actualization. Instead of developing a context for learning, which addresses students' own educational goals, the technological approach often exacerbates the problem by prescribing a curriculum and learning context, which usually does not align with the students' desires (Sidorkin, 2002, 2009).

It is not by chance that Russian philosopher of dialogism Mikhail Bakhtin used examples from conventional schooling to illustrate his concept of extreme monologism (Matusov, 2009):

> In an environment of… [excessive] monologism the genuine interaction of consciousness is impossible and thus genuine dialogue is impossible as well. In essence… [excessive monologism – EM] knows only a single mode of cognitive interaction among consciousnesses: someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error; that is, it is the interaction of a teacher and a pupil, which, it follows, can be only a **pedagogical dialogue**. (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 81, emphasis is added)

I argue that, in essence, Bakhtin described a technological approach to education here with its focus on making a presumably ignorant student arrive at preset curricular endpoints.

In his analysis of Dostoevsky's literary masterpiece, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Bakhtin argues that excessive monologism is employed to manipulate the consciousness of another person toward predetermined endpoints. Hence, it makes the other person predictable, calculable, and controllable. That action of this objectivization causes humiliation, disrespect, dehumanization, and denial of agency in the person:

> Truth is unjust when it concerns the depths of *someone else's* personality.
>
> The same motif sounds even more clearly, if in somewhat more complex form, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, *predetermines* his further behavior by *predicting* that next time he would without fail take the money. To this Liza replies:
>
> … Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis – I mean your analysis… no, better call it ours – aren't we showing *contempt* for him, for that poor man – in *analyzing his soul like this*, as it *were*, *from above*, eh? In deciding so certainly that he will take the money? [SS IX,

271–72; *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book Five, I] (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 60, the italics original)

From this Bakhtinian point of view, conventional schools are humiliating, disrespecting, dehumanizing, and denying children's authorial agency. Indeed, since the goal of conventional education is to make students' subjectivities, predictably arrive at ready-made curricular endpoints, predetermined truths known by the teachers and/or by the conventional schooling system in advance, genuine dialogue based on humanity and respect between the students and the teacher is impossible (Matusov, 2007). Conventional schools want to make students predictable and calculatable.

This technological orientation proceeds not from a humble human plane but "from above," from a "bird's eye's" vista, as if "the One who is Above":

1. is morally better,
2. knows what the Universal truth is,
3. is all-knowing, i.e., Expert#1, and
4. can see ignorance of "less knowledgeable people" (cf. Vygotsky, 1978).

This technological approach positions the teacher to impose curricular endpoints on his/her pedagogical object (i.e., students), while at the same time releasing the One "from above"—i.e., the designers of the curricular standards and tests—from epistemological, moral, emotional, and/or ethical responsibility.

Let us seriously consider this question of denial of authorial agency to students by proponents of the technological approach to education. Proponents of a technological approach may insist that they do not want to rob students of their authorial agency through their educational instrumentalism. On the contrary, they might argue that they want to empower the student's authorial agency by equipping students with a powerful toolkit of essential knowledge, skills, and dispositions—thus enabling students to do whatever they wish to do after their education is over (cf. Hirsch, 1996). It is not important for the students to be interested in the technological learning activities through which they are supposed to learn this toolkit. Using economic terms, learning activities have an instrumental value but not a use value for the students (Nilsson & Wihlborg, 2011). The mainstream school asks students to postpone their authorial agency until this agency is powerfully equipped with important knowledge and skills defined by the society (Matusov, von Duyke, et al., 2016). The learning activities are important as opportunities for the students to learn essential skills and knowledge, usually for their future lives, rather to consume them by the students because of their interests and/or needs. For example, the school teaches the students to read in general as a universal skill—so they can read whatever they want in their future. School reading does not need to be interesting, relevant, or important for the students so long as they learn the universal reading skills and strategies. What they choose to read later in their future is up to the students themselves, school does not interfere in students' future choice or impose on their future. Instead, the school provides students with a toolkit of essential skills and knowledge (i.e., "cultural capital") regardless of the specific, current and future desires and goals of the students. Even when the students' interests in reading are acknowledged and encouraged, these "situational interests" and "individual interests" are viewed as opportunities for students to learn universal reading skills (Alexander, 2005). In other words, students' personal and situational interests are exploited by the teachers for such universal technological learning. In this example, reading is viewed instrumentally, separate from its goal defined through the person's desire.

However, as I have shown elsewhere (2011a), the notion of a tool is heavily based on the desire of the person who uses the tool. This psychological concept of tool was developed by the German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler[6] (1973) at the beginning of the twentieth century in his studies of the mentality of apes. Köhler argued that the concept of tool is impossible without the concept of desire. Without the organism's desire, a tool, which mediates a desire, stops being a tool. Thus, without students' desires, a tool cannot exist. Yet, students' desires are *usually* excluded by the technological approach to education (Taubman, 2009), except for a desire to please the teacher and/or parents, to reach or be on the top of the school-created standard of achievement (e.g., a high GPA), and/or to achieve credentials for entering certain professions. In the technological

[6] It can be argued that it was Köhler, rather than Soviet psychologists Vygotsky or Leontiev, who was the original founder of so-called "Activity Theory" in psychology. Usually contemporary scholars credit Leontiev as the founder of this theory in psychology and as the one who coined the term.

approach, students' desires, goals, and problems, outside of credentialism, are usually not legitimate aspects of schooling practice and are often subjected to severe suppression or exploitation by the school system, in its effort for unilateral control (Ben-Peretz, 2001). School systems concerned with this type of technological approach demand students' unconditional cooperation.

In everyday life, people often learn tools to achieve their activity goals and desires. In conventional schools, students learn tools to conform and to satisfy the teacher (i.e., to *please the teacher* as one who is "a deliverer of the system") who communicates how to arrive at the preset curricular endpoint,—which is another tool mediation all together (DePalma, Matusov, & Smith, 2009). This phenomenon is especially evident when students choose to act according to school procedures—what they think the teacher and/or school wants from them,—even in obvious contradiction to their own sense and experience (Matusov, 2015). Consider the following example:

> In one [high school] classroom, students were asked to find the weight of a brick [given to the students] after measuring its length, width, and height, and being given the value of its density in pounds per cubic inch. The exchange went something like this:
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | *Teacher*: | Who can tell me the weight of the brick? |
> | *Student*: | 1016 pounds (*Looking at his paper*) |
> | *Teacher*: | Lift the brick. Now, how much does it weigh? |
> | *Student [lifts the brick]*: | (*Again looking at his paper*) 1016 pounds. |
>
> The student had failed to make the connection between the problem and real life. Calculations were unrelated to common sense. This example was not an isolated incident. Time after time we witnessed the use of numbers with little or no thought given to implications and applications (Boyer, 1983, pp. 108–109).

Students are encouraged to suspend articulating their own concerns about the value of a task (e.g., "you'll need this information later" or "maybe we'll have time to discuss this more at the end of the unit"). In my view, this is arguably true even for a constructivist version of a technological approach because the curricular endpoints are still predetermined by the educational authorities, disregarding (or exploiting) students' ontological desires.

In schools governed by a technological approach, students often learn to unconditionally obey the teacher's demands, and/or resist the teacher's demands, and/or ignore the teacher's demands without getting caught, and/or smuggle in their own interested learning (DePalma et al., 2009). Students' agency is thus usurped in such efforts. It exists in parallel to the teachers' resistance to the students' desires, goals, and problems. The technologically oriented teachers often do not engage students in subject matters in any depth either because of their own disinterest in the targeted academic subject and a lack of knowledge of the academic discipline as a result. They often concern about control, time, and/or the targeted curricular standards that need to be "covered" by the lesson (Kennedy, 2005; Matusov, 2009, 2011a; Smith, 2010). McNeil (1986) has argued that many teachers in a technological approach teach "defensively." Their primary effort is to prevent "disciplinary problems," that is, the potential student rebellion against teacher-unilateral or effort-consuming demands (and thus avoid going into subjects with students in-depth). Ultimately, some teachers in a technological approach to education, despite their espoused teacher philosophy, are primarily concerned with "management" of students over teaching and guiding, to seek the "control of student resistances to the smooth flow of classroom work processes" (Carlson, 1992, p. 190). A similar concern has been expressed by Kennedy (2005), who found that the primary fear of the teacher is for students to move "off-script," away from the pre-planned endpoints. This may occur because preservice teachers are often not encouraged to seek or use their practicum students' cues as directions for curriculum development. This is especially true when those teachers work in traditional schooling systems under pressure and stress of the recent neoliberal educational reforms like President George W. Bush's "No Child Left Behind" and/or the President Barack Obama's "The Race to the Top" (Matusov, 2011b; Soslau, 2011, June).

Thus, I argue that a technological approach fails to deliver its own promise of empowering students with a toolkit of essential ready-made knowledge, skills, dispositions, and attitudes (2011a). This is evident in a so-called "a lack of transfer" (when students can't "apply" in one situation what they have "learned" in another situation) (Lave, 1988), academic disengagement and boredom (Yazzie-Mintz, 2006), shallow understanding (Boyer, 1983), use of pedagogical violence by teachers (Sidorkin, 2002), the primacy of concerns of classroom management issues and teacher authority over engaging in academic subjects (McNeil, 1986), and so on (Matusov, 2009). Agency-free education (aka Education 1.0) fails to empower the students' agency—i.e., the goal that this type of education sets for itself—to equip students with a powerful toolkit that allows them to do what they want to do after education is over.

But is agency-based education, education for authorial agency (aka Education 2.0), possible? Can genuine dialogue, essentially dismissing preset curricular endpoints, be possible in education (see a discussion of this question here, Matusov, 2007)? Can education actively promote students' agency in socially desired practices when students' desires, goals, interests, creativity, diversity, and problems are welcome in the classroom by the teacher? And if so, what would such education look like?

According to this technological approach, learning is viewed as acquisition of pre- and well-defined, self-contained, decontextualized knowledge, skills, dispositions, and attitudes, constituting *preset curricular endpoints of teaching* (Matusov, 2009). It views teaching as a combination of well-defined and self-sustained unilateral techniques, strategies, and methods that can effectively guarantee such acquisition (or transmission, or discovery, or co-construction) of preset knowledge, skills, attitudes, and so on. Technological approach to education can be diverse. It can involve *instructionism* when the teacher envisions one well-defined pathway for all students toward the preset curricular endpoint, or *constructivism* when the teacher envisions potentially limitless ill-defined negotiated pathways toward the curricular endpoint preset by the teacher. To ensure the efficiency and accountability of this technological teaching, usually:

1. the curricular standards are designed by the state educational agencies,
2. high stakes testing is administered to all students in some regular periods to reveal their educational deficits and achievements (i.e., lack of deficits), and
3. educational research of teaching efficiency examines teaching technology following a "medical model." The medical model of educational research involves: (a) diagnosing educational deficiencies through educational testing (pretest), (b) treating these deficiencies with a calibrated, research-based, instruction (treatment), and (c) then the student is retested for an outcome (posttest). Ideally, this educational testing is based on randomized samples and double-blind control and treatment groups—i.e., so-called "research-based teaching" (Hargreaves, 1996).

I wonder if this technological approach to education an expression of an economic drive is[7] for requiring predictable and replaceable workers on a systematic reproducible basis. Indeed, as consumers in the modern local and global economy (and clients of institutionalized bureaucracies), we, common people, want "quality services" regardless of the particular workers who provide them. Living in modern society, many people wish to have replaceable doctors, replaceable bank officers, replaceable lawyers, replaceable teachers, replaceable waiters, replaceable janitors, replaceable nurses, replaceable flight attendants, replaceable firefighters, replaceable police, replaceable judges, and so on. We want our society to work like a clock—efficiently, reliably, and predictably. When people move to another institution or to other workers, they often want painless replacement of workers to serve us without any disturbance to the service, such as replacement of the same blocks in a Lego game or the same parts of a car. Consumers of a modern society often demand standardization of services, labor, relations, knowledge, skills, people, and, yes, standardization of the curriculum and of instruction.

The essence of the Technological Approach to education is in the divorce of skills, knowledge, attitudes, and so on from the goals of their use and the need for them. Students are supposed to learn ready-made, self-contained, self-sufficient, and standalone skills, knowledge, and attitudes and then to apply them outside school (and after graduation) at their work, in their civic responsibilities, and in everyday life. During the school term, especially K-12 schools, the students are often expected to be excluded from the economy, citizenship, and active life. Their goals and interests are not welcome in school because they may interfere with the teacher's lesson plans. A technological theory of K-12 school is to teach the basic knowledge and the basic skills of all academic subjects—toolkits of essential skills and knowledge—to empower students to do competently whatever they want to do or required by the society to do in the future. The students are required to put aside their own goals, inquiries, and interests and to cooperate with their teacher to study these basic skills and knowledge, divorced from their goals and desires. This is what often means by "to be motivated to learn"—i.e., students' wanting what the teacher wants them to learn. In a school guided by the Technological

[7] I suspect that this type of economy can be characterized as "industrial" (which can be capitalist or socialist or mixed) that can be contrasted with preindustrial and postindustrial (Collins & Halverson, 2009).

Approach of Education 1.0, this want of the students to cooperate with teachers is manufactured through a specially and elaborately designed system of rewards and punishments of grades, passes, and other means.

However, as I argued above, tools cannot be divorced from the goals they mediate (Köhler, 1973). Since in Education 1.0 schools, the only legitimate goal for the students is to cooperate with the teacher, all tools that they learn in these schools *mostly* mediate this goal of how to please their teachers. That is why knowledge that students learn in Education 1.0 schools are often dogmatic and uncritical. I call this type of knowledge "conventional" because it is based on a conventional agreement rather than on testing ideas (Matusov, 2009)—while skills they learn are often inflexible and rigid. Because of these characteristics of Education 1.0 schools, Collins and Halverson characterize them as "a civic church" (Collins & Halverson, 2009). Let me illustrate it with the following case based on my own teaching experiences.

I was passing by an elementary school girl at an afterschool program, probably in 2nd grade, who was working on her math homework when I noticed that she wrote, "57−8*(4 + 2) = 78" in her notebook. I stopped, pointed at 57 and 78, and said with a smile, "This is strange. You took out something from 57 and got a bigger number. I love this strange math. If I have 5 candies and I give you 3 but I'll get 10 candies at the end, I'd be happy – this is cool math. I wish it were true!" The girl looked at me, smiled, and then told me, "This is how our teacher showed to us. I did exactly how she told us to do." I replied, "I don't know what your teacher told and showed, but it looks strange, magic, and impossible to me. What do you think?" The girl stopped smiling and said, "I need to do how we're taught to do. Otherwise, I'll be in trouble and the teacher will yell at me." She did not make any changes in her equation and kept working on the next math problems in her homework.

For me, the issue is not that the teacher taught a wrong mathematical procedure (I hope not!) or did not guide the girl the math well (which probably was the case). What is very important for me in this example is that the girl treats the (school) math reality as an authoritative procedural ritual (McLaren, 1993), in which she engages, which excludes any possibility for her own judgment and understanding. The student learned to recognized patterns of manipulation with numbers to please the teacher (Matusov, 2020b). I argue that in this case, the teacher serves as a Holy Priest of Epistemological Divine Authority to whom the student offers her servitude to avoid punishment and, probably, even to reap up some rewards in the form of praise and good grades.

When I presented this case to education graduate students, they asked me what I did afterward, in this case, whether I taught the girl of her math mistake. I told them that after the girl finished her homework, she, other children, and I played a Monopoly game that required very sophisticated math, in which this girl and the other children participated with joy. At times during the game, the children asked me for help with their calculations and I provided my guidance for that. They and I asked each other for justifications for our math calculations and we provided them to each other. But I did not help the girl with her homework. Some of my graduate students were upset listening to me because I did not teach the girl to correct her math homework. For them, it was not "a happy end" of the pedagogical story they expected. In my view, I could not help with Education 1.0 homework. Of course, as an adult, perhaps, I could violently force the girl to accept the "correct" conventional knowledge, but would it be genuine math and the genuine guidance of Education 2.0? In the context of this Education 1.0 homework, the girl was only concerned with pleasing her imaginary teacher and I could not and did not want to help her with that because in my view, it would involve further suppressing her authorial agency. In order to engage in real math, where people can freely ask the questions of "why" and "how do you know that" of each other, she should leave the realm of Education 1.0 homework. And as soon as she did by joining the Monopoly game, she could become involved in genuine math based on the free testing of ideas.

One may ask a question, "But why couldn't a teacher provide the girl with the correct calculation rule with a good math explanation of how the rule works and with a math proof of it? Even more, why couldn't the teacher lead the girl to this math rule, so she could arrive at it by herself? What would be wrong with this teaching to the curricular endpoint that can be easily tested on a math exam?" I agree that this question leads to the core of my critique of Standards-based Education 1.0. Indeed, students' memorization of detached rules and pattern recognition learning to "the correct" answer, expected by the teacher, is only one of the symptoms of Education 1.0, although it is a powerful, widespread, and harmful symptom (Matusov, 2020b).

In my view, the core of the Standards-based Education 1.0 paradigm is the teacher's desire and his/her teaching objective to lead a student to a preset curricular endpoint. That is why "to lead the girl to this math rule so she could arrive at it by herself" is still a version of the Standards-based Education 1.0 but in its most perfect and developed form. In the professional-pedagogical field, such an approach of guided "self-understanding," "self-construction," and "self-discovery" of a curricular endpoint preset by the teacher is associated with a certain version of "constructivism."

But what is wrong with the teacher's desire to lead a student to a preset curricular endpoint? What is wrong with the idea that the teacher would "provide the girl with the correct calculation rule with a good math explanation of how the rule works and with a math proof of it" "so she could arrive at it by herself?" Here are some of my objections to that, which are based on the work of Russian dialogic philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his followers in the area of education and philology:

1. Bakhtin (1986, 1999) argued that meaning exists in a relationship between a person asking an interesting question, who is genuinely searching for an answer, and another person replying, who is taking this question seriously. Education, which is based on meaning-making (especially for the student but also for the teacher), can start its process only when a STUDENT (and not the teacher!) asks a genuine answer-seeking question, about which the student deeply, ontologically, cares. Unless a student raises such a question, addressing it to the whole class (but, in the first instance, to him/herself), genuine education cannot begin. Such a question by the student can be fuzzy and unclear to the student, and/or the teacher, and/or others. This question by the student may be provoked by the teacher or a situation, in which the teacher involves the student. I argue that without such a question raised by a student, there is no genuine education. However, in the Standards-based Education 1.0, usually, questions are raised by the teacher and not by students. Also, these questions are not genuine because (a) the teacher usually knows the answer (or thinks that he or she knows it), (b) the teacher does not genuinely, ontologically care about searching for the answer. Essentially, the Standards-based Education 1.0 is based on a pseudo-meaning-making process that leads to shallow memorization and acquisition of ready-made rules, explanations, and proofs.
2. Meaning-making questions by students cannot be exhausted either in their depth or in their diversity of connections (their width).

Although the teacher can foresee some of the students' meaning-making questions, the teacher cannot define all of them in advance. Because of this fact, Russian educator Alexander Lobok characterized education and its results as probabilistic and uncertain (Lobok, 2001, 2012, 2014).

3. As Bakhtin argued, meaning lives in a dialogue of the one asking and the one replying and not in some self-contained statements. Such statements are only signs, tokens, references to dialogic events embedded in a dialogue that has been going on in the past, is going on in the present, and even will be going on in the future, because dialogue can never be exhausted. For example, let's consider such a "simple" math statement as $2 + 2 = 4$, which is often seen as the quintessence of self-contained truths. It seems to be self-contained and unconditionally true, of course, after we define what the number 2, the mathematical operation of addition (and the operator '+'), the mathematical operator of equality, and the number 4 are. However, its self-contained nature and unconditional truth are only appearances. First, $2 + 2$ is not always 4. If we add two drops of water to two drops of water, we will get only one drop of water and not 4. Although the resulting drop is bigger, if we are interested in counting drops, it still is only one, thus, in this case, $2 + 2 = 1$ (Berlyand, 2009b). Similarly, if we add two animals (e.g., two hungry cats) and two animals (e.g., two fat mice), we may get only two animals (e.g., two satisfied cats), $2 + 2 = 2$. Two molecules (e.g., of oxygen) plus two molecules (e.g., of hydrogen) can produce three molecules (e.g., two molecules of water and one of oxygen), $2 + 2 = 3$. Adding two triangles and two triangles can produce 5 triangles, $2 + 2 = 5$; but adding two rectangles and two rectangles can give 9 rectangles, $2 + 2 = 9$. But sometimes $2 + 2$ does not provide any certain answer at all, as is the case when adding two friends and two friends: the answer can be 0, 2, 3, or 4—moreover, the answer can dynamically change with time. The following interesting math questions emerge (at least, for me), when, for which objects, $2 + 2$ is 4, and for which objects it is not 4. What properties of objects produce the linearity, expressed in the math equation? Why the math, which we know in our everyday life and school prioritizes linear objects? What non-linear math looks like? Why should we prioritize talking and thinking about math over other important issues? Who cares? Why bother? And so on. These questions are some of the possible

universe of questions, making the statement $2 + 2 = 4$ meaningful. These questions are the possible beginning of meaning-making dialogues (in Education for Agency, 2.0). What questions students can ask and to what these questions may lead is never known in advance. Moreover, these "final points of education" are never really final, but always temporary, because this dialogue of learning does not have an end. The depth of any subject or theme, taken seriously, is bottomless, and its width of approaches is boundless (Bakhtin, 1986; Matusov, 2009, 2020a).

4. Russian psychologist Galina Zuckerman (1993) argues that a wrong answer is a correct answer to another question. Similarly, Köhler, the German Gestalt psychologist, defined "stupidity" as evidence of intellect that appears in an inappropriate time and place (Köhler, 1973). In this sense, solving any problem or question is working with/transforming this problem or question until the puzzlement it creates dissolves (Lave, 1988). For example, Zukerman asked first-grade students how many "sounds" there are in the word "five." Students gave different answers like 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8. Then she worked with the children, so they could ask questions to make these answers correct. How many words are written on the blackboard? 1. How many sounds are in the word "five"? 3. How many letters are in the word "five"? 4. What does the word "five" mean? 5. What is your guess of how many sounds there are in the word "five" 8 (Matusov, 1997; Zuckerman, 1993). Working with the question or problem is the core of the meaning-making process.

That is why any attempt by the teacher to make the students arrive at preset curricular endpoint leads to meaninglessness and shallow understanding by the students. Even when a student arrives at the preset curricular endpoint, desired by the teacher, the student usually lacks the desire and the serious question to which this curricular endpoint address. Many undergraduate teacher education students cannot explain the addition of fractions with different denominators, treating the addition as a conventional procedural norm rather than a mathematical concept (see Matusov, 2015, pp. 64–65).

Conclusion: Can Technological Education Be Good?

Can the Standards-based Education 1.0 provide deep understanding and thoughtful mastery? My answer is no. It is because deep understanding and thoughtful mastery are based on learners' freedom to ask unpredictable questions, test ideas, and select topics of learning—in other words, it is based on Education 2.0, education for the authorial agency. Educator Yong Zhao (2009) argues that "Being able to pass a prescribed test is not a high expectation… to become exceptional in an area that you want to pursue—that is a high expectation, and it is about having dreams. By imposing standards, we are not elevating expectations, but perhaps driving down expectations, especially for poor communities. … We are depriving them of the chance to dream. … [Even worse, standards can] cause psychological damage to those not judged as good."[8]

In the case described above, why would the girl want to learn the $57-8*(4+2)$ calculation? Why would she want to ask questions to know what it means, why people need it, what addition, subtraction, multiplication mean, why she should care about this math problem at all, and so on? Where is her own problem defining? As soon as a teacher wants the students to learn something that the teacher knows in advance, deep understanding and genuine mastery become impossible. With time and effort, it is probably possible to make/force the girl do well on a math test in Education 1.0. Still, it is impossible to engage her in genuine math or develop her desire, joy, and appreciation of math. Paraphrasing the famous saying about a horse, Education 1.0 can make students pass a test, but it can't make the students deeply understand and enjoy it. The Technological Approach of Education 1.0 separates the school from life expecting the students to focus on the teacher-defined curriculum at the expense of his or her own curriculum dictated by the student's participation in life. Innovative educator John Holt criticized this approach thus: "It's not that I feel that school is a good idea gone wrong, but a wrong idea from the word go. It's a nutty notion that we can have a place where nothing but learning happens, cut off from the rest of life" [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Holt_(educator)].

[8] https://www.kqed.org/mindshift/39612/standards-why-realizing-the-full-promise-of-education-requires-a-fresh-approach.

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CHAPTER 3

Inherent Alienation of Labor and Work

When I go to a grocery supermarket that has an automized self-checkout option as well as a human cashier, I always choose a self-checkout, if possible. In part, it is a personal preference of mine—unlike some other people, I do not like small talk with strangers who serve me. But mainly, it is my conviction that working as a checkout cashier is a waste of human potential. Staying all day, day-after-day, and doing the mechanical work of scanning items while unconditionally greeting and cheering all customers is often very alienating. Sometimes some cashiers may find ways of coping with this alienation by different means making their mechanical job bearable. Still, again, this coping goes against their primary job instead of being its core. It takes a significant physical and emotional toll on the cashier. Besides, this activity does not require any genuine dialogue, creativity, improvization, engagement in public affairs, and self-actualization in the cashier—which, what I would argue, defines the human nature (Arendt, 1958). I would argue that this rote activity actually suppresses these important human engagements. Although I feel sorry for cashier workers who lost their jobs because of this type of automation, I think that in the long run, humans deserve better than a routine mechanical activity, especially when it is not needed anymore.

In this chapter, I will evaluate the value of labor: whether it fits human nature or not. For a long time, labor/work has been glorified. Thus, German philosopher and economist Engels, Karl Marx's co-author, argued that labor has shaped the human mind and body "labour created man himself" (Engels, 1972, p. 1). In contrast, I have concluded

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that labor/work—both creative and routinized—is antithetical to human nature. I found that any labor inherently creates alienation. *The core of human alienation is labor itself and not capitalism or exploitation, although they contribute to it as well.* I agree with philosopher John Danaher who argues that automation of human work is both possible and desirable, "The automation of work is both possible and desirable: work is bad for most people most of the time, in ways that they don't always appreciate. We should do what we can to hasten the obsolescence of humans in the arena of work" (Danaher, 2019, p. 2). As a cartoon[1] popular on the Internet goes, instead of crying, "Damn, a robot took over my job! Now I have to look for a new source of monetary income…" a newly unemployed worker should embrace the global technological unemployment with joy, "Yay! A robot took over my job! Now I am free to actually enjoy life!"

Would you Keep Working, as a Multimillionaire, for the Love of Your Job?

A true test for alienation by the job is whether people would continue doing it even though this labor is not required for the people's survival and/or well-being *just because* they intrinsically love the labor/work's activities. If people quit their jobs or stay for different reasons (see below), it means they are alienated by their jobs. Thus, Jacki Cisneros, who worked as an overnight assignment editor for the KNBC television station in Los Angeles, won $266 million in the Mega Millions lottery in 2010. She initially decided to keep working because she said, "I can't imagine not working. It's a foreign concept to me" (http://www.today.com/id/36982755/ns/today-today_news/t/million-lottery-winner-keeping-her-job/#.WIe7y_krJPY). By 2013, she mostly worked at her Foundation. Still, Jacki Cisneros was the first to admit that her journalist career in news was difficult to walk away from and that she still tried to be as involved in it as possible, "It was a hard transition because I really loved what I did. I loved everything about my [current] job [at the Foundation]," said Jacki Cisneros. "But I still call the station to pitch things, and I still try to keep my foot in the door if I can" (http://annenberg.usc.edu/news/media-center/usc-annenberg-

[1] https://images.app.goo.gl/MhjGpoBv3MnF1opP8.

alumna-jacki-wells-cisneros-pledges-500000-name-wallis-annenberg). In my view, this test by winning the lottery shows that Jacki Cisneros' work in journalism might not be that alienating—she reluctantly quitted it in favor of another activity of managing her foundation. But, how many people are like Jacki Cisneros?

My survey of empirical research literature shows that although there are many people who did or would stay on their jobs after winning a million-dollar lottery, very few did or would do it for Jacki Cisneros' reason. Early research on million-dollar lottery winners, when million-dollar lotteries became available in the United States, shows that 80% of the studied winners quit their jobs. Nearly all of them (34 of 37, 92%) had not had college education, most families were earning in the lower income ranges, and nearly all worked in semi-skilled or skilled blue-collar jobs (Kaplan, 1978). Later research reveals only 23% of the million-dollar winners quit their jobs because the pool of winners involved more diverse white-collar employees such as professionals, clerks, and managers. However, in general, the trend continues, "Individuals with psychologically and financially rewarding jobs continued working regardless of the amount they won, while people who worked in low paying semi-skilled and unskilled jobs were far more likely to quit the labor force" (Kaplan, 1987, p. 168). The empirical research literature on business organizations suggests that individuals are more likely to quit if they had been or were dissatisfied with their jobs (Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaneil, & Hill, 1999). Meta-analyses studies reveal that job satisfaction has shown statistically significant correlations with turnover (Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia, & Griffeth, 1992; Tett & Meyer, 1993). However, the notion of "job satisfaction" does not necessarily involve intrinsic love of the activities involved in the job (e.g., see the recent report on job satisfaction here, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/2016-Employee-Job-Satisfaction-and-Engagement-Report-Executive-Summary.pdf, p. 6). When the concept of job satisfaction involves intrinsic love of the job activities, its shows that 59% of those who are satisfied with their jobs (47.3% of the total respondents) replied that it was "interest in work" (Cheng, Kan, Levanon, & Ray, 2014). Still the term "interest in work" may mean something different than having an intrinsic love of the job activities.

For example, Arvey, Harpaz, and Hui Liao (2004) found that "work centrality" may highly contribute to post-award work behavior of million-dollar lottery winners with regard to quitting or keeping their jobs. Work centrality is defined by the role of people's work in their identity, "People who consider work as a central life interest have a strong identification with work in the sense that they believe the work role to be an important and central part of their lives" (Hirschfeld & Feild, 2000, p. 790). Arvey, Harpaz, and Hui Liao found that

> Individuals who won large amounts in the lottery would be less likely to quit work if they had relatively greater degrees of work centrality. After controlling for a number of variables (i.e., age, gender, education, occupation, and job satisfaction), results indicated that work centrality and the amount won were significantly related to whether individuals continued to work and, as predicted, the interaction between the two was also significantly related to work continuance. (Arvey et al., 2004, p. 404)

A job culture—a cultural belief about the centrality of a job in a successful life—may contribute to that (I will discuss this issue later). Also, a job may involve more than just its underlying activities, for which people are paid. A job may provide by-product activities and relationships. For example, a job may provide opportunities to meet people who become friends or systematically share family troubles with co-workers or provide informal psychotherapy to colleagues and so on. In these cases, the outcomes of these activities are the by-products of a job. These by-product activities and social relationships are very meaningful, relevant, and enjoyable for the workers outside of their intrinsic love of their job activities, by creating a community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). A by-product of a community of practice, created by a job, may provide comraderies, informal relations, networks, dialogues, job stability, important contributions to the society (and humanity), job prestige, as well as an escape from loneliness, meaninglessness, and boredom, and so on (Cheng et al., 2014). However, even when the job activities themselves may have extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, values for the workers, the jobs can be important for the workers. Such extrinsic job values may include important contributions to the society/humanity (e.g., reduction of poverty, promoting health, reduction of global warming), the social prestige of the job, and so on (Highhouse, Zickar, & Yankelevich, 2010).

> Many people continue to work after winning the lottery because their jobs give them a sense of purpose in life, says Denver-based career coach Leila Hock. "We all need something outside of ourselves to stay focused on," she says. Indeed, more than three in four workers who would keep working after a lotto win say they'd do it because work gives them "a sense of purpose and accomplishment," according to CareerBuilder.
>
> Others keep working because they're still learning on the job and feel they're making an impact, says Jeff Vijungco, the vice president of Global Talent for Adobe. Socialization also matters: Nearly one in four workers say they'd keep working because they'd miss their coworkers if they weren't working, the CareerBuilder survey found. … Simply filling your time was also a factor: Roughly three in four said they'd keep working because they'd be bored if they didn't, the CareerBuilder survey found). (Hill, 2016)

Thus, job satisfaction might not relate to workers' intrinsic love of their work activities as they might not know what to do with their free time.

Can Jobs Be a Source of Spirituality and Mindfulness?

It can still be true that for some people, the activity of a grocery cashier or any other similar job activities, involving mostly routines, may constitute human nature. People may find deep meaning, intrinsic satisfaction, moral commitment to servitude, or conditions for meditation in such routinized activities, like some Christian or Buddhist monks (but not only) find in similar routine activities. In Zen Buddhism, routine activity has been viewed as a type of mediation that may lead to nirvana. As the Chinese Buddhist text called Ch'an explains,

> … In these instances of collective participation (p'u-ch'ing), all should exert equal effort regardless of whether the task is important or unimportant. No one should sit quietly and so contrary to the wishes of the multitude… Rather, one should concentrate his mind on the Tao, and perform whatever is required by the multitude. After the task is completed, then one should return to the meditation hall and remain silent as before. One should transcend the two aspects of activity and nonactivity. Thus though one has worked all day, he has not worked at all. (Ornatowski, 1996)

However, the question remains: how many Buddhists have actually and genuinely experienced this state of enlightenment articulated in the Buddhist espoused ideology? The psychology of this satisfaction and personal devotion to mechanical routinized activities has to be studied. I suspect that this sense of spiritual enlightenment emerging from a mechanical routinized job on a systematic basis is quite rare. In addition, satisfaction and devotion are unnecessary, accidental, and even counter-productive[2] to this mechanical job itself, driven by economic necessity and efficiency.

Historically, however, there have been many religious and secular attempts to scale down this personal satisfaction and devotion to any mechanical labor needed by the society by appealing to self-sacrifice and even to a version of self-flagellation (see a Soviet Communist version of that in the autobiographical novel by Ostrovsky, 1959). My conclusion from the literature on these attempts is that they all failed when tried on a systematic and mass scale. Despite the Protestant ethics (Weber, 2001), labor remains alienated. People remain alienated by labor. Despite the Communist consciousness and awareness agitated in the Socialist countries of the twentieth century, labor remained alienated (Gorz, 1989). Despite the romantic ideology of hippie or kibbutz movements,[3] labor still felt alienated for many of its adepts (Klein Halevi, 2013; Russell, Hanneman, & Gets, 2013). Famously, 2016 Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders was asked to leave a hippie commune for "sitting around and talking" about politics instead of working in 1971 (Daloz, 2016). This is how Daloz describes the transformation of a "hippie" leader's attitude toward "liberating labor"[4] in a "hippie-like" commune in the mid-nineteenth century,

[2] Working in an afterschool program at a Latin-American Community Center with my undergraduate teacher education students, I experienced such counter-productivity of personal satisfaction of a mechanical work. Since a child was reluctant to collect toys after himself, I created a game of cleaning. The cleaning game, I invented was so successful that after we finished cleaning, the boy created intentionally a new mess so we had an opportunity to clean it again (Matusov, Smith, Soslau, Marjanovic-Shane, & von Duyke, 2016). Thus, the cleaning game pleasure was counter-productive to the goal of cleaning.

[3] Influenced by Russian writer Leo Tolstoy, Zionist Aaron David Gordon (1856–1922) developed of the ideology of "the religion of labor," which as an ideological inspiration for many participants of first kibbutz (Dubson, 2008).

[4] It is both ironic and telling that the Auschwitz concentration camp greeted the prisoners with the gate sign, "Arbeit Macht Frei," translated as "work makes you free" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbeit_macht_frei.

> One of the group's founding members was Nathaniel Hawthorne, who joined hoping that communal living and shared labor would free him, as promised, for more time to write. At first he embraced [farm work] with a kind of grumbling irony: "This morning I have done wonders. Before breakfast, I went out to the barn and began to chop hay for the cattle, and with such 'righteous vehemence,' as Mr. Ripley says, did I labor that in the space of ten minutes I broke the machine." But even his tongue-in-cheek enthusiasm ("I have milked a cow!!!" he wrote on his third day, of Margaret Fuller's "transcendental heifer") disappeared after a few weeks of shoveling manure. He quickly became frustrated with [farm work's] failure to offer either "the highest mental freedom" or a sense of moral purity: "In the midst of toil or after a hard day's work … my soul obstinately refuses to be poured out on paper," he wrote. "It is my opinion that a man's soul may be buried and perish under a dung-heap or in the furrow of the field, just as well as under a pile of money." He left at the end of his first summer and later fictionalized his experiences at Brook Farm in his novel *The Blithedale Romance*. (Daloz, 2016, p. 39)
>
> …labor is the curse of this world, and nobody can meddle with it, without becoming proportionably brutified. (Hawthorne, cited in Maibor, 2013)

Why cannot people like Nathaniel Hawthorne enjoy idyllic farm work for self-support among their comrades? Indeed, there is no exploitation involved, so why do they feel so alienated? My answer is that this labor activity demands humans to act like "smart machines," which violates "human nature" (cf. Arendt, 1958). Let me elaborate.

People Acting as Smart Machines: *Labor*

The first smart machines have been humans. Already Aristotle in 350 B.C.E noticed that "the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments" (Aristotle, 2000). By "smart machines," I mean entities that can systematically achieve a preset goal. By "systematically," I do not necessarily mean success in achieving the preset goal every time but enough to prevent a disaster for the community and/or the person acting as a "smart machine." "Smart machines" do not generate new goals outside of potentially creative ways of achieving the overall preset goals. At the dawn of humanity, the major activity of humans as "smart machines" took the form of labor.

Philosopher Hanna Arendt defined "*labor*"[5] as a human activity aiming at meeting biological (and some other) necessities for self-preservation and the reproduction of the species,

> Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition[6] of labor is life itself. (Arendt, 1958, p. 7)

Referring to Marx, Arendt claims that *labor* is an activity like animal laboring for its life biological survival and maintenance, enriched by powerful cultural mediation. Because these survival needs cannot be satisfied once and for all, *labor* never really reaches an end. Its fruits do not last long; they are quickly consumed, and more must always be produced. *Labor* is thus a cyclical, repeated process that carries with it a sense of futility, without any clear beginning or end. The preset goals for humans acting as "smart machines" were bound by biological necessities and survival such as providing food, drinking water, shelter, protection against elements, dangerous animals, and hostile people. However, although *labor* has been carried out mostly by humans acting as "smart machines," there is a part of *labor* that is outside of humans acting as "smart machines"—namely developing and prioritizing goals bounded by biological necessities and survival. Traditional hunter-gatherer societies are and were mostly, but not entirely, engaged in *labor*. In those societies, although there was/is the use of tools and tool kits, tools were/are kept to the necessary minimum because of the nomadic nature of the society (Torrence, 1989). When city-based civilizations emerged, *labor*—e.g., involving agriculture and cattle-raising—often became delegated to slaves and the poor. In modern developed societies, many household activities—such as cooking, house cleaning, laundry, personal hygiene, grocery and clothing shopping, and so on—remain organized as *labor*. The rich and powerful defined and prioritized the goals of *labor* and managed *labor*

[5] To distinguish from colloquial use of the terms "labor," "laborer," "work," and "worker," I use italics when I mean Arendt's notions.

[6] Wikipedia defines the human condition as "the characteristics, key events, and situations which compose the essentials of human existence, such as birth, growth, emotionality, aspiration, conflict, and mortality" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_condition).

itself. Also, in civilization-based societies, "*work*"—another form of organization of economic and non-economic activities—becomes a very powerful economic activity along with *labor*.

People acting as Smart Machines: Work

John Danaher makes a good point that "work [and labor] was not defined as a specific activity or set of activities, but rather a condition under which activities are performed" (Danaher, 2019, p. 54). The condition of work and labor activities is defined by survival, necessities, social commission, goods and labor markets, slavery, exploitation, instrumentalism, and so on. Arendt (1958) defined "*work*" as an activity of durable tool making, producing raw materials, bureaucratic actions, and so on. Unlike *labor*, *work* has a clearly defined beginning and end. It leaves behind a durable object, such as a tool, or an action without its own use rather than an object or service for consumption. These durable objects become part of the world we live in. In *labor*, humans try to involve in "metabolism with nature" through confrontation and domination of nature through clever adaptation to nature.

In contrast to *labor*, *work* is based on the violation of nature, in which the *worker* interrupts nature in order to obtain and shape raw materials for people's needs and wants. "This element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and *homo faber*, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature" (Arendt, 1958, p. 139). *Work* comprises the whole process, from the original idea for the object to the obtaining of raw materials to the finished product. *Work* makes it possible for people to live in cocoons of artifice, from which nature is excluded. For example, air conditioning in buildings and cars promotes constant, comfortable temperature regardless of very cold or very hot outside temperatures.

> Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species' ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an "artificial" world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness. (Arendt, 1958, p. 7)

The process of *work* is determined by the categories of means and end, rather than by "human metabolism with nature." Arendt argued that thinking of ourselves primarily as *worker*s—*homo faber*—leads to instrumental reasoning, which assumes that everything is a potential means to some further end. This marks the beginning of the disappearance of a notion of a kind of worth that is intrinsic (self-worth), as opposed to value, which is relative to human demand, need, or want outside of this self-worth (e.g., acting on a job for salary and not because the activity is pleasurable and/or valuable in itself). In modern developed societies, many traditional *labor* economic activities—such as agriculture, healthcare, childcare, education, and so on—become more and more organized as *work* by standardization of the activity with its focus on doing correct procedures, regardless of their effect on "human metabolism with nature"—human necessities (biological and otherwise) and survival.

The Discovery Channel's series "Dual Survival" provides a good dramatized articulation of the contrast between *laborer* and *worker*. In this reality show, two protagonists are involved in a somewhat staged "survival" scenario in various challenging natural environments: a naturalist and primitive-skills expert and a military-trained survival instructor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_Survival). Their contrasting attitudes toward nature are quite revealing. A naturalist and primitive-skills expert claims that he tries to find benefits in any situations that nature throws at him (i.e., a laborer's approach), "To me, [survival] revolves around paying attention of the natural landscape, from the view of escarpment to the following the hippo trail, all to using the termite mound to patch the mokoro [a type of African boat] was all about paying attention to what nature offered and using that to our best ability" (Cody Lundin, Season#3, Episode#8, "Meltdown"). Meanwhile, a military-trained survival instructor announces that he tries to conquer, subdue, and win over—i.e., defeat—the nature-enemy (i.e., a worker's approach), "Mother nature tries to kick you in the face over and over and over. You got to get up and kick her in the face. That is the only way to get out of here alive. Period." (Joseph Teti, Season#3, Episode#6 "The Green Hell".) Although in different seasons (currently 9), there are different pairs, their contrasting attitudes toward nature remain more or less the same. There is a recurring tension between them. The naturalist and primitive-skills experts understand their survival as organizing a sustainable cycle of their "metabolism with nature" through securing shelter, fire, drinkable water, and food. Thus, they view their survival as *labor*, adapting to nature, and often want to stay a bit longer when they successfully establish the cycle. In contrast, the military-trained survival instructors understand their survival as a series of challenges and problems to solve to reach the final goal of "getting out" and reaching civilization in the fastest and most effective way. Thus, they view their survival instrumentally as *work* to be done as fast as possible.

In *labor*, humans-as-smart-machines can act in their own ways so far as they can successfully achieve the preset goals (i.e., satisfy "metabolism needs") within certain limits—their *labor* activity is crafty, contextual, and aesthetic. In *labor*, the product of the activity is ready for immediate consumption. The preset goal for a *laborer* is embedded in this consumption (i.e., use value) and, thus, it can guide the *laborer*. This makes the laborer's activity contextual. For example, an unusually smelly animal killed by a hunter may suggest to the hunter that the animal was sick and can be dangerous to eat (i.e., consume). A *laborer* is guided by his/her judgment about how much the product of his/her activity is ready for consumption (i.e., use value).

In industrial and post-industrial societies, w*ork* transfers humans, acting as "smart machines," into objects of its own control. In the same vein, as *work* tries to control nature, it tries to control *workers* since humans-as-smart-machines have their own objective nature. *Work* tries to make humans-as-smart-machines predictable, reliable, and replaceable. It creates manuals, guidelines, and procedures, separated from the unique context of the activity. In *work*, humans-as-smart-machines have become increasingly demanded to act in some uniform way that must be the most efficient—their activity tends to be standardized, decontextualized, and rationalized. The preset goals for humans acting as "smart machines" have also changed. The goals have become purely instrumental based on *social commission*—i.e., satisfying needs of other people.

In contrast to labor-based societies, in modern industrial and post-industrial *work*, the product of the activity often may not be ready for consumption but requires further transformations. The nature of the *work* product may be unavailable to the *worker* him/herself (e.g., a worker may produce a part for a device that the worker may not even know). The social commission, e.g., exchange value, often alien to the *worker*, sets the *worker*'s goal and guides the *worker*'s activity. For example, the modern *worker*'s conformity to the preset social commissions is exchanged for the *worker*'s wages. Thus, a *worker* is guided by discipline to conform to the preset social commission (e.g., exchange value). In *work*-based societies, instrumental values dominate. Intrinsic values of activities—enjoyment of doing activity, being in the flow of the activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), self-realization, and self-actualization through the activity (Maslow, 1943)—are often viewed as frivolous, private, idle, luxurious, and unimportant, reserved for hobby and recreation (Arendt, 1958). *Work* further sets the division between those who act as "smart machines" and those who set, prioritize, and revise goals and orders that they set for humans acting as "smart machines."

Arendt (1958) and then Gorz (1989) argue that Karl Marx was ambivalent and confused about what makes people feel so alienated in their job-related activities. Specifically, Arendt pointed to the following three[7] ambivalences and confusions in Marx:

1. both his recognition and his confusion of the differences between *labor* and *work*,
2. his defining human as *homo faber*, defined by *labor/work*, while claiming that the Communism will liberate people from the necessities of *labor/work*, and
3. his locating the source of alienation in *labor/work* per se in some of his writings while in exploitation of *labor/work* in some other of his writings.

For my discussion here, the most relevant ambivalences and confusions are 2 and 3. Following Hume, in Marx's essays "The critique of Hegelian dialectic" and "The German Ideology" (and elsewhere) Marx insisted "that *labor* (and not God) created man or that *labor* (and not reason) distinguished man from the other animals" (Arendt, 1958, p. 86). However, in his Evtopian Communist society, Marx envisioned that *labor/work* will cease for the sake of human self-realization and self-actualization,

> In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production… Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom… (Marx, 1972, p. 820)

[7] Actually, she noticed more than the three, but the others are outside of the scope of our discussion here.

Arendt argued that humans (i.e., human nature) cannot both be defined by *labor/work* and emancipated from *labor/work* to reveal its true nature. She concluded that *labor/work* is not the true human nature (and, thus, the definition of humans) but rather its oppression.

For Marx (in some of his writings), alienation is a result of commodification and exploitation rooted in *work* with its exchange value and not in *labor/work* with its use value, which reaches its peak in a capitalist society,

> The people who met on the exchange market, to be sure, were no longer the fabricators themselves, and they did not meet as persons but as owners of commodities and exchange values, as Marx abundantly pointed out. In a society where exchange of products has become the chief public activity, even the laborers, because they are confronted with "money or commodity owners," become proprietors, "owners of their labor power." It is only at this point that Marx's famous self-alienation, the degradation of men into commodities, sets in, and this degradation is characteristic of labor's situation in a manufacturing society which judges men not as persons but as producers, according to the quality of their products. A laboring society, on the contrary, judges men according to the functions they perform in the labor process; while labor power in the eyes of *homo faber* is only the means to produce the necessarily higher end, that is, either a use object or an object for exchange, laboring society bestows upon labor power the same higher value it reserves for the machine. In other words, this society is only seemingly more "humane," although it is true that under its conditions the price of human labor rises to such an extent that it may seem to be more valued and more valuable than any given material or matter; in fact, it only foreshadows something even more "valuable," namely, the smoother functioning of the machine whose tremendous power of processing first standardizes and then devaluates all things into consumer goods. (Arendt, 1958, pp. 162–163)

Marx also envisioned non-alienation as a type of non-commodified *labor/work* that was enjoyable for the producer as a process and a product and useful for a consumer,

> Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective,

> visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature …. Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature. (Marx, 1844)

However, Arendt argued that people's experience of alienation from their activities occurs both in the *labor* and *work* conditions. It is mainly because both *labor* and *work* subordinate human nature to the necessity, survival, commodification, instrumentality, and social commissions of the wants and needs of other people.[8] Unalienated *labor/work* is a misnomer. In other words, the problem of alienation is not rooted in capitalism as a particular form of organization of *labor*, *work*, and exploitation, but rather in the nature of *labor* and *work* itself. Until *labor* and *work* prevail with or without capitalism (e.g., under the Socialist regimes of the twentieth century), alienation will remain.

Capitalism is just a particular way of organizing *labor* and *work*. Capitalism may contribute additional forms of alienation, but alienation itself is not rooted in capitalism per se. Arguably, based on the historical preference of human migration,[9] this particular way of organization set by capitalism is the most preferable one, compared to socialism, feudalism, and traditional societies. This finding by Arendt (1958) and Gorz (1989) about the nature of alienation rooted in *labor* and *work* and not in capitalism contradicts the political beliefs of the traditional Left, who sees most of the evils of a modern society in capitalism.[10]

[8] In contrast to Marx, Arendt argued that there can be more alienation in *labor* than in *work*, "alienation—the atrophy of the space of appearance and the withering of common sense—is, of course, carried to a much greater extreme in the case of a laboring society than in the case of a society of producers" (Arendt, 1958, p. 209).

[9] So far, on average, when they have a choice (or even when it is illegal), people from Socialist, Feudal, and Traditional societies prefer to move to a Capitalist society than the other way around (although this also happens for a small number of people). Apparently, people around the world vote with their feet for developed capitalism.

[10] Of course, capitalism has its own evils but these evils are subordinated to the evils of *labor* and *work*, in my view.

Inherent Alienation in Creative *Labor* and *Work*

It is much easier to appreciate Arendt's point about the oppressive and alienating nature of *labor* and *work* for humans acting as "smart machines" than for creative designers of *labor* and *work*, who set, revise, and prioritize their own goals (and even create personal desires for consumption[11]). *Laborer*s and *worker*s acting as "smart machines" are alienated from the goals that are preset for them. But this is less true for designers of *labor* and *work*. Indeed, is it not the job of designers of *labor* and *work* to be creative? Does not creative *work* involve the *authorial agency* of transcending the given recognized by the self and others (see chapters above)? Even the crafty activities of *laborer*s and to a lesser degree the activities of *worker*s may involve creativity and authorial agency in achieving the preset goals. As Confucius advised, "Choose a job that you love, and you will never have to *work* a day in your life" (Xunzi, 29),[12] which seems to mean, "If you have a job that you love, you would do it for free and not feel alienated." Is it really a matter of choosing the right *labor/work* for a person to be free, happy, and unalienated? Arendt answers, "No."

The problem of the persistent alienation in *labor/work* is rooted in the fact that creativity and authorial agency, demanded by *labor/work,* are subordinated to necessities, survival, commodification, instrumentalization, and use value. Yes, an artist, for example, can successfully and creatively self-realize and self-actualize herself in her art. Still, as soon as the artist has to live by selling her art, her art activities become more and more distorted by the artist's concerns about her survival, demands of the art market, commodification, instrumentalization, use value of her art*work*, social commissions, and so on. This point was argued already by Aristotle, insisting that artists and artisans who had to live by their art cannot be considered as free citizens. The artist may not be able to afford to paint one picture too long, or not to paint for a while, or to paint pictures that may not be sold (or sold for too low a price), or to ignore

[11] The co-founder of Apple, Steve Jobs, argued that consumers' desire has to be created and discovered rather than followed (Vallely, 2012), see also Glasser (1972) on deliberate manufacturing consumers' desires, anxieties, and identities in modern capitalist economies.

[12] A more exact translation, "Confucius said, 'When the gentleman has not yet succeeded, then he takes joy in his ideals, and when he has succeeded, then he takes joy in bringing good order to affairs. Thus, he has joy to the end of his life, without a single day of worry'" (Xunzi, 2014, p. 329).

self-promotion, or to neglect to engage in creative entrepreneurial market practices, and so on. Sell your art or perish as a professional artist! An artist living on her art has to satisfy demand and create demand for people who can afford to buy her art*work*. This is how famous contemporary artist Eric Fischl describes the market pressures on artmaking,

> As the maker of a commodity, even if he didn't see himself that way, the contemporary painter was under constant pressure to produce work that was catchy, recognizable, and replicable—in short, to brand himself. Artists who bucked the prevailing tide, who thumbed their noses at the new establishment or insisted on making small, ephemeral, or otherwise uncollectible work, did so at peril to their careers. But those who recognized the new trends—painters who conformed to the romantic vision of the traditional studio artist, dealers like Mary Boone who possessed the verve and resources to orchestrate blockbuster exhibits and red-carpet events—reaped rewards beyond what anyone had thought possible a few years before. (Fischl & Stone, 2012, p. 191)

Some artists, like Eric Fischl, try to erect "a firewall between the temptations of the marketplace and [the artists'] decisions about what to paint" (p. 6). Still, it is unclear how successful they (and their judgments) are under these corrupting temptations and pressures of the marketplace and conflict of interests between their artistic vision and the necessity to make a living by their art. By his own admission,

> I created a fictional world made up of scratchy black-and-white images of houses, boats, and bridges drawn from the traditional fishing communities neighboring Halifax. I drew these images simply and naïvely—with my limited skills I didn't have much choice—and as though to further proclaim their authenticity, I painted them directly onto my studio wall, where they couldn't be sold or commoditized. My artistic purity lasted about one semester, and except for a few slides, there's nothing left to document this all-but-forgotten stage of my development. (Fischl & Stone, 2012, p. 87)

One can only imagine what Eric Fischl's artmaking could have been without the pressure of commodification and necessity to support his own life and lifestyle by selling his paintings. For example, a widow of famous Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky once told another famous Russian writer Leo Tolstoy that her husband had envied him. It was because being a wealthy aristocrat and not having a concern about getting means for his life, Leo Tolstoy could afford to perfect his pen mastership, while Fyodor Dostoevsky had to compromise his writings to get money soon.[13]

Of course, the commodification of art may have positive by-product effects on artmaking, on an artist's creativity, and even on the artist's intrinsic love of the art-making activity. It is because the marketplace provides artists with opportunities to meet with other artists and an audience that can provide fertilization with new ideas and constructive critical feedback on the artist's process and product. Market forces may push an artist into more art experimentation and risk-taking, seizing emerging opportunities, and mobilize her for more artmaking (Gibson, 1997; O'Reilly, 2014). However, arguably, all these positive effects of commodification can be achieved outside of the art marketplace and its negative pressures. Artists can meet with each other and their audience, share their art products and engage in forums about their art that may occur at non-commercial galleries, special events, studios, among friends, and on online forums. This would require separation between the artist's livelihood and the artist's artistic activities.

However, as I argued above, marketplace commodity and capitalism is just one way of organizing *work*. The inherent alienation of *work* is not rooted in marketplace commodity and capitalism per se but in a social commission for the *work* itself. Marketplace commodity and capitalism are particular ways of defining this social commission. In socialism, the social commission was defined by ideology rather than by marketplace commodity. Thus, in the Soviet Union, any product of *work* became first of all an ideological text rather than a marketplace commodity with its exchange value for further consumption (this was secondary and almost accidental under the real Socialist regimes of the twentieth century),

> …the market did not exist in the Soviet Union. Hence neither the economic success nor the economic failure of the political leadership could be established 'objectively,' that is to say, neutrally, non-ideologically. Certain commodities were produced in the Soviet Union not because they sold well on the market, but because they conformed to an ideological vision of the communist future. And on the other hand, those commodities that could not be legitimated ideologically were not produced. … In Soviet communism, every commodity became an ideologically relevant statement,

[13] http://www.textologia.ru/literature/interesnie-fakti-literaruri/dostoevskij-f-m-i-ego-proizved/interesnie-fakti-iz-biografii-dostoevskogo-fm/6814/?q=471&n=6814.

> just as in capitalism every statement becomes a commodity. One could eat communistically, house and dress oneself communistically – or likewise non-communistically, or even anti-communistically [i.e., anti-Soviet]. This meant that in the Soviet Union it was in theory just as possible to protest against the shoes or eggs or sausage then available in the stores as it was to protest against the official doctrines of historical materialism. They could be criticized in the same terms because these doctrines had the same original source as the shoes, eggs and sausage – namely, the relevant decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU [the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. (Groys, 2009, pp. xx–xxi)

Even further, *labor* and *work* do not need to be commodified at all to be alienated, as *labor* and *work* in self-sufficient communes, such as hippie communes, Tolstoy's colonies and communes,[14] cooperatives, and kibbutzim, shows (see an example above). The root of *labor* and *work*'s alienation is in a routinized social commission of regular consumption that guides its activity rather than its own process. It may not have any exchange value for a *worker* and can be done as a personal favor, or because of the sense of duty, or altruistically, for the sake of "social good" and/or humanity.

Finally, I want to summarize and compare the alienation aspects of *labor/work*. *Labor/work*'s alienation of its participants involves at least the following important aspects:

1. The accidental and/or exploitive nature of self-realization, self-actualization, creativity, and authorial agency in *labor/work* (Barrett, 1989). *Labor/work* can indeed bring self-realization, self-actualization, creativity, and authorial agency. Still, these events are accidental and exploitative because they are done in servitude to necessity and to social commission.
2. Suppression of the *worker*'s own self-realization, self-actualization, creativity, and authorial agency for the sake of the totality of social commissions. This is true for both *workers* acting as "smart machines" and *workers* as creative designers. However, this suppression of their authorial agency is manifested differently for each. For *workers* acting as "smart machines," their authorial agency is often minimized and expelled from the realm of their *work* activity

[14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tolstoyan_movement.

into hobbies. For *workers* acting as creative designers, their authorial agency is tunneled for the benefit of the totality of their social commissions. Although manifested differently, this aspect of alienation is present in *labor* as well. I think this aspect is primary for the claim that alienation is inherent in both *labor* and *work* (Arendt, 1958).

3. Decontextualization of many modern *workers* acting as "smart machines" from the unique contexts of their activities, making their behavior "agentic" (Milgram, 1974). In contrast to *laborers*, *workers* acting as creative designers of social commissions, and old-fashioned *workers*-craftsmen acting as "smart machines," and many modern workers acting as "smart machines" are guided by decontextualized procedures, manuals, guidelines, and regulations without much regard for disturbances in the consumption (i.e., use value) of the overall product of the work activity. For example, a registered nurse in a modern hospital may give a post-operational patient a pill of stool softener because of the prescription record on her computer, despite the fact, known to her, that the patient suffers from diarrhea. She just follows orders. Psychologist Stanley Milgram called this behavior "agentic." Agentic state involves submitting one's own agency to social commissions regardless of one's own authorial judgment. "I shall term this the agentic state, by which I mean the condition a person is in when he sees himself as an agent for carrying out another person's wishes. This term will be used in opposition to that of autonomy – that is, when a person sees him-self as acting on his own" (Milgram, 1974, p. 147).

My hypothesis is that agentic behavior is more common in work-based societies than in labor-based communities. Indirect support for this hypothesis comes from the evidence that unschooled illiterate people in traditional (i.e., labor-based) communities more often resist decontextualized statements that do not make personal sense to them (like syllogisms), imposed on them by an experimenter, than people from modern schooled and literacy-based societies (i.e., work-based) (Luria, 1976; Matusov & St. Julien, 2004; Scribner, 1977; Scribner & Cole, 1981). For example, an unschooled illiterate Uzbek peasant rejected drawing any conclusions from a syllogism, "In the Far North, all bears are white. Novaya Zemlya is on the Far North. What kind of bears are on Novaya Zemlya?" He argued that since he had not visited Novaya Zemlya or had not encountered a trusted person who had talked about it, he could not talk about it (Luria, 1976). This aspect of alienation led Marx to claim that *work* is more alienating than *labor* (see the discussion above).

On the other hand, many traditional *labor*-based cultures regard obedience as a virtue; historically, societies have expected children to obey their elders (compare patriarchy, slaves to their owners, serfs to their lords in feudal society, lords to their king, and everyone to God) (Hvitfeldt, 1986). Also, in those societies, rational discourse is often not public but private (Arendt, 1958). Future research is needed to test these opposing hypotheses.

4. Reduction of public dialogue about human *work* activities to their satisfaction with the social commissions. This alienation applies to both workers acting as "smart machines" and *workers* acting as *creative designers*. For example, in capitalism, discourse is bounded by exchanges on the marketplace, reduced to losses and gains and truth is defined as success on the marketplace,

> So long as humans live under the conditions of the capitalist economy they remain fundamentally mute because their fate does not speak to them. If a human is not addressed by his or her fate, then he or she is also incapable of answering it. Economic processes are anonymous, and not expressed in words. For this reason one cannot enter into discussion with economic processes; one cannot change their mind, convince them, persuade them, use words to win them over to one's side. All that can be done is to adapt one's own behaviour to what is occurring. Economic failure brooks no argument, just as economic success requires no additional discursive justification. In capitalism, the ultimate confirmation or refutation of human action is not linguistic but economic: it is expressed not with words but with numbers. (Groys, 2009, pp. xv–xvi)

On the positive side of the human dialogue under capitalism, people are often thrown into contact by the forces of the marketplace breaking up the previously existing isolation of the labor-based worlds, "Capitalism destroyed the isolation of these worlds, broke down the seclusion and inner ideological self sufficiency of these social spheres" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 19). "Capitalism, similar to that 'pander' Socrates on the market square of Athens, brings together people and ideas" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 167). In contrast to labor-based societies, capitalism also promotes the social testing of ideas, although limited to the outcome of the market forces (Groys, 2009). All of that prompted Arendt (1958) to claim, in disagreement with Marx, that *work* is less alienating than *labor* (see my footnote 10 above). In *labor*, human dialogue about labor activities is private, isolated, secluded, and self-sufficient.

Under the real totalitarian conditions of Socialism in the twentieth century, the public human dialogue was often reduced to the ideology totality—its proclamation through directives of managers–administrators and the Party authorities and articulation through the Party leaders, interpretations by masses, and resistance by dissidents (as a self-defined social group and as isolated individuals defined by the authorities). Again, people were forced together, but this time not by the forces of the marketplace, but by the forces of the ideology backed by administrative commands and violence by the state secret police. In contrast to capitalism, there was no socially legitimate testing of ideas under socialism.[15] Reality was ideologized (Groys, 2009).

In addition to inherent alienation by labor/work listed above, Danaer argues that things going worse. He listed the following five reasons why we should hate our jobs:

> The Problem of Dominating Influence: Employment contracts, and, more generally, the state of being employed, typically give employers an unjust dominating power over the lives of workers. This significantly undermines the freedom of workers.
> The Problem of Fissuring and Precarity: The working environment is becoming increasingly fissured, and working conditions are becoming increasingly precarious for many workers. This makes working life more unpleasant and stressful.
> The Problem of Distributive Injustice: Work is distributively unjust. Technology is resulting in an increasingly polarized workforce in which a small number of highly paid individuals reap most of the economic rewards, and these rewards are not, in any obvious way, proportional to effort or merit.
> The Problem of Temporal Colonization: Work colonizes our lives. Most of our mental and physical effort is taken up with preparing for, performing, or recovering from work. What's more, this colonization is getting worse as a result of technology.

[15] Of course, testing of ideas did occurred in totalitarian regimes, but it often occurred either in underground or as a part of idealogized reality.

> The Problem of Unhappiness and Dissatisfaction: Most people are dissatisfied with their work and think they could do better, and this makes it difficult to justify the other bad-making features of work (Danaher, 2019, pp. 55–56).

In the following chapter, I will discuss an emerging crisis of *labor* and *work* in the modern economy and society as a result of automatization.

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CHAPTER 4

Changes in the Economy: Technological Unemployment and Creative Authorial Labor

Economists argue about the effects of automatization on the economy. According to some group of economists discussed below, one of the big consequences that will come from automatization is unemployment caused by technological innovations. Up to now, this type of unemployment seems to have just *local* effects: some old jobs disappear or are severely reduced while many more new jobs appear. However, we may be at the edge of a dramatic change, where the overall number of jobs may shrink as a result of technological innovation. This may cause *total* and permanent technological unemployment, as fewer workers would be needed for the economy. Also, the nature of the jobs may change as real smart machines take over from workers. Demand for creative jobs may grow. In this chapter, I will discuss all these probable changes and possible (mostly negative) responses to them—the assessment of how much likely these changes are or when they might occur is outside of the scope of this book.

E. Matusov, *Envisioning Education in a Post-Work Leisure-Based Society*,
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A Probable Emerging Crisis of Unemployment in the Modern Economy and Society: Technological Unemployment

About 200 years ago, the industrial revolution made certain types of jobs[1] obsolete rapidly, visibly, and totally. Probably the best known of this phenomenon was a group of English textile workers and self-employed weavers who were called Luddites. They could not compete with textile machinery and, in response to losing their jobs, smashed the machinery in riots. In the end, their work was eliminated by the machines in the textile factories. Many self-employed weavers became unemployed and had to move to other types of work or join the textile factory workforce (Thomis, 1972). This phenomenon of technological progress causing unemployment was noticed already in the fifteenth century in Europe. As Prion (1907) found, “In 1412, the [German] city council of Cologne prohibited the production of a spinning wheel by a local craftsman because it feared unemployment among textile manufacturers that used the hand spindle” (cited in Dron, 2014, April). A similar fate awaited many types of jobs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including cabbies, dovers, tailors, water carriers, and so on. Some of these jobs have survived on the periphery of the economy as special types of crafts or arts (e.g., tailors) or as hobbies (e.g., crochet).

Up to now, this process of elimination of some jobs through the introduction of a new technology seemed to be followed by the creation of new types of jobs. In the past, the technological progress did not seem to induce a long-term rise in unemployment for several major reasons. First is the creation of new jobs by a new technology. Thus, the elimination of jobs of horse cabbies and dovers—people who provided an inventory of horses—coincided with the creation of new types of jobs related to automobiles: car and truck drivers, car factory workers, car maintenance workers, oil producers, and so on. Second, the falling prices of products, as a result of the growing productivity induced by new technology, raised the purchasing power of consumers and increased demand for other products and services, thus raising employment in other sectors (Dron, 2014,

[1] I use this term loosely that combines *labor*, *work*, and modern waged work.

April). Finally, new technology created new desires and demands in consumers that had not existed before, which leads to new jobs (Glasser, 1972) (e.g., the recent invention of smartphones).

On the other hand, there has been a trend of decreasing weekly working hours and working time through the lifespan from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to now. For example, in 1830, the average working week in the United States (in manufacturing) was almost 70 hours and it was gradually dropping every decade since (http://eh.net/encyclopedia/hours-of-work-in-u-s-history/). Currently (November 2019), the average working week in the United States is 34.4 hours (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/average-weekly-hours).[2] There is also evidence that people spent less time on *work/labor* (including household *labor*) during their lifespan both in absolute numbers and percentage wise. Thus, in 1880 in the United States, the average total number of hours spent for work, travel for work, and household chores during a lifetime was 182,100, while in 1995 it was 122,400—a drop of 32.8% (Fogel, 2000). Since life expectancy in 1890 was 42.2 years, and in 1990, it was 73.4 years in the United States (http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005140.html), the lifetime *work/labor*/chores percentage dropped from 49.3 to 19.0%.[3]

There are at least three major possible reasons for this development of the drop in the lifetime *work/labor*/chores percentage. First is the growth of productivity due to the technological progress of automation. Second, the increasing involvement of women in employment—thus, more people than before joining employment. Third is dropping fertility rates leading to fewer hours needed to be worked to support children (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Working_time#Gradual_decrease_in_working_hours). These three major developments probably led some economists to predict "technological unemployment" in the first place.

Technological unemployment is the loss of *overall* jobs caused by technological innovations and changes. Technological unemployment is

[2] Of course, this number includes increasing part-time employment, but this fact does not affect my argument about diminishing need for labor/work for the economy as the whole.

[3] However, this 200-year development of reduction of *work/labor*/chores/school obscures the historical fact that in Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, and even in the Medieval Europe, people, including slaves, serfs, and peasants, spent almost half of their life in festivities—both religious and secular (de Grazia, 1962, pp. 89–90).

rooted in a diminishing need for human labor for a successfully running economy. This notion of *total* technological unemployment of a diminishing need for overall human labor was introduced by British economist Keynes in 1930 (see the discussion below).

However, recently, some scholars used the term technological unemployment *locally* as,

> …the loss of jobs caused by technological change. Such change typically includes the introduction of labour-saving "mechanical-muscle" machines or more efficient "mechanical-mind" processes (automation). Just as horses employed as prime movers were gradually made obsolete by the automobile, humans' jobs have also been affected throughout modern history. Historical examples include artisan weavers reduced to poverty after the introduction of mechanised looms. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_unemployment)

Local technological unemployment involves the loss of particular types of jobs but not necessarily of the *overall* economic need in human labor. For example, as previously mentioned, although the jobs of urban horse cabby drivers disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, the automobile industry generated even more jobs overall. Thus, the job loss was *local*, limited to particular types of jobs. In contrast, the *total* technological unemployment that Keynes was writing about in 1930 involved *overall* reductions of jobs due to the technological advances of automation. Up to now, it is not very clear if humankind has never experienced total technological unemployment, but several far-sighted scholars of the past envisioned it,

> Unlike the Industrial Revolution and the computer revolution, the A.I. [Artificial Intelligence] revolution is not taking certain jobs (artisans, personal assistants who use paper and typewriters) and replacing them with other jobs (assembly-line workers, personal assistants conversant with computers). Instead, it is poised to bring about a wide-scale decimation of jobs — mostly lower-paying jobs, but some higher-paying ones, too. (Lee, 2017, June 24)

Below, I am going to discuss these scholars and their visions of *total* technological unemployment. Since my focus is on *total* and not on *local* technological unemployment, I will drop this qualifier.

A possibility for the total technological unemployment was already considered by Aristotle in about 350 B.C.E., "the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, 'of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods'; if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves" (Aristotle, 2000). In other words, if machines were smart enough to replace humans working like "smart machines" in every activity, slavery, *labor*, and *work* would become unnecessary. Aristotle viewed technological unemployment positively, as a liberating force. He defined "a free citizen" not by freedom from the bondage of slavery but freedom from the bondage of *labor* and *work* (Arendt, 1958). Thus, many non-slaves—e.g., poor Athenian peasants—were not free from Aristotle's point of view because they were forced to work to support their livelihood.

In contrast to Aristotle, who had a very positive view on technological unemployment, in the nineteenth century, such classical political economists as Sismondi, Malthus, James Mill, and Ricardo viewed it negatively. Thus, British political economist David Ricardo, who analyzed the effect of innovative machinery, concluded, "All I wish to prove, is, that the discovery and use of machinery may be attended with a diminution of gross produce; and whenever that is the case, it will be injurious to the laboring class, as some of their number will be thrown out of employment, and population will become redundant, compared with the funds which are to employ it" (Ricardo, 1821, 31.11). Following Malthus, he suggested that technological unemployment might encourage countries to engage in wars to employ the superfluous (male) population in the military and even eliminate some of it as a result of the hostilities.

Although sharing this pessimism on technological unemployment under capitalism, Karl Marx returned back to Aristotle's positive view of technological unemployment for his Utopian political regime of Communism, "Thanks to leisure and to the means given to all, the reduction of the necessary social work to a minimum will favour the artistic and scientific development of everyone" (Marx, 1963, cited in Dumazedier, 1974, p. 10). According to Marx, achieving Communism involves the following two consecutive phases. During the first phase, workers will be liberated from alienation by exploitation. Capitalists' exploitation of workers must be eliminated through stopping "the theft" of unpaid alienated labor and through workers' taking over the means and goals of the production. This phase will be achieved through a revolution banning private property and capitalist exploitation (i.e., unpaid or underpaid work). The second phase is liberation from the alienating aspect of the work itself. This phase will be achieved through a reduction of the amount of time spent on necessary work due to technological progress. "Liberation *within* work is, for Marx and Marxists, particularly those in workers' organizations, the necessary prerequisite for liberation *from* work; for it is through liberation *within* work that the subject capable of desiring liberation *from* work and of giving it a meaning will be born" (Gorz, 1989, p. 95). Or in the words of Marx himself,

> Phase#1
>
> The *theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based*, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. The *surplus labour of the mass* has ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the *non-labour of the few*, for the development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. (Marx, 1857/1973)
>
> Phase#2
>
> The free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them… 'Truly wealthy a nation, when the working day is 6 rather than 12 hours. *Wealth* is not command over surplus labour time' (real wealth), 'but rather, *disposable time* outside that needed in direct production, for *every individual* and the whole society' (*The Source and Remedy* etc. 1821, p. 6.). (Marx, 1857/1973)

In essence, Marx addressed technological unemployment through a reduction of working hours in Communism. Everybody will and must be employed but for very few hours, which will be gradually diminished even further with future technological advances in automation. Like Aristotle, Marx saw this expected shrinking need for human labor due to technological progress as a positive, not negative phenomenon. In his view, the technological advances will liberate humans from the oppressive yoke of the necessities to support their metabolism of life (i.e., *labor*, in Arendt's sense) and promote the inherent human nature of self-realization. As British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote in 1923,

> If every man and woman worked for four hours a day at necessary work, we could all have enough; … it should be the remaining hours that would be regarded as important – hours which could be devoted to enjoyment of art or study, to affection and woodland and sunshine in green fields. The mechanistic Utopian is unable to value these things: he sees in his dreams a world where goods are produced more and more easily, and distributed with impartial justice to workers too tired and bored to know how to enjoy them. What men are to do with leisure he neither knows nor cares; presumably they are to sleep till the time for work comes round again … Man's true life does not consist in the business of filling his belly and clothing his body, but in art and thought and love, in the creation and contemplation of beauty and in the scientific understanding of the world. (Russell & Russell, 1923, p. 50)

Famous British economist John Maynard Keynes coined the notion of "technological unemployment," "We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come–namely, *technological unemployment*. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour" (Keynes, 1930/1963, p. 364). Like Marx and Aristotle, Keynes also considered this phenomenon positively when he wrote about it in the midst of the Great Depression, warning against "economic pessimism." He wrote,

> We are suffering, not from the rheumatics of old age, but from the growing-pains of over-rapid [technological] changes, from the painfulness of readjustment between one economic period and another. (p. 358)

> But this is only a temporary phase of maladjustment. All this means in the long run *that mankind is solving its economic problem*. (p. 364)

> …Thus for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem-how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well. … Three-hour shifts or a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while. For three hours a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam[4] in most of us! (p. 369)

Keynes argued that this transformation of the society from necessities-based to leisure-based would require transformation of the current societal morality, which is glorifying wealth, money, *labor*, and *work* while vilifying leisure—the point I will discuss later. He also asserted that the technological unemployment phenomenon was already underway in 1930—a point on which most scholars and historians of the economy might disagree. On the other hand, as I discussed above, on average, the number of workweek hours continues to be shrinking on a systematic basis since the beginning of the nineteenth century and the percentage of a person's life spent on labor seems to be shrinking as well, due to technological advances. All of these may be precursors to the technological unemployment, envisioned by Keynes.

Modern debates on technological unemployment continue and deepen the past debates. They include the following issues:

1. Is technological unemployment unavoidable (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011) or not (Dron, 2014, April)?
2. Is technological unemployment already underway[5] (Ford, 2015) or not (Markoff, 2015)?
3. Is technological unemployment a curse (Blacker, 2013) or a blessing (Rifkin, 2014) in the long run?
4. Which jobs will be affected more or less by technological unemployment (Dron, 2014, April)?

[4] "The old Adam" is a reference to the Biblical Adam in the Leisure Paradise of the Garden of Eden, from which Adam and Eve were expelled into the world of necessity, work, and labor, "in the sweat of your brow shalt though eat bread."

[5] Research estimates that each new robot eliminates about 3 human jobs total in the economy (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017, March). This assessment includes new jobs that robots create in other spheres of the economy. With increase of robotization—current ration is 1 robot over 1000 human workers,—the technological unemployment will become much more visible (Danaher, 2019).

5. How will the nature of jobs change with approaching technological unemployment (Florida, 2012; Pink, 2005; Zhao, 2009, 2012)?

The last two issues seem to be new, emerging in the last 25 years. I will not consider issues 1–2 because of their purely economic nature outside of the scope of this book. Below I will discuss diverse "bad" scenarios of future technological unemployment, envisioned by various scholars and culture critics, and expected (and ongoing) effects of technological change on the nature of jobs.

Pessimistic Scenarios of Technological Unemployment

I consider scenarios and solutions as "optimistic" when they embrace and actively respond (not merely react) to technological unemployment as a qualitatively new economic, cultural, and political regime. I will discuss good scenarios in the next chapter. Here I want to consider modern pessimistic scenarios and solutions for long-term technological unemployment. I consider a scenario or solution "pessimistic" when it merely reacts to or suppresses total technological unemployment.

Neoliberal Economic Eliminationism

British economist Joan Violet Robinson famously stated, "The only thing worse than being exploited by capitalism is not being exploited by capitalism." Since human labor becomes less needed because of technological progress, the economically unneeded people become "superfluous," not worthy of any investment in them. This is especially true in a neoliberal society, where all human values are reduced to economic values (Matusov, 2011). Although the term "eliminationism" initially was introduced and developed in the context of the German Nazi genocide (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminationism), educational philosopher David Blacker redefines it to refer to "economic eliminationism" to analyze "educational eliminationism." According to Blacker, educational eliminationism is a neoliberal tendency to eliminate educational practices and institutions because they are not profitable anymore.

> Under such structurally corrupted conditions, commitments to heretofore bulwark public institutions such as public education are unlikely to be renewed. … technology aided productivity enhancements have merely

> reduced the overall need for workers … which is leading to a wholesale abandonment of previous public commitments such as the longstanding one to the universal provision of education. Even more than this, austerity reveals what I call an educational *eliminationism*, whereby increasing segments of the population are morally written off as no longer exploitable and hence irrelevant to capital accumulation. Why bother caring for them at all, let alone educating them? Such a question is implicit in current neoliberal policies that are altering the moral status of the "unprofitable" human being toward throwaway precariousness and irrevocable degradation (pp. 11-12). … No longer possessive of much exploitability, these are the people seen purely as costs, redundancies, superfluous, "extra" people, regrettable instances of systemic waste and excess (p.29). … So while the ideational stance of eliminationism admits of a wide spectrum of responses, once people are consigned to social categories such as "useless," "disposable," "parasitic," and the like, history demonstrates all-too clearly that this is a slope that can become slippery very fast. (Blacker, 2013, p. 105)

Blacker's notion of neoliberal economic eliminationism can be tracked back to Malthus' notions of "preventive positive checks" on the "superfluous" (over)population such as moral restraints (e.g., abstinence, delayed marriage until finances become balanced) to control and reduce such population growth (Malthus, 1798). Of course, in contrast to Malthus, who embraced economic eliminationism, Blacker severely criticizes it. Blacker criticizes the neoliberalism where human value and human life are evaluated only by contributions to the economy.

There is another important connection between the work of Malthus on technological innovations—i.e., "machinery"—(Malthus, Wrigley, & Souden, 1986) and Blacker's notion of economic eliminationism. In essence, Malthus argued that technological unemployment (he did not use that term) would diminish production because of the diminution of demand, associated with workers who lost their jobs (Curreri, 2006; Malthus et al., 1986). When more and more people lose their jobs (and waged income) due to the technological progress, and as the neoliberal economic eliminationism pushes these permanently unemployed people to sub-living existence, so will the global economic demands shrink for two major reasons. First, there will be few consumers with disposable income. This tendency will be even more amplified by the depression of wages of working people with jobs due to the oversupply of potential workers on the job market. Second, the state tax revenue—i.e., the state being another big consumer—will drop as well, because of the shrinking number of people with jobs who pay taxes and diminished incomes of the employees. Malthus further showed that an economic switch from the production of wage goods—goods, supporting workers (middle- and low-classes)—to the luxury goods, which are very limited, would further suppress production (Curreri, 2006). In other words, Malthus' argumentation leads to the conclusion that the economic eliminationism of consumers makes the economy unstable, inflexible to labor market fluctuations, and potentially catastrophically shrinking.

In addition, the opposition between an increasing underclass of nonconsumers, barely surviving on a sub-living welfare income, and a small number of super-rich might create enormous social and political instability and unrest. It may lead to civil class wars and revolutions overthrowing neoliberal economic eliminationism.

Alternatively, it may lead to the creation of class apartheid, concentration camps for "the economically superfluous," and even genocidal eliminationism, where "the economically superfluous" people will be physically eliminated. Recently, in his novel *Super Sad True Love Story*, Gary Shteyngart creates this type of dystopia of such economic neoliberal eliminationism that resulted from technological unemployment. In the novel, everyone is scored on the neoliberal economic metrics, superfluous people are put in concentration camps and some are even physically eliminated (Shteyngart, 2010). The current deepening gaps in economic inequalities and the hegemony of neoliberal ideology and policies in many countries (especially in the United States) makes this neoliberal economic eliminationism likely, in which case this neoliberal economic eliminationism may end up catastrophically and very violently.

Creation of Fake Jobs

In the Soviet Union, in a grocery store, it took three clerks to sell a piece of meat (Graeber, 2013, August 17). One clerk would cut and weigh a piece of meat for a customer. This clerk would also wrap the meat, set it apart, and give a ticket with the price to the customer. Then the customer would go to another clerk, a cashier, give the ticket, and pay for the meat. Finally, with a receipt from the cashier verifying the pay, the customer would go to the third clerk, who would pick up the receipt and give the wrapped piece of meat to the customer. The Soviet Union had full employment, and any adult without a job (unless a student, disabled, or a babysitter) was considered to be a criminal and if caught, sent to jail from 2 to 5 years with confiscation of property.[6] Without a market economy, the economic efficiency of jobs could not be determined in the USSR.[7] However, the economic inefficacy was very evident in a constant growing deficit of goods. Full employment was an ideological demand and not an economic phenomenon (Groys, 2009). It is safe to assume that many jobs in the Soviet Union were fake and they were created in order to support the ideologically driven full employment.

Sometimes, fake jobs in the name of "a jobs program" are created in capitalist countries. Thus, in the time of the Great Depression, on September 13, 1935 politician William Aberhart of the Social Credit Party in Alberta gave a speech to the Canadian Club in Toronto. He was unhappy because government building projects were not using modern large-scale machines in the name of job creation:

> One of the school graduates came to me to pay his respects to the school; he told me he was in charge of helping on one of the Dominion airports. I said to him, "I suppose you use modern machinery in your airports?"
>
> "No, sir."
>
> "Why?"
>
> "Well," he said, "if we used modern machinery in the establishment of airports there would be very little need of men to help us to do it, for they would do it so rapidly and easily that there would be no need of man labour. We give them picks and shovels and put them out to do it in the old-fashioned way."
>
> I smiled and said to him: "It would probably be just as well to give them spoons and forks; it would take them still longer to do it." It seemed to me so ridiculous; we let modern machinery rust at the road side or

[6] See: (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%8F%D0%B4%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE).

[7] In his 1988 audiotaped testimony and reflection titled "About the accident on the Chernobyl atomic plant," Valery Legasov, a Soviet scientist who led the Soviet government committee to contain the Chernobyl disaster, provided a devastating critique of the Soviet socialist system and its effect on the Soviet chemical and atomic industries in which Legasov was deeply involved as a scientist. Legasov showed that the Soviet socialist strong vertical of power suppressed any technological or strategic expert dissent on a systematic basis, thus, often reserving to the only one possible feedback on Party decisions: emergencies, accidents, and disasters, which in its own turn created the atmosphere of constant pressure of urgencies and promoted tunnel visions in decision makers. http://www.pseudology.org/razbory/Legasov/00.htm (as it is now, available only in Russian).

> airport and make those men bend their backs in order to give them the purchasing power to buy the necessities of life, and hardly that.[8] (http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/10/10/spoons-shovels/)

The use of public works for addressing technological unemployment is not new. In the early nineteenth century, famous French economist Jean-Baptiste Say wrote, "[A] benevolent administration can appropriately make provision for the employment of supplanted or inactive labor in the construction of works of public utility at public expense, as in construction of canals, roads, churches, or the like …" (Treatise, 1803 [1814], p. 88; cited in and translated by Baumol, 1999, p. 198). Recently, economist Mathew Forstater argued that public works and guaranteed jobs in the public sector may be the ideal solution for technological unemployment because, unlike welfare or guaranteed income schemes, they provide people with the social recognition and meaningful engagement that comes with work (Forstater, 2001, 2015).

In my judgment, these policies tried hardly and long time under real Socialism, miserably failed, because of creating unneeded "fake jobs." The main reason for this failure is that the genuine economic need for public works will quickly run into conflict with employment needs. The economic need for public works involves: (1) the necessity of the work to be done (i.e., a genuine use value), (2) the necessity that this work be done as efficiently and as economically as possible, saving money, time, and effort resources, and (3) avoiding injury and fatal accidents and catastrophes. In contrast, the employment goal involves as many workers as possible for as much time as possible. The two examples of economic absurdities and inefficiencies above, do not represent aberrations or extremes of using public works for addressing technological unemployment. Instead, they are a logical consequence of the concern to ensure employment (often in times of economic distress of depression or recession), taking over economic concerns. Because of the necessity of employment, these public jobs become fake jobs.

Anthropology professor David Graeber (2013, August 17, 2018) discusses the possibility of creating nonpublic fake jobs (he called them "bullshit jobs") in response to technological unemployment. Among other evidence, Graeber (2018) cites the YouGov survey in the UK in

[8] Later, a similar story was told by the famous economist Milton Friedman about some Asian country.

2015, according to which 37% of British workers claimed that their jobs did not have any meaningful contribution, constituting "bullshit jobs." Graeber provides various reasons for the emergence of these fake jobs: personal or corporate ego of boosting of self-importance, out-of-control bureaucratization, bad management, and so on. This occurs in all times, of course, but, Graeber argues, technological unemployment provides necessary resources while political and social culture provides an ideological cover-up for the phenomenon. The creation of fake, economically unnecessary or unneeded, jobs (i.e., without any use value behind them),—thus creating intentional inefficiencies in the economy—prevents unemployment when human labor is not needed in the private and public sectors. The overall goal of the creation of fake jobs can be political—to prevent the unrest of unemployed people—and to preserve the cultural and moral value of work when the value of a person is measured by the work, he/she does. People in power do not like it when people have a lot of free time on their hands,

> While corporations may engage in ruthless downsizing, the layoffs and speed-ups invariably fall on that class of people who are actually making, moving, fixing and maintaining things; through some strange alchemy no one can quite explain, the number of salaried paper-pushers ultimately seems to expand, and more and more employees find themselves, not unlike Soviet workers actually, working 40 or even 50 hour weeks on paper, but effectively working 15 hours just as Keynes predicted, since the rest of their time is spent organizing or attending motivational seminars, updating their facebook profiles or downloading TV box-sets.
>
> The answer clearly isn't economic: it's moral and political. The ruling class has figured out that a happy and productive population with free time on their hands is a mortal danger (think of what started to happen when this even began to be approximated in the '60s[9]). And, on the other hand, the feeling that work is a moral value in itself, and that anyone not willing to submit themselves to some kind of intense work discipline for most of their waking hours deserves nothing, is extraordinarily convenient for them. (Graeber, 2013, August 17)

Graeber sees evidence of an increasing number of fake jobs in the administrative and managerial sector, "'professional, managerial, clerical,

[9] Graeber seems to refer to the Civil Rights movement and unrests here.

sales, and service workers' tripled, growing 'from one-quarter to three-quarters of total employment.' In other words, productive jobs have, just as predicted, been largely automated away…" (Graeber, 2013, August 17). Politicians often use "job creation" as a justification of their policies even at the expense of efficiency. Thus, Graeber cites then Illinois Senator Barak Obama,

> "I don't think in ideological terms. I never have," Obama said, continuing on the health care theme. "Everybody who supports single-payer health care says, 'Look at all this money we would be saving from insurance and paperwork.' That represents one million, two million, three million jobs [filled by] people who are working at Blue Cross Blue Shield or Kaiser or other places. What are we doing with them? Where are we employing them?" (David Sirota, "Mr. Obama Goes to Washington," Nation, June 26, 2006, https://www.thenation.com/article/mr-obama-goes-washington/)

Graeber raises important questions about this quote,

> I would encourage the reader to reflect on this passage because it might be considered a smoking gun. What is the [senator] saying here? He acknowledges that millions of jobs in medical insurance companies like Kaiser or Blue Cross are unnecessary. He even acknowledges that a socialized health system would be more efficient than the current market-based system, since it would reduce unnecessary paperwork and reduplication of effort by dozens of competing private firms. But he's also saying it would be undesirable for that very reason. One motive, he insists, for maintaining the existing market-based system is precisely its inefficiency, since it is better to maintain those millions of basically useless office jobs than to cast about trying to find something else for the paper pushers to do. (Graeber, 2018, p. 157)

Many economists despise the idea of creating unproductive labor as a means of dealing with technological unemployment. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx were in agreement when they despised unproductive labor as parasitical, actually a kind of perversion of labor, as though nothing were worthy of this name which did not enrich the world (Arendt, 1958, p. 86).

Creating fake jobs will be economically viable for an economy with a decreasing need for real human labor. Growing productivity due to automatization and robotization will make fake jobs affordable. However, I argue, fake jobs are economically undesirable. In a way, the creation of fake jobs approach to technological unemployment is the opposite of the economic neoliberal eliminationism approach, because the former creates economic waste, while the latter cuts it.

I agree with Graeber that creating fake jobs is a bad idea because it increases human alienation from work and disrupts the economy. The three Soviet store clerks created three long lines for the customers who had to spend painful hours in them. Working with shovels to dig soil, instead of using available machinery, creates unnecessary pains of toiling, tolling the workers' health.

However, there can be problems with David Graeber's argument that the creation of fake jobs is what increasingly goes on now in many developed capitalist countries. Capitalism is inherently based on inefficiencies. Indeed, fake jobs have always been present in capitalism. But they may present for a different reason than Graeber argued. There is always a limited number of fake jobs in capitalism because the capitalist market rationale of supply matching demand is never precise and immediate—like the law of probability, it works in the long run and not in the short run, and, of course, not because of its concern about perpetual unemployment. However, sooner or later, these inherent economic inefficiencies of capitalism are tested through the regulated market, regulated competition, and occasional economic crises. Yes, inefficient private enterprises can do well for a while, bubbles can be created and grow for a while, but then they eventually collapse (unless the state keeps these economic inefficacies going). A more job-lean and efficient competitor will take over the market and/or give more profit to shareholders if the competition is fair—which is a big if in real Capitalism. Finally, even though the success of an economy is often measured by a low rate of unemployment, so far there has been no evidence for a strong ideology of keeping jobs for preventing unemployment, at least not in the United States (although it may change under the Trump presidency who may bring national socialism—i.e., nationalist statism—into the American economy or it may occur in the Democratic Party's response to Trumpism).

Banning/Refusing/Resisting Technological Innovation (Neo-Luddism)

Technological innovations and progress can be very painful. Work is not only an economic category but also a lifestyle and identity. Economic efficiencies can destroy people's livelihood and well-being. As I discussed above, technological innovations were occasionally banned already in the late Middle Ages to protect labor (see Dron, 2014, April). Calls for policies, curbing the use of machinery, famously culminated in the riot movement of the Luddites. This trend continues well into the twentieth century. Thus, in 1924, Mahatma Gandhi wrote, "What I object to, is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labour-saving machinery. Men go on 'saving labour,' till thousands are without work and thrown on the open streets to die of starvation" (Gandhi, 1981, p. 378). Gandhian economics (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gandhian_economics) called for a delay in the uptake of labor-saving machines until unemployment was alleviated. However, the first Indian Prime Minister Nehru rejected this approach.

Probably the most famous implementation of the policy of slowing the introduction of technological innovation in the twentieth century in the name of high employment was in China under Mao,

> Mao ... certainly believed Man as supreme to the Machine. His 'walking on two legs' policy was meant to provide opportunities to the vast manpower in rural China to participate in construction activities and so he deliberately reduced the use of machinery, wherever men could be employed. Under the Great Leap Forward he decentralised production units, so that the needs of every community could be met by factories located in them. He wanted a 'productive mix' of man and machine without relying solely on the latter, as some of his opponents wanted to do. He felt that such decentralisation of economic power would help in developing the country and also the strength of the people instead of concentrating in the growth in urban metropolises like Shanghai and Peking. (Vepa, 2003, p. 183)

Mao's totalitarian economic policies were carried out and characterized by the use of state violence to achieve its economic desires. As a result, intentionally suppressing science and technology, was catastrophic for many Chinese people and the Chinese economy. It contributed to a famine[10] that killed about 36 million people, based on the latest estimation (Yang, Friedman, Guo, & Mosher, 2012) or even maybe as many as 45 million (Dikötter, 2010). In addition, about 2.5 million were tortured and beaten to death and between 1 and 3 million committed suicide.

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Chinese_Famine.

Hong Kong historian Frank Dikötter reports that during the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese economy initially grew: iron production increased 45% in 1958 and a combined 30% over the next two years, but plummeted in 1961, and did not reach the previous 1958 level until 1964. The quality of the produced iron was often very low, making it impossible to use. In addition, the set high norms of iron production by the Communist Party forced people to melt useful products made of iron, thus actually destroying iron-made products. The Great Leap also led to the greatest destruction of real estate in human history, outstripping any of the bombing campaigns from World War II. Approximately 30–40% of all houses were turned to rubble. Frank Dikötter states that "homes were pulled down to make fertilizer, to build canteens, to relocate villagers, to straighten roads, to make place for a better future beckoning ahead or simply to punish their owners" (Dikötter, 2010, pp. xi–xii).

In some religious communities like the Amish, technology is examined by a special council chaired by the district bishop twice a year. Social and religious consequences of a new technology are considered. For example, "Electricity, automobiles, television, clothing fashion, and the like are considered to be distractions that promote pride, envy, vanity, sloth, dishonesty and other undesirable traits… A technology may be accepted for business or practical reasons, but never for indulgence, desire or entertainment. A technology is more likely to be accepted if it is a natural extension of an existing technology and will have a minimal social impact. Using a nylon rope in place of a hemp rope would be an example of a natural extension" (Wise, 2010, August 30). "However, the electricity needed to run a modern dairy must be produced, typically using gas or diesel generators. This may be more expensive than grid electricity, but lacks the degree of intrusion on Amish values and households that would result if fixed-line external power were used" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordnung#Technology).

There are emerging calls for establishing similar governmental councils for technological innovations to consider possible negative effects of technological innovations on jobs[11] with consequent banning/suppressing those types of new technology. Back in the early 1970s, futurologist Alvin Toffler (1970) called for a "democratic" (read "bureaucratic," Graeber,

[11] Of course, not only on jobs but on environment, health, social justice, safety, and so on (e.g., O'Neil, 2017).

2015, p. 118) oversight over technological innovations and their potential adverse effects on the society.

> …technological questions can no longer be answered in technological terms alone. They are political questions. Indeed, they affect us more deeply than most of the superficial political issues that occupy us today. This is why we cannot continue to make technological decisions in the old way. We cannot permit them to be made haphazardly, independently of one another. We cannot permit them to be dictated by short-run economic considerations alone. We cannot permit them to be made in a policy vacuum. And we cannot casually delegate responsibility for such decisions to businessmen, scientists, engineers or administrators who are unaware of the profound consequences of their own actions. (Toffler, 1970, p. 436)

In response to Toffler's call, an Office of Technological Assessment (OTA) was created in 1972. The Office was defunded and closed in 1995 as useless governmental waste by Newt Gingrich's Congress, who was ironically a follower of Toffler. In her 2008 Presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton pledged to reinstate OTA. "In April 2010 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars released a report entitled 'Reinventing Technology Assessment' that emphasized citizen engagement and called for performing the functions of the OTA by creating a nationwide network of nonpartisan policy research organizations, universities, and science museums: the Expert & Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology (ECAST) network. ECAST would conduct both expert and participatory technology assessments for Congress and other clients" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Technology_Assessment). The European Union has established a similar office called "The European Parliamentary Technology Assessment" (EPTA). Finally, in 2015, the Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation incubated a new startup called TechCongress, to bring tech talent, ideas, and training to Congress, and to build a practical and pragmatic understanding of Washington within the tech community (https://www.techcongress.io/).

Microsoft founder, billionaire-philanthropist Bill Gates worries about technological unemployment. In March 2015, at the American Enterprise Institute meeting, he argued that "Technology over time will reduce demand for jobs, particularly at the lower end of the skill set. Twenty years from now, labour demand for lots of skill sets will be substantially lower. I don't think people have that in their mental model" (Greber, 2015).

To address this problem, Gates proposed in February 2017 that robots should be taxed. By taxing the robots, he argued, we would slow down the pace of automation and the funds raised could be used to retrain and financially support displaced workers, who could then move into new jobs in health care, education, or other areas where human labor is needed. However, in the same month, the European Parliament rejected a proposal for a tax on robot owners, the proceeds of which would retrain the workers who had lost their jobs. Preservation of the employment status quo at the expense of slowing the technological progress of automatization may be detrimental to the realization of humanity's potential (Titcomb, 2017, February 20).

In the 2016 Presidential US elections, the proposal to curb technological advances has been articulated from the Left by Senator Bernie Sanders and from the Right, by now, President Donald Trump. Both are against globalization and trade deals, involving job outsourcing—a modern engine of technological advances. Globalized job outsourcing propels technological innovations by lowering costs of production for technological innovation, lowering consumer costs, reducing the cycles of introduction and adaptation of the innovations, reducing initial capital for innovations, and alleviating poor countries—like China, Vietnam, and India—from poverty (Wang, 2014). However, outsourcing also creates local unemployment for some type of jobs in developed countries. Most significantly, it also speeds up the pace of total technological unemployment. Recently, at the end of November 2016, Senator Sanders introduced the Outsourcing Prevention Act, "We need to send a very loud and very clear message to corporate America: the era of outsourcing is over. Instead of offshoring jobs, the time has come for you to start bringing good-paying jobs back to the United States of America."

Similarly, President Trump threatens companies that are outsourcing jobs with new tariffs and taxes. Ironically, a vast majority of Sanders' and Trump's supporters do not want to accept the economic consequences of their job protection policies. Thus, according to the Associated Press-GfK poll on April 14, 2016,

> Nearly three in four say they would like to buy goods manufactured inside the United States, but those items are often too costly or difficult to find… A mere 9 percent say they only buy American.
>
> Asked about a real world example of choosing between $50 pants made in another country or an $85 pair made in the United States — one retailer

> sells two such pairs made with the same fabric and design — 67 percent say they'd buy the cheaper pair. Only 30 percent would pony up for the more expensive American-made one. People in higher earning households earning more than $100,000 a year are no less likely than lower-income Americans to say they'd go for the lower price.
>
> "Low prices are a positive for US consumers — it stretches budgets and allows people to save for their retirements, if they're wise, with dollars that would otherwise be spent on day-to-day living," said Sonya Grob, 57, a middle school secretary from Norman, Oklahoma who described herself as a "liberal Democrat". (Boak & Swanson, 2016, April 14)

The economic and social impact of job outsourcing for a developed country is complex and its analysis is ambivalent. It is much easier to calculate how many jobs are lost in developed countries as a result of outsourcing, but it is much more difficult to calculate how many jobs are gained as a result of more trade, economic activities, increasing production in other areas, low prices, more consumer spending, and growing technological innovations (Milberg & Winkler, 2013). No doubt, unregulated job outsourcing can and does create many problems like sweatshops, child labor, ecological degradation. However, in my judgment, job protectionism and isolationism can lead to economic disasters of tariff trade wars, political confrontations, high prices, high inflation, economic inefficacy, economic stagnation, global economic depression, even higher unemployment, and even ecological catastrophe.

The latter is evident in President Trump's promises to revitalize the coal industry in the United States, which is both ecologically dangerous and economically unviable. In May 2016, on his Presidential campaign, Trump promised to Appalachian coal miners, "We're going to get those miners back to work … the miners of West Virginia and Pennsylvania, which was so great to me last week, Ohio and all over are going to start to work again, believe me. They are going to be proud again to be miners." The total US coal mine employment dropped 5 times from 250,000 in 1980 to about 50,000 by the end of 2016 and its share of energy production has fallen to 16%. In 2015, 94 coal-fired power plants were closed in the United States. In 2016, 40 more were expected to close by the end of December 2016 (Krauss & Corkery, 2016, November 19). "Coal production declines in 2016, with average coal prices below their 2015 level" (https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29472#). Coal production is not only ecologically dangerous, highly affecting the rate of pollution, deterioration of public health, and global warming, but also it is less and less economically needed.

In her highly criticized speech, 2016 Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton "promised" to "put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business." However, she also promised to help them,

> So for example, I'm the only candidate which has a policy about how to bring economic opportunity using clean renewable energy as the key into coal country. Because we're going to put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business, right?
>
> And we're going to make it clear that we don't want to forget those people. Those people labored in those mines for generations, losing their health, often losing their lives to turn on our lights and power our factories.
>
> Now we've got to move away from coal and all the other fossil fuels, but I don't want to move away from the people who did the best they could to produce the energy that we relied on. (Hillary Clinton, March 13, 2016, the CNN TV One Democratic Presidential Town Hall, http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/03/13/full-rush-transcript-hillary-clinton-partcnn-tv-one-democratic-presidential-town-hall/)

Later Hillary Clinton elaborated,

> We're not going to go back to an energy system that looks like it did in the 20th Century. We know that we need to protect our children's health and futures by combating climate change and accelerating the transition to a clean energy economy.
>
> But that is still a transition. Anyone who pretends that we can flip a switch and be in the clean energy future tomorrow isn't being honest with you either. So we need to try everything we can to cut carbon pollution. That includes supporting cutting edge work being done right here in Appalachia in institutions working on carbon capture and sequestration technology.
>
> This is too important to take any possible solution off the table.
>
> I believe that if we're going to go around the country, talking about the benefits of a clean energy economy, which I have done for more than a year, that we have a responsibility to come to this region of the country and look people in the eye and talk about what that really means for your lives and livelihoods. (Jones, 2016, May 4)

Clinton developed "a $30 billion, 4,300-word plan to retrain coal workers that covers everything from education and infrastructure to tax credits and school funding" (Walsh, 2016, May 10).

It is not clear whether Clinton treated increasing coalminer unemployment as local technological unemployment or as the total one. Traditional politicians often see "education"—i.e., professional retraining—as a solution for local technological unemployment. Although it can be questionable how easily (if at all) many coalminers can be retrained for "cutting-edge work" and technology, "education" (i.e., "retraining") cannot address the total technological unemployment resulting from a shrinking need for human labor. Autor and Dorn (2013) and some other economists argue that "education" alone will not be sufficient to solve technological unemployment, pointing to recent declines in the demand for many intermediate skills, and suggesting that not everyone is capable of becoming proficient in the most advanced skills. Pol and Reveley argue that with the raise of the global technological unemployment, youth may be trapped in a "cycle of immiseration," when educated young people won't be able to pay off their student loans because of a lack of jobs for them (Pol & Reveley, 2017). Kim Taipale, Founder and Executive Director of the Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies, insists that "The era of bell curve distributions that supported a bulging social middle class is over and we are headed for the power-law distribution of economic opportunities [The kinds of work performed by 'information creators, exploiters and decision-makers'—entertainers, artists, CEOs, entrepreneurs, technology architects, etc.] Education per se is not going to make up the difference" (Bollier, 2013, p. 20). Nobel Prize winner in economics Paul Krugman (2011, March 6) argues that better education would be an insufficient solution to technological unemployment, "It's no longer true that having a college degree guarantees that you'll get a good job, and it's becoming less true with each passing decade."

In short, none of the 2016 US Presidential candidates was addressing the problem of the upcoming technological unemployment. In my judgment, both Sanders' and Trump's solutions to resisting technological unemployment are counter-productive and harmful while Clinton's retraining solution is ineffective. Ironically, Sanders/Trump's job protectionism and isolationism may accelerate the rate of automatization and robots to replace high-cost American workers altogether (Diggle, 2017, January 25).

Welfare Needs-Based Payments to the Permanently Unemployed

In a work/labor-based society and culture, permanent (but not necessarily technological) unemployment is a big problem. In contrast to traditional economically underdeveloped nations where permanent unemployment threatens starvation, as it was in Gandhi's India of the first part of the twentieth century, in developed industrial and post-industrial societies permanent (technological and non-technological) unemployment often leads to generational needs-based welfare programs. Society, through its governmental policies and bureaucracies, constantly patronizes and, thus, humiliates the recipients of needs-based welfare programs, often viewing them as waste or even parasites, ready to cheat on the working part of society. Paradoxically, any gradual attempts of the recipient to move away from welfare programs are threatened with punishing cuts. The government closely monitors the recipients' financial accounts and decides what kind of food can be bought by using food stamps. Infractions by welfare recipients that are not very costly for working, especially for middle-class people, may threaten the entire well-being of the recipients by causing them to lose their welfare benefits. Often even their constitutional rights are ignored. For example, recently, Florida and Georgia passed laws requiring drug screening for welfare recipients. Fortunately, these laws were blocked by the courts judging these laws unconstitutional, violating the Constitution's Fourth Amendment ban on illegal search and seizure.

Nevertheless, "a 2011 poll by Quinnipiac University showed that 71 percent of Floridians — including 90 percent of Republicans — supported the drug testing law… 'It was always a favorable political issue for [politicians]. Welfare recipients are never popular with voters,' said Florida Atlantic University political science professor Kevin Wagner" (Sherman, 2015, March 10). Recently, in March 2017, the US Republican Congress voted to allow states to drug test the unemployed.[12] In work-based societies, needs-based welfare recipients are often viewed as second-class citizens. This solution seems to be very similar to the economic neoliberal eliminationism that may lead to political oppression, instability, unrest, and, probably, even wars.

[12] http://fox6now.com/2017/03/15/congress-votes-to-allow-states-to-drug-test-the-unemployed-tmwsp/.

Shortening Working Time

Several scholars believe that the phenomenon of *total* technological unemployment has been with us for more than two hundred years (e.g., Graeber, 2013, August 17). Even in his famous 1930 article, where he coined the term "technological employment," Keynes alluded that it had been tacitly going on for some time. The evidence for the *hidden total* technological unemployment can be the following. As I showed in the statistics above, since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century, the average time spent on labor/work has been systematically dropping both within a workweek and proportionately to a lifespan and in absolute numbers. This process continues now (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/average-weekly-hours). In other words, so far, the constant and gradual reduction of the economic need for labor might have been compensated for by the constant, gradual, and invisible reduction in the average time workers spent on labor. That might be why, ironically, unemployment was not part of this hidden total technological unemployment! Thus, the phenomenon we are discussing should be renamed. Instead of calling it "[total] technological unemployment," as Keynes did in 1930, it should be probably called "*the constant technological reduction of the economic need for human labor*" (or something like that). The constant technological reduction of the economic need for human labor may or may not lead to permanent unemployment. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century and up to now, the constant technological reduction of the economic need for human labor might have been balanced by the constant decrease in labor time for a worker.

However, things may change in the near future or, as some argue (e.g., McAfee, 2013), things already have been changing. Although probably caused by constant increasing productivity, the mechanism of constant shortening working time remains unclear. At times, this mechanism involved a political struggle for shortening hours of the workweek, but the constant shortening working time has occurred without any political class struggle as well. There may be "an invisible hand" of the marketplace balancing the economic need for human labor and the amount of labor time workers spend. However, the balance between the *gradual* reduction of labor time and the *rapid* reduction of the need for labor may soon become or is already becoming upset. This may lead to real permanent unemployment for an increasing number of workers.

Instead of relying on the invisible hand of the marketplace balancing the economic need for human labor and the amount of labor time workers spend, some scholars argue that government regulation, shortening working hours for the workweek or introducing early retirement while keeping the same salary, is needed to prevent permanent unemployment. Thus, a Socialist government in France limited the workweek to 35 hours in 2000. Sweden has been experimenting with a 6-hour workday (30-hour workweek), starting in 2002 on the Toyota service centers in Gothenburg. In contrast to France, in Sweden, the purpose of shortening working time has not been purely the concern about unemployment reduction but also improvement of the workers' well-being, increasing the quality of life, and decreasing carbon footprint. Ironically, shortening working time in Sweden led to such an increase in productivity and intensification of labor that some Swedish companies do not hire new workers, while others (e.g., hospitals) have found new hiring very expensive (Alderman, 2016, May 20). By the end of 2019, the unemployment rate in Sweden is 6.8%; in the United States, it is 3.5%; and in France, it is 8.6%—the patterns of the unemployment rates in these 3 countries do not provide a clear answer of whether the government's shortening working time for reducing unemployment is successful or not (http://www.tradingeconomics.com). Swedish and French experimentations with the state's firm regulation of working time raise an issue with their rigidity for businesses that may need flexibility of working hours.

The ideas of shortening working hours and genuine full employment as an expression of human dignity are aligned and can be found already in Marx (although he was very confused and ambivalent about that as discussed above). This development would be the result of legislation, resulting from a political struggle, according to Marx,

> …a reduction of the hours of labour was also indispensable to give the working class more time for mental culture. Legislative restrictions were the first step towards the mental and physical elevation and the ultimate emancipation of the working classes. Nobody denied, nowadays, that the State must interfere on behalf of the women and children; and a restriction of their hours led, in most instances, to a reduction of the working time of the men. England had taken the lead, other countries had been obliged to follow to some extent. The agitation had seriously commenced in Germany, and the London Council was looked to for taking the lead. The principle had been decided at former congresses; the time for action had arrived. (Marx, 1868, p. 387)

As I discussed above, Marx envisioned his Communist Evtopia, where *everyone* will (or must?!) work for a few hours and then spend the rest of their time on hobbies. Why would everyone work when the necessity for work shrinks? It is not clear. Marx and many Marxists proclaim that, in the Marxian Communist Evtopia, there will be a New Human with the new consciousness super sensitive to the societal needs (cf. John F. Kennedy's famous call, "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country"). Work needed to be done would be done by a New Human as his/her self-actualization,

> If there is work to be done, everyone should do some of it; additional remuneration [over and above a "national guaranteed income"] would depend on the type of work an individual performs. But shorter working days, longer vacations, and earlier retirement imply that most of us should never work anything like 'full time' as measured by the standards of the industrializing era. … [but] … Everyone would assume the responsibilities of producing and maintaining public goods, so no able citizen would be freed of the obligation to work. (Aronowitz & DiFazio, 1994, p. 353)

Marx's follower André Gorz legitimately doubts Marx's solution of genuine full but short-hours employment and, instead, introduces forced labor. Like Marx, Gorz sees exclusion from labor as the primordial sin of capitalism. For Gorz, "obligated" (i.e., forced) full but short-hours employment is the solution,

> The essential aspect of an obligation to work in exchange for a guaranteed full income is that this obligation provides the basis for a corresponding right: by obliging individuals to produce by working the income which is guaranteed to them, society obliges itself to guarantee them the opportunity to work and gives them the right to demand this. The obligation it imposes on them is the basis for the right they have over it, the right to be full citizens, individuals like any other, assuming their – increasingly light – share of the burden of necessities and free, by that very token, to be unique persons who, during the rest of their time, may develop their multiple capacities, if such is their desire. I do not claim here to have responded to all the questions and objections that may be raised. (Gorz, 1989, p. 211)

Gorz seems to be unaware that he nicely describes the situation that existed in the Soviet Union and many other Socialist countries of the twentieth century (minus short-hours work). "Obligated" (i.e., forced) labor has to be backed up by criminal law. In the Soviet Union, with its genuine full employment, any adult who was not working on the state enterprises was considered to be "a societal parasite" ("tuneyadets," "тунеядец," in Russian) and was subject to imprisonment and forced labor in a Gulag for 2–5 years with confiscation of their personal property. Lottery winners, students, disabled, retirees due to their old age, and babysitters were exceptions. Working outside of a state enterprise (e.g., private tutoring) was viewed as a crime as well. The state decided the amount of "the guaranteed income" for each. How much was it? A popular Soviet joke reflected it, "They [i.e., the state] pretend to pay us – we pretend to work." Finally, the forced ("obligated" in Gorz's terms) labor is not very economically productive and efficient as the Soviet economy on the whole showed.

However, in my judgment, Gorz is correct in his insistence on the forced/obligated labor as necessary to promote full employment. When labor stops being contractual, and the labor market is abandoned, as it is the case with genuine full employment, labor has to be forced. Since, as I discussed above and Gorz (and Arendt) agrees, labor is inherently alienating, regardless of the political and economic system it exists under, people will not volunteer to work on a systematic and regular basis across the entire economy, beyond special extreme circumstances (like catastrophes[13]) or particular people or particular types of work.

Now, I will turn to a discussion of effects on labor, beyond technological unemployment, that automatization of jobs brings.

Effects of Automatization on Jobs: Labor of Human Smart Machines Will Go, Creative Labor Will Flourish

Automatization is constantly transforming labor. It makes workers more powerful by adding powerful tools in their workers' hands (e.g., a pick hammer), it simplifies a work (e.g., zebra scanners for a checkout cashier),

[13] David Graeber insists that, "all social systems, even economic systems like capitalism, have always been built on top of a bedrock of actually-existing communism." To provide evidence for that he often gives the example of natural catastrophes, when people work together without any exchange in mind (Graeber, 2014, p. 95). I respectfully disagree with him exactly because of these extreme examples – extreme situations cannot be a bedrock for a regular economic life cycle.

it augments human intelligence (e.g., tax calculating software), it entirely replaces human labor with machine labor (e.g., ATM). Automatization eliminates some types of labor, changes the need for other types of labor (e.g., bank teller jobs still exist, but their demand is highly diminished), transforms some other types of jobs, and finally, it creates new types of jobs. In this section, I am going to discuss what kinds of jobs automatization will kill and/or diminish and what kinds of jobs it will promote.

In the late 1990s and through the 2000s, when economists and technology innovators discussed trends of automatization of jobs, they claimed that certain jobs were safe. They figured out that well-defined mechanic repetitive jobs, like checkout-cashiers, and symbolic repetitive jobs of manipulations with well-defined symbols (e.g., numbers), like tax accountants, were susceptible to full automatization. Jobs that involve a complex environmental input like truck drivers or secretaries were considered safe,

> If home grocery delivery ever takes off, and it looks like it will the second time around, the demand for drivers and truck mechanics will increase even more.
>
> This trend should continue until someone invents a Star Trek - like teleportation system or replicator system. So don't hold your breath, delivery services look very, very good for a long time to come. (Robinson, 2004)

By the end of 2019, it is clear that these predictions were only partially correct. The mechanic and symbolic repetitive jobs were indeed unsafe and gone first (but not entirely). The jobs involving a complex environmental input, like truck drivers, were safer and the demand on some of them (such as home delivery car and truck drivers) indeed even increased, but with the final testing of autonomously driving cars (and trucks), they will probably be gone in 10–15 years from now (maybe not completely as well). The jobs of caretakers for disabled elderly, home plumbers and electricians, still seem to be safe because currently they create enormous contextual challenges for the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. Will these challenges be overcome in the remote future—we do not know. Although the human voice still represents a tremendous challenge for automatization, voice-controlled computer-based personal assistants have become a practical reality for a growing number of people using Apple Siri, Google Assistant, Microsoft Cortana, Amazon Alexa, and so on. At the university department where I work, the number of secretaries dropped 4-fold in the last twenty years and their work has been dramatically changed.

Nationwide, from 2001 to 2013, more than 2.5 million secretary jobs disappeared, leaving the number at slightly less than 4 million in 2014 (Covert, 2015, May 4).

An analysis by Oxford economists Frey and Osborne (2013) suggests that 47% of US jobs were at risk of being replaced by automation over the coming two decades. However, their 2016 follow-up report predicts that the impact will be far greater in the developing world than in the developed world. For instance, the report concludes that 69% of jobs in India and 77% in China are at "high risk" of automation much above the 47% they found in the United States and 57% across the OECD (Frey, Osborne, & Holmes, 2016). At the Council of Foreign Relations conference on "Robots and the Future of Jobs" on November 14, 2016, James Manyika, a Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, Inc. and the Director of the McKinsey Global Institute reported that according to their analysis, "30 percent of activities in about 60 percent of jobs could be automated. Well, what does that actually mean? It means that most jobs change, even though the job may not go away in its entirety" (http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-science/robots-future-jobs-economic-impact-artificial-intelligence/p38475).

However, in 1991 Juliet Schor, in her book "The overworked American," cautioned us against an overly enthusiastic acceptance of technological employment and cutting weekly worktime as she claimed that all predictions to that effect from before 1991 have turned to be more or less wrong. She wrote, "on the heels of the widespread predictions that work was disappearing. … By today, it was estimated that we could have either a twenty-hour week, a six-month workyear, or a retirement age of thirty-eight" (Schor, 1991, p. 4). Thus, Schor referred to Russell Lynes' chapter (1958) and on an unidentified 1967 US senate subcommittee testimony published in *Times* magazine for these rosy predictions (Veal, 2009, p. 6). With 5G Internet, Internet of Things, self-driving cars, and new robots on the horizon, within a few years from now, the situation for total technological unemployment may qualitatively change (or not). Past trends for and against technological unemployment do not guarantee its future. As psychologist Amos Tversky argued, "Reality is not a point; it's a cloud of possibilities."[14] That is why, in my view, it is worth to continue discussing it.

So, what may a long-term trend of the effect of automatization on jobs be? I argue that many jobs, in which workers act as smart machines,

[14] http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-big-short-author-michael-lewis-says-this-is-where-you-should-put-your-money-2016-12-07.

may disappear or be greatly reduced by automation. People act as smart machines when they are engaged in performing preset tasks or solving preset problems. These disappearing smart-machine-like jobs can be low or high skill, blue-collar or white-collar, requiring a low level or high level of formal education. As we know now, computer programs based on pattern recognition and pattern production beat world champions in such complicated intellectual games as chess and go. Jobs that will probably not be automated involve creative defining (rather than fulfilling, following or solving) of goals, values, problems, and relationships, designing, and improvizationally performing. In other words, they are open-ended creative jobs, creative labor (Brouillette, 2009). These jobs, such as artists, musicians, designers, entrepreneurs, caretakers, inventors, educators and so on can also involve blue- and white- collar work, some requiring and some not requiring a high level of formal education. Such creative labor is not only unique, unrepeatable, unduplicatable, etc., but is also defined by the authorship of those who perform it. The labor is authorial. In hybrid jobs, involving both manipulation of (predefined) patterns and designing new goals, the goal-designing part will grow. My prediction is in accord with the predictions of many other observers and analysts of the economy, that sooner or later, most smart-machine-like jobs will be gone or significantly reduced, while an economic need for creative authorial jobs will increase (e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Dron, 2014, April; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Pink, 2005; Zhao, 2009, 2012). However, creative authorial jobs may not grow at the rate of reduction of smart-machine-like jobs, as some scholars desire.

Richard Florida (2004) predicted the emergence of "creative class"—people who mostly engage in creative authorial labor—who will have their own class interests, class ethos ("the creative ethos"), and class culture. In his follow-up book (Florida, 2012), he reevaluates his predictions and discusses why the emergence of the creative class has been much slower than he initially predicted. According to Florida, the creative class values diversity, openness, and nonconformity, eschewing "organizational or institutional directives" and embracing city life as freedom from tradition (Florida, 2004, p. 77). Its members are also quite willing to connect self-worth to career success, and they feel "distaste for material things"—because they aspire to live in an era of "post-scarcity," when getting richer and richer has stopped being a value (p. 194). A successful creative career is important for the members of the creative class because it means being granted freedom to pursue creative inclinations without too much concern for market necessities, although losing this creative career can still cause anxieties.

However, in contrast to Florida, Lazzarato notices an important tension in creative labor, the "antagonism" between "autonomy and command." The social commission does not disappear in creative labor, but it "re-poses the antagonism at a higher level, because it both mobilizes and clashes with the very personality of the individual worker" (Lazzarato, 1996, p. 135). A creative worker may disobey a social commission and an administrative command but this disobedience is the very prerequisite for creative productivity (Lazzarato, 1996, p. 136) because by its very definition creative labor has to create new goals, new values, new desires, and new demands that violate the old ones.

Creative authorial labor is based on workers' authorial agency involving creative transcendence of the given—nature, culture, tradition, values, goals, relationships—recognized and evaluated by others and it is based on the worker in dialogue with others. Creative labor is always socially authored because it involves the author–work–audience relationship, which brings any kind of meaning "into play" (Lazzarato, 1996, p. 146). It involves the creative worker's self-actualization, self-realization, and dialogue subordinated to existing, emerging, and/or designed social commissions and necessities. Thus, in sum, creative labor is still alienating although not as much as the labor of acting as smart machines.

Some enterprises try to create an illusion of leisurely freedom for their creative workers, for example, a workplace at Facebook provides more freedom, reduces stress, and cares more about their workers than Google and many other companies (Gillett, 2015, April 28). However, as Terranova and Brouillette argue, creative labor "nurtures, exploits, and exhausts" (Terranova, 2000, p. 51) "its labor force by ongoing affective social production of self-sacrificing and self-motivated workers, people who freely offer their creative labor because it is experienced as non-laborious pleasure or as moral compulsion" (Brouillette, 2009, p. 143). A creative worker's enjoyment and commitment to creativity, self-expression, and self-actualization often leads to self-exploitation. Florida did not recognize the alienation and exploitation of the inherent and existential human need for creativity and self-actualization in creative labor, bounded by social commission (e.g., of work). "Florida's mistake is seeing the commingling of capitalism and creative expression as a benign or even ideal realization of the end of soul-destroying labor. It is, rather, an intensification of exploitation, though it is often experienced as the opposite" (Brouillette, 2009, p. 143). Although it may be true that there may be a grey area between self-exploitation and creativity, labor and market forces might promote exploitation.

This self-exploitation of creative authorial labor is often experienced even by freelancers, who "do not have bosses." A successful and rather famous artist complained to me that at times he feels he is "a creativity production machine." Everyone, including himself, expects creative art from him that will be appreciated by an audience both with and without money on a systematic basis. Not only does the artist's economic well-being depend on a systematic production of acclaimed creativity, but also his personal and professional reputation and self-worth do. Once one is a successful professional artist, one should stay a successful artist forever. He told me that at times he had anxieties and even nightmares that his creativity would dry out, either because of a writing block or due to producing low-quality, non-acclaimed, artwork. In my view, in part, this is also a result of the lingering prevailing work and necessity-based culture and system of values. We do not live in the leisure-based society yet—and changing values, especially such a huge cultural value as "work," "diligence," "productivity," "usefulness for society," so on—will be very very hard to transcend. Often even super-wealthy people are anxious about whether they are worthy if they do not work, regardless of their wealth (Johnson, 2003).

In sum, there are four possible major changes in the labor economy:

1. Reduction of overall average time needed by the economy that workers spend on their jobs;
2. Reduction of smart-machine-like labor;
3. Increase in demand for creative authorial labor;
4. Emergence of total technological unemployment.

Now, in the next chapter, I will switch to considering the notion of leisure, as an alternative for humans' focus on satisfying the necessities, and the economy and society supporting it.

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CHAPTER 5

Genuine Leisure: "Eat to Live, Don't Live to Eat"

What would happen if people did not need to labor and work for their survival and well-being? Would their lives change and if so how? Would they try to labor and work, even when they do not need to do it for their survival and/or well-being? Would they commit to idleness or to "a passive consumption of mindless" TV shows/movies, partying, games, and decadence? Would they engage in creative activities with other people? Would they engage in critical dialogues in public forums? Do we live to survive and fulfill our needs OR do we survive and meet our needs in order to live? If the latter, what "to live beyond survival and needs" means for humans? All these questions target the notion of "human nature." This chapter is about the investigation of human nature and the human condition that promotes it. I argue here that the true human nature is genuine leisure.

The concept of human nature is often discussed as being either fixed or unfixed.[1] Fixed human nature is viewed as a natural human capacity, such as rationality, cognition, mediation, toolmaking, language, or as natural limitations of these human capacities, such as psychological limitations or even dysfunctionalities. For example, psychologist Stanley Milgram found that many people would administer a deadly electrical shock to another person when asked by authority even though they disagree with the order (Milgram, 1974). Similarly, cognitive scientists found many limitations on

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_nature.

E. Matusov, *Envisioning Education in a Post-Work Leisure-Based Society*,
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human rational thinking or even awareness of being influenced by manipulated contexts. Thus, just hearing several words that describe old people may slow down participants' pace of walking—the so-called priming effect. Also, many participants of a psychological experiment would reply that an outspoken woman is more likely to be a feminist secretary than just a secretary despite an undeniable fact that the former is a subset of the latter, and thus is less probable (Kahneman, 2013).

However, in this chapter, I mainly focus on an unfixed, even transcending, concept of human nature. Thus, psychologist Ernst Boesch argued that "…a main trait of human reality is to transcend itself…" (Boesch, 1993, p. 15). Similarly, economist James Buchanan (1979) insisted that a human being is different from all other animals in being "*artifactual*"—i.e., creating new cultural constraints that promote new desires and new subjectivities in his or her own new and not entirely predictable being, "We are, and will be, at least in part, that which we make ourselves to be. We construct our own beings, again within limits. We are artifactual, as much like the pottery shards that the archaeologists dig up as like the animals whose fossils they also find" (pp. 94–95). Russian philosopher Vladimir Bibler introduced a notion of "a person of culture" that focuses on the production of a new culture through transcendence of the given culture as the key feature of human nature (Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009).

German philosopher, economist, and cofounder of Marxism, Friedrich Engels argued that the transcending human nature is a result of labor and necessities, "[Labor] is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself" (Engels, 1972, p. 1).[2] Studying labor and its historical transformations is the key to understanding the transcending human nature, according to Engels. As I discussed in Chapter 3, *labor* and *work* are inherently driven by survival and necessity. Thus, in a way, Engels echoed the popular proverb that "Necessity is the mother of invention." According to this view, without the sharp and painful spur of survival and necessity, the transcending nature of humanity would collapse. It reminds me of one of my undergraduate students in a teacher education program who claimed that without being required to attend classes, backed by

[2] It is unclear if Karl Marx saw this essay by Engels and if so, whether he agreed with it. The essay was written in June 1876 but published only in 1896, 13 years after Marx's death (http://www.marx2mao.com/M&E/PPL76.html#en1).

grades, she would spend all her time in bed. Would carefree people, when their survival and necessity needs are satisfied, commit themselves only to idleness, passive, meaningless consumption, decadent, and deviant activities? I argue here that although labor might create conditions for true, human nature which may lead to instrumentalism and exploitation, it does not define it or shape it. In other words, human nature can flourish outside of survival, necessity, and consumption. Together with such Greek philosophers as Plato and Aristotle (see below), I argue that human nature thrives in leisure.

But what is leisure? Is "free time"—free from work time—leisure (cf. de Grazia, 1962)? What is genuine leisure, and what is fake leisure? Below, I will examine the carefree historical conditions of the lives of the rich, of childhood, and of retirement, to check whether or not the transcending human nature requires survival and necessity. And if not, what does active transcendent leisure look like and what human condition promotes it. Can invention have many mothers and if so, what do the non-necessity mothers of invention look like? Finally, is transcending human nature reduced to invention only, or is invention a part of transcending human nature? If so, what do other parts of transcending human nature look like? To address these questions, I will start my investigation by considering "fake leisure" that distorts or confuses genuine human nature.

Fake Leisure

De Grazia (1962) criticized the definition of leisure that equates leisure with simply having free, discretionary time—"as the time left over after various obligations have been fulfilled" (Chambré, 1987, p. 6). Free time is a prerequisite for leisure, but it does not guarantee it. Free time can be filled with "fake leisure." Godbey defines fake leisure (or "anti-leisure" in his term) in the following way,

> …activity which is undertaken compulsively, as a means to an end, from a perception of necessity, with considerable anxiety, with a high degree of time-consciousness, with a minimum of personal autonomy and which avoids self-actualization, authentication of finitude. (Godbey, 1976, p. 46)

Thus, fake leisure is associated with determinism, necessity, and a lack of agency. Reading literature on leisure, I can distinguish several types of “fake leisure” associated with wealthy people, poor people, working people, studying people, resting people, and so on.

The Conspicuous Leisure of the Wealthy

American sociologist Thorstein Veblen published his classic book “The theory of the leisure class” at the end of the nineteenth century, where he coined the term “conspicuous leisure” (Veblen, 2007) to characterize the activities and lifestyle of the upper class historically and in his day. He used the term “the leisure class” with some irony because, as he showed in his investigation, the “leisurely” lifestyle is very tiresome, alienated, and fake and far away from genuine leisure. This lifestyle of the upper class was based on deliberate show-off: conspicuous consumption, conspicuous waste, conspicuous philanthropy, conspicuous aesthetics, and conspicuous education. Upper-class males worked hard to use their conspicuous leisure to communicate, advance, and maintain their high social status (oppositional reputability). Veblen argued that upper-class males use their wives and servants as manuals and décor for their oppositional reputability—i.e., to establish their reputation in opposition to common people who could not afford having servants, luxury goods, wasteful activities. Their wives and servants were involved in the conspicuous vicarious leisure of their male masters. Even excessive, wasteful, and luxurious consumption was primarily done not for personal pleasure, as upper-class people might publicly proclaim, but mainly as a bid for reputability. In other words, the primary pleasure of conspicuous leisure was and still is in communicating high reputability and vanity.

According to Veblen, there are three major mutually related aspects of conspicuous leisure, which drive oppositional reputability: it’s excess (and wastefulness), it’s opposition to utility (and work), and it’s opposition to common people. For example, consider an aesthetic taste for feminine beauty. In food-scarcity societies (e.g., in the European Renaissance), beautiful women are viewed as having chubby bodies (even if it may cause obesity). In contrast, in food-abundance societies (e.g., in the modern United States), where the human evolution pressures people to overeat, beautiful women are viewed as having thin bodies (even if it may cause anorexia). In sun-abundant countries, pale-skinned women were viewed as beautiful because it put them apart from common people working in the fields under strong sunlight and thus having tanned skin. In Spain, rich pale-skinned women, constantly covered from the sun, were called "blue blood" because one could see their blue veins under their pale skin. In contrast, in Northern European countries with a lack of sun, tanned women, who had the luxury of traveling to Southern Europe, were seen as beautiful. Nowadays, when people mostly work in offices with little sunlight, tanned skin for White women is viewed as beautiful because it takes time and money to get tanned (even if it may cause skin cancer). Veblen argued that these are cases of conspicuous aesthetics when concerns about the oppositional reputability trumps all other concerns of forming people's personal and social tastes of beauty and ugliness.

Similarly, conspicuous education for the upper class in order to gain "cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1977) involved studying exotic dead languages and other curriculum that was excessive, wasteful, anti-utilitarian, and oppositional to common people, requiring time and money to study it. The studies of the dead languages were not done for personal curiosity or personal interest by the rich students but as a way to maintain their oppositional reputability. The goal of conspicuous education is to create a cultural barrier surrounding the upper class. A study of an American boarding high school for upper-class students reveals that conspicuous education has survived in our time (Khan, 2011).

Veblen also observed that in addition to conspicuous leisure, the rich are also often involved in what can be called predatory labor of exploitation (Veblen called it "pecuniary employment", which is a bit too narrow term, in my view). This is a labor of domination and exploitation. For example, in the medieval feudal time in Europe, predatory labor of exploitation involved a feudal lord's military pursuits and looting, military subjugation of other people, collection of levies and taxes from the subjugated people, and so on. Feudal lords might work hard to subjugate, loot, fight, and exploit other people. This labor of exploitation predates industrial labor ("industrial employment," in Veblen's terms). Industrial labor involves the production of values for one's own and other people's consumption. In the modern capitalist age, predatory and industrial labor merge for the rich engaged in employment. Many big companies' CEOs, managers of hedge funds, stockbrokers, venture capitalists, big stockholders, and so on are involved both in the productive industrial labor of management and in the predatory labor of extracting and expropriating "surpluses" of other people's industrial labor. This merger of the predatory and industrial labor is not unique to capitalism. In the Ancient Roman Republic, Roman senators were involved both in the predatory labor of exploitation and in the "industrial labor" of taking care of the Roman Republic (Beard, 2015).

Veblen insisted that this dual nature of the rich: conspicuous leisure and predatory labor, shapes all aspects of the upper class, including, for example, their education. Thus, the education of the upper class involved not only acquiring their cultural capital of oppositional reputability but also dominance and exploitation (e.g., military training, administrative management, leadership, and so on). Similarly, all spheres of the life of the rich involve show-off for oppositional reputability and predation for exploitation. Veblen argued that each time a rich person gets involved in genuine leisure or genuine industrial labor, he or she could easily become a subject of disapproval, ridicule, and ostracism (i.e., lowering of social status) and/or be taken advantage of (i.e., become an object of exploitation). For example, a passionate and persistent commitment to some activity by a gentleman was often viewed as odd and asocial (e.g., Benjamin Franklin's passionate interest and pursuit of science after he became a gentleman, Wood, 2004).[3] The "leisure" of the "leisure" class is distorted and fake. Although genuine leisure resists subordination to utility, it is not defined by its opposition to utility, as conspicuous leisure is.

The Anxious Leisure of the Unemployed Poor

Often the term "leisure" is associated with not being engaged in the economic labor. Being free from work is often a marker of leisure. However, had it been true, the poor would have had "most leisure, especially those without work; although the word 'leisure' is perhaps not the best description of those eventless hours, which are nevertheless so charged with anxiety about survival" (Seabrook, 1989, p. 68). In his interviews with unemployed "leisured" poor people in the UK, Seabrook documents the misery of their life, full of humiliation, scarcity, and anxiety. The life of the not working poor is often divided between killing time, household chores, worrying about the future, alleviation of depression and anxiety, and fight for necessary resources and survival.

[3] Wood showed that Franklin's transition from the middle-class to the aristocratic upper-class was marked, among others, by the change of his public attitude toward his science studies. Before, Franklin had portrayed his science studies as a useful and profitable vocation but after the transition he portrayed as a leisurely activity to satisfy his curiosity and amusement.

> Towards the weekend, the money is running out; and by Tuesday the pubs are almost empty. By soon after 10.30, even on a warm night, the streets are deserted, even though the light lingers until after eleven: a few people in shirt sleeves, the dog taken onto the green for a shit; Tuesday night supper is a few chips and a couple of sausages; there is no sauce left; the sugar ran out several days ago; salt is the only condiment in the house. The furniture is wearing thin - you can't stop the baby from playing, and that makes things deteriorate fast; they're reduced to eating off tin plates. You can feel the house getting shabbier, and you know you won't be able to replace anything. Television is a necessity; not that you watch it all the time, but it's on, even in the afternoon. That is when the programmers show their contempt for women, who are believed to be the main audience - nothing challenging or serious, just a form of tranquillizer to help you get through time. Eileen says, "I got an interview for a job. It made my week; only then I found out they were interviewing everybody, then there was to be a second interview, and only the finalists would go on to a third. It was like bloody Miss World, and it was only an office job". (Seabrook, 1989, p. 70)

Seabrook adds, "Nowhere is this unwelcome inactivity more shocking than in those appalled and devastated places whose entire reason for existence was the labour they were called into being to perform" (p. 68). Of course, the life of the poor unemployed has its own bright moments and sides, "The only good thing that's come out of unemployment is that the families are more together: men take more care of the kids, they know a bit more what it's like for a woman" (Seabrook, 1989, p. 79). People get involved in cooperation and mutual help without money exchange.

In sum, the absence of labor/work does not necessarily constitute genuine leisure. Genuine leisure involves stable resources for a carefree, free from necessity, life, well-being, the authorship of self-realization. It also provides a community free from humiliation and aggression and a culture normalizing leisure as a community value. Killing time, idleness, passive consumption of media, and drugs serve both to alleviate and to promote boredom, depression, anxiety, and helplessness.

The Assignment Leisure of Schooled Childhood

In the so-called developed countries, children are excluded from labor. For many (but not all) children, life is mostly "carefree."[4] Their needs are arguably taken care of. Many children are excluded not only from the labor market but also from home chores. For these children, the life alternates between play, peer socialization, interactions with adults, and school studies constrained by the adult supervision and discipline. Here I want to focus on the schooling aspect of the children's lives as it becomes more and more prevalent in defining modern childhood. Is schooling a form of genuine leisure? The ironic etymological answer is "yes" because, as I mentioned before, the Greek word "school" means leisure (Arendt, 1958).

On the other hand, the experiences of most students suggest that school is one of the last places where they experience leisure. When classes are canceled, a vast majority of students will be happy and not upset (see Chapter 1 and also E. Matusov, 2009). People often perceive schooling as something tedious and not pleasurable that they want to shorten if not eliminate entirely if possible, in contrast, the genuine leisure (E. Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017).

Modern conventional school is anti-leisure because it colonizes students' authorial agency by the inescapable totality of assignment (in a broader sense of this word). Everything is assigned to a student: whether to study or not, what to study, how to study, with whom to study, where to study, when to study, when to talk and how, how to sit, what to do and not to do, and so on (E. Matusov, 2015a). Not only is school life assigned but the student's home life is also colonized by the assigned homework. A considerable time in modern childhood is spent on other people's assigned activities and communication (E. Matusov, 2009; E. Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Students often have a major "choice"[5] to either unconditionally comply with a particular school's demand or resist it (E. Matusov, 2011a). Students have no ownership of their education and thus of their school life (E. Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017).

[4] Ironically, this paternalistic "carefree" childhood arguably robs and alienates children from their autonomy, citizenship, and rights and, thus, it creates its own new burdens and necessities for the children to deal with, severely limiting possibilities for genuine leisure.

[5] These are mostly attractors (cf. dynamic theory of chaos) that grab students rather than the students deliberately making a choice about them.

The assigned "leisure" of schooling is fake leisure because it "sucks the life out of students" (DePalma, Matusov, & Smith, 2009). Genuine leisure requires the participants' ownership of their activities, communication, and life. Even school recess or school break—an endangered species of many modern schools—is also a fake leisure as I will show in the next section.

Recovery Leisure of Vacation Time

Taking a rest from work to recover and refresh oneself and then come back to work with new and fresh energy, attention, motivation, enthusiasm, alertness, and so on is also often confused with leisure (cf. "the leisure industry" is often referred to the business focused on recreation, entertainment, sports, and tourism). The confusion seems to come from the fact that taking a rest is a time away from work, carefree and assignment-free time, time that the participants can own to define their own activities and communications. Also, sometimes, vacations or recesses provide people with additional recourses for their self-realization. However, what makes taking a rest not genuine leisure is the fact that its main goal is to return back refreshed to labor or school. Recreation in its narrow sense—as recreation—is restoration of a person's body, mind, and spirit for new productive labor, work, and household chores. The main value of resting is in its therapeutic effect of becoming a better worker or a better student. Everything is subordinated to and exploited for this instrumental goal. In contrast, I claim that genuine leisure is intrinsic—it is valuable in and of itself and does not subordinate to any other activity. "The demand to 'work less' does not mean or imply the right to 'rest more', but the right to 'live more'" (Gorz, 1997, p. 121).

The Imprisoning Leisure of Addiction

Addiction—drug addiction, gambling addiction, work addiction, sex addiction, food addiction, shopping addiction, and so on—is another type of fake leisure. Addiction is often confused with leisure because both of them are intrinsic, process-oriented, and pleasurable. Both of them may involve pain of withdrawal because, in both cases, interruption or prevention from pleasure can cause pain. In contrast to genuine leisure, addiction diminishes one's control and ownership over one's life. If a person does something that he or she considers being bad because of the perceived craving or does not do what he or she considers being worth doing, this craving is addictive and not leisurely. Of course, the notion of addiction can be contested: while some observers may see addiction, an actor may see leisure and vice versa. However, this fact does not undermine the boundary of free will and imprisoning compulsion between these categories.

The Impotent Leisure of Illness

Another type of fake leisure involves the carefree time of a person who was struck with an illness (in a broader sense of this word, including fatigue, sleep deprivation, lousy mood, sickness, and some, but not all, disabilities). Illness may suck energy and extinguish interest and motivation in people. Alternatively, it can focus people on their ill health at the expense of all other interests. People's physical and/or psychological abilities may deteriorate in an illness to the point of debilitation and concern. An illness can make health the primary necessity concern when all other needs and necessities are satisfied. Obviously, the "carefree" time of illness is not true leisure because of the person's suffering, pains, debilitations, stress, disabilities, infirmity, and depression. Genuine leisure requires relatively good health (both physical and mental), free of pains, and full of physical and psychological potency. The father of a Russian friend of mine once said, "People really live only for eight years: seven years before school and one year after retirement." In my interpretation, he meant seven years of carefree leisurely childhood, still uncolonized by schooling institutions with their unconditional assignments,[6] and one year of leisurely retirement free from illnesses and disabilities.[7]

Therapeutic Leisure of "Alienation Vacation"

Some free-choice educators involved in democratic schooling and homeschooling have noticed an interesting and disturbing phenomenon. When students, previously attending conventional schools, enter a new free-choice learning environment, where learning and the curriculum are not

[6] At the time of the statement, children started attending mandatory Soviet school at age 7.

[7] Unfortunately, for my Russian friend's dad, this assessment of illness-free retirement was too true—he died of a heart attack exactly a year after his retirement.

forced on the students but are completely voluntary, many of the students either try to force themselves to study something that is prestigious or necessary in the eyes of relevant others or they choose to withdraw themselves from any activity at all into "alienation vacation" (E. Matusov & Brobst, 2013),

> …sometimes people want to take vacations, and by vacation, this means taking a small break from their life. This does not necessarily mean abandoning their life and never coming back. I'm not sure how this relates, but it's interesting to me how there's something about academics in that they tend to not believe in or desire vacations (Week 13, May 10, 2008). (E. Matusov & Brobst, 2013, p. 101)

A. S. Neill, the founder of famous UK democratic school "Summerhill," said that the students who swear the most and are the laziest, are the ones most unfamiliar with freedom (Neill, 1960). He noticed that it takes time for new students to get accustomed to freedom and this time is proportional to their time spent in a conventional school,

> Children who come to Summerhill as kindergartens attend lessons from the beginning of their stay; but pupils from other schools vow that they will never attend any beastly lessons again at any time. They play and cycle and get in people's way, but they fight shy of lessons. This sometimes goes on for months. The recovery time is proportionate to the hatred their last school gave them. Our record case was a girl from a convent. She loafed for three years. The average period of recovery from lesson aversion is three months. (Neill, 1960, p. 2)

Researching different classroom atmospheres—authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire—promoted by adult leaders, Lewin and his colleagues, found that an authoritarian social climate leads to long-term paralysis of students' agency after the adult leader is gone (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939).

Similar to Neill's observation on new students in Summerhill, studying homeschoolers, Llewellyn (1998) noticed that the longer children spent in conventional schools, the longer they need school detoxification when they do not do anything but get bored themselves and frustrated. She suspected some kind of institutional depression of agency and recommended leaving these students alone and letting them recover through an alienation vacation,

> When you quit school, do nothing academic for at least, at the absolute minimum, a week. If you wish, however, write stories or journal entries about your past and your future. Dream, dream, dream. If you crave TV, watch it. If you crave sleep, indulge. Allow yourself to go through withdrawal. Pass no judgments. If you want to "work" on anything, work on forgiving and forgetting. Forgive yourself for everything. Forgive your teachers for everything. Forgive your parents for everything. Forget the lies school taught – forget that learning is separate from your life, that you can't teach yourself, that you are defined by your grades, and all other such nonsense. Detoxify. Purge. (Llewellyn, 1998, p. 126)

The recovery from oppressive alienating conventional schooling that suppressed a student's authorial agency—alienation vacation—is carefree time but it is not genuine leisure because it is a version of impotent leisure where a person's authorship of self-realization cannot be enacted due to a type of agency disability.

Fake vs. Genuine Leisure

In sum, fake, distorted, and confused leisure teaches us about genuine leisure. Although "free time," personal time away from work and labor, is a prerequisite for leisure (de Grazia, 1962), free time does not guarantee leisure. Genuine leisure, as a human aspiration to fulfill the life beyond addressing the necessities, is intrinsic and not subordinated to labor, school, or the vanity of oppositional respectability. Genuine leisure is not a response to body or mind being tired or bored as recreation is,

> Recreation and leisure are institutions that are different yet closely related. Recreation refers to activities such as sports, games, the vacation, hobbies, and the like that aim to renew mind and body by either relieving them of tension or delivering them from boredom. Recreation is thus primarily a reaction to some state of body or mind. Leisure activities, on the other hand, are pursued as ends in themselves. They are unplanned and unrequired. Leisure is primarily action, directed generally toward self-development. (Atchley, 1971, p. 13)

Genuine leisure is time away from labor, obligations, and recreation. Genuine leisure is based on personal freedom and intrinsic motivation, "For leisure to exist, one has to be in control of one's behaviours and have a sense of freedom to pursue willingly a given activity. Thus, perceived freedom and intrinsic motivation are… the most important defining characteristics of leisure" (Iso-Ahola, 1997, p. 131). These characteristics involve carefree time, self-valuable personally meaningful time, a time of freedom to make one's own choices (Iso-Ahola, 1980), a time of pleasure (Roadburg, 1981), a time of self-realization, a time of self-expression (Stebbins, 1997), a time of potency (i.e., free from sickness), a time with resources involving person's control and ownership over one's life. Besides, genuine leisure involves a community and culture supporting and affirming the value of genuine leisure. In the next section, I consider various forms of the genuine leisure.

In addition to rejecting fake leisure, French sociologist of leisure Joffre Dumazedier (1974) considered four other types of pseudo-leisure that he rejected: (1) work/labor with pleasure (I discussed it in the previous chapters), (2) family obligations, (3) voluntary socio-spiritual activities, and (4) voluntary socio-political activities. He rejected all these activities as a definition of authentic leisure because all of them have a strong instrumental obligatory nature even if they can be pleasurable, voluntary, or outside of work/labor. He argued that genuine leisure starts when all obligations, needs, and duties are more or less fulfilled, and body and mind are rested from fatigue and boredom. In genuine leisure, the person turns toward others and him/herself beyond any obligation or necessity. Genuine leisure must be "oriented toward self-fulfillment as an ultimate end" (Dumazedier, 1974, p. 71), which may or may not have some (accidental) aspects of work, family care, socio-spiritual, or socio-political activities.

Diverse Forms of the Genuine Leisure of Self-Realization

Aristotle defined leisure negatively—as what it is not—as "freedom from the necessity of being occupied" (de Grazia, 1962, p. 14). Similarly, David Frayne defines "true leisure" as a "sweet 'oasis of unmediated life' in which people detach from economic demands and become genuinely free for the world and its culture" (Frayne, 2015, p. 70). French economist Andre Gorz elaborated the definition of the genuine leisure of self-realization as "autonomous activity": "For me, the only real autonomous activity is one that is neither an obligation imposed in the name of moral, religious or political principles nor as a necessity for survival" (Gorz, 1985, p. 70). However, this definition is still negative focusing on what an autonomous activity is not. Here I try to define the genuine leisure of self-realization positively. I abstracted four major types of this genuine leisure with their overlaps and ill-defined boundaries: intrinsic play, intrinsic, noninstrumental, education, hanging-out social interaction, and passions-endeavors.

Intrinsic Play

"The [person] of leisure… is always at play or (as Plato would say) on the hunt, in the exercise of the mind" (de Grazia, 1962, pp. 371–372). I define *intrinsic* play as a leisurely endeavor of the participants' seeking and creative designing a flow of their eventful experiences in a fantasized world. Eventfulness in a fantasized world is the key to intrinsic play. In events, people are faced with unpredictability and uncertainty that throws them into action-deeds that define them in their own eyes and in the eyes of others. Eventfulness is always emergent and never predictable. The authorship of intrinsic play involves mastery to create opportunities for emergent eventfulness. In its own turn, eventfulness allows people to redefine themselves, to transcend themselves, to become different from who they have been before, to change their relationships with others, to break with the past,—i.e., to self-realize, to fulfill "by oneself […] the possibilities of one's character or personality".[8]

Here, I am going to discuss "intrinsic play"—a play that has an intrinsic value in itself. Often play is used instrumentally as "productivity through fun" (Hamari & Keronen, 2017, p. 134) that involves such utilitarian uses of play as gamification (e.g., business games), professional gaming (e.g., professional soccer, professional chess), gambling (e.g., for-profit casino Poker, online gaming), educational and developmental games (e.g., Oregon Trail, Math Bus, Scrabble), and so on. In utilitarian instrumental play, usually in the form of games,[9] intrinsic play aspects, which I am discussing in this section, are subordinated to utilitarian aspects (Hamari &

[8] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-realization.

[9] I define game as a play with relatively fixed rules, scripts, and goals. Violating the game's rules, scripts, and goals is often viewed as an illegitimate cheating behavior. In contrast, in non-game play, rules, scripts, and goals are not fixed and are subject to legitimate improvisational transcendence by the players (cf. Graeber, 2015).

Keronen, 2017). The reverse is true as well: in intrinsic play, its utilitarian aspects (e.g., making friends through a play) are usually subordinated to its intrinsic nature, such as eventfulness and self-realization in a fantasized world. I argue that intrinsic play inherently involves the participants' authorship of self-realization so essential to genuine leisure.

Erich Fromm and Mortimer Adler define self-realization as freedom from any external coercion, including necessity, social obligations, cultural expectations, political and economic freedom, and freedom from worldly attachments, worldly concerns (e.g., vanity), and past worldly desires etc.

> The freedom [of self-realization] we have identified as circumstantial is variously called "economic freedom," "political freedom," "civil liberty," "individual freedom," "the freedom of man in society," "freedom in relation to the state," and "external freedom." It is sometimes referred to negatively as "freedom from coercion or restraint," "freedom from restrictions," or "freedom from law," and sometimes positively as "freedom of action," "freedom of spontaneity," or "freedom under law". (Adler, 1973, p. 127)

Self-realization is always a creative act that defines what the world ought to be by transcending what the self and the world are (i.e., authorial agency). Self-realization always involves a creative act of authorial agency but the authorial agency does not necessarily involve self-realization. Thus, for example, elsewhere, I showed that school conformity involves authorial agency, arguably in its rather distorted form (E. Matusov, 2011a). However, the creativity of conformity is not self-realization because the authorial agency for conformity lacks "freedom of action" and "freedom of spontaneity." It also lacks the freedom of defining new values and the oughtness of the world (legitimacy of defining what the world ought to be and why, according to the person).

Self-realization calls for answerability and responsibility to reply whether this newly defined world is good or evil (i.e., morally desirable or undesirable), how do you know that what is good or evil, for whom, and so on (Bakhtin, 1993). For example, in a doctor-patient play of two 4-year old girls assuming roles of doctors with a 2-year old girl who was assigned a role of a sick child patient, the doctors peed in a bottle to prepare an unpleasant but beneficial medicine for the sick child patient. Despite the 2-year old's protests, the 4-year old doctors insisted that she must drink the medicine for real. They argued that medicine was always unpleasant, children often reject unpleasant but beneficial medicine, and, finally, she had agreed to play a sick child patient. This was arguably a very problematic, if not evil, self-realization by the two 4-year girls (Schousboe, 2013, p. 16).

In contrast, preschool teacher Vivian Paley described play situations in which children playfully incorporated previously unpopular children and created a new “we-ness” (Paley, 1992). Self-realization brings new reality, new vistas, new perceptions, new sensitivities, new culture, and new values and promotes a discourse of values—i.e., an axiological discourse. Thus, self-realization begs for a critical dialogue about these emerging new values, although such critical dialogue is not necessarily guaranteed during or after play. Self-realization often, if not always, disrupts previous social relations with other people and with the self and, thus, creates further eventfulness for other people. As we saw in the prior example of giving urine as a play medicine, all 3 girls had been good friends before the doctor–patient play and this play incident arguably might put some short- or long-lasting stains on their relations (Schousboe, 2013). Self-realization is risky because it can be rejected and even punished by other people who see a danger of disruption in it and/or rejection of its values. For example, in a fictional account, two racially diverse girls play on a fence and develop a friendship around their play only to be criticized and punished by their parents (Woodson & Lewis, 2001). Eventfulness does not guarantee self-realization but rather it is the condition for self-realization.

In play, everything is permitted and possible for a play character. The fantasized world of play provides safety for self-realization as its ethical consequences are not real and vanish when play is over unless it spilled out in the real world as in the case of 4-year old girls forcing 2-year old drinking real urine (it would have been OK to drink an imaginary urine in a play or to pretend drinking real one). In the fantasized world of a play, a character can kill another character or be a villain without any moral or legal consequences for the player (unless such play is forbidden by the authority or community, see, for example, Thompson, Stern, Ginsberg, & Kindlon, 2006). A play character can create a flood, or fire, or earthquake in play without the player carrying any responsibility. The fantasized world of a play provides unlimited resources for a play character. One can imagine piloting a military jet fighter, or walking in the desert, or flying inside of a human body’s blood vessels. Both social and natural laws are suspended in the fantasized world of a play.

The fantasized world of play both promotes and hinders eventfulness and thus opportunities for self-realization. The fantasized world of a play promotes eventfulness by freeing the players from societal and natural laws and giving them unlimited imaginary resources. But the very same freedom of play destroys the possibility of the eventfulness. When everything is possible—nothing is possible. The fantasized world of a play lacks "resistance of material" (Shklovskii & Sher, 1990). Fortunately, the fantasized world of a play—"the sphere of imagination, in which the [players] are actors in make-believe events" (Schousboe, 2013, p. 18)—is not the only sphere of play.

Imagination is just one of the three spheres of play. There are also "the sphere of staging, in which they make proposals and negotiate themes and roles in the sphere" (i.e., players' directing the play) and "the sphere of reality, in which [the participants] pay attention to those real-world properties of the players and of the physical surroundings which are relevant to the contents of the [play] of imagination" (p. 18). The spheres of staging and reality create the resistance of material so necessary for the emergence of eventfulness in play. The sphere of staging brings negotiations among the players of what they consider as possible/impossible and desirable/undesirable in the play. The sphere of reality sets limits on the participants' immediate surroundings, time, props, available cultures, the players' well-being (e.g., getting tired, wanting to go to a toilet). The reality sphere creates both affordances and constraints for a play action (Gibson, 1979; Vygotsky, 1978). For example, the presence of certain toys, videogame consoles, cultural scripts for the players, make certain play scripts and fantasies easier but certain other play scripts and fantasies more difficult (but not impossible). Thus, household toys make it easier to play family or dinner fantasies but more difficult, although not impossible, to play soccer. Also, with some props, certain fantasy-actions are easier to perform while certain other fantasy-actions are more difficult to perform (but again not impossible). In the fantasized world of play, worldly constraints coming from the spheres of staging and reality provide the resistance of material for the sphere of imagination and its eventfulness. However, in play, these worldly constraints do not take over play but rather subordinate to it. When the worldly necessity constraints take over play, it often ceases.

Let me consider the example of a short fragment of 3-year old children's play to extract its flow of eventfulness and self-realization that occurred in a fantasied world of a play. This example is taken from the ethnography of play by Laura Bonica (1993, pp. 59–67) which was abbreviated by Marjanovic-Shane (2011, p. 208) and now even more shorten by me. In the fragment, the three spheres of the play: imagination, staging, and reality interact and shape each other. In a daycare center in Genoa, Italy, two older girls Serena (3;0) and Silvia (3;1) and younger boy Rocco (2;10) play,

> Serena goes to the kitchen corner and calls out: *Dinner is ready! Dinner is Ready! Let's eat! The pap!* Silvia, who holds a baby doll, repeats: *Dinner is ready!* But Serena and Silvia are having difficulties. They start and stop their play several times. They have disagreements: Silvia wants to include the doll as a "baby", but at first Serena does not; then they struggle about who will feed the "baby" and what to feed the "baby:" Serena wants to feed him "pap," while Silvia is giving him "milk" and "water," etc. All the while Rocco tries to join the play—he pretends first to be a baby, but when ignored, he pretends to be a dog.
>
> At one point, Serena switches from playing "dinner" with Silvia to pretending to be an animal with Rocco. Serena goes down on all fours and barks like a dog:
>
> Serena: *Bow-wow!*
>
> Silvia reacts immediately: *Hello, little cat!* [Silvia seems to make a bid to Serena for redefining a dog/Serena into a cat/Serena – EM].
>
> Rocco joins in [Serena's play as another dog – EM]: *Ow, wow!*
>
> Serena rectifies: *I am not a little cat, I am a dog!* [Serena rejects Silvia's redefining and insists that she is a dog and not a cat – EM], and turning to Rocco, she says: *Come little cat-dog, I say bow-wow!* [Silvia seems to redefine Serena's order for Silvia to be a cat as an ambivalence between a dog and a cat and redirects this ambivalence to a dog/Rocco – EM.]
>
> Rocco and Serena run along together on all fours, barking away.
>
> Still, Silvia keeps calling Serena a cat and tries to order her to "be a cat."
>
> But Serena keeps insisting that she is "a dog."
>
> Suddenly Silvia exclaims: *Come here, little cat, the pap!* and laughs [Silvia seems to make a bid for teasing Serena for previously wanting to play about dogs and dinner by calling her a "little cat" – EM].
>
> Serena approaches Silvia, and once again barks like a dog [Serena seems to join to become another dog teased to be a "little cat" – EM].
>
> Silvia remarks: *You're not the cat, eh? Serena, Serena, you're not the cat, eh? That's true!* [This time Silvia seems to be serious, finally accepting Serena's dog role – EM].
>
> Serena answers: *But yes, I am the cat, bow-wow!*, in a deep voice like a dog [Serena seems to turn Silvia's teasing her into a dog pretending to

be a cat somewhat in defiance to Sylvia's insistence that this play is purely about cats and not about dogs – EM].

In this fragment, eventfulness came from a tension between the sphere of imagination and the sphere of staging, between Silvia's apparent desire to play cats and Serena and Rocco insisting on playing dogs. The tension was resolved not through a dispute—a shift into the sphere of reality—but through a series of creative improvisation action-deeds in the sphere of imagination. Serena did not completely reject Silvia's bid for her to play a cat, but rather creatively incorporated it in teasing dog/Rocco by addressing him as "little cat." Selena joined the game as a dog, but then, in response to Silvia's playful challenge, she quickly redefined herself as a dog who pretended to be a cat (in my interpretation).

This episode of play is full of improvisational uncertainty that all three participants brought in. After the tension between Silvia and Serena emerged, each of their moves became unpredictable both for us, the observers, and for them, including, I argue, each child's own actions to her- or himself. They surprised each other, themselves, and us. These surprises had to become a subject of dialogic negotiation both through *talking about* these surprises in the sphere of staging (e.g., "Serena, you're not the cat, eh?") and through play-acting these surprises in the sphere of imagination (e.g., "But yes, I am the cat, bow-wow!" in a deep voice like a dog). Through this verbal and nonverbal question-answer dialogue across the three diverse spheres of play, the meaning-making process is unfolding. In the context of the interpersonal tension (especially between Silvia and Serena), their playful actions as characters and directing actions staging the play episodes became dialogized deeds in the sphere of reality, perhaps, contributing to their friendship. This brings us to self-realization.

The two little girls—Selena and Silvia—and Rocco (a boy) realize themselves as friends preserving their friendship without giving up their conflicting desires of staging the play. Even if they had experienced something like that before this episode, each time this realization of their friendship is a non-guaranteed achievement and accomplishment. Initially, Silvia did not join Rocco's and Serena's play of dogs. Then Silvia generously opened a possibility for a cat context in her game with Rocco for Serena to enter, teasing a dog-Serena by calling it-her as a cat. Meanwhile Serena generously entered Silvia's game as a dog character, thus without breaking Rocco's dog play, although on her own conditions to be a cat-dog. Serena took Sylvia's teasing to make a clownish cat-dog character.

In the sphere of staging, Silvia playfully challenged and teased Serena's insistence to join Rocco's play of dogs. Serena replied to this teasing-challenge in the sphere of imagination with her creative act of the organic incorporation of the cat acting into the dog play. Serena and Silvia realized themselves as new players, new play directors, and new friends in the flow of the playful events.

This ephemeral development of self-realization in play often might have its residue in the sphere of reality—it might create new lasting good or bad relationships, new nostalgias or repulsions, new attitudes toward certain plays and players, new play scripts, new visions of the world (e.g., a dog pretending to be a cat), new ways of being in the world (e.g., identities), and new memories. "Some [forms/episodes of play] are high in spirit and engrossed with social support and encouragement, with a strong sense of positive togetherness (we-ness). Other games[10] are frustrating and unresolved full of conflicts and accusations among the gamers—some games are more neutral, but none is ever the same, in emotional density and qualia" (Winther-Lindqvist, 2013, p. 51). Unfortunately, many scholars of play focus too much on psychological, educational, or utilitarian outcomes and mechanisms of play and not on the ontology of play—the life fabric of play that makes play worth living (see for exceptions, Brown, 2013; Marjanovic-Shane, 2011).

In her article about play, Ana Marjanovic-Shane (2011) argues that play

> …is a dramatic event in the making that the players actively and perpetually negotiate and construct. It is a world with which they challenge themselves: they create tensions, problems, and issues and attempt to invent also ways of resolving them. I hypothesize that, rather than purposefully creating any finalized form in [play], the players "wrestle" with each other in creating new tensions and in finding ways to overcome them. In this process, they are surprised by each other's as well as their own [action-deeds] and the possibilities they open for the [new] emerging relationships and perspectives. As long as there is uncertainty and as long as there are prospects of encountering and creating unharnessed possibilities, the [fantasy of play] can be continuously created. (p. 209)
>
> …one of the reasons that children and adults become attracted to building the [fantasy of play], may be a chance to construct lively and exciting

[10] I prefer to use the general term "play" here, while reserving "games" for a type of play with preset rules.

> challenges while continuously inventing new [action-deeds] as the characters. My assumption is that characters in [play's fantasy] are in constant construction. They are neither predefined nor fully known to the players, but surprising and unpredictable. (p. 210)

I agree with the Soviet child developmental psychologist Vygotsky (1978) that in play a player becomes "a head taller," although for a different reason. Vygotsky argued that play allows a child to create a "zone of proximal development" and new "higher psychological functions." My reason is not developmental and not psychological but ontological. I argue that in a fantasized world of play, a person (any person: not only a child but also an adult, see, Gee, 2003) has an opportunity to engage in the social and dialogic flow of events of self-realization that make a playing person "taller"—to live a life of freedom, authorial agency, and dialogue (but not necessarily a critical dialogue) (Bakhtin, 1984; Huizinga, 2009).

Intrinsic, Noninstrumental, Education

In his somewhat lengthy novella *Profession*, famous American writer Isaac Asimov vividly described "intrinsic education" and contrasted it with instrumental education, so ubiquitous nowadays. Asimov envisioned a future society in which education is replaced by a special modification of people's brains. When the brain is modified, a person gets all necessary knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to perform well any job required by society (somewhat similar to "download" of knowledge and skill into the brain depicted in the movie "The Matrix"). Also, a special analysis of the brain reveals a person's predisposition for this or that profession, so people's innate potentials are utilized in the most effective way. However, as the story unfolds, it shows the limitations of this approach because it cannot account for the development of new things and events or solve emerging, previously unknown, problems in society. A small elite of innovators and inventors of new technologies, practices, and solutions is needed. The criteria for selecting this small elite in the story are the following: (1) their brain is not modifiable in a predictable way, (2) they like to innovate, and (3) they love to learn and actively seek this learning even when their education is actively discouraged (Asimov, 1959). I think that the latter criterion defines intrinsic education, in which its process and experiences create value-in-itself (cf. Aristotelian "final cause") overweighting the desirability of the educational outcomes. In instrumental education, education is mainly a means to achieving the desired educational outcomes, while education itself is perceived as an annoying, but, unfortunately, necessary activity. The shorter it is, the better, i.e., more efficient, if the results are not compromised.

But is it true that only a small elite of people, with some deviant, mutated, brains, would desire and capable of intrinsic education? Do most people really only desire instrumental education to get good jobs, improve their socioeconomic status, make society better, promote patriotism, and so on? Is Asimov right about his elitist vision of humanity?

To test this inquiry, my colleagues and I conducted a study in three countries—the United States, Russia, and Brazil—with 58 participants of different ages, with a diverse educational and vocational background. We called this study "The Magic Learning Pill." In this study, we ask our research participants if they would take an imaginary Magic Learning Pill (MLP), would-be designed by scientists, instead of going through with their education, if the result of taking the Pill would be "the same," if not better, than the result of the best education. We asked them to envision areas of their past education for which they might take the Magic Learning Pill, if at all, and for which they might not, if not at all, and why (E. Matusov et al., 2017).

If Asimov was right that only a small elite of people craves intrinsic education, then we would find only a small group of our research participants, if at all, who would reject the Magic Learning Pill for any of their past educational experiences. According to Asimov's hypothesis, a large majority of people should unequivocally choose the Magic Learning Pill for all their past and future educational needs. Of course, even if it were true, it still would be unclear why most people would prefer instrumental education. It can be because, as Asimov argued in his story, people have brain differences making a high majority of people predisposed to instrumental education, and a very few people predisposed to intrinsic education. However, alternatively, it can be that institutions and cultures in our need-based society highly suppress authorial agency in many people making them incapable of and repulsed by intrinsic education. There can be other explanations for Asimov's hypothesis as well.

To our big surprise, the results of our study suggest that Asimov's hypothesis was wrong. Almost all of the research participants (93.1%, all but four) could think of some educational experiences for which they would *not* take the Magic Learning Pill because of a high intrinsic value of these educational experiences for them. However, the opposite was true, as well. Almost all participants (98.3%, all but one) could think of some educational experiences for which they *would take* the Magic Learning Pill because in these areas, it was the educational outcomes that most mattered to them, according to them. The findings suggest that both intrinsic and instrumental education are desirable among these diverse groups. It seems that a desire for intrinsic education is no less omnipresent in the general population than a desire for instrumental education. This further suggests that intrinsic education is a fundamental existential human need.

We expected that pleasant, enjoyable, meaningful, and fun educational experiences would promote intrinsic education attitudes in our participants (i.e., rejection of MLP); while unpleasant, painful, tedious, mechanical, frustrating, meaningless, and boring educational experiences would promote instrumental education attitudes (i.e., acceptance of MLP). We got confirmation in our findings. Education can be frustrating, involving many mistakes, for which students are punished, "[Shorten learning experience?] Oh yes, then you would not make as many mistakes, it takes a long time to learn that and you make a bunch of mistakes. [However,] if you already know it without going through the experience, it's a lot nicer because it's perfect and you do not make all the mistakes from the beginning (Catherine, US, teenager)" (E. Matusov et al., 2017, p. 6). However, when education is enjoyable, it becomes appreciated as intrinsic, "[Take MLP?] No, because it is something that I enjoy, I love doing it (Alma, US, young adult, HS diploma +)" (p. 8).

However, we found many other patterns for intrinsic education beyond or even instead of enjoyment:

1. Education = special relationship with other people, "[Take MLP?] No, because my relationship with them can't be shortened. Why? Honestly, Cheryl has been an excellent role model and took us a long time to develop our relationship and she is a good person to be around and I don't want to shorten that, [even if the learning could happen faster?] It is the relationship that is important, it's not the time (Jane, US, adult, MS)" (p. 8).
2. Education is an interesting endeavor in its own right,

   [Take MPL?] No, because the process is important. I would want to try it, definitely, to see what it is like… but on the other hand, I feel like I would be losing something because the actual learning of something is interesting… Well the gradual interaction with some material, when you think about it every day, and start to view it differently. Immediately, now you don't know it, now you don't, you go through these stages and understand it completely differently, like something else. And moreover, when you're immediately there, you don't have the feeling that the material is something social, with that you lose some of the color, even some of the lines. Do you understand? So, when initially English was something foreign to me, it's important, because now I hear it through someone else's ear, as well as with my own. Maybe with mine not as well, as the carriers, but on the other hand, a lot better with that of the other. It becomes kind of like a stereo effect (Sasha, Russia, adult, BS) (p. 8).

3. Education = Life and life journey, shortening learning = shortening life itself,

    - [Why wouldn't you want to take MLP?] Well… let's say… hahaha. The thing with my close friend, I wouldn't want to shorten that. That means that… it means to push out of life all the adventures that I did, being in the mountains. It means to amputate part of my life, and what would I get in return? Those results that I achieved, let's have them earlier, but I would lose that whole part of my life (Victor, Russia, adult, HS diploma).
    - [Take MLP?] No, it just doesn't go with my whole philosophy in life, which is the fact that it is not about the destination but about the path. To have this happen and it is not under my power or control to know exactly what it is the experience of learning is what it is all about not the end result of being this way…you don't know what the destination really is (Janna, US, young adult, BS) (p. 9).

4. Education = The crafting of a practice; serendipity; taking out mistakes, dead-ends, and taking a shortcut on experiences reduces the quality of learning,

    - [Take MLP?] I do not think so because [otherwise if I took MLP then] I could know nothing in high school and pick up a class and know all this technical information but I would not have a natural progression because photography gives you this progression I would have the same results but not the sense of accomplishment because I would not be able to see the progress of it (Anne, US, young adult, HS diploma +).

- You have to understand that you can't, if you are immediately able to do everything really well, then you don't know what is bad, and then you can't evaluate that this is really, in fact, good and is the maximum that you can get. So that you would still be left with some kind of… you would still have thoughts… you aren't sure that you've achieved the absolute. So that it's still, you don't know the bad, you always look for the good when you know the different sides of a situation. If you fall into a better side, a perfect side, how do you know it's perfect if you have nothing to compare it to? You know, I take a medicine and I would be well able, and that would probably be good, but then I wouldn't be able to answer your question, because I would only know that one way, and no other (Olga, Russia, adult, PhD) (p. 10).

Some types of intrinsic education can be very frustrating and even super painful. Thus, young American adult whom we called Alma talked about how her terrible injury of falling from a horse transformed her life and her as a person and that is why she does not want to shorten this important but painful learning experience (p. 9).

More than a half of our participants (55.2%) were so committed to the notion of intrinsic education and its omnipresence even in instrumental education that it was difficult for them even to imagine such a thing as the Magic Learning Pill, "I am skeptical of [the feasibility of an MLP]. I would like to underline that methodology is something that… there is probably a way to quicken teaching methodology. But what concerns the substance, that is probably very individual. The process of growth and individuality, to the moment when it has something to say (Igor, Russia, adult, BS)" (p. 16).

Our findings suggest that people universally recognize and appreciate intrinsic education. However, the question remains whether all people would seek intrinsic education when they are mostly free from labor and other needs, and when a societal culture supports leisure and such leisurely activity as intrinsic education. Of course, this is an empirical issue to investigate in future research.

Passionate Endeavors

My dad, Lev Matusov (1927–2015), was a man of leisure for the last 25 years of his life after he retired and immigrated to the US. He emigrated from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1990 at the age of 63. In my observation, in the United States he realized his life as his life started blossoming out through his constant creative self-realization and self-actualization. He used to say, “In America, I live like under Communism. This is how I have imagined Communism.” I suspect that by that he meant not just full satisfaction of all his needs by the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Benefits and other US government programs for elderly people without income. I think that my dad appreciated all plentiful opportunities and support for his creativity and initiatives which he suddenly found in the United States and which he never took for granted, being always thankful to the American people and the US government for that.

My dad threw himself into many diverse passionate projects of his initiation. He volunteered to the Library of Congress’ project of video interviewing Russian-speaking Holocaust survivors. He wrote and published poetry on the Internet.[11] He developed a genealogy, a family tree, of our big family, and put it online.[12] He wrote and published three books of his memoirs.

> *Lev*: I would like to say that working on every character of this project, it was like I was conversing with every person that I was writing about, I pull from my memory, from the archives of my memory, everything that I remember about that person. So that again, shortening the time span that it took [i.e., by taking the Magic Learning Pill] would not be very useful. It is because, let’s say, about many of the people I can’t really say anything, and in regards to them I am rather indifferent. But with those, with whom I was close, with my close friends, while working on the project, I was continuing my conversations with them. Many

[11] See some of his poetry in Russian here: http://prg.stihi.ru/avtor/lmatusov.

[12] “Kaleidoscope of life… The more you move from the beginning, childhood through adolescence, through [the] stormy years of my life the more colorful and clear these remote events look to me. The people, loved ones, friends and relatives surrounding me, some here, some gone, some fading away fill my life with colors. They are my life… To these reaches of life I dedicate this Web Site in hope of sharing it with my beloved future, my grandchildren and generations to come. My roots, their roots, from where we all came from this story tells it all… Lev Matusov” (http://ematusov.soe.udel.edu/family/).

of them have already died, and I will never be able to converse with them again. Only by working on this project, with my memories, I get deeper and enter into contact with these people. This may sound somewhat mystical, but nonetheless, that is how it is.

Eugene: And you learn through this, right?

Lev: Yes, without a doubt. Because every step in this direction gives me something, adds something. To my knowledge, and to my art, if I can refer to it in that way (2002 interview for the Magic Learning Pill project, E. Matusov et al., 2017).

He volunteered preparing lectures about famous poets, singers, artists, and movie stars at a local care center for elderly people. He loved to help people often using his expanding computer skills to find a doctor, a necessary service, or desired items on the Internet. In his memoir book (L. Matusov, 2006), he wrote that helping other people gave him great pleasure. I think it was especially true when helping his family. When my wife lost her job in the early 1990s, before the mass use of emails, my dad used to come to a post office before its opening, to send her job applications so they could arrive a bit earlier. He wrote poetry for other people's anniversaries. He made CDs with personal photos and favorite music from YouTube first for himself and then for people from his community who were not able to do it by themselves. "All that music generated nostalgia, but not a nostalgia for 'Russia that we lost,' but a nostalgia for the irrevocably gone youth. I understand that each generation has its own music, connected to its own youth – we had our own…" (L. Matusov, 2006, p. 416, translation from Russian is mine). He organized many informal events. He was an important hub in the Russian-speaking elderly communities in Northern and Southern California and in Philadelphia, connecting people, services, and institutions and providing many services to the people.

My dad loved to learn. When he arrived in the United States, he threw himself into learning English with all his passion. Learning to drive a car at 64 was not easy and it took him one year before he could get his driving license. The most challenging learning about computers for older people is learning how to control a mouse—a task that requires a lot of patience and perseverance to sustain one's own motivation and to deal with constant frustration,

> I'm never sick and tired of working with a computer. Each time I sit down and start working on it, it opens secrets and mysteries to me more and more. Once, with a recommendation from Eugene, I installed software that allowed manipulating videos. The software was very good, but I haven't been fully ready for it yet. I managed to make some pieces of a film [I had in mind] but I still could not manage to finish it. I want to use this example to show that I always have more problems than the capacities to solve them. The computer (often with help from Eugene) constantly provides me with interesting work. (L. Matusov, 2006, p. 416, translation from Russian is mine)

My dad took several computer classes in a community college, mostly on the use of Photoshop to manipulate his photos creatively: restoring old photos, making photomontages, and so on. I remember him making a picture of us in Hawaii, although we never visited Hawaii back then. Also, he made a montage of me in my thirties, holding myself as a two-year-old, "I really like to work with Photoshop on the computer. It is something that I really enjoy doing – time is irrelevant when I do it. Photoshop teaches me – every time I sit and work on it, I learn something new. Learning the new is what life is about, it pushes life forward, without the new life cannot exist" (2002 interview for the Magic Learning Pill project, E. Matusov et al., 2017).

> For him, it was organic to grasp new and to guide others to learn it, giving his time and energy altruistically to his friends. He mastered a computer better than any of us (for elder people learning computers is not easy). He was first who bought and managed an electronic photo frame and electronic reader Kindle. We followed him while he patiently guided all of us who asked for his help. … Lev's memoir inspired me to write my own memoir, mostly for my own family – children and grandchildren. Lev helped me with it. Also, with his help, Zoya El'kind, a Holocaust survival, wrote and published her memoir "The burden to carry the good". ("Of blessed memory our friend, Lev Matusov, obituary" in *Jewish Life*, issue 4, p. 25, February 18, 2015, translation from Russian is mine)

His memory and then hearing started deteriorating, which created problems not only for learning but also for retaining what was learned. My dad approached these extremely annoying and troubling problems creatively to develop detouring strategies and social support for his own handicaps. He wrote numerous handwritten reminding notes to support his weakening memory. When his handwriting became difficult because of the shaking of his hands, he typed these notes on his computer. He developed a new social routine mediating his interlocutors' frustration with his poor hearing (he couldn't wear a hearing aid because his oxygen machine interfered with its work). He patiently repeated again and again, "Excuse me but can't you repeat what you just said, please? I didn't get it due to my poor hearing." He loved to learn about new computer technology, art, and politics. I interviewed him in 2002, when I was doing a research project about how different people learn (E. Matusov et al., 2017). At the end of the interview, I asked all my research participants about what they thought was the goal of my research. My dad replied, "Your goal might be to show what I have learned. To show that I am no longer eighteen but seventy-five and that at this level, and that at this level, you can still learn something new and live a full life. If I understand your goal correctly, then this goal is noble" (translated from Russian by Artyom Matusov, Lev's grandson).

However, somewhat ironically, my dad did not describe much of his leisure in his memoirs that he finished about a year before his death. He did not describe his projects or helping other people or creating circles among his friends, or inspiring other people's leisure. Unfortunately, I did not notice that before, while he was alive, and I did not ask him about this phenomenon. One reason was that his narrative genre was mostly shaped by our labor- and necessity-society and he did not know or did not feel appropriate to discuss his leisure life in any detail. Seabook found the same phenomenon when he interviewed retirees about the passion-endeavors that they developed during their retirement,

> Mr Grosskurth is 92; he … retired 20 years ago. Since then he has taught himself to paint, mostly copies of masterpieces in the National Gallery and Louvre: the Mona Lisa, Rembrandt, Rubens, the Impressionists, Goya; all of them meticulously executed. Particularly good are the renderings of faces and their expressions. Mr Grosskurth was an embroiderer in the East End, working on contracts to the big fashion houses. Some of the motifs he designed himself, operating a machine, guiding the needle over the pattern as though it were a pen. He had no idea that he possessed any artistic talent until he was well into his forties. One day, he idly copied a line-drawing from the newspaper, and discovered he could reproduce it almost exactly. He did his first painting when he was almost 60.

> …. If Mr Grosskurth had no idea of his slumbering talent, this is because the events of his life were so overwhelming that they effectively concealed it. (Seabrook, 1989, p. 123)

However, in his interview, Mr. Grosskurth focused on only difficult and traumatic events in his life. He described the terrible hardships of his Jewish family in Odesa, a Black seaport in Tsarist Russia: poverty, anti-Semitic discrimination, pogroms, a long path of emigration from Russia to the UK in 1905, poverty and struggle in the UK. "When my brother and I got to Frankfurt, they wrote to my father to send the money for us to continue the journey. I came to where they [were living in Whitechapel]. I was dismayed. I hated it. The buildings at that time were all black with soot, the air was full of smoke, the streets smelled of dung and hay and horses; there was mud and filth in the streets. I just wanted to go home" (p. 124). He learned hard work. "My father was working in one of the tailoring shops; and that's where I got my first job; 2 [pence] for machining each pair of trousers. I'd do up to three dozen pairs a day. Oh, how we worked! The cutters cut them out, 50 pairs at a time, you raced through them, stitching without pause" (p. 125). The later life of self-realization leisure seemed to feel almost frivolous and definitely exceptional to Mr. Grosskurth. "… I married, I had three children. That brings other tsores [troubles, worries], you have to survive. I always had a dream of doing something else … Now I've been able to achieve it. I don't complain. I have angina; my daughters live nearby; my son died recently. My niece is an opera singer, she lives in Sweden. I'm lucky, I've lived to realize my talents in old age. Not everybody is so fortunate. You can only wonder how many people take to the grave all the possibilities within them that never come to flower" (p. 125). My dad's memoirs were similar.

I call my dad "a leisure person" because he defined leisure not as rest from work, or idleness, or as unemployment, or as never-ending entertainment. Instead, he defined leisure as creativity, as self-actualization, as self-fulfillment, as initiative, as passionate projects, as help to others, as having interest in other people, as voluntarism, as caring of others, as networking, and as building and being a social hub. He sought and seized both emergent and designed opportunities for self-realization, however frustrating and even painful but also pleasurable they might be. His leisurely activities were driven by his openness to the self, to other people, to life and to the world and not by fulfilling his needs, necessity, jobs, instrumental goals, pressures, debts, duties, obligations, credentials, pressure, stigma, vanity, and so on. Needs, necessities, laws of nature, duties, logic were subordinated to his self-actualization rather than dominated and defined his activities. Due to his age and, to a lesser degree, immigration status, society legitimized his freedom from necessity so he could have leisure without any stigma. His formal and informal leisurely autodidact education was freed from the institutionally imposed instrumentalism of mainstream education.

I suspect that my dad, Lev Matusov, was a person from our possible leisure-based future where advances of technology liberate people from labor and create opportunities for leisure that my dad so actively embraced and enjoyed. Together with Maslow (1943), I argue that human self-actualization—creative transcendence of the given recognized by others and/or the self, which I call "authorial agency"—and not fulfillment of needs is the essence of human nature and destiny.

Hanging Out Conversations Among Friends

Friendship is a relationship that is not defined by any specific event or discourse, or topic, or goal; rather, it is the enjoyment of being together across many diverse events, discourse, topics, genres, and goals—it opens up spaces for many overlapping possibilities (i.e., heterodiscoursia; see E. Matusov, 2011b). Friends' interest in each other is self-contained and intrinsic—it is not reducible to anything or any particular reason, including their authorial self-growth (E. Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015).

The basis of friendship is mutuality without reciprocity (Graeber, 2014). Friendship is not so much based on a reciprocal exchange of favors to each other—doing something to please the other, expecting in return that they do something they otherwise may not want to do; being useful to each other with reciprocity. Rather, friendship is based on intrinsic pleasure from being and engaging with each other. Hanging-out dialogue with friends is not goal-oriented but rather relationship-oriented—it creates a joint living space of freely chosen relationships, "… [the] café is *a framework for freely chosen social relationships*" (Dumazedier, 1974, p. 85, the italics original). In this sense, friends have meta-interaddressivity—overall interest in their own involvement with each other across vastly diverse life contexts (Nikulin, 2006).

In the friendship I describe here, dialogue among friends is about being together through deep interest in, and enjoyment of, each other's subjectivity and taking care of each other. The subjectivity of the friend is accessible but never fully known in the tension between a genuine question and a serious answer. It is meta-interaddressivity driven by the relationship and interest in the other and not primarily by authorial self-growth. Thus, the opaqueness of consciousness (E. Matusov, 2015b) is preserved in friendship relationships because it is defined by a deep, unconditional, and sustained interest of friends in each other across contexts and discourses (Perel, 2017) and not like-mindedness and mindreading as Vygotsky (1986) described with reference to Leo Tolstoy's novel "Anna Karenina" when lovers could understand each other's phrases by writing just the initial letters of the words.

Friends sacrifice for each other rather than for an idea or a cause. In contrast to Aristotle who claimed, "Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas" ("Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend"), in friendship, we can say, "Amica veritas, sed magis amicus Plato" ("Truth is my friend, but Plato is a better friend"). The friend is the final cause of friendship. A genuine dialogue among friends is the "I-Thou" dialogue defined by Martin Buber (Buber, 2000). *It*—i.e., the topic of dialogue (e.g., truth)—is a mediator of friendship, provoking friendship-defining events.

Although they can benefit from each other, any instrumental relationship among friends may jeopardize the friendship. That is why friendship and business should be kept separate from each other. In nonlegalistic, noncapitalist economies, friendship can buttress business relations, while a business relationship creates new opportunities for friendship (Mauss, 1970). This creates a dualism similar to quantum mechanics. A person can simultaneously be a friend and a partner in a task-oriented enterprise, but the relationship-oriented friendship cannot be reduced to the entrepreneurial partnership, which may lead to instrumentalism and exploitation. Equally, the entrepreneurial partnership should not be reduced to the friendship, which may lead to corruption and inefficiencies. The careful boundary between friendship and enterprise has to be maintained.

Since I define education as a leisurely enterprise of critical examination of life and the world, this dualism is true for education as well—thus, in our view, friendship cannot be the sole basis of education, in contrast to Illich's argument to the contrary (Illich & Cayley, 1992). Using Martin Buber's I-Thou-IT terminology defining a genuine dialogue (Buber, 2000), educational and entrepreneurial relationships' orientation is about I-IT/Thou-IT (finding the truth or achieving a goal) which overpowers friendship (I-Thou), and can actually, in some cases, destroy friendship—and the other way around. I think that this duality often creates various illusions and hopes that may be false. This is the framework for examining a different quality of the feelings of love/caring/hate/coldness/meanness—that often gets roused in educational settings (Marjanovic-Shane, personal communication, April 4, 2017). Thus, friendship sets limits for external, enterprise-oriented power relations and vice versa.

Internally, the dialogue of friends involves strong and direct power relations. Friends can easily impose on each other and reject these impositions. While non-friendship relationships outside of hierarchy (described above) require meta-negotiation on impositions, friendship does not need this. For example, a friend of mine often apologized for "bothering us" when she initiated a request or just introduced a topic. I replied to her: "This is what friends are for—to constantly bother each other. If you stop bothering us, it means either that we stopped being friends or that we died." After that, she stopped apologizing and "bothered" us unapologetically, as friends are supposed to do. Power and counter-power are welcomed in dialogue among friends.

Philosopher of dialogue Dmitri Nikulin turns things around and defines the notion of dialogue through hanging out conversations among friends (Nikulin, 2006, 2010). He emphasizes the unfinalizability, interruptibility, polythematicity, and nonproductivity of genuine dialogue among friends. The unfinalizability of dialogue means that "the meaning of the subject being [dialogued] has not… been fully extinguished [and cannot be ever extinguished]; it needs to be discussed further and is not ([ever]) accessible to the interlocutors in its entirety…" (Nikulin, 2006, p. 73). In genuine dialogue with friends, "Each interlocutor must speak herself out in an unfinalizable variety of ways, doing so each time anew and in a new situation while still maintaining the never fully thematizable sameness of herself as her own other" (Nikulin, 2006, p. 7). Let's consider an example of the unfinalizability of dialogue between two friends.

Sociolinguist Deborah Tannen recorded and analyzed a 2.5-hour Thanksgiving conversation among 6 friends in their 30s in 1979. Here is a fragment of a conversation between her and her childhood New-Yorker friend Peter (Tannen, 2005, p. 109)[13]:

[13] You can listen to this exchange here: http://www.deborahtannen.com/s/page109.mp3.

> My interchange with Peter [about sleeping and eating lifestyle patterns] ends with observations about dating. Peter volunteers the information that following his separation, he went through a period of dating a lot, but now he has decided that he does not find that satisfying. I make a generalization (a device typical of my style) to the effect that his experience is "normal." At the end of our exchange, both the rhythm and content of our comments effect harmony and conclusion:

(I) Deborah: Well that's a véry usual páttern. I mean I think when you
suddenly find yourself single, of cóurse what you want
to do is date a lot. ... In fact I would think it would
s - remain interesting for about a yéar. [*laugh*] Thén you
get bóred.

(2) Peter: We:ll, I think I got bòred. [*Deborah laughs*] Well I-I
acc

mean basically what I feel is what I really like ...
is people. And getting to know them réally wéll. And
you just cán't get to know .... <u>ten</u> people <u>rea</u>lly
[*breathy*]
well. You [can't dó it.
p

(3) Deborah: [Yeah right. Y'have to there's no - Yeah
There's [no time.

(4) Peter: [There's not time.

(5) Deborah: Yeah ... 'strue.

Deborah provides her theory about why prolonged dating becomes less and less satisfying because it becomes boring. It seems to me that Deborah implies that prolonged dating loses its novelty and, thus, becomes routinized. On the surface, Peter agrees with Deborah that he got bored with prolonged dating, but, actually, his reason for dissatisfaction is different. He seems to become overwhelmed by his causal but intense attempts to know deeply too many people in a short time. Deborah agrees with Peter about not having time in prolonged dating without admitting that her previous theory of why prolonged dating was dissatisfactory for Peter was incorrect. Peter's personal disclosure disrupts and transcends Deborah's vision, her little intellectualized theory of prolonged dating and probably dating itself. Also, it may (or may not) be that Deborah's little theory helped to reflect on his dissatisfaction with his prolonged dating and formulate his reason for that for the first time. They both used the word "bored," but they mean different things. Deborah means the ritualized event of dating losing its novelty, eventfulness, and meaning. In contrast, Peter means a sense of being overwhelmed by pressure to "really know well" his numerous dates in a short period of time. They are ending the theme in a chorus of agreement.

Although this topic faded after this brief exchange, I argue that this topic is potentially unfinalizable. It is pregnant with an unlimited number of questions that remained unaddressed and never exhausted. For example, what does it mean for Peter (and others) "to know [one's date] really well"? Is it possible? Is it really necessary for starting a deep romantic relationship? What are alternatives to knowing a date really well for starting a deep romantic relationship? Is dating as a cultural practice of "trying out" numerous diverse potential romantic partners helpful? What can be alternative practices, strategies, or approaches? What does it mean for Peter to "like people" and why and what does it have to do with dating? What is the connection between "to like people" and "to know them really well"? And so on. For some reason, Deborah and Peter decided not to jump into this "rabbit hole" of a deep unfinalizable dialogue, which is rather typical of hanging out conversations among friends. A typical hanging out conversation among friends involves numerous diverse short-lived thematic bubbles (Tannen, 2005) pregnant with deep unfinalizable dialogues (Nikulin, 2006). Some of these themes reemerge later but some die out. In hanging out conversations with friends, the focus solely remains on each other rather than on pursuing the emerging themes even when this pursuit occurs.

This contrasts with pragmatic conversations when the focus is on accomplishing something together or taking some benefit from another. For example, the following is a pragmatic conversation I recorded in Russian and translated into English. It is an exchange between a wife and a husband after she talked on the phone with Leona, their mutual friend, who had a problem with the sewage in their house. The wife just finishes her phone conversation with Leona in another room, she enters the room where her husband is reading and interrupts his reading. The husband knows about Leona's family's troubles with their sewage.

> *Wife*: You know, Leona said they [a sewage repairing company] started digging already. She said what saved them [from a high bill] was a sewage and external electricity insurance. I think we should buy it as well. …
>
> [Long pause. The husband was considering his wife's suggestion-demand but he was apparently still unconvinced.]
>
> *Wife*: We have an old house. Something may break suddenly – it may cost us a lot. Will you look for it [i.e., search for a suitable insurance company on the Internet]?
>
> *Husband*: Yeah [it's a good idea.] Why don't you ask her [Leona] for the name of the [insurance] company?
>
> [Long pause. The wife goes to another room and calls Leona again to get the name of the insurance company. She comes back disrupting her husband from reading.]
>
> *Wife*: It's Homeservusa. Do you want me to text it [to you]?
>
> *Husband*: Yeah.
>
> [Wife texts the name of the company to the husband. He continues his reading.]

In this pragmatic social exchange, the wife tries to convince her husband to buy insurance coverage for sewage and external electricity and for that purpose to find a suitable insurance company. The husband hesitates so the wife provides an elaborate reason for buying insurance. The husband agrees but instead of looking for a suitable company on the Internet, he asks his wife for the name of Leona's company since Leona apparently likes it (this was not said by the husband but was implied). The wife seems to process this implied reason and signals agreement by following the husband's suggestion. The wife gets the information about the insurance company from Leona and passes it to her husband. A few hours later, after finishing his reading, the husband finds the company on the Internet and checks its coverage options. In a day, during a leisure car trip to another state, the husband informs his wife about his conclusion that the coverage does not fit their needs. They have a disagreement that remains unresolved.

This pragmatic task-oriented and goal-oriented dialogue about buying home insurance coverage is unfinished but finalizable. It is finalizable because either this family will purchase insurance coverage or not.

The topic is exhaustible within the horizon of the pragmatics. The interlocutors treat each other as participants in an activity with a well-defined (although negotiated) goal. They try to act upon each other. They try to reach an agreement that does not transcend their own being. Their pragmatic dialogue belongs to the world of things, of the *It* (cf. Buber, 2000). It transforms them into talking things, talking *Its*. They are living in a world of needs and necessities. They need something from each other. Their pragmatic dialogue is aimed at a certain product—an agreement (for the wife, the agreement is about buying insurance coverage while for the husband it is about not buying it). Pragmatic dialogue tends to be productive.

In contrast, hanging out conversations among friends are often nonproductive (Nikulin, 2010). These conversations are not aimed at establishing the truth or generating some collective or individual action desired by the participants. A genuine dialogue is outside of the realm of activity. All occasional products of a genuine dialogue are accidental and not aimed at.

These unfinalizable non-pragmatic dialogues among friends are usually messy. The dialogic turns are often really short (about 10 words per turn on average, Tannen, 2005, p. 64) with overlapping and interrupting qualities. For Nikulin, the latter is the marker of genuine dialogue. After Russian sociolinguists Lev Shcherba (1915) and Lev Yakubinsky and Eskin (1997), Nikulin argues that interruptibility often (but not always) indicates the interlocutors' interest in each other's ideas (i.e., interaddressivity, see E. Matusov, 2011b), "giving another interlocutor the chance to speak, so that each answer presupposes another question that will follow" (Nikulin, 2010, p. 74). Shcherba tried to study narratives in the living speech of common people, but he often failed,

> Remembering the time that I spent among these half-peasants, half-factory workers, surprisingly enough I never witnessed a [narrative-long] monologue – only *interrupted* dialogues. Thus, these people would not talk about their business trips to Leipzig or other locations individually; their narratives were usually composed of lively dialogues. This was certainly not a sign of their lack of culture but maybe, on the contrary, a sign of their extreme "culturedness," of their eternal chase after new and superficial impressions and of a certain hastiness distinguishing factory workers from real peasants.... All these observations prove once more that monologue is a highly artificial form of language and that language reveals its true essence in dialogue. (Cited in Yakubinsky & Eskin, 1997, p. 249)

In contrast, Tannen attributes a higher degree of interruptibility to a particular culture of the participants, for example, a particular Jewish New York culture in her case[14] (Tannen, 2005). Meanwhile, Nikulin argues that particular culture, particular settings, and particular people can be more or less dialogic or monologic based on their dialogic interruptibility (Nikulin, 2010). Interestingly enough, the pragmatic dialogue above occurs without overlapping and interruptions in accordance with Nikulin's philosophical claim that uninterrupted speech can be a marker of monologism.

Hanging out conversations among friends both generate friendship and are the medium where friendship exists. Hanging out conversations among friends is being-together oriented.[15] The unconditional nonpragmatic interest in a friend, in the person who he or she is, creates intimacy and a community behind the person's self-realization and his/her emerging voice (see E. Matusov, 2009). It brings safety for self-disclosure among friends in the moments when people feel intense friendships with each other (Tannen, 2005). In friendship, based on its unconditional acceptance, transcendence and transgression of the culturally given, social norms, and social taboos become increasingly possible. This leads people to "feel themselves" with their friends—when the unconditional acceptance and interest collapse, the friendship collapses.

To illustrate that, I want to bring a fieldnote from research conducted by one of my colleagues[16] (she did not record the conversation but restored it afterward, so we do not know overlaps and interruptions),

> I picked up Maria, my granddaughter, and Michelle, her friend, from school today and drove them to Maria's home. They had a "play date." Maria is about to turn 6 in a few days, and Michelle is about the same age.
>
> In the car, they were making different conversations. They looked for a wooden statue of a wolf, "Woolfie," in one of the yards we were passing on the road and discussed if his name was "Woody or Woolfie" since it was a wooden statue of a wolf…

[14] Three out of the six participants were Jews from New York. They interrupted more than the rest. However, interruption was omnipresent throughout the Thanksgiving dinner conversation—everybody participated in it (Tannen, 2005).

[15] This may be expressed differently in different cultures—perhaps further research is needed.

[16] With permission of my colleague who wants to remain anonymous.

At one point Michelle said,

1. *Michelle*: I love this hat! You know why?
2. *Maria*: Why?
3. *Michelle*: I have 10 reasons to love it. Actually, I have more than 10 reasons, but they are private. I will just tell you 10.
4. *Maria*: What are they?
5. *Michelle*: First, it has this flower that is in my favorite colors. Second, it is warm and keeps my head warm. Third, it has these strings, I can pull on. Four, I can chew on these balls at the end of the strings. Five, I can fold it really tight. Six, I can put my gloves in it. Seven, I can curl it.
6. Michelle gave reason 8 (I forget what) and then said, "Ten, I can easily hide it where no one can find it…"
7. *Maria*: Wait, it's nine! You said 'eight' and then 'ten'. But it's really nine!
8. *Michelle*: Oh, yes. Nine. Nine, I can easily hide it where no one can find it. Ten… Oh, promise you will not tell anyone and you will not laugh!
9. *Maria*: I promise!
10. *Michelle*: I sometimes put it in my clothes, my underwear, or my shirt. It really keeps me warm! Like this! Oh, I cannot reach down, just to my shirt. (The two of them were riding with the seatbelts on so Michelle could not reach below her waist.)
11. Maria (after a pause and in a very serious voice): I have never done anything like that.

    (At that moment, we approached an intersection that Maria recognized.)
12. *Maria*: I know where we are! It is very near my home.
13. *Michelle*: Are we going to your grandmother's or to your house?
14. *Maria*: We are going to my house.

The conversation continued about grandmothers. Michelle thought she saw me on grandparent's day, but Maria told her, it was not me, but her great-grandmother… There were a few more topics they mentioned before we got to Maria's house and they went into play and I went away.

Later that day, when I came back to babysit, Michelle's mother was picking her up, and the two girls did not want to separate. They held hands, and Michelle went back inside a few times. I learned that it was their first time to have a "play date."

The 6-year old girls apparently recognize that messing with their underwear is a social taboo (10–11). A transgression of this social taboo has to be kept private (3) or as a secret among friends (8–11). People who transgress social taboos can be humiliated and ostracized through laughter (8). A friend accepts her friend's transgression by taking it seriously (11). A safe and serious dialogic reply by a friend creates a community behind that nurtures the friend's authorship of his/her own life (i.e., self-realization and self-actualization).

Concluding Notes on Genuine Leisure

Genuine leisure is not just the absence of labor, but rather the promotion and prioritization of the authorship of self-realization, self-actualization, and self-initiatives (for the self and for the others) over needs, necessity, duties, obligations, survival, pragmatics, instrumentalism, and so on. According to O'Malley, leisure is a radical cultural action, as the reassertion of creative, human self-constitution, "the positive deviance of personality" (O'Malley, 1972). Of course, instrumentalism, necessity, and servitude are always present in leisurely being as well, but they are subordinated or occasional rather than becoming the primary guiding and driving force of human existence, as is often the case now and in the past. The absence of labor may generate fake leisure that I described above.

In the current and past societies, genuine leisure in the form of intrinsic play, noninstrumental education, passionate endeavors, and hanging out conversations with friends, often unrecognized, publicly unappreciated, and/or exists on the margin. It is barely tolerated and often is viewed as frivolous, wasteful, egoistic, and even sinful (e.g., as lapses of a person's moral character) unless it can be exploited or viewed in the utilitarian terms of the need-based society (e.g., as rest, as exploitable creativity or engagement, as a useful relationship, as productive dialogue, as productive learning). However, we may be coming to a new material age of being able to make genuine leisure into the cornerstone of our being, to realize Aristotle's motto, "We work in order to have leisure" (Aristotle, 2000, p. 7) and Benjamin Franklin's slogan, "Eat to live, don't live to eat!" By doing that we may realize our human destiny to prioritize "to ought"—i.e., how things should be in accordance with our imagined "true human nature"—over "to have"—i.e., what the necessities and needs force on us now. In the next chapter, I will discuss a possible realization of leisure-based society and ways of its economic, political, and social organization.

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CHAPTER 6

Necessities in a Leisure-Based Society: Economy, Politics, and Social Obligations

Leisure-based society is a society in which cultures and practices are mostly dominated and priorities are determined by the genuine leisure of self-realization over the necessities of survival and ensuring one's well-being. As I will show that below, it does not mean that in a leisure-based society, all its members practice genuine leisure all the time, and eliminate all necessities and instrumentalities. Instead, a leisure-based society aims at spreading opportunities for genuine leisure for as many of its participants as possible in its present historical moment. At the same time, genuine leisure is not imposed on people who want to pursue activities of necessity or engage in fake leisure, discussed above. Thus, leisure-based society remains always hybrid, pluralistic, liberal, and tolerant both internally and externally. Internally, in all its leisurely activities and pursuits, genuine leisure cannot escape necessity.[1] Necessity has to be addressed while not allowing it to take over and colonize genuine leisure. Externally, outside of leisure, material conditions for people's engagement in genuine leisure are based on attending to the necessities that enable these

[1] That is why I prefer my term "leisure-based society" to the term "leisure society" (e.g., Archambault & Theodore, 2005; Seabrook, 1989), which is often defined as "a society which is at least culturally, and probably economically, focused on leisure, the equivalent of industrial society or agrarian society" (Veal, 2009, p. 2). In contrast to industrial society and agrarian society that reached their totality, I argue that leisure-based society will always remain a hybrid between its (shrinking) industrial and (increasing) leisure aspects, which will be both cultural and economic.

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conditions. Somebody has to work and act to secure genuine leisure for others (and themselves).

In this chapter, I focus both on internal and external societal factors that may force people to attend to their necessities—something being required or indispensable—in a leisure-based society: economy, politics, and social obligations, while creating necessary conditions for genuine leisure. Genuine leisure "is not the result of an individual decision, but above all, the product of economic and social evolution" (Dumazedier, 1974, p. 71). The economy creates material conditions for people's engagement in genuine leisure. People have to have food, shelter, medical care, and other resources to spend most of their time on carefree genuine leisure. Also, often, genuine leisure itself requires certain resources (e.g., a digital camera, computer, and software to pursue a passionate endeavor of digital photography, as it was in a case of my dad).

Similarly, leisure-based assemblies, communities, and societies have to be governed, self-governed, which has to involve politics. In a leisure-based society, promoting the diversity of people's interests and values, which may be in disagreement and even conflict with each other, this politics has to be, in my view, a form of liberal democracy. Finally, many genuine leisure activities and endeavors are driven by people's interests described above require short- and long-term social obligations and commitments from its participants. For example, even hanging out with friends in conversation requires synchronization and commitment of time from its participants obliging them to prioritize these conversations with friends over other possible activities.

The Economy in Leisure-Based Society: Freedom with Dignity

Warren G. Bennis, a scholar of organizational leadership, once made a prediction about the future economy based on technological unemployment: "The factory of the future will have only two employees, a man and a dog. The man will be there to feed the dog. The dog will be there to keep the man from touching the equipment" (Fisher, 1991, p. 151). I do not expect that all humans will ever be expelled from the economy entirely because humans will always be needed to innovate, maintain, and balance the economy. The economy involves creative inventions of new goods, new services, and new human desires for them. The economy involves the creative fixing of emerging new problems. Even assisted by smart computer applications, the economy involves negotiations and bargaining economic exchanges of supply and demand among other humans on the marketplace based on human subjectivity. Certain types of jobs will probably remain temporarily or permanently impossible to automatized. So, even though there will be a diminishing need for human labor in the new economic age, I believe there will still be a need for human labor.

To solve this problem, Marx and many of his followers (e.g., Gorz, 1985, 1989) insist on imposed total and full employment on the society—when all able body and mind persons must and will work,—while decreasing the working hours required for human labor. They want to promote the principle of equality. If the inherently alienating human labor is necessary for society, let it be an unpleasant obligation for all. Thus, Gorz (1985) insists that at some point in the future everyone will be required to work 15,000 hours per lifetime.[2] Others estimate a reduction of daily work to 2–3 hours to maintain full employment (Bregman, 2017).

In Chapter 4, I argued against full employment as a means to address the challenge of technological unemployment. My main reasons are the following. Full employment leads to political oppression in society and to economic inefficacies. As Gorz (1989) admitted himself, some people would *have to be legally coerced* to fulfill their societal obligation to work the minimum hours in their lifespan. Since economic coercion will be out of the question, because, in his proposal, all people will be guaranteed the basic income necessary for living,[3] the coercion has to be political and legal. As the history of socialism in the twentieth century shows us, even when political and legal coercion was active, some people refused to work and had to be jailed for their "social parasitism." Some people may refuse to work for various reasons. First of all, labor/work is inherently alienating, as I showed above. Second, people may want to engage in leisurely activities that promote their self-realization. Third, outside of the marketplace that Marxists want to eliminate with capitalism, what one person sees as a work, the state/society/community may not see as necessary, socially needed, work. Fourth, what the economy may need in each particular case, a person may not want to deliver. For example, 24-year-old Soviet poet Joseph Brodsky, who was later awarded the Nobel Prize in

[2] The actual average number of lifetime working hours per person was 122,400 in 1995 (Fogel, 2000).

[3] Karl Marx's famous formula of the communist economy, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" proclaimed in his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program, eliminates the possibility of economic coercion under communism.

literature, was tried in Leningrad in 1964 for crimes against the state. He was accused of "social parasitism" ("тунеядство," tuneyadstvo in Russian) for not "working" according to the state's definition of work. Brodsky was sentenced to five years of hard labor and served 18 months on a collective farm (kolkhoz) in the village of Norenskaya, in the Archangelsk region, 350 miles from Leningrad. Here is the exchange between the Soviet judge and Brodsky during the trial:

> *Judge*: And, in general, what is your specific occupation?
> *Brodsky*: Poet. Poet-translator.
> *Judge*: And who said you're a poet? Who ranked you among poets?
> *Brodsky*: No one. (Unsolicited) Who ranked me as a member of the human race?
> *Judge*: Did you study for this?
> *Brodsky*: Study for what?
> *Judge*: To become a poet. Did you attend some university where people are trained… where they're taught?…
> *Brodsky*: I didn't think it was a matter of education.
> *Judge*: How, then?
> *Brodsky*: I think that… (perplexed) it comes from God…
> *Judge*: Do you have any petitions for the court?
> *Brodsky*: I'd like to know why I was arrested.
> *Judge*: That's a question, not a petition.
> *Brodsky*: Then I have no petitions (Vigdorova, 2014, p. 185).

It was expected in socialist countries that "a new person" with a Communist consciousness would emerge through education—a Communist person—with a deeply internalized obligation toward society. What is needed by the society was defined by the State and not a person. Very soon in the history of real socialism, the Gulag—a system of hard labor camps in Siberia—became the main means of this "education." The social engineering experiment of creating "a new person," who wants always what the state wants the new person to want, miserably failed (Zinoviev & Janson, 1985).

The economic inefficacies of total employment produce shortages in goods and services, problems with their delivery to consumers, stagnation, and "bullshit jobs" described above (see Chapter 4 and Graeber, 2018). The efficient economy is aimed to satisfy the needs for goods and services desired by people, while reducing the cost of production, including the costs and needs for human labor. The goal of full employment goes against this major economic efficiency by resisting cutting the costs of labor and eliminating unnecessary labor. Thus, it creates "bullshit," fake, unnecessary jobs (Graeber, 2013, August 17). The full employment mandated by the state eliminates the labor market that, however imperfectly, still balances supply and economic demand in human labor. Without a labor market, the "genuine" amount of labor needed becomes unknown. Rational planning alone consistently fails in assessing the needs for labor, due to the economy's dynamism, complexity, uncertainty, distribution, a lack of feedback loops, and the human factor. Total employment, extra-economically mandated by the state, resists technological innovations that can cut costs of production and especially automation reducing the very need for human labor. Finally, certain economic activities may require more time from a person's labor than the mandated full employment allows (e.g., two hours per day). These economic inefficiencies of full employment lead to political and moral corruption introducing shadow markets, a shadow economy, shadow politics, and even, probably, political totalitarianism as the history of the twentieth century shows.

In a necessities-based society, total employment is viewed as a virtue for everybody's economic well-being. However, in a leisure-based society, economic well-being is going to be divorced from participation in the economy. Nevertheless, some scholars insist on total employment in a leisure-based society mostly on social justice grounds. Below, I consider and criticize the desirability of economic equality and undesirability of economic inequality, as modern hegemonic ideologies (among alternative hegemonic ideologies) put forward by social justice proponents, in general, and for a leisure-based society, in particular.

With regard to the issues of inequality and equality, there is a sense of a centennial déjà vu. At the beginning of the twenty-first century as at the beginning of the twentieth century, global economic inequality is again on the rise, and so is the growing vocal demand to stop it by promoting equality. As of January 2016, the 62 wealthiest people on earth own as much as half of the world's population put together.[4] In response to the problem of growing to extreme inequality, there have been increasing

[4] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3404296/The-world-s-62-wealthiest-people-poorest-3-6billion.html#ixzz3yvqZmJqq.

calls for equality and/or equity.[5] Thus, for the first time in many-many decades, a viable presidential candidate of one of the major political parties in the United States, Bernie Sanders, called himself a "socialist."[6]

I argue that the ideas of equality pushed to the extreme are unavoidably bad and tragic in themselves. In other words, it is extreme equality itself, and not its poor implementations, that has to be blamed for the tragedies and crimes of the twentieth century. I argue that both equality and inequality are necessary aspects of "good life," and both extreme equality and extreme inequality are at fault, producing miseries in society. To avoid a vicious circle of tragedies, and crimes of the twentieth century associated with the extreme inequality and extreme equality, we should focus on finding a good balance between equality and inequality to address the current growing extreme inequality rather than again to call exclusively for equality in response to rising extreme inequality.

The twentieth century can be characterized as a century of global experimentations with equality in a response to extreme inequalities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The equality experiments differed from taming capitalism (e.g., Roosevelt's "New Deal"[7]) to diverse types of socialism (e.g., "National Socialism" in Germany, "International Socialism" in Russia and many other countries). But by the end of the twentieth century, the most radical of these equality experiments collapsed (with a few exceptions) and even some policies of taming capitalism were being rolled back and eroded in the United States and elsewhere. Radical equality experiments of the twentieth century were often accompanied by total misery: totalitarianism, purges, internal state terrorism, curtailing of freedoms, wars, economic collapses and stagnations, genocide, and flourishing mediocracy. A Soviet joke expresses the wrongs of extreme equality, "If we can't make everyone equally happy, we can make everyone equally miserable." Arguably, extreme equality is worse than extreme inequality by promoting self-inflicted internal genocide (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016).

[5] For the purpose of this chapter, I lump the notions of equality (i.e., equal treatment) and equity (i.e., creating conditions for the equal result) together.

[6] http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/clinton-engels-to-stop-bernie-sanders-socialism/424896/.

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Deal.

Observing the historical experiments of the twentieth century with equality, pushed to its limits, I can extract at least five mutually related adverse consequences of extreme equality:

1. inhibition of innovations and creativity (stagnation, mediocracy),
2. inhibition of diversity,
3. suppression of liberties,
4. extreme violence (wars, terror, concentration camps, and purges), and
5. paralysis of public critical thinking.

A famous Soviet joke commented on the tension between the notion of *quality* and (extreme) *equality* (please notice the similar root of these words) proclaims, “Free medicine is medicine-free.” In the Soviet Union, health care was universal and free for all, but it also had notoriously bad quality. The tension between quality and equality was nicely captured by science-fiction writer William Gibson, who said, “The future is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed.” Fighting an unevenly distributed new good is fighting the future of this good itself. This fighting unavoidably leads to a societal stagnation. Arguably, inequality provides extra resources needed for innovation. For example, new safety, navigation, driving, and efficiency features of cars often start from expensive cars and then gradually spread to cheaper cars by cutting the initial high costs of production of these innovations. The socialist regimes of the twentieth century, based on promoting extreme equality, tried to solve this problem through rationalist “scientific” planning by managing inequality of resources to prioritize areas of important innovation. However, planning is based on expectations, which are always rooted in the past and present, and, thus, can never fully anticipate the eventful future, unpredictable by its very nature. Planning cannot take into account the transactional dynamism of the transcendental and constructivist nature of human desire, both of which are rooted in and transcend reality. This makes planned economy—the economy based solely on planning—incredibly wasteful, inefficient, shortages-based, and insensitive to people’s diverse and emerging needs and wants.

Of course, extreme inequality brings also suffering misery to a majority of people. It destroys human dignity. It undermines liberal democracy, increasingly promoting authoritarian regimes, based on brutal force, populism, nationalism, bigotry, and so on. It threatens peace and leads to violent political instabilities. It promotes political and economic corruption and economic inefficiencies. It often orients the economy on the production of luxury goods and tools of oppression and war. I expect that a reader of this book is familiar with these arguments and underlining evidence for them (Cappellari, Tatsiramos, & Polachek, 2016; Wilkinson, 2005). In sum, I argue that equality and inequality are necessary aspects of "the good life" and both extreme equality and extreme inequality are at fault by producing misery in society.

My economic proposal addressing technological unemployment in a leisure-based society is based on both promoting and curbing socioeconomic inequality and equality to avoid extremes of any of them. My economic justice will focus on promoting human uniqueness and dignity. I want to respect and promote diversity and the human uniqueness while providing growing universal basic resources as a universal human right. With regard to economy, I expect three groups of people emerging in a leisure-based society: (1) a gradually diminishing group of people who are mainly involved in the economy, (2) a group of people who are involved essentially in both the economy and in leisure, and (3) a growing group of people who mostly engage in genuine leisure and not in the economy. In my proposal, the engagement in these three groups will be voluntary, imperfectly regulated by a labor market and people's economic and non-economic needs. The economic life of the society will be based on regulated market capitalism, growing universal basic income, and growing technological unemployment spurred by automatization.

In contrast to the Marxist and Old Left, promoting the old mantra of extreme equality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I think that regulated market capitalism is the best regime for the economy. Paraphrasing the famous statement about democracy by Winston Churchill, "Regulated market capitalism is the worst form of Economy except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." As I argued above in Chapter 3, although capitalism adds its own misery, the main source of human alienation is in the economy itself, in the (economic) necessity subordinating and suppressing the human nature of self-realization. Capitalism is based on three major pillars: (1) extortion of unpaid labor that can become capital, (2) markets of supply and demand, including the labor market, (3) regulations that curtail greed and monopoly destroying the economy, environment, and society; enforce obligations; and protects private property, without which capitalism is impossible. I argue that capitalism has two great achievements: (1) replacement of physical coercion of labor evident in slavery, feudalism, and real socialism with an imperfect labor market of contractual obligations and (2) its imperfect promotion of technological innovation. Of course, these two achievements are imperfect—they have been violated in some cases and from time to time, but so far, they hold on average.

In contrast to other economic regimes, capitalism does not punish people's non-participation in labor by physical violence. So far, capitalism has been able to fix itself from its vices, or at least to address them in the long run, with the help of the market, the courts, the democratic liberal government, civic engagement, protests, unions, laws, and regulations. Another important aspect of capitalism is its high hybridity. Capitalism tolerates, if not actively promotes at times, diverse non-capitalist modes of production and service: non-profits, cooperatives, open-source, charities, state enterprises (e.g., public schools), and so on.[8] Arguably, capitalism is a champion of diversity (and, thus, inequality). Russian philosopher of dialogism Bakhtin (1999) focused on both the positive and negative aspects of capitalism:

> Capitalism destroyed the isolation of these worlds [of the past economic regimes], broke down the seclusion and inner ideological self-sufficiency of these social spheres. In its tendency to level everything, to leave intact no divisions except the division between proletariat and capitalist, capitalism jolted these worlds and wove them into its own contradictory evolving unity. These worlds had not yet lost their own individual profile, worked out over centuries, but they had ceased to be self-sufficient. Their blind co-existence and their peaceful and trusting ideological ignorance of one another came to an end; their mutual contradictoriness and at the same time their interconnectedness was revealed with the utmost clarity. Every atom of life trembled with this contradictory unity of the capitalist world and capitalist consciousness, permitting nothing to rest easily in isolation, but at the same time resolving nothing. The spirit of this world-in the-state-of-becoming found its fullest expression in the works of Dostoevsky. (p. 19)

[8] Including negative ones like slavery, sweatshops, black market, human trafficking, and so on.

Capitalism also brings people together, "Capitalism, similar to that 'pander' Socrates on the market square of Athens [i.e., agora in Greece, forum in Rome], brings together people and ideas" (p. 167); while creating "the conditions for a special type of inescapably solitary consciousness" (p. 288).

By promoting automatization and cutting the costs of human labor via cutting human labor itself, when possible, capitalism creates the economic conditions for a leisure-based society, but, of course, it does not guarantee it.[9] Robots and machines do not require salaries and wages (but, of course, they have initial cost and costs of maintenance and upgrade, which compete with costs of human labor). However, by cutting total human labor and workers involved in the economy, capitalism undermines the economy itself because it reduces the number of people who can afford to buy goods and services. In November 1956, Walter Reuther, a leader of the automobile workers union, delivered a speech to a Council group of the National Education Association,

> I went through this Ford engine plant about three years ago, when they first opened it. There are acres and acres of machines, and here and there you will find a worker standing at a master switchboard, just watching, green and yellow lights blinking off and on, which tell the worker what is happening in the machine. One of the management people, with a slightly gleeful tone in his voice said to me, "How are you going to collect union dues from all these machines?" And I replied, "You know, that is not what's bothering me. I'm troubled by the problem of how to sell automobiles to these machines". (http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/11/16/robots-buy-cars/)

As many had done before me, I propose dissociation of people's economic well-being from their labor via a universal unconditional basic income (Bregman, 2017; Flowers, 2016, April 25; Gorz, 1985, 1989; Markoff, 2015; Yang, 2018). "A *basic income* (also called *basic income guarantee*, *Citizen's Income*, *unconditional basic income*, *universal basic income*, *freedom dividend*, or *universal demogrant*) is a form of social security in which all citizens or residents of a country regularly receive an unconditional sum of money, either from a government or some other

[9] Actually, historically, emergent capitalism dramatically diminished free time that people could spend on leisure but then again the amount of free time has become increased under capitalism (de Grazia, 1962).

public institution, in addition to any income received from elsewhere."[10] In my version of the universal basic income, all people have a right for certain economic well-being regardless of whether they work or own capital or not. In contrast to need-based welfare programs, the universal basic income is not conditional on a need and, thus, not paternalistic. Wright characterizes universal basic income as a project for reforming capitalism into an economic system by empowering labor in relation to capital, granting labor greater bargaining power with employers in labor markets, which can gradually decommodify labor by decoupling work from income. This would allow for an expansion in the scope of the "social economy," by granting citizens greater means to pursue activities (such as the pursuit of the arts) that do not yield strong financial returns (Wright, 2005, March). The economic conditions for a leisure-based society arrives when a society economically affords and politically has a will of paying enough universal basic income[11] to each of its citizens so that more and more people can comfortably live without working.

Since "comfortable living" is a subjective category, I argue that there will always be a number of people for whom the current universal basic income is not enough and, thus, who want to work in exchange for more economic resources that promote their comfortable living. Besides, there will always be people for whom the economy provides necessary means for self-realization. These people may be eager to subordinate their human nature of leisurely self-realization to the economic needs for an exchange of the opportunities to access means needed for their self-realization. For example, people interested in building full-scaled rockets may join rocket economic enterprises to satisfy their leisurely passions. Hence, I expect four groups of people contributing to the economy in a leisure-based society:

1. People who enter the labor market because they need significantly more income or special conditions (for comfortable living) than the current universal basic income can provide to them;

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_income.

[11] One of the biggest concerns about universal basic income is a massive inflation that weeps out this income. This fear makes sense because if everyone's income increases, why not to increase prices on the goods. However, there are counter-arguments based on accelerating technological progress and on studies of limited universal basic income in Alaska, Mexico, and Finland (e.g., Cunha, De Giorgi, & Jayachandran, 2018).

2. People who join the labor market because the economy can provide them with means and opportunities for self-realization that would otherwise be difficult to fulfill;
3. People whose leisurely process of self-realization is based on attending to societal necessities and helping others;
4. People whose leisurely activities involve by-products that have economic values of goods, services, and/or technological innovations. For example, people who may be interested in math may solve a math problem that can be useful for economic production or economic innovation. These are direct and indirect contributions to the economy by leisure. This may create an open-access non-monetary economy where desired and/or needed goods and services can be consumed for free.

I propose the following **Principle for the Economy of a Leisure-Based Society: Maximizing economic means (i.e., basic income) for self-realization for each and every one that the society can afford**.

My principle is very different from the Communist Economy Principle of "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" famously adopted by Karl Marx (1875) from August Becker (1844), Louis Blanc (1851), and the French evtopian Étienne-Gabriel Morelly (1755), who seemed to have coined the phrase.[12] The main difference is that in my economic principle of a leisure-based society, there is no societal demand for each to contribute, "according to his/her ability." In respectful disagreement with famous American anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber (2013), I argue that this Communist economic principle is inherently pregnant with violence. Since work is inherently alienating, a person's work according to—i.e., in full potential of—his/her abilities all the time can be only done by force.

Also, I respectfully disagree with the second part of the Communist Economic Principle, "to each according to his/her needs" for two major reasons. First, it is never possible to satisfy all the needs of all people because of a lack of resources and human creativity to invent new needs. Second, the human agency is not defined by satisfying human needs but as I argue here by self-actualization and self-realization.

[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/From_each_according_to_his_ability,_to_each_according_to_his_needs.

However, how can society figure out what maximum means it can afford for people's self-realization without an economic collapse or stagnation? How can society and the economy ensure that there are enough necessary workers involved in the economy?

In my proposal, the necessary labor involved in the economy will be regulated (1) by taxation of capital and labor income for the universal basic income and (2) by the labor market. As automatization will grow, productivity will increase and the need for human labor will decrease, while, I expect, the nature of the labor will become more and more authorial and creative (see Chapter 4). This will afford collecting more taxes from the capital and the wages to increase the amount of the universal basic income, thus, making labor less attractive. Of course, the universal basic income will be exempted from taxation. As the amount of the universal basic income grows, it makes labor less attractive for the people in groups #1 and #2 above. When the amount of universal basic income becomes big enough, people in group #2 with similar interests can combine parts of their universal basic income to start their own leisurely clubs, organizations, cooperatives, and enterprises, outside of the economy. As the labor market shrinks due to growing global technological unemployment, so do people's desires to join it due to the growing universal basic income. Also, the labor market can be (still imperfectly) balanced by emerging inflation/deflation and by government regulations and policies (see the section on politics below).

The first phase (#1) toward a leisure-based society is to institutionalize a universal basic income (UBI) (Gentilini, Grosh, Rigolini, & Yemtsov, 2020) at any amount, even below the poverty level.[13] In 1999, the Alaska Permanent Fund paid each person of whatever age who had been living in Alaska for at least one year an annual UBI of $1680 per person per year (van Parijs, 2000). A similar law was tried to pass in the United States in 1969 by the Nixon administration to fight poverty. The legislative attempt for the universal basic income was supported by conservatives (e.g., the economist Milton Friedman) and liberals (e.g., the sociologist and later Democratic Senator Daniel Moynihan). Unfortunately, it failed. Some liberal senators did not like Nixon's universal basic income proposal of an annual $1600 for a family of four (equivalent to roughly

[13] "An unconditional income transfer of less than the poverty line is sometimes referred to as a *partial basic income*" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_income.

$11,213.43 in 2019[14]) because it did not go far enough. Also, in Nixon's proposal, the universal basic income was not unconditional because all people who did not work would have been required to be registered with the Department of Labor to get it. Later, when the universal basic income law was brought again, some liberal Democratic and conservative Republican politicians withdrew their support for it because of their fear of its unintended consequence of increasing family divorces (Bregman, 2017).

Indeed, universal basic income has the consequence of economic liberation from oppressive social unions, including family, when family becomes oppressive. According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, "The family is the original cell of social life,"[15] and the World Family Organization agrees, "The Family is the basic unit of society."[16] I argue that the unit of humanity is a person—humanity and not society has to be prioritized as the highest value. All economic calculations of the universal basic income have to be done per person, from birth, and not per family or household (or corporation). Otherwise, family or household can and do become an economic prison for a person who dares to leave it regardless of the abuse or discomfort that he or she experiences in this union. Recently, 2020 Presidential candidate from the Democratic Party, Andrew Yang proposed the universal basic income, he called "the freedom dividend," of $1000 per month for every US adult above 18-year old (Yang, 2018). On criticism of Yang's UBI proposal is that people with disabilities may suffer if the existing needs-based programs like Supplemental Security Income will be eliminated because of UBI.[17] I think this critique is valid. In view, elimination of the current needs-based programs have to be done gradually and carefully in the phases #1 and #2 of UBI to avoid hurting people. Certain needs-based programs, like supporting people with disability, should probably transition to (universal) health care insurance.

The next phase (#2) toward fulfilling the economic conditions for a leisure-based society is for the personal (individual) universal basic income to reach and overcome the poverty level. This step will eliminate poverty.

[14] https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/.

[15] http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/para/2207.htm.

[16] http://www.worldfamilyorganization.org/brochure.pdf.

[17] https://www.vox.com/first-person/2019/12/19/21026925/andrew-yang-disability-policy.

Achieving this level requires a certain degree of: (a) growing technological unemployment, (b) rising productivity, and (c) the political will of society. In 2018, the Federal poverty level in the United States was $12,059 for a one-person household.[18] As I insisted before, in contrast to the current calculations, where the unit of the economic analysis is the household, the universal basic income should be calculated per person. Hence, the current poverty level universal basic income is $12,059 per person per year.

The final phase (#3) toward fulfilling the economic conditions for a leisure-based society is when it reaches a comfortable living level for a large enough number of people (but never all!) in society to engage in full-time genuine leisure (i.e., *sufficient* universal basic income). My non-systematic assessment based on surveying my friends in the United States is about $50,000–$60,000 per person per year after taxes (in 2019 prices). I asked my friends about non-taxable income that will allow them to live comfortably and engage in genuine leisure without earning money by work. It is somewhat consistent with the 2008 research of 450,000 responses to the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index surveys that shows that, "Perhaps $75,000 [of the annual income before taxes] is a threshold beyond which further increases in income no longer improve individuals' ability to do what matters most to their emotional well-being, such as spending time with people they like, avoiding pain and disease, and enjoying leisure" (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010, p. 16492). This economic condition will be reached first by households with more than one person because many expenses are not linear and proportionally decrease with the size of a household. However, in my view, the human economic right has to be protected for each person. There can be a transition from the household as a unit of the universal basic income in phase #1 and #2 to the person, regardless of age, in phase #3.

The UBI should not be the only safety net for people. I argue that certain areas like education, health care insurance, and politics have to be guaranteed with special targeted vouchers that can be used only for that purpose. My colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I discussed such idea intensively for education (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016). Similarly, I propose that each citizen must receive an annual political voucher to

[18] https://obamacare.net/2018-federal-poverty-level/.

spend on promoting their political cause (e.g., candidate notions in representative democracy). Health care insurance voucher guarantees everyone the basic insurance coverage while providing choices for insurances.

There are several sources from which universal basic income can be financed. First of all, it is the existing social programs such as needs-based welfare programs, earned income tax credit, social security benefits, and so on. These existing social programs, except medical programs, can (gradually) contribute to the universal basic income. Medical and disability programs have to be separate from a universal basic Medicare for all to provide universal medical basic insurance (via vouchers). Second, there would be additional taxation of the rich and of capital. Third, there will be some societal savings from the eradication of poverty. Fourth, the power of central banks to create money can be used as one funding channel for universal basic income,

> We believe that the most pressing needs of the moment [of the Great Depression] could be met by means of what we call a National Dividend. This would be provided by the creation of new money – by exactly the same methods as are now used by the banking system to create new money – and its distribution as purchasing power to the whole population. Let me emphasize the fact that this is not collection-by-taxation, because in my opinion the reduction of taxation, the very rapid and drastic reduction of taxation, is vitally important. (Douglas, 1935, p. 15)

Based on economic statistics from 1999, economist Charles M.A. Clark estimated that the United States could support a universal basic income large enough to eliminate poverty and continue to fund all current government spending (of course, except that which would be made redundant by the universal basic income) with a flat income tax of just under 39% (Clark, 2003). Professor of political philosophy Karl Widerquist argues that we should not wait for technological unemployment before having basic income. For him, the plan is not about averting the next disaster—it is about curbing the exploitation of the property system and ending poverty (Widerquist, 2013). However, the world's first universal basic income referendum in Switzerland on June 5, 2016 was rejected with a 76.9% majority. It seemed two major objections were: (1) cultural:

giving money to people who do not work, (2) anti-immigrant: universal basic income may attract more immigrants.[19]

Global technological unemployment leads to the excessive inequality and the Gilded Era of the emergence of few super-rich and many very poor. As a need for human labor in the economy subsides, the negotiation power of the (organized) labor diminishes despite of the growth of productivity (Danaher, 2019). American CEO compensation grew 1007.5%, while average worker's pay grew only 11.9% from 1979 to 2018, according to the Economic Policy Institute.[20] In 1965, in the United States, the compensation gap was 19.9 times between CEO and median worker, in the 350 largest companies ranked by sale, according to the Institute. In 2018, in the United States, the compensation gap reached 278 times, although the highest gap was recorded in 2000, reaching 368.1 just before the dot com bubble burst. In 2018, Tesla executive Elon Musk made 40,668 times more money than the median Tesla employee.[21] I expect only acceleration of this gap with the global technological unemployment getting stronger. To address this proposal, I propose to legislate a gap of about 20 for the wage ratio between the highest and lowest compensations in a company, which legislated in many developed countries around the world and was a norm in the United States roughly from the 1940s to the mid of the 1970s.[22]

Another big challenge in establishing the sufficient *universal* basic income is the global division of labor and the unequal distribution of capital and of potentially eliminable jobs around the globe. This may lead to a situation in which the remaining economy will be mostly concentrated in a few countries like the United States, China, Canada, UK, Germany, and so on. Meanwhile, many countries that currently have low-paid jobs or jobs that can be easily robotized may lose any tax basis that can provide

[19] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36454060. In my view, the major problem of immigration is not economic or demographic but political and cultural. Liberalism has its limits of tolerating minority illiberalism. Crossing these limits, liberalism can collapse. However, although borders may be justifiable now to protect national liberal democracy, national borders violate the fundamental human right of human free movement and living choice. I expect a leisure-based society to be borderless (Bregman, 2016).

[20] https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/16/ceos-see-pay-grow-1000percent-and-now-make-278-times-the-average-worker.html.

[21] https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/26/18744304/ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure-2018.

[22] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wage_ratio.

the sufficient universal basic income for living and, thus, the material basis for genuine leisure (Lee, 2017, June 24). This problem may suggest that the currently existing nation-states are incompatible with the truly universal and sufficient basic income and genuine leisure. As Russian-American poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko noticed, "[national] borders are scars on the face of the planet,"[23] and they probably have to be eliminated in the future (Bregman, 2016). As I am going to discuss below, political, governmental decision-making can be organized by issues at hand rather than by geographical localities.

Unconditional universal basic income high enough for comfortable living can provide the economic basis for human freedoms with dignity (van Parijs, 1995, 2000). Transition from the needs-based welfare to the UBI welfare diminish or eliminates "a poverty trap" and "a degrading and paternalistic bureaucracy" that currently manages the poor and needy (Yang, 2018). American patriot Thomas Paine argued that universal basic income is needed to protect *the power to say no*, which is essential to an individual's status and dignity as a free person (Marangos & King, 2006). If some other group of people controls resources necessary to an individual's survival, that individual has no reasonable choice other than to do whatever the resource-controlling group demands. Resources necessary to the production of food, shelter, and clothing have been privatized in such a way that some have gotten a share, and others have not—i.e., extreme inequality. Personal, political, and religious freedom are worth little without the power to say no to state, labor, family, and institution.

Even rationality, critical thinking, and long-term vision require a safety net of well-being. Andrew Yang (2018) argues that it is difficult for people who constantly concerned about survival to consider long-term and gradual threats—like, for example, humans-made global warming—because they often have a phenomenon of the tunnel vision,

> Why have we so far barely made a dent in what we need to do in order to combat this crisis? When 78% of our fellow Americans are living paycheck to paycheck, it's hard to mobilize people to care about the massive problem of climate change. Many think, "I can't pay my bills. The penguins will have to wait." It's impossible to think about the future if you can't feed

[23] Poetically paraphrased by punk-rock musician Eugene Hutz in his song "We are raised again" (Gogol Bordello, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/gogolbordello/weriseagain.html).

> your kids today. We need to get the economic boot off of the throats of our fellow Americans so everyone can get their heads up and start facing this threat head-on. (https://www.yang2020.com/blog/climate-change/)

Psychologists show that a lack of "slack," a safety net, stupefies people and makes their mistakes unrecoverable which creates personal, generational, and communal vertexes of despair (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). Universal basic income along with guarantee targeted vouchers provide economic freedom, which—combined with political freedom, freedom of belief, and personal freedom—establish each individual's status as a free and capable person.

Liberal Democracy Politics in a Leisure-Based Society

Politics is an imposition of decisions and actions on people who disagree with the imposed decisions and actions but consent that these impositions are legitimate. Under brutal violence, when people's will is violated without any regard for its legitimacy for the people, politics is not needed. Similarly, when people agree with each other because they come to the same conclusion independently or because they can genuinely convince each other without any manipulation, politics is again unnecessary. Thus, politics stays between the two extreme poles: naked violence/violation and uncoerced/unmanipulated agreement. However, the boundaries between naked violence and politics, on the one hand, and between politics and uncoerced agreement, on the other hand, can be fuzzy. Politics can be violent when consented imposition is violent. For example, in a liberal democratic society, there is consent among citizens (maybe not all) that the police have the right to use force, including deadly force, in some circumstances regulated by the law. Politics can be consensual. For example, Quaker communities make their political decisions by consensus, which does not, however, preclude imposition in a case of minority veto or majority social pressure (Bartoo, 1978; Cooper, 1985).

There have been attempts to eliminate politics from both poles and in both cases. However, these attempts have been unsuccessful in my judgment. While tyranny tries to eliminate political dissent via brutal violent force, the deliberation approach seeks to eliminate any subjectivity, on which politics is based, via objective rational and informed deliberation among rational, reasonable, well-informed, and good-hearted people.

On the one hand, tyranny has tried to eliminate politics via brutal violent force. In tyranny, elimination of politics is unsuccessful because, to be effective, tyranny has to share power and, thus, it creates a ruling elite that still requires politics for itself on whatever limited scale. Also, total brutality is never entirely possible, even with regard to the powerless, which again requires some elements of politics. For example, even in genocidal concentration camps, the Nazis had to develop a particular political regime involving ensuring some degree of cooperation of the prisoners (Kotek & Rigoulot, 2000).

On the other hand, there has been a claim made by some past and current philosophers—e.g., Plato, Kant, Habermas, Rawls,—that well-intentioned, well-informed, rational people can agree with each other through free collective deliberation. These well-meaning, rational, well-informed people do not need politics. They do not need consented imposition. According to this view, a community of well-intentioned and well-informed rationalists, like a community of scientists or philosophers, does not need politics. Critical deliberation based on testing ideas can predictably generate a consensus in such a community. In their critique, political philosophers Mouffe (2000) and Kukathas (2003) show that the definition of the well-intentioned and the rational are circular in this approach of *deliberalism*. People who are viewed as rational and well-intentioned are those who *agree* about values and inference strategies with other "well-intentioned and rational" people. In other words, consensus defines the community and not the other way around as the proponents of deliberalism argue. Also, empirical studies of deliberation communities, such as scientific communities, show that politics is an inherent and necessary part of their practices (e.g., Latour, 1987). Following Russian philosopher Bakhtin, elsewhere, I argued that there is no transparency of subjectivity and that every agreement is an artifact of ignoring differences and mis-/non-understanding (Matusov, 2015). Authentic dialogue cannot fully guide decision-making because authentic dialogue does not have a beginning and an end, is unfinalizable, involves temporary suspension of responsibility (i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of ideas), and resists urgencies (Bakhtin, 1986, 1999; Nikulin, 2010).

In contrast, decision-making about action is urgent, limited in time, saturated with ethic responsibility (there is no such thing as freedom of action in liberal democracy), and finalized (i.e., something definite happens). Dialogue and action have dramatically different realms or, as Bakhtin might say, they have qualitatively different chronotopes (Bakhtin, 1991).[24] Hence, politics, like a phoenix, always emerges from these attempts to eliminate it through deliberalism. Politics actualizes dialogue while dialogue humanizes politics (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015).

Politics stay in-between work and leisure. Like work, politics is brought to life by necessities of communal or societal decision-making. Sebastian de Grazia, a father of modern leisure study, argued that "The [Progressive] educators [like John Dewey] try to say that leisure and democracy were destined for each other. To the [Ancient] Greeks, who were more liberal than we in the matter of bedfellows, these two would be strange partners… let us ask ourselves a central question, a dangerous question, outright…: Are democracy and leisure compatible? The answer: No" (de Grazia, 1962, pp. 350, 351). The results of politics—a communal decision–action—are often more important than the subjective experience of the process. In general (but not in each and every case), politics is not voluntary engagement based on the participants' personal interests in the process, but rather a forced engagement based on needs. However, like leisure, politics may involve personal, communal, and societal self-realization: whom I/we want to be, whom I/we ought to be in the face of necessities I/we have to cope with. In an abundant leisure-based society, a personal and collective search for better values can dominate over necessity, although not always, not in each and every case (Arendt, 1958).

Although she did not coin the notion of "leisure-based society," arguably Hannah Arendt (1958) envisioned it. She defined "the human condition" of such society as "plurality," "Plurality is the condition of human action [i.e., a leisure-based society – EM] because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live" (Arendt, 1958, p. 8). Plurality requires a liberal democratic politics in a leisure-based society. Liberalism involves affirmation of diversity, uniqueness, and pluralism, including tolerance of illiberalism but on limited terms, so this tolerated illiberalism won't overthrow the overall societal liberalism and will allow members of an illiberal community to leave it freely (Kukathas, 2003).

[24] Elsewhere, I argue that Bakhtin changed his view on this issue for several times (Matusov, 2020, in press).

Democratism is the principle of equal rights of all members of the society/community/group to participate in the collective decision-making (Mouffe, 2000). However, I argue that the liberal democracy of a leisure-based society will be different from how it operates now.

Currently, the liberal democratic political framework is characterized by what can be called "winning politics."[25] The major focus of this type of politics is to win the legitimate imposition of a particular decision on the whole society by one's partisan group. Winning politics has the following principles:

1. Promoting particular individual and group interests;
2. Winning control over collective imposition;
3. Using persuasion, manipulation, coercion (including bullying), compromising, and bargaining for winning;
4. External restrains: "If something is not forbidden, it is allowed," "If I can, I'll do;"
5. Involving a tiny minority of the citizens (i.e., politicians) in political decision-making (e.g., representative democracy).

All these aspects of winning politics nicely fit a necessity-based society with scarcity of resources because when one political group deviates too much from the necessity-based reality so it loses its legitimacy in a majority of the population, there is a non-violent mechanism to change it. However, the winning liberal democracy politics contradicts a leisure-based abundant society's focus on self-realization, liberalism, and democratism.

I envision an alternative politics framework that I call "self-realization deliberative politics" that may fit better to a leisure-based society. I see the following aspects of liberal democracy politics in a leisure-based society:

A. Limited critical dialogue of collective deliberation to search for better personal and collective values in the particular collective decision-making that define the collective ethos;
B. Limited critical dialogue on the legitimacy and the need for imposition of a particular decision on those who disagree with it;

[25] German organizational sociologist Robert Michels called it "militaristic politics" (Michels, 1999).

C. Open-minded search for alternative values and solutions, considering their pros and cons, and testing ideas;
D. Internal ethic restrains: "My decisions and actions define who I am and whom I want to be";
E. Equal rights for all of the participants of a group, community, society for making decision-making to be taken seriously by the others;
F. Finding livable compromises[26] when possible.

Below I provide a half-baked institutional visualization of a particular version of the *self-realization deliberative politics* to allow a reader to imagine it and engage in a discussion of particular forms of this politics. I am aware that my particular version of self-realization politics is full of "holes" (i.e., unresolved issues) that have to be thought through (or have alternatives found for them, if they become unsolvable). In brackets, I will note some of these unaddressed issues that I can see (I am sure that there are issues that I do not see—I hope my readers will raise them).

Visualization of a Self-Realization Deliberative Politics

"Creativeness in politics, if it is to come, will come from leisure" (de Grazia, 1962, p. 414) that is based on self-realization embedded in critical dialogue. The key of the collective self-realization deliberative politics is collective self-realization based on limited critical dialogue about finding good values that will define the collective in the particular decision-making at hand. I believe that this limited critical dialogue is possible only in a small group. With reference to Ancient Greek thinkers, philosopher of dialogism Dmitri Nikulin argues that a quality dialogue happens in a small group numbering between the number of Graces (3) and the number of Muses (9) in the Ancient Greek mythology (Nikulin, 2010, p. 83). When a deliberation group becomes too big, it has a tendency to break into smaller fractions based on agreement among the participants, which

[26] Livable compromises are negotiated compromises that people can live by without having much pains and are achieved without manipulation, violence, and/or exploitation of ignorance. People may agree or disagree with these compromises. but they do not want to block them as they do not feel that a compromise would undermine ontological being and deep values of them and people whom they deeply care of. My notion of livable compromise is akin but not completely identical to the notion of compromise-based consensus developed by Quakers, feminists, and anarchists (see, Graeber, 2013).

often leads to the emergence of winning politics. When a deliberation group becomes too small, it may lose sufficient diversity for a rich dialogic deliberation. Based on my personal experience, I envision the size of the deliberative decision-making body to be between 6 and 12 (the number of jurors). The acceptable range of the group size is an empirical question that should be further investigated.

Each dialogic deliberation group is a small parliament for making a decision. It is important to make sure that the people constituting a dialogic deliberation group for societal decision-making are diverse with regard to the solutions toward which the members personally lean. This solution diversity may be rooted in diverse personal experiences, places hold in the society, belonging to diverse social groups, diverse personal philosophies and values, and so on. I envision self-governing societal decision-making based on the following 4-step process.

1. *Petition for self-governing societal decision-making.* A person or a group submits a petition for self-governing societal decision-making via the Internet. The petition articulates the problem and possibly affected/involved people in the problem and possible solutions. The later defines a geographical or interest level of the decision-making: a neighborhood, a local county, an interest group, the entire globe, and so on [the division of geographical or interest levels have to be thought through]. As soon as a petition is registered on a special self-governance Internet site, it becomes ready for collecting signatures (e.g., by automatic sending emails to people who may be interested/involved/affected by the petition—smart computer algorithms may help to identify these people). When and if the number of petition signatures reaches a certain predefined number set for each geographical or interest level [who and how sets it?], it will trigger the automatic collective deliberation process of step #2.
2. *Forming random deliberation groups for generating solutions.* Invitations will be sent to those interested/involved/affected by the petition to form deliberation committees for generating solutions. However, everyone on the globe [an issue of a language emerges] can join if he or she finds [how?] the petition is important, interesting, and/or relevant for him/her. A person interested in participation has to commit to a minimum of, let say, 2 days: at least one day for participation in the solution deliberation group and at least one day for participation in the decision-making deliberation group.

Groups of the acceptable size between 6 and 12 people will consist of randomly chosen people among those who indicate that they want to join the groups (the process of forming the groups can be managed by a computer). The participants of the solution deliberation groups constitute a decision-making body on the petition [can people join the process later?].

A deadline for deliberation will be set [who and how defines it?]. Each group is charged with searching for a viable solution to the problem presented in the petition by redefining the problem and developing a list of plausible pros and cons for each of the proposed solutions. When it is possible (e.g., in local geographical areas), people can meet physically. When the groups cannot meet physically, face-to-face meetings and discussions will be facilitated by an Internet video telecommunication technology (e.g., Skype, Zoom). A group meeting cannot be held when the number of participants drops below the group minimum (e.g., less than 6 people). A group can search for ideas and evidence on the Internet and in libraries, consult with relevant experts, or with other groups during and/or outside of the meeting. Finally, each solution deliberation group presents a report of their findings, published on the self-governing Internet site. After that, the solution deliberation groups are dissolved.

3. *Individual straw vote.* When all possible solutions and their pros and cons are listed on the self-governing Internet site, all and only people constituting past solution deliberation groups are invited to vote on these solutions by a certain day. Depending on a number of plausible solutions, a person may record her/his rated preferences as well as mark the "indecisive" option. Campaigning is allowed before the individual straw vote. The purpose of this straw vote is to form decision-making deliberation groups that will involve people with the most diverse preferences for a solution. If the calculated [how?] diversity of the straw votes is below a certain level, e.g., a particular option reached 80% of the votes [what level? how is it established and by whom?], the decision-making process is stopped here, and the super-majority solution is declared to be the collective decision. If not, decision-making deliberation groups of 6–12 people are formed based on some computer algorithms ensuring diversity of the participants' preferences.

4. *Decision-making group deliberation and collective voting.* The purpose of a decision-making deliberation group is to come to a consensus about which of the plausible solutions articulates better a personal, collective, or societal value defining the participants and beyond. A decision-making deliberation group, consisting of 6–12 participants, will be compiled by a computer that will try to create as diverse a group as possible based on people's individual straw votes. The meetings, discussions, deadline, and deliberations of the decision-making deliberation group are arranged and operated more or less in the same way as they are arranged and operated in the solution deliberation group, facilitated by a computer. However, in contrast to the solution deliberation group, the members of the decision-making deliberation group have to convince each other or themselves of a particular solution (or to remain indecisive) and to vote at the end of the deliberation.

   Generally speaking—without taking into consideration possible exceptions emerging from extreme particularities,—the legitimate means of deliberation are persuasion, research, new information, reasoning, appealing to conscience, prioritization of values, testing ideas, considering pros and cons, obligations, bargaining, necessities, interests, needs, wants, and searching for compromise. The general illegitimate means of deliberation are threats, pressures, manipulation, abuse of ignorance, bargaining, use of force, use of logical fallacies, suppression, monopoly on voice, and so on—identifying legitimate or illegitimate means of deliberation is a deliberative democratic political decision-making in itself.

   By trying to establish a consensus in a decision-making deliberation group, a test of the legitimacy of imposition is conducted on a small scale. If a deliberative consensus is reached, the solution is recorded along with the number of people voting in the group (the group cannot drop below the minimum 6). If a half or more of the voted governing decision body (see step #2) cannot reach a consensus, it is acknowledged that no decision-making was made—the existing status quo will continue (i.e., indecision was the decision). Alternatively, a majority solution, calculated among the decision-making deliberation groups that achieved a consensus and multiplied by the number of the voted people in each of the groups, is recorded as a collective governing decision. Certain collective decisions, like for example, constitutional decisions, may require higher thresholds than a simple majority [who and how will set up these constitutions, including the presented here, at various levels?]

I expect that this organization of politics will imperfectly promote (but won't guarantee) the priority of a free responsible, conscientious person in the community of humankind over an obedient, loyal subject of a government or a powerful group (cf. Thoreau, 1849). This prioritization will occur through the following processes. The deliberation process and outside free societal forums, including media and social networks, create a self-reflective political society that involves "continuing critical examination through unmanipulated debate" and political dialogue (Fishkin, 1991, p. 124). The self-realization politics involves voluntary, direct, deliberative liberal democracy. Anyone has the right to participate or not to participate (i.e., participation is not forced). Hopefully, those who participate are those who are the most interested, affected, and relevant for the problem and solution at hand. Thus, the decision-making and the following actions are made and experienced by the same people (Ross, 2011).

In a collective deliberative self-realization politics based on critical dialogue, "Participation [in politics] comes to be valued not merely for what it produces, but also for what it means. Formulating, holding, and expressing political opinions become parts of a way of life" (Fishkin, 1991, p. 180). Of course, I am aware that winning politics, manipulation, pressure, corruption, stupidity, demagoguery, ill-intent, error, ignorance, ideology, groupthink, greed, trollism, fake news, secrecy, suppression, and inefficiency are possible and, probably, inavoidable in the deliberative self-realization politics I described above. However, I hope that it will be minimized, contained, and subordinated to the participants' focus on their self-realization facilitated by the described organization and societal leisure.

Automatization, telecommunication, and the self-realization deliberative politics can replace the legislative branch altogether, and the executive and judicial branches partially, leaving intact the police to enforce the laws and jury peer courts to resolve legal and civil disputes. An arrangement for emergency and crisis decision-making has to be developed.

In sum, for political governance in a "post-work" leisure-based society, I propose moving away from the current politics of winning in a nation border-based state organized around local geographical constituencies to the borderless politics of dialogic deliberation organized around issues at hand. Now, I turn to consider challenges to my proposed political governance.

My biggest concern about the described self-realization deliberative politics is about the availability of people's resources for participation in democratic self-governance. Paraphrasing the famous quote by Irish writer Oscar Wilde, "The trouble with self-realization deliberative politics is that it takes too many evenings." Actually, it may take many days. Among people who primarily will be involved in leisure, it interrupts leisure and takes time from it.

> Any effort to sustain membership influence requires, among other things, that the members be involved in the activities of the organization, participating in meetings and being aware of and concerned with the major problems affecting the life of the movement. In actuality, however, relatively few members attend party or union meetings. The pulls of work, family, personal leisure activities, and the like severely limit the amount of actual time and psychic energy which the average person may invest in membership groups or politics. The lower interest and participation are also due to the fact that the membership of any mass organization necessarily has less education and general sophistication than the leadership. (Seymour M. Lipset, introduction to Michels, 1999, p. 17)

Among people who primarily will be involved in work—economy and government institutions, such as police,—it interrupts work and takes time from it. Probably, work has to both accommodate and limit its workers' participation in democratic self-governance by setting the maximum number of allowed working days for it. I expect that a sheer volume and complexity of required self-governing decision-making at diverse geographical and interest levels will prevent people from participation in each and every decision that may be interesting or relevant for them, or may affect them. I hope this fact will focus people on prioritizing their political engagement, at least, at times, rather than complete withdrawal from politics. So long as enough people are participating in the self-realization deliberate politics, at least from time-to-time, I think the leisure-based society will be OK. My biggest concern is the emergence of a systematic political apathy among a vast majority of the population of a leisure-based society and the emergence of a political elite, i.e., oligarchy, that rules this society (Michels, 1999).

Social Obligations in a Leisure-Based Society

The paradox of obligation—a social obligation or self-obligation—is that it both extinguishes and supports genuine leisure. Engagement that is based on obligation involves the person's will and external pressure derived from reason, morality, threat, social pressure, and so on. Obligation extinguishes genuine leisure because it makes the past and the given control of the present (and the future) by suppressing transcendence, spontaneity, creativity, promiscuity, authorship, flexibility, and flow. Obligation-driven activities and processes always have a degree of imposition, rigidity, external pressure. Obligation is always a toll of the person's will, attention, and energy—not being sufficiently supported internally by the activity or process itself (otherwise, the obligation is not necessary).

On the other hand, obligation supports genuine leisure externally and internally. Obligation supports genuine leisure externally by creating external conditions for genuine leisure via the economy, politics, governance, institutions, conflict resolution, and so on. It frees people from their necessities and also provides resources for exercising leisurely activities.

Internally, the obligation helps to sustain leisurely activities and processes. In his doctoral dissertation Anthony Anderson (2010) analyzed his teenage students' participation in their hip-hop music and song making group. He distinguishes diverse modes of their involvement in their own genuine leisure of hip-hop: consumption, aspiration, dilettantism, and professionalism. Arguably, dilettantism and professionalism constitute participation modes of a passionate endeavor. Anderson argues that dilettantism—from the Italian word "delicious"—is a mode of participation that is primarily driven by pleasures that the participant drives from the activity itself. For example, when operated in a dilettanti mode, Anderson's students were eager to perform their original hip-hop music and songs in front of their close friends and fans knowing well that they would be received enthusiastically.

However, they would avoid performing in front of strangers who might harshly judge their performance. Professionalism is a hybrid of pleasure- and obligation- driven activity, prioritizing self-realization and growth over activity pleasures and safety, "We grow forward when the delights of growth and anxieties of safety are greater than the anxieties of growth and the delights of safety" (Maslow, 1968, p. 47). A professionalism mode of a passionate endeavor inherently involves self-obligation for self-realization and self-growth. Participants in a professionalism mode actively seek opportunities for self-realization, which may be risky, uncertain, frustrating, and prone to failure. In addition, social obligation can promote synchronization and coordination in genuine joint leisure. Anderson argues that dilettantism is a necessary and important developmental phase in a passionate endeavor toward professionalism.

However, even in the professionalism mode, a participant's fidelity to a self- or social obligation remains open. There are issues of legitimacy of and enslavement by obligations. Political and moral philosophers discuss the legitimacy or illegitimacy of social obligations. For example, they consider an inquiry of whether a person who benefits from other people's actions should feel obligated to reciprocate, when his/her obligation was or was not negotiated in advance; or whether an obligation is exploitative or not. Some political philosophers (e.g., Hart, 1979) search for rules of legitimacy but others (e.g., Fishkin, 1991) argue for public and personal critical examination of this legitimacy in an open dialogue. I agree with James Fishkin—establishing the legitimacy of obligatory impositions is a political process that should be governed via a critical dialogue as I just described in a section above.

Enslavement by obligation, even throughout a free conviction, is an existential issue. It is an issue of whether a particular obligation suffocates a human life or promotes it or something in-between. Thus, sometimes "voluntarism" is a misnomer for enslavement by social obligation, "'It's a duty I owe the community,' stated the director of labor relations for a larger company. 'However, I loathe volunteer charity work'" (de Grazia, 1962, p. 133). An obligation requires an existential test.

A Russian folklore fairytale "According to a pike's will" (also translated as "Emelya and the Magic Pike" or "By will of the pike-fish" or "According to pike;" see the outline of the fairytale http://blogs.transparent.com/russian/the-strangest-russian-fairy-tale-ever-plus-a-santa-story/, the second tale) can provide an imaginary experiment to define an existential test. In the fairytale, peasant simpleton Emelya tries to avoid all social obligations except those that bribe him. Being bribed by his sister-in-law, he goes hiking through the snow and fetch a couple of pails of freshwater from the lake. By pure dumb luck, he catches a pike, and plans to cook it up into a delicious pot of fish soup called ukha—or, rather, the brothers' wives will boil the ukha, while he has a pre-lunch nap on the oven. The pike asks Emelya for mercy in exchange for her magic—she can fulfill any wish by Emelya.

From now on, Emelya uses the pike's magic to meet his social obligations along with serving his necessities. The Russian fairytale is about laziness to its extreme—Emelya retreats into idleness, consumption, saves the tsar, makes the tsar's daughter love him, acquires the tsar's daughter as his wife and governance of his own kingdom that he expropriates from the tsar (his now father-in-law) by using the pike's magic will ("By command of the pike, may it be as I wish!").

In my view, the fairytale presents an existential test for an obligation. If a person, like Emelya, wants to fulfill an obligation by the use of the pike's magic, the obligation is enslaving. If, on the other hand, a person does not want to fulfill an obligation by the use of the pike's magic will, the obligation can be ontological, constituting an important aspect of the person's life. This existential test is similar to one I described above in Chapter 5 called "Magic Learning Pill" to distinguish instrumental education from ontological (intrinsic) education (Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017).

For example, when my son was little, I had a social obligation to play with him and read books aloud to him. At times, I felt being annoyed by these obligations because I wanted to do other things instead. However, back then I would not want to eliminate these obligations entirely. I did not want the pike's magic to fulfill my parental obligations. Although not always but quite often, playing with my little son or reading books to him constituted the existential fabric of my life. I also got enjoyment out of these activities and relationship with my son. Now, when my son is an adult, I miss these activities, interactions, and relationships. Promoted by social obligations, these activities, interactions, and relationships constituted my genuine leisure at that time.

In contrast, I do not miss many of my other social obligations and I would like it if they could be fulfilled by the pike's magic. The role of the pike's magic can be taken by technology. I do not mind if smart robots would take care of taking garbage and recycling bags out, or would fix my bed, or would cook for my family and me, or would wash our dishes, or would go shopping, or would clean the house, or would do laundry, and so on. I see these obligations as enslaving. I am very thankful to the inventors of the microwave oven, the vacuum cleaner, the dishwasher, the washing and drying machines, and so on, and I hope that these useful inventions, freeing us from obligation, will continue to be made. Of course, a sense of enslavement or ontological engagement is subjective. What for one person can be an ontological obligation for another person is enslaving and vice versa. For some people, some of these obligations are not enslaving but ontological. For example, I had a friend for whom cooking was a passionate endeavor—probably, he would not have wanted to eliminate his cooking obligations.

In the next chapter, I turn to consider the cultural value of leisure. My focus will be on examining the cons and pros of leisure and especially addressing cultural and historical objections against leisure.

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CHAPTER 7

The Cultural Value of Leisure: Contra and Pro

People have been concerned about leisure and its values. They fear that leisure may lead to negative, undesirable consequences. "The problem of leisure"—a concern that people will spend their free time badly—is a problem of distrust in human authorial agency. It is believed that without a "stimulus"—i.e., originally, a sharp prick regularly piercing us between our ribs—stemming from a necessity, natural or culturally manufactured, humans would do nothing and/or quickly deteriorate mentally and physically. In this chapter, I will consider objections to the value of leisure, provide counterarguments, and articulate some values of genuine leisure.

I have abstracted the following mutually related critiques of leisure from the literature listed above:

1. In leisure, without work, labor, and necessities human life loses its meaning;
2. Necessity is the mother of invention—thus, leisure will lead to technological, scientific, and artistic stagnation;
3. Only a small elite of people can be productive in leisure. As for the others, leisure leads to their personal degradation;
4. Leisure is incompatible with professionalism and perfection limiting people and their activities to amateurism and dilettantism;
5. People are social through division of labor and necessity—thus, leisure will lead people to individualism and isolation;

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6. Leisure promotes spiritual emptiness and will unavoidably lead masses to self-distractive behavior (e.g., consumerism, drugs, crime, violence, suicide).

I will critically consider all these concerns below. In conclusion, I hypothesize that these concerns may be circular, arising from the value and consequences of work mentality, and work-based civilization. The concerns about leisure have to be open-mindedly tested through leisure practice. Finally, I will turn to envisioning new cultural values required for genuine leisure.

Objections to Leisure as a Value

The Protestant Ethic of Fruitful Work

Several sociologists have reported an interesting economic phenomenon widespread in rural communities among peasants and artisans in Germany (Weber, 2001), Russia (Chayanov, 1966), and Great Britain (de Grazia, 1962) in the past. Given an incentive by increasing wages, peasants and rural artisans might choose to work less, earning the same income, rather than to work the same or more to gain an increase in their income. Their attitude to work[1] seems to be negative: apparently treating work as a necessary, but unpleasant, chore to be minimized even when an extra income can improve their livelihood or promote upper social mobility.

Historians estimated that in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, up to the capitalist industrial revolution, people, including peasants, serfs, and slaves, worked half a year on average, spending the rest of the time by engaging in religious holidays, rituals, ceremonies, and festivities (de Grazia, 1962). This attitude to work contrasts with industrial workers' attitude and the dominant, hegemonic, modern attitude toward work.

The modern hegemonic attitude values work as being morally worthy in itself. Not any work, of course,—not busy work,—but only fruitful work. The fruitfulness of the work indicates one's moral value. Thus, in one of his interviews, the co-founder of "Apple" Steve Jobs equated his own personal value with the value of his earned wealth at that time, "I was worth [such and such] millions of dollars." Any strong commitment to fruitless leisure—fake or genuine—is seen either as a religious sin, a

[1] In this chapter, I use the terms work and labor as synonymous.

moral failure, or as a medical problem of addiction (e.g., game addiction). People should have a good excuse not to work by being too young, or too old, or too sick, or too disabled, or attending school studies that can make future work more fruitful.

Nowadays, even being rich and not having a necessity to work is not a good excuse not to work. Jamie Johnson, an heir of the pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson, made a documentary called "Born Rich" (Johnson, 2003) about young people from super-rich US families. Interviews with the rich young people and their parents reveal their anxieties that unless rich people fruitfully work in some areas of the economy, arts, sports, philanthropy, and so on, their personal and moral worth is questionable. Just enjoyment of life through fake and/or genuine leisure without any fruitful work does not convincingly justify the life of a modern rich person in the eyes of society. That was different from the old, feudalism-rooted, aristocracy, when an aristocrat could proudly claim, "A gentleman does not have an occupation" (Towles, 2016).

German sociologist Max Weber (2001) tracked the emergence of modern hegemonic work ethics from Protestantism (among other sources). The precursor of this ethic can be found in Christian monastic life in the Middle Ages. "Idleness is the enemy of the soul. … And therefore, at fixed times, the brothers ought to be occupied in manual labor, and again, at fixed times, in scared reading" (St. Benedict monk order, Rule XLVIII, cited in de Grazia, 1962, p. 41). To work is to serve God. "Idle hands are the devil's work" (Chambré, 1987, p. 114). Thus, to work was not just to provide livelihood, to be able to live, to serve necessities, but also, if not instead, it is the right and moral thing to do. Work is not only good for one's stomach, but it is also good for one's soul. This valuation of work and labor as Godly activity had started in early Christianity and in the Catholic Middle Ages and later fully developed in the Reformation and Protestantism (de Grazia, 1962, p. 154). However, it is in Protestantism that the value of work becomes the key, while in Catholicism and Orthodox Churches, the value of work remains more peripheral among other religious values (Weber, 2001).

> Protestantism characteristically involves what Weber calls an 'ascetic' morality (Weber, 2001). At the same time as it extols work as the God-given duty and 'calling' of mankind, it adopts a forbidding attitude towards leisure, and particularly the pleasures of consumption and the satisfaction of needs, which it looks upon as mere 'idleness' and 'indulgence'. In this way, the

> Protestant ethic opposes work to leisure, production to consumption, activity to idleness, and values the one to the exclusion of the other. (Sayers, 1989, p. 42)

Weber argued that Protestantism made the following contribution to work ethics: (1) it made fruitful work God's calling, (2) it insisted on the asceticism of fruitful work, and (3) it made work ethics universal and religiously central. As I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, work is instrumental: it does not have an intrinsic self-worth, a value in itself. Although occasionally, the activities involved in work may have an intrinsic value for an actor, this value is accidental and peripheral to the work itself. The value of the work may even interfere with work by making it less effective. Thus, for example, if one may enjoy washing dishes, he or she may expand this enjoyment and hence wash dishes for longer than necessary. However, as a work activity becomes enjoyable, arguably, it stops being work, contradicting work efficiency and work rationality. Let me illustrate this with an example.

Once, while working at a Latin American Community Center with my undergraduate students, future teachers, I was faced with an interesting phenomenon. My students and I often started our practicum at the Center with a pizza party introducing each other to the kids. After the party, I sent my students to a gym to play with kids, while I, with a group of volunteer kids, stayed back to clean the room where we had a pizza party. Soon, volunteering kids got bored of cleaning and I invented a fantasy game of different characters who picked up trash from the tables and the floor. The game was so successful that when we almost finished cleaning, the kids started littering the room again to continue the game of cleaning. It shows how outcome-based work and process-based joyful play *contradict* each other (Matusov, 2009).

By insisting on God's calling, Protestantism has introduced an intrinsic value into the instrumentalism of work through making it a Godly activity. Fruitful work is not valued because of its utilitarianism—i.e., because its products are useful and fruitful. In Protestantism, fruitful work is valued because it is Godly. Fruitful work is enjoyable not because the very activity of work is enjoyable, which is viewed in Protestantism as frivolous and sinful, but because the servitude to God through fruitful work is, or must be, joyful. God wants fruitful work from people. Chosen people serve God through their fruitful work with joy. Success in work and business is the mark of God's approval and God's reward—the mark of being chosen. Thus, instrumentalism, utilitarianism, and rationality of fruitful work become religiously intrinsically valuable in Protestantism, according to Weber.

This leads to the second major contribution of Protestantism to modern work ethics—the asceticism of fruitful work. The fruits of work should not be primarily used through their consumption, for satisfaction, entertainment, vanity, or enjoyment—these are frivolous self-indulgences, according to Protestantism,—but for making more fruitful work, more service to God. Consumption of the fruits of labor should be minimal to promote survival and to serve more work. Earned money must be used for future investment and frugal saving rather than for consumption. Similarly, sex in marriage has to be used for making children rather than for making love, "Be fruitful and multiply" (Weber, 2001, p. 105). Spending earned money on luxury, entertainment, idleness, and leisure are viewed by Protestantism as frivolous, wasteful, self-indulgent, and, thus, sinful. Dedication to God means dedication to fruitful labor and earning.

The opposite is also true: fruitfulness of one's labor is evidence of God's grace on this person as being chosen. Fruitfulness of labor despite all possible odds and thanks to one's own efforts, ingenuity, creativity, rationality, and industry is God's gift and mercy. Honestly earned wealth is not just fortune but one's holiness, one's chosenness, and one's moral righteousness in the eyes of God. And vice versa: unfruitfulness of labor, idleness, and poverty are markers of evilness, sinfulness, immorality, and God's disgrace. These attitudes reverberate in some trends of modern American Protestantism of the "Prosperity Gospel"[2] (e.g., televangelist ministers like Benny Hinn and Kenneth Copeland) for whom true believers blessed by God have to be rich (Bilger, 2004).

Finally, Weber argued that Protestantism universalized the religious and moral value of fruitful work beyond Medieval monasteries and made it a central concern for both Christianity and morality. A good Protestant Christian, a good moral person, is one who dedicates his or her life to working fruitfully, profitably. Success in business is evidence of being chosen by God.

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosperity_theology. Incidentally, President Donald Trump attends a Prosperity Gospel church (see the references in the Wikipedia article above).

Weber argued that the Protestant ethics of fruitful work became secularized in the eighteen century and transformed into the spirit of capitalism. Weber provided a lengthy quote from Benjamin Franklin's almanac directed to low middle class clerks that support his claim (here is a fragment),

> Remember, that time is money. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides.
>
> Remember, that credit is money. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit, and makes good use of it.
>
> Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on. Five shillings turned is six, turned again it is seven and three pence, and so on, till it becomes a hundred pounds. The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. He that kills a breeding cow, destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might have produced, even scores of pounds. (Benjamin Franklin, "Advice to a Young Tradesman" 1748, cited in Weber, 2001, pp. 14–15)

Franklin referred not to religious virtues or sins in describing the ethics of fruitful work but to moral virtues or moral flaws of a person's character.[3] Fruitfulness of labor is measured by earned money although never comprehensively. Fame, prestige, power, contributions to social and personal welfare, fulfillment of social obligations and duties remain markers of fruitfulness along with money.

Weber showed that the religious ideology of Protestantism disappears in the secular spirit of Capitalism. There are no references to God. However, all three aspects of Protestant ethics of fruitful work remain in the secularized version. Fruitful work is not anymore God's calling but a

[3] Interestingly, when Franklin decided to become an aristocrat, he explicitly rejected this ethic focusing on leisure and civic duty as the major motivators of his activities and not profit (Wood, 2004).

moral calling. To be morally worthy one must fruitfully work. In contrast to Protestantism with its metaphysical theology of God's calling, secular Capitalism promotes its immediate moral metaphysics, unmediated by an elaborate ideology. One feels directly: it is not good, it is immoral, not to work even if there is no necessity for work. This moral feeling—moral anxiety—transcends the concern about one's fair contribution to the welfare of the entire society or community.

> Today the American without a job is a misfit [unless one is too young, too old, too sick, or too disabled to work – EM]. To hold a job means to have status, to belong in the way of life. Between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-five, that is, after school age and before retirement age, nearly 95 per cent of all males work, and about 35 per cent of all females. Being without a job in prosperous times is bad enough, but being without one in a depression is worse yet. Then the American without work — or the German or Englishman — is a damned soul. Various studies have portrayed the unemployed man as confused, panicky, prone to suicide, mayhem, and revolt. Totalitarian regimes seem to know what unemployment can mean: they never permit it. …
>
> After the triumph of the United States in World War II — so heavily attributed to massive industrial productivity — the work ethic along with so many other things American was imported by countries all over the globe at an accelerated pace. In not a few nations new constitutions were drawn up. The very first article of one of these proclaims that the country is "a democratic republic based on work." (de Grazia, 1962, p. 46)

Similarly, French sociologist of leisure Georges Friedmann argued in his 1970 book "La puissance et la sagesse" ("The power and the wisdom") that "… leisure is accompanied by a psychological devaluation of work. Even when it is a success, it channels the main interest away from work. This is a 'pathological' situation" (cited in Dumazedier, 1974, p. 214).

In Johnston's documentary "Born Rich" cited above, many affluent youths are concerned that without their family wealth, if, for example, their financial fortune turns away from them, they would become nobody. That is why many of them try to develop an occupational calling in themselves. This is not a concern of an aristocrat whose priory task is to find dignity in any challenging situation (Towles, 2016). Protestant ethics of fruitful work was based on people's anxiety of whether they were chosen by God, which could be indirectly indicated by the fruits of their labor,

> Work is an expression of life. To assert that the individual expresses his personality and cultivates himself in the course of his leisure … is to accept the suppression of half the human personality. History compels the judgment that it is in work that human beings develop and affirm their personality. Those who set an inordinately high value on sports and gambling are without substance. (Ellul, 1964, p. 399)

Secular capitalist ethics is based on the middle class' existential economic anxiety of sliding into poverty. This anxiety and ethics of fruitful labor based on this anxiety become hegemonic in the twentieth century and penetrate or colonize all classes (Matusov & Smith, 2012; Zakaria, 2003). Occupation—one's commitment to a particular line or lines of fruitful work—defines a modern person. To know about a stranger, nowadays, one often asks about the stranger's occupation, "What do you do?" rather than social status or community origin as it used to be in the past. When people move to retirement, away from work, many experience a crisis of self-worth as well as the worth seen by others,

> American culture places a great emphasis on the work ethic. Doing some form of work, be it paid work at a job or unpaid work in the home, is thought to be essential in order to lead a normal life (Roadburg, 1981). Keeping busy and being active are central values (Buhler, 1961, pp. 349-351); people such as welfare recipients who do not conform to these values are stigmatized. Even though retirement and widowhood are socially accepted status transitions, a common theme in the gerontological literature is that older people's well-being is higher when they are more involved in the life of their community. (Chambré, 1987, p. 7)

I argue that the ethics of fruitful work transcends Capitalism and it is common to both International Socialism (e.g., the Soviet Union) and National Socialism (e.g., Nazi Germany) as the twentieth century demonstrates. In contrast to Capitalism and in accordance with Protestantism, Socialist work ethics is mediated by the metaphysic ideology of constructing "the bright future" of Communism or the Thousand-year Reich. Soviets invented the notion of "labor heroism" that they promoted through its ubiquitous propaganda,[4]

[4] Soviet underground musician Alexander Bashlachev (1960–1988) satirized this Soviet propaganda in his 1984 song "The rally-symposium": "We have place for a labor feat. We have a place for labor valor.//Only a slacker and an idler won't find a place among

> It is evident that a strong puritanical streak also runs through some versions of socialist morality. For example, leisure and pleasure have no place in the life of the heroic, Stakhanovite worker of Soviet propaganda, whose sole satisfaction seems to consist in the performance of socially useful labour. (Sayers, 1989, p. 42)[5]

The Socialist calling is the loyalty to the bright future mediated by the Party and, ultimately, by the Party's Supreme Leader. Socialist anxiety is an anxiety of Party loyalty (Havel & Keane, 1985). Party defines the fruitfulness of one's work and struggle. The motto of the Young Communist Pioneer organization in the Soviet Union was, "Pioneer, to fight for the cause of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, be prepared!" followed by the pioneer's response, "Always prepared!"[6] And the motto for The Little Octoberists[7]—a semi-mandatory Soviet Communist organization for elementary school children—was, "Only those who love labor are called The Little Octoberists!"

Like Protestantism, the spirits of Capitalism and Socialism call for asceticism and self-sacrifice. As Franklin argued in his moral almanacs, one must be frugal and avoid consuming the fruits of his/her labor as much as possible. Despite their very nature, the instrumentalism and utility of work (and struggle in Socialism) becomes intrinsically valuable. Again, I want to emphasize that work/struggle are intrinsically valuable in Capitalism and Socialism not because the activity of working or engaging in struggles are intrinsically valuable for its actors but because work/struggle serves Morality (in Capitalism) and/or the Orthodox Political Ideology

us." (У нас есть место подвигу. У нас есть место доблести.//Лишь лодырю с бездельником у нас тут места нет).

[5] As Sayers argues further in his essay and I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, on the whole, Marx did not follow the Protestant ethics of fruitful work and saw genuine leisure as the acme of the humankind's development. However, as Arendt (1958) and Gorz (1989) argue—and I agree with them—Marx's writing was contradictory, wavering toward the Protestant ethics at times. This tendency was even stronger in Engels's writings. Lenin's writings moved even stronger toward the Protestant ethics. The practice of Soviet-style Socialist countries was overwhelmingly driven by the Protestant ethics's ideology.

[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solemn_Promise,_Motto_and_Rules_of_Young_Pioneers.

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Octobrists.

(in Socialism). As Weber argued, the ethics of fruitful work in Protestantism and Capitalism is the ethics of transcendental instrumentalism, transcendental utilitarianism, and transcendental rationalism:

> In fact, the *summum bonum* of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudæmonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture. It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naïve point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under capitalistic influence. At the same time it expresses a type of feeling which is closely connected with certain religious ideas. (Weber, 2001, p. 18)

The Capitalist asceticism is complicated by the fact that if everyone becomes economically ascetic and frugal, the economy may get stagnant or even depressive since people will buy and consume less and save and invest more (it has been in Japan for the last 30 years). This will jeopardize the fruitfulness of work. To avoid this, Capitalism involves the opposite value of hedonism through the active promotion of consumerism. Capitalist asceticism and hedonism both undermine and support each other and the ethic of fruitful work. In order to be happy, one has to consume more and work more. It creates a particular love-hate ambivalent attitude toward work in Capitalism that is absent in Socialism.[8]

"The problem of leisure"—a concern that people will spend their free time badly—is a problem of subordination of leisure to work. In the Protestant, Capitalist, and Socialist ethics of fruitful work, the value of leisure is subordinated to the value of fruitful work. Only if leisure contributes positively to fruitful work (and struggle in Socialism), it is viewed positively. If play, education, hanging out, hobby, rest, vacation, recreation, conspicuous consumption, and so on contribute positively to work, this leisure is good. Good leisure is utilitarian, "by good use of leisure

[8] It was not the case that everybody loved to work in Socialism but their reluctance to work was private and often suppressed.

we can here understand not only use of leisure in which the individual avoids psychological and physical harm, but one in which – while satisfying himself – he incidentally 'improves' himself: by enriching memory and imagination, or by developing physical strength and skill" (May & Petgen, 1928, p. 5). It is tolerated and even apprised. If one can create an exciting new physics theory during his or her leisure time, as Albert Einstein did, this leisure is viewed as being "good." If one passionately plays videogames to become a successful videogame designer or tester, then the leisure of playing videogame is good. If one's leisure is voluntary work—i.e., unpaid work with a high utilitarian value—it is good leisure. If one's conversations with friends and strangers become recognized as important philosophy, as it was in the case of Socrates, then these leisurely conversations are good. If rest and vacations contribute to labor productivity, the rest and vacation are good. If the hobby of collection of post stamps, leads to one's wealth, it is a valuable hobby. If the use of recreational drugs leads to successful self-medication that helps the person to function and work, the use of recreational drugs is viewed as "good." Thus, "good leisure" is "serious leisure" (Stebbins, 1997). This utilitarian approach to leisure, justifying it when it serves work/labor values, probably goes back to the Roman Republic where Cicero proclaimed, *Otium cum dignitate*—"Leisure with dignity" (Stebbins, 1997, p. 119)—i.e., leisure of serving the Republican politics, in the case of Cicero.

"Bad leisure" is one that distracts people from pursuing fruitful work. In other words, the ethics of fruitful work creates the utilitarian and instrumental value of leisure. The Protestant, Capitalist, and Socialist ethics of fruitful work resists any attempt to define an intrinsic value for leisure independent of work.

> For 200 years or so societies have been dominated by the productivist ethic which has sanctified work as mortification and sacrifice, as a renunciation of life and pleasure, of the freedom to be oneself. It will certainly not be an easy matter to destroy it and replace it with an ethic which privileges the values of voluntary cooperation, self-determination, creativity and the quality of our relations with each other and with nature. (Gorz, 1985, p. 107)

The Protestant, Capitalist, and Socialist ethics of fruitful work is not without a problem itself. It is highly problematic how instrumentalism with its inherently extrinsic value can be self-valuable in itself. Utility and rationality work hard to minimize and even eliminate labor altogether when possible. However, one does not want to cut anything, that is truly valuable.

Necessity is the Mother of Invention

In his 1876 essay, "The part played by labour in the transition from ape to man,"[9] Frederich Engels, the closest collaborator of Karl Marx, argued that necessity and "labour created man himself." In his book "Anti-Duhring," Engels defined freedom as "the recognition of necessity." This strong materialist and monist view on the role of necessity and labor in the origin of humans was often used to justify the Protestant ethics of fruitful labor in the International Socialism of the twentieth century. However, putting aside the Protestant ethics, this argument about the role of labor (and necessity) in the origin and maintenance of humanity has its own merit to consider. In gist, this argument claims that necessity and labor are the mother of all invention and without them, humanity would degrade. This idea is not new. One of the first sociologists, fourteenth-century Arabic scholar Ibn Khaldun, made an observation in his essay, called the *Muqaddimah*, that no dynasty usually lasts beyond three generations of about 40 years each. The third generation of dynastic rulers often forgets the hardships of their predecessors and deteriorates. Success spoils and creates cultural decadence. Luxury and leisure kill the dynasty. By the third generation, the people have forgotten the period of toughness "as if it had never existed … Luxury reaches its peak among them because they are so much given to a life of prosperity and ease. They become dependent on the dynasty … Group feeling disappears completely. People forget to protect and defend themselves and to press their claims … When someone comes and demands something from them, they cannot repel him."[10]

Indeed, many important inventions have been created in response to necessity and even hardship through labor. For example, arguably the first successful (specialized) computer was built in the UK under the leadership of British mathematician Alan Turing to solve the urgent problem

[9] https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/.

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asabiyyah.

of hacking the German Enigma coding machine during WWII (Isaacson, 2014). The creation of an atomic bomb in response to the Nazi threat during WWII is another such example. Would a leisure-based society degrade without its focus on labor and necessities? Can leisure undermine the Protestant ethics so much that it will make societal innovations and new discoveries impossible?

However, is it really true that necessity is the mother of all invention? Of course, leisure—both "serious leisure," i.e., leisure that brings fruitful outcomes recognized by society, and fun leisure—has a long list of innovation achievements on its own. Leisure time can provide inventors and scholars with new problems for which inventions and discoveries then provide solutions. Thus, for example, Scott Cook, a marketing manager at Procter & Gamble (P & G), was sitting at the kitchen table, listening to his wife complaining about her difficulties in organizing a domestic budget. Cook was suddenly inspired to create a digital program to do this—Quicken financial management software (Intuit) (Taylor & Schroeder, 2003). Similarly, Arthur Fry, a chemical engineer at 3 M, was irritated that hymnal bookmarkers kept falling out during church choir practice. Suddenly he realized that his colleague Spencer Silver's invention of a nonstick adhesive could be attached to paper to mark his place. He invented the Post-It (Reid & De Brentani, 2004).

Although necessities can definitely stimulate creativity by providing new problems, tasks, and serendipities, leisure can also provide conditions for making unexpected, serendipitous out-of-box solutions for existing problems. Thus, Paul Lafargue, Karl Marx's son-in-law, wrote in his 1883 essay *The Right of Idleness*, "idleness is a mother of the arts and noble virtues" (cited in Dumazedier, 1974, p. 107). For example, Gordon Murray, a designer of race cars working for Brabham, came up with his invention of a hydropneumatic suspension system while relaxing in the bath—it enabled him to put his problem into perspective by reconsidering fundamental physical principles (Cross & Cross, 1996). Leisure can provide opportunities to pursue an inventor's/discoverer's passions, curiosities, interests, and endeavors like it was in the case with Albert Einstein, who was working on his Theory of Relativity during his leisure time while being employed at a Swiss patent bureau. Leisure time inventions are more heuristic and conceptual and worthy of fruitful inventions than working time inventions, "Patented inventions for which the main insight occurred during the employee's leisure time were found to be worth more, on average, than inventions resulting from work time inspirations" (Davis, Davis, & Hoisl, 2013, p. 1439).

When leisure was provided to the rich, some of the rich engaged in leisurely inventions and discoveries. Barry Jones wrote, "In past golden ages of leisure – including Periclean Athens, some Italian city-states during the Renaissance, France under Louis XIV and the Netherlands for much of the eighteenth century – the privileged classes pursued the arts, travelled, hunted, built, gardened, and discussed politics and history" (Jones, 1995, p. 205). It seems that it is rather snooty to assume that given a similar material opportunity for leisure, other people would not be able to use it in similar ways. In the past, the extent and quality of leisure has been still "an element of distinction between individuals" (Lengrand, 1959, cited in Vitomir, 1960, p. 576), a phenomenon of differentiation between social, economic, and political classes. In a leisure-based society, leisure will be democratized in its extent and, what is probably more important, in its quality.

I expect that a leisure-based society will be based on a hybrid of pure leisure, pure work, and their combination, as discussed in the previous Chapter 6. I suspect that leisure-based innovations and discoveries will be based on unleashing human curiosity and critical thinking of self-realization. This does not need the Protestant ethics of fruitful work. As to the field of (capitalist) economy in a leisure-based society, it may still rely on the Protestant ethics of glorying transcendental instrumentalism, utilitarianism, and rationalism.

Individualism and Egoism of Leisure

Some scholars argue that the social nature of humans is rooted in the division of labor, requiring other people to help and collaborate. People are interested in each other only or mostly because they cannot accomplish something by themselves. Thus, German philosopher-idealist Hegel and Soviet philosopher-materialist Ilyenkov argued that in the future, the increasingly powerful humanity will end up collapsing into one Entity: The Absolute Spirit for Hegel (1967) or The Universal Mind for Ilyenkov (1991). For these philosophers, the multiplicity and diversity of people will become unnecessary with super-powerful technology and science. Alternatively, according to this logic, when economic and technological interdependence will diminish or collapse, people might become individualistically minded and isolated (Putnam, 2000) and/or superfluous

(Blacker, 2013). Some scholars are concerned that when technology (e.g., robots) starts reliably satisfying our emotional and sexual needs, we will lose interest in each other (Scheutz & Arnold, 2016).

From this point of view, although division of labor can put obligations on us and can limit freedoms on our self-actualization and our self-transcendence, it also often provides social glue. However, division of labor can be alienating, it provides the centripetal force for unity, solidarity, mutual interest, and sociality. Making an observation on well-to-do Americans in 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville commented that their prosperity and security made them withdraw into parochial private or family affairs at the expense of communal and societal life, "Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind… [The Welfare State] provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?" (Tocqueville, 1948, pp. 318–319). In the modern-day, a similar observation was made by sociologist Robert Putnam in his book "Bowling alone" (Putnam, 2000). Putnam worries about Americans' decline in voter turnout, volunteer organizations, and grassroots political activism. He blames selfish individualism and poor lifestyle choices. John Tribe (2015) raises an issue of whether leisure is essentially a solitary or a social endeavor. Similarly, "Alain Touraine's *The Post-Industrial Society*… is concerned more with the likely negative effects of mass leisure within current industrial in the context of cultural participation in its broadest sense" (Veal, 2009, p. 4) because mass leisure may lead to extreme individualism.

> Moreover, it is by no means clear how far such forms of the division of labour can be altered within the context of modern industrial work. However, there is no need to resolve these issues in order to see the inadequacy of Gorz's position. For Gorz's argument involves an extreme individualism which would make short work of such questions. According to it, all forms of the division of labour (beyond the immediate household or small group level, at least), are incompatible with the development of individuality and freedom. Socially organised work – in itself and just as such – is alienating. (Sayers, 1989, p. 38)

Thus, according to this framework of the social nature rooted in the division of labor, a leisure-based society may lead to the disintegration and destruction of humanity.

In my view, the major flaw of this instrumental utilitarian approach to human social nature is in its atomistic view of humans. From an alternative perspective provided by Russian philosopher of dialogism Mikhail Bakhtin, human interest in each other is primary and does not need any mediation by division of labor or instrumentalism. A person's urge for a dialogic encounter with the Other is the essence of human nature (Bakhtin, 1993, 1999; Lobok, 2014; Sidorkin, 1999),

> The encounter/meeting is the ultimate opportunity to hear yourself in the other. This other can be a physical interlocutor or it can be an encounter with a text or with some phenomenon of culture, which forces me to make that very effort. The encounter/meeting, which I am talking about, is that what presupposes my great effort to encounter the other who is not overlapping with me (i.e., opaque to me), but who is interesting for me. [This meeting generates] a point of puzzlement/surprise and at the same time it is a point of some kind of unusual joy of discovery of myself in the [other] unexpected for me. … And at the same time, [the other] creates the space, in which these deep intuitions of mine begin to live and begin the fireworks of my own creative thinking … [The other] capture[s]/ hook[s] something in me, which is essential about me. To "capture/ hook" something in me, means to provoke, spark, self-actualize, and initiate some kind of my own activity. And this situation of the encounter/meeting that I am describing here is, as a matter of fact, an educational situation. The genuine education unavoidably involves an element of provocation. (Lobok, 2014; the fragments are from two video conferences, transcribed and translated by us) (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015, p. 216)

Elitism of Genuine Leisure and Self-destruction by Mass Leisure: Common People Do not Know What to Do with Their Leisure

In one of my past undergraduate classes for future teachers, before I started experimenting with a pedagogical regime in my undergraduate and graduate classes (Matusov, 2015b), I asked my students if they like leisurely education when they could choose what to study, how to study, and so on. One of my students said that she categorically would not like it because she would have spent all her time in her bed if she had not been required to do things. My hypothesis is that unless this student was clinically depressed, she might be disabled by conventional education. Her authorial agency was severely suppressed. An alternative explanation is that only a small percentage of the population has inherent urges for self-realization/self-transcendence and is equipped with authorial agency. It might be in our genes. Only a small elite is interested in genuine leisure. That was a view taken by Plato, "Sometimes it is as hard to convince people that everybody does not want leisure as it is to convince them that in the days of domestics, servants pitied their masters' lot. Much of Plato's Republic is devoted to the simple proposition that we cannot all be philosophers. If we can't be philosophers, we'd be bored with leisure" (de Grazia, 1962, p. 379). Very few citizens of Ancient Greece and Rome were involved in genuine leisure (Forbes, 1932). As Veblen (2007) showed, the so-called "leisure class" of aristocracy, who were freed from most concerns about necessity, rarely got involved in genuine leisure.

Similarly, French sociologist of leisure Georges Friedmann argued in his 1970 book "La puissance et la sagesse" ("The power and the wisdom") that "… a majority of workers don't know how [to] use [leisure]. They are bored, they take up another job or they potter" (cited in Dumazedier, 1974, p. 214). In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith complained that members of the British (male) working class spent any free time in pubs and brothels while some social observers in the nineteenth century complained about brutality, violence, public disorder, and crimes promoted by the increasing free time that masses achieved through their political and economic struggle (Wilensky, 1960).

In the twentieth century, these concerns about self-destruction by mass leisure continued, "The social problems arising from such an age of leisure will be infinite: what to do? How to keep out of trouble? What's the use anyway? Someone will have to answer these questions…" (Furnas, 1932, p. 14).

These concerns focused on the use of drugs, crimes, and environmental degradation:

> … it is probable that many people choose to expend their increasing resources in a manner injurious to themselves and their environment. Such individuals are not idle. They can be extremely busy in all sorts of mischief. This is a very real problem, but it is obviously no leisure problem, in the sense that people do not know what to do with their time. It is a social problem. … It is possible also to worry over the fact that so many people

> occupy themselves, if not with mischief, at least with such vacuous practices as reading comics and drinking Coca-Cola. This too is something that can lead people to talk of a leisure problem. For moral, ethical, cultural, or other reasons, they cannot accept the way others choose to use their time. Here again; we have a problem relating not to economic free time, but to the quality of our civilization. (Linder, 1970, p. 12)

> For those who are unprepared for this adventure, it is frightening and overpowering. Consequently, we demean the importance of recreation and fill our free time with busy work, neurotic phobias, and narcotic consumption. (p. 312) … Although the new generation of workers are affected by the residue of our previous [work ethic] attitudes, they are creating a set of their own. To them, free time is a right and they want to enjoy it. Unfortunately, they are not always sure how to achieve it, so like lemmings, they scurry the countryside seeking fulfillment. Often this leads to the destruction of self and the eroding of our natural resources. (Sessoms, 1972, p. 313)

Other concerns of misuse of leisure involved consumerism, environmental degradation, passive spending time, keeping oneself busy, empty entertainment, and so on, "… [the] warning of a populace trained to work but not to live will be seen in all its force – and in all likelihood, it may be too late to do anything about it in a missile-maddened, consumption crazy society premised on lunacy and buttressed by hypocrisy. … The problem of what two hundred million of us will do in our increasing leisure time … is so awesome in its magnitude as to be terrifying" (Swados, 1958, pp. 362–363). With the spread of leisure, Bates predicts expansion in a number of "categories of non-work activities," including an increase in "narcissistic activities," such as personal grooming and plastic surgery, and the multiplication of "religious and philosophical cults" (Bates, 1971). Beck argues that in the "free-time society" there is "a real danger that … a new class division will emerge between the active and the passive"; the latter are people "evicted from the labour process" who will be increasingly "degraded" by the culture industries into "entertainment patients totally in need of care" (Beck, 2000, pp. 61–62). Beck insists that "leisure and play are unthinkable without work (or any way without social activity) …. In the absence of [work] activity, compulsory leisure might easily become hell on earth" (p. 62). Beck calls for "a multi-activity society" that will be "based not upon leisure [or work] but upon political freedom" rooted in "civil labour" (p. 125). Somewhat similar concerns have been expressed by Gabor,

> We are here very much on unknown ground. Western object-mindedness and work addiction is one extreme, Eastern quietism and introversion is another; the two seem to mix as badly as oil and water. … Nobody can really be satisfied with the picture of man in the Age of Leisure nervously filling his spare time with do-it-yourself hobbies which imitate work and getting no nearer to the meditative repose of the east than angling. However unfruitful attempts have been so far, one must not give up hope that we shall be able to assimilate something from the east which will be better for the restless Western mind than alcohol or opium. (Gabor, 1964, p. 156)

There have been several hypotheses of why free time does not automatically lead to genuine leisure on a mass scale:

1. *The elite leisure hypothesis* claims that only geniuses and talented people, both aspire and are capable of genuine leisure. These few take any opportunity for self-actualization, self-transcendence, self-expression, and self-realization. The rest of the people are passive consumers of their work, not capable and not interested in creativity. Consumption must capture these masses because otherwise, completely left on their own, people may experience void, boredom, and are prone to disorder. They have to be busy with consumption or work. Of course, there may be people constituting a grey area of in-between, but this does not change much of this argument. According to the elite leisure hypothesis, genuine leisure is impossible on a mass scale.
2. *The compensatory leisure hypothesis* argues that the observed misuses and abuses of leisure by the masses are a direct result of people's work. People get rebellious at the constant demands of the needs-based life and work for their obedience, compliance with demands of others (and of life), and constantly doing what they do not want to do. Thus, their free time becomes a manifestation of their rebellious reaction to oppression getting wild,

    > In an up-to-date version [of the compensatory leisure hypothesis] the Detroit auto-worker, for eight hours gripped bodily to the main line, doing repetitive, low-skilled, machine-paced work which is wholly

> ungratifying, comes rushing out of the plant gate, helling down the superhighway at 80 miles an hour in a second-hand Cadillac Eldorado, stops off for a beer and starts a bar-room brawl, goes home and beats his wife, and in his spare time throws a rock at a Negro moving into the neighbourhood. In short, his routine of leisure is an explosive compensation for the deadening rhythms of factory life. (Wilensky, 1960, p. 544)

To reduce the destructive nature of free time, the compensation hypothesis calls for the humanization of work conditions (Friedmann, 1992).

3. *The "spillover" leisure hypothesis* argues that the observed misuses and abuses of leisure by the masses are a direct consequence of people's work. People get exhausted by the oppressive work conditions sucking the human essence of self-actualization from the people—they simply want to have a rest. Their free time, misleadingly named "leisure," is nothing more than recreation and recuperation—restoring mental, emotional, and physiological energy for another working day. This "leisure" is a continuation of alienation from life started by work and subjugation to the realm of necessity,

> Another auto-worker goes quietly home, collapses on the couch, eats and drinks alone, belongs to nothing, reads nothing, knows nothing, votes for no one, hangs around the home and the street, watches the 'late-late' show, lets the TV programmes shade into one another, too tired to lift himself off the couch for the act of selection, too bored to switch the dials. In short, he develops a spillover leisure routine in which alienation from work becomes alienation from life; the mental stultification produced by his labour permeates his leisure. (Wilensky, 1960, p. 544)

> The great majority of the population—i.e., the industrial and rural producers—devoted such leisure as remained to them after exhausting labour to rest and the recuperation, through inactivity, of their mental and physical energies. It could be said that, for most people, leisure was synonymous with resting or 'killing time.' (Vitomir, 1960, p. 576)

According to the compensation and spillover leisure hypotheses, genuine leisure on a mass scale is possible when work and life necessity conditions are highly reduced in time and are less oppressive (e.g., when work requires more creativity from its workers). Both hypotheses imply that all humans are born capable of genuine leisure but work/labor and a life full of the necessity demands rob people of their potential. Once the yoke of work and necessity is lifted, people will naturally embrace genuine leisure.

4. *The disabling leisure hypothesis* agrees with the compensation and spillover leisure hypotheses that humans naturally aspire to and are capable of genuine leisure being robbed from them by the life of work/labor and necessity but it disagrees with the claim that once the yoke of work and necessities is lifted people can easily bounce back to their natural state of genuine leisure. The disabling hypothesis argues that people can be severely damaged and become temporarily or even permanently disabled to aspire to and engage in genuine leisure. Thus, educationalist Yong Zhao (2012) argues that all little children before joining school are full of creativity and self-transcendence only being punished, curbed, and disabled by traditional school and then by work/labor. Traditional school and the workplace often socialize people to conformity, obedience, and doing what other people order them to do.

> When people haven't experienced freedom they are often afraid of what they might do if they had freedom. Perhaps there is anger that has built up over a period of time, perhaps there is doubt in oneself; the compulsory school system, as it exists now, encourages people to be dependent on others for decision making. It is a system built on disempowerment, and thus, relying on yourself to make decisions, to direct your own time and energy, is an unknown. It's scary. … The longer a person has experienced disempowerment and the abuse of an authoritarian system, the longer they've had their own personality scraped away from them, the longer it's going to take to recover. (Mintz, 2017)

Except for a lucky few, who may become members of the elite, creativity, authorship, authorial judgment, transcendence of the given become dangerous and subject to punishment. Based on interviews with creative workers and graduates in small UK towns, Ravenscroft and Gilchrist (2009) conclude that the working society of leisure lifestyle is viable only for a few, those with sufficient resources to take the economic risk involved in embarking on the lifestyle of the "creative class" (Florida, 2004). Time, support, and resources for self-determination are often withdrawn from most people. Societal work- and necessity-oriented values also go against the self-actualization of genuine leisure. By the time of retirement, when some people may gain time and resources for self-actualization, they may be too damaged to use this opportunity for genuine leisure.

> The meaning of work in American culture plus the relative recency of extensive leisure time and of retirement itself have several implications for this book. The first is whether older people have developed a "leisure competence," a knowledge of the kinds of activities available and the ability to derive sufficient meaning from leisure to counterbalance other role losses (Atchley, 1977). Several observers have seriously questioned whether leisure activities can serve this purpose, do serve this purpose, and should serve this purpose (Atchley, 1971; Miller, 1965, p. 84). A lack of specific responsibilities can be a source of embarrassment for a retired person, particularly if retirement occurred on an involuntary basis. For some people, leisure activities will not fill the gap and be a gratifying substitute for work. For others, retirement may not be so crucial because work may not have been so central to their lives. (Atchley, 1971, p. 16) (Chambré, 1987, p. 7)

The disabling leisure hypothesis predicts that lifting the yoke of work and providing time and material resources for genuine leisure are probably not enough for people to gain aspiration and capability for genuine leisure on a mass scale. A therapeutic recovery from their lifelong alienation from self-actualization is needed along with an active re-socialization in the values and practice of self-actualization lost in their childhood after joining traditional schooling.

5. *The leisure culture hypothesis* argues that although genuine leisure is natural for humans, it is also a cultural phenomenon, requiring special cultural values and sociocultural practices. "Leisure is bound up with society as a whole, its demographic and professional structure, its historical and cultural context" (Friedmann, 1960, p. 518). Currently, most of the people are unprepared for the genuine leisure,

"The somewhat sudden acquisition of leisure has found us unprepared for the correct use of so much spare time (p. 66).... the salvation of our civilization depends upon whether we can teach them [i.e., those who unprepared for genuine leisure] [the engagement in the genuine leisure], if, indeed, we know what to teach" (Cutten, 1926, p. 87). However, of course, the problem of genuine leisure on a mass scale is not simply educational. According to the culture leisure hypothesis, for the genuine leisure to spread on a mass scale, the entire society with its cultural values, technology, social organization, economy, politics, and education has to be leisure-oriented.

> Only social groups imbued with a strong hedonist spirit, backed by a lively tradition of games and 'festivals' could put up an effective barrier to the process of the decay of leisure; and it is doubtful whether any such groups exist, or can exist within a technological civilization in Europe or the United States. It is only in the societies of Africa, Asia and Oceania, governed by customs and traditions, where work is closely bound up with ceremony, magic and ritual (and even there, of course, only until the material and moral effects of industrialization begin to be felt) that the producer-consumer mentality fails to overcome an attitude of congenital indifference. (Friedmann, 1960, p. 516)

The genuine leisure on a mass scale is a leisure civilization (Dumazedier, 1967).

6. *The leisure-bias hypothesis* suggests that mass leisure might involve more genuine leisure than many critics think. Various types of genuine leisure might not be recognized by these critics due to their strong work and necessity value biases. As Dumazedier has pointed out in his 1959 essay in French "Réalités du loisir et ideologies,[11]" genuine leisure is a fundamentally ambiguous thing,

> The ethics of leisure appear to be related to other ethics, of work, of family duties, of social service, etc. .... What used to be called idleness when confronted with the requirements of the firm is now described as dignity; what used to be called selfishness when confronted with the requirements of the family is now perceived as respect for the personality of one of its members. Part of what was

[11] Cited by Vitomir (1960, p. 577).

> considered sinful by religious institutions is now recognized as the art of living. Some have referred to the ethics of hedonism. …
>
> We may be experiencing a new stage in the liberation of the human personality from the totalitarianism of social institutions, whether brutal or insidious, manifest or hidden. (Dumazedier, 1974, pp. 41–42)
>
> ….
>
> Yet in connection with leisure, individualistic values are also being reappraised in opposite ways: games, travel, affective relationships or personal studies, considered by many in the recent past as a waste of time, a doubtful form of entertainment or an infringement on family and social duties, now tend to become personality requisites, within conditions which fluctuate and vary with each situation. Within the leisure time prescribed by this new social norm, it is neither technical efficiency: nor social utility, nor spiritual or political commitment which is the end of the individual, but his own fulfilment and self-expression. This is my central hypothesis. (Dumazedier, 1974, p. 43)

These critics of leisure complained at adults playing video games, watching TV, using recreational drugs, spending time and money on fashion clothing and hairstyles (manipulatively promoted by greedy corporations), and so on. Often non-productive leisure and productive leisure with low social status are not recognized as genuine leisure, which apparently indicates pro-work and pro-necessities value biases. I suggest that probably any activity or way of being can be an example of true leisure. The reverse is probably also true: any activity or way of being can be an example of non-leisure or non-genuine leisure. What defines genuine leisure is perhaps not the type of activity or way of being but what guides the relationship between the actor and the activity or the way of being. If it is a necessity or a social commission or an obligation, it is probably not a case of genuine leisure. If it is self-actualization, self-expression, self-realization, self-transcendence, self-fulfillment, rooted in one's interest in other people, processes, dialogue, and the self, it is probably a case of the genuine leisure. However, there can be a grey area of a mixture of genuine leisure and non-leisure (or non-genuine leisure).

In sum, except for the first hypothesis of elitism, all other hypotheses imply that genuine leisure on a mass scale is possible when the pressure of work/labor and necessity-based life eases. The disabling and culture leisure hypotheses argue for therapeutic recovery from alienation caused by work/labor and necessities-rooted life, re-socialization in genuine leisure, and for a leisure civilization with its specific leisure-oriented cultural values, social organization, politics, economy, and education. Finally, the leisure-bias hypothesis suggests that mass leisure might not be so bad as its critics argue due to their pro-work and pro-necessity biases. Now we turn to a discussion of the cultural value of genuine leisure.

Pro Genuine Leisure

Human life stripped of economic, health, and social pressures and obligations can become oriented toward self-expression, self-realization, self-actualization, self-transcendence, dialogic encounter with others, and a genuine interest in other people, "I believe we are entering the Age of Leisure and that for the first time since the days of ancient Greece and Rome, man has the freedom to enjoy his own pursuits, at his own pace" (Sessoms, 1972, p. 311).

> Leisure is the opportunity for individualism – the opportunity to live, do and make, according to the dictates of self-expression. In the world of production alone man exists in a vicious, sinister circle, but in the world of leisure he may truly live. It is in leisure that civilization will find its justification. It is the only excuse for civilization, and unless the manifest advantages of leisure outweigh the ills of a machine age, civilization as we now understand it is inevitably doomed. (Pack, 1934, p. 240)

Experiences become more important than the outcomes of people's activities. People may stop seeing other people as means or objects of their actions but rather as opaque partners in dialogue, whose consciousnesses are not transparent but rather a subject of their genuine interest. They can become intrigued by the exciting unpredictability and surprises that other people can reveal for them. People will stop assuming that consciousnesses are transparent and that god's-eye or bird's-eye views of consciousnesses are possible. This transition from the current utilitarian, necessity-based, civilization to the future leisure civilization will require a transformation of cultural values. Ivor Clemitson and George Rodgers have coined the term "life ethic" to articulate the new cultural values of genuine leisure, "… We need to develop a 'life ethic' rather than a work ethic and the corresponding concept of 'full life' rather than 'full employment'. Such an ethic would be concerned with the full development of human beings and human potential … a life ethic would cease to see a person's only and major contribution to society as being made through his or her employment" (Clemitson & Rodgers, 1981, p. 13). However, Clemitson and Rodgers still apparently prioritize "contribution to society" over personal actualization and transcendence recognized by other people and/or the self. I argue that the former priority belongs to work ethics while the latter to life ethics or leisure ethics.

An economy that needs fewer and fewer people to engage in its functioning will create the material foundation for genuine leisure, but genuine leisure cannot realize itself without promoting its own distinct cultural values. Thomas Kando articulated the relationship between the necessary material conditions for genuine leisure and its necessary cultural values in the following way, "It may be that a civilization capable of creating the conditions necessary for true leisure, an affluent material base, has no use for leisure itself; and conversely, a culture whose ideology is supportive of leisure may not be able to erect leisure's material foundation" (Kando, 1975, p. 136). For the success of a leisure civilization, both the material conditions for and the cultural values of genuine leisure are necessary. Let me list some of the new mutually related cultural values of the future leisure civilization in their opposition to the current cultural values of the utilitarian, necessity-based, civilization:

1. People will deserve welfare not because they are economically self-sufficient, not because they sufficiently contribute to the welfare of other people, not because they are in a legitimate need to be proven resulting from the fact that for whatever reason they cannot provide for themselves (e.g., being too young, too old, disabled, or students). Instead, people deserve welfare simply because they are fellow humans. Their welfare is part of their basic human rights. Work and capital need no longer be the primary mechanism for the redistribution of wealth (Bregman, 2016; Jones, 1995).
2. As Thomas Paine pointed out, unconditional well-being becomes the foundation for human dignity when people can safely say "no" to impositions and wrongdoing.
3. Experiences and events will become more important than achievements and outcomes.

4. Creative authorship of transcendence of the culturally given will rule over conformity to the socially important given (Matusov, 2011; Matusov, Smith, Soslau, Marjanovic-Shane, & von Duyke, 2016).
5. Diversity will become more appreciated than a higher place in the socially desired hierarchy.
6. Instead of asking a stranger about what he or she is doing for a living, people will ask other people—strangers or familiar people—what interesting and exciting is going on in their lives.
7. Justice will be based on the appreciation of human uniqueness and not on the claim of equality (Graeber, 2013; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2018).
8. People will relate to other people not because the latter can help the former satisfy some of their needs and desires but because the former expect to be surprised and puzzled by the dialogic encounter with the latter (Lobok, 2014).
9. Subjectivity will be more important than objectivity. As stated by French sociologist of leisure Radovan Richta (1969, p. 468), in leisure-based society "the subjectivity of the individual has become a social value in itself" (cited in, Dumazedier, 1974, p. 40).
10. A personal informed, critical, responsible, contextual authorial judgment, embedded in a critical dialogue with others, will become more appreciated than an objective universal calculation, rule, law, procedure, or measurement (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2018).
11. Intrinsic education for its own sake will be prioritized over instrumental education for serving other spheres (e.g., the economy, democracy, patriotism, social cohesion, upward social mobility) (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019).
12. The opaqueness of human consciousnesses—i.e., people's disagreements, a lack of understanding, misunderstandings, puzzlements, surprises—will be more appreciated than the transparency of human consciousnesses—i.e., agreements, consensuses, overlaps, and coordination (Bakhtin, 1999; Matusov, 2015a).
13. Unpredictable open, unfinalizable, critical examination of alternative ideas will be valued more than making others arrive at the predictable preset endpoints.
14. Dialogue based on disagreement will be appreciated more than collaboration—somewhat harmonious work toward a shared goal.

15. Fantasy, imagination, and possibility will be valued no less, perhaps even more, than an interest in reality, the given, and the past.
16. Societal and personal instrumentality will serve personal leisure rather than the other way around. “Some individuals who used to live in order to work now dare to work in order to ‘live’ or at least dream of doing so” (Dumazedier, 1974, p. 41). Genuine leisure is a human right (cf. the UNESCO Declaration of Human Rights, Article 24, “Everyone has the right to … leisure.”[12])
17. Self-expression, self-determination, self-realization, self-actualization, self-transcendence, disinterested hanging out with other people, and play will be more valuable than serving others, serving society, or sustaining the self unless this is a part of the former.

> [Jean] Fourastié writes: “to choose one’s leisure will be to choose one’s life.” How is this daring thought to be understood? How can an effective resistance be made to everything that limits, distorts or alienates free choice? For society, the choice of leisure will always rank second to that of family, occupational or sociopolitical obligations. However, these institutional alternatives will probably be increasingly influenced by the choice of a type of leisure, and, in addition, determined by new cultural values. (Dumazedier, 1974, pp. 148–149)

18. Education is primarily a personal and not a societal business, based on the personal needs, interests, and aspirations of each individual rather than the industrial, bureaucratic, political, and/or economic needs of the community or society (cf. the right of education for the “inner life” in Jones, 1995).
19. Questioning, disagreement with, and deviation from the cultural values above will be tolerated and appreciated, while the freedom of a diversity of cultural values will be protected.

The listed cultural values of genuine leisure exist today but only on the margin of the necessity- and need-based technological society. In a leisure-based society, diverse cultural values will also be circulating. The utilitarian, necessity-based cultural values will remain.

[12] http://www.unesco.org/education/information/50y/nfsunesco/doc/hum-rights.htm.

However, I expect that the listed cultural values of genuine leisure will become dominant.

In a leisure-based society, the main question will be, "When our machines release us from ever more tasks [of survival and necessity], to what will we turn our attentions? This will be the defining question of our coming century" (Wolcott, 2018, January 18). In my view, addressing this question requires strong support from the listed cultural values.

Now I will turn to envision education in a leisure-based society.

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CHAPTER 8

Education in a Leisure-Based Society

Both instrumental and non-instrumental (aka ontological, intrinsic) education co-exist in our necessities-based society. I expect that this will continue in a leisure-based society. However, there will be an important difference. In our current necessities-based society, instrumental education is highly visible, appreciated, and institutionally and financially promoted. Instrumental education dominates in its *institutional* and *ideological* presence and as a dominant (i.e., hegemonic) societal value over ontological, non-instrumental, education. Non-instrumental, ontological, intrinsic education often remains invisible and private. It is often viewed as frivolous. It is not institutionally supported in our current necessities-based society.

I envision that in a leisure-based society, non-instrumental, ontological, intrinsic education will take priority over instrumental education. I also expect that instrumental education will be shortened, intensified, and even eliminated/minimized. Also, it will be changed from being mostly technological, based mostly on pattern recognition and production (Matusov, 2020) to becoming more authorial, based on dialogic meaning-making and creativity—transcendence of the given, dialogically recognized by the self and others (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016; Matusov, Smith, Soslau, Marjanovic-Shane, & von Duyke, 2016).

In this chapter, I will consider the role, diversity, and dynamics of instrumental and non-instrumental education in a future leisure-based society. I try to define, provide, and analyze examples of diverse forms of instrumental and non-instrumental education. I hypothesize that in a

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leisure-based society, non-instrumental education will spread and deepen, while instrumental education will shrink.

Instrumental Education in a Leisure-Based Society

Nearly all the education that people would like to shorten or eliminate with the Magic Learning Pill (MLP) is instrumental (see Chapter 5 for a brief description of this study or the full research report here Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017). People interested in instrumental education are mostly interested in its outcomes, which such education produces, over its process. Their primary goals are not educational, per se, but other social, political, and economic goals achievable through education: upward social mobility, prestigious well-paid jobs, credentials, opportunities to do desired activities, institutional access, abilities to do some non-economic activities important for a person, and so on. However, I expect that the pressure for upward social mobility and credentials may diminish in a leisure-based society when people's economic and social well-being are guaranteed by the universal basic income and stop being directly linked with their jobs' wages.

Still, although this pressure may diminish in a leisure-based society, I expect that a need for instrumental education will endure. First, a need for work will still persist in a leisure-based society, at least, for some remaining workers. Second, participation in many leisurely activities may require instrumental education. For example, a person who is interested in the artful manipulation of digital images and photography may need to learn the nowadays Adobe Photoshop software to realize his/her artistic creativity. Learning Photoshop may or may not be perceived by a digital image artist as an annoying necessity. If the former is the case, the digital image artist faces instrumental education. Also, instrumental education may be an inherent part of ontological, intrinsic education, which a person does not want to shorten. For example, in our MLP research, a Brazilian adult participant in our study reported that he would take the MLP for learning technical and mechanical aspects of (analogue, non-digital) photography but not for creative ones; however, both of them can be deeply intertwined,

> …when it comes to photography I'm not interested in the technical part [such as, for example, "the right aperture or shutter speed"] as I'm interested in the compositional part, I don't think it is something that you

> learned and it's just a matter of doing it over and over again. If you take a whole roll of film, you never know how it's going to come out as far composition goes… even in ten years from now, it may be the same. (Matusov et al., 2017, pp. 469–470)

Educational philosopher Alexander Sidorkin argues that in an increasingly jobless society with a high level of technological unemployment, people who won't engage in labor will be mostly involved in three major types of activities: prosumption (production + consumption),[1] volunteering, and self-design. Prosumption involves a unity of production and consumption common in non-capitalist societies. There is a current growing trend of mass participation in prosumption of people by creating new values on social media like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and so on by participating in evaluating products, and, soon, by making material things for themselves using 3D printers—to give a few examples. Arguably, volunteerism can be another growing area for a "post-work" society (cf. Chambré, 1987). Finally, Sidorkin suggests that self-design—people's active authorship for the aesthetization of human life—will be the third pillar of a society with a high level of technological unemployment (Sidorkin, 2017). Some of these three areas of activities in a "post-work" society, such as self-design, may gravitate toward leisure, but some, such as presumption, when driven by personal necessity, may not, and some, such as volunteerism that can be driven by moral obligations and/or by passionate endeavors of being helpful to others (see Chapter 5), may occupy an in-between position. Also, as I discussed in Chapter 5, I foresee other areas of leisure that Sidorkin did not consider. All these areas of post-work activities may involve a hybrid of instrumental and ontological education.

As in the case of work, I expect that technological advances will reduce or, in some cases, eliminate the need for instrumental education, although never completely. I have observed, experienced, and envision at least four major ways of reducing or eliminating instrumental education (they can also work in a mixture):

[1] The term was introduced by futurist Alvin Toffler "Once we recognise that much of our so-called leisure time is, in fact, spent producing goods and services for our own use – prosuming – then the old distinction between work and leisure falls apart. The question is not work versus leisure, but paid work for Sector B [the formal economy] versus unpaid, self-directed, and self-monitored work for Sector A [the domestic economy]" (Toffler, 1980, p. 288).

1. *Division of human labor embedded in infrastructure.* The need for activity and its corresponding instrumental education can be minimized or eliminated by the division of labor embedded in infrastructure. For example, when I lived in the Soviet Union, people who wanted to acquire a driving license had to learn how the automobile works and how drivers could make emergency repairs on the road by themselves without any professional help from car mechanics. In the most developed countries with a sophisticated infrastructure and division of labor, such instrumental education is unnecessary. Car repairs are mostly done by professional mechanics in special car shops where immobilized cars can be towed by specialized towing companies.
2. *Automatization*. The need for instrumental education will be diminished by the automatization of many activities. A Russian friend of mine, who lives in Russia and who can only speak Russian, uses Google Translate for communication with Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian lodging companies to make arrangements for his regular travels to Scandinavia for his summer vacations. He does not need to learn English anymore, just to use it for this purpose (i.e., instrumental education). Smartphones, tablets, and computers, the Internet have almost eliminated the need for learning to write by hand—another type of instrumental education—for many people. Self-driving cars will soon eliminate the need to learn driving for many people. In contrast to the past, when one type of instrumental learning was replaced by another one or even many more, I expect that the total amount of required instrumental education will drop with the proliferation of sophisticated smart machines and robots.
3. *Augmentation*. In complex activities, smart machines will perform many technical and mechanical tasks, leaving creative and responsible actions to humans, simplifying the technical aspects of these activities for humans. For example, in modern computer-based word processors, spelling is monitored and even automatically corrected by the computer allowing a human writer to focus more on creative or meaningful aspects of writing and, thus, reducing the need for the instrumental learning of spelling. Another example, adding smart back cameras on a car makes parallel parking easier for human drivers and thus reduces the need for the instrumental learning of parallel parking (and there is already a technology for luxury cars that makes parallel parking fully automatic). Also, nowadays, due to

advances in photo cameras, one can do decent photography without ever learning about the shutter and its operation, something that was impossible a few decades ago.

4. *Cyborg*. The biological transformation of the human body may also dramatically reduce or eliminate the need for instrumental education. For now, this possibility is still mostly part of science fiction. Isaac Asimov's fictional idea of transforming the brain to pass knowledge and skills directly into it (Asimov, 1959) or the example of the science-fiction dystopia movie "The Matrix," where the mastery of piloting a modern helicopter is directly uploaded into the brain, provides a visualization of this approach. Other ideas that have been already experimentally tried to involve transforming the human body into a cyborg—a "cybernetic organism" of a being with both organic and biomechatronic body parts. Implants that combine mechanical modification with any kind of feedback response are also cyborg enhancements. There are attempts to create implants that will provide people with direct access to the Internet, with its rich and dynamically updated knowledge database, at a thought's demand[2] or will transform human thoughts directly into machine actions.[3] Hearing aids and cochlear implants[4] create controversy because they potentially eliminate Sign Language and education associated with it. Some opponents of cochlear implants claim that these will eliminate the Deaf Culture. Learning Sign Language may be ontological and not instrumental for some deaf people (and not only for deaf people) (Levy, 2002). Finally, genetic engineering/modification (genetic enhancement), making the human body different from what it is now (an alternative to biological evolution)

[2] http://www.kurzweilai.net/first-brain-to-brain-telepathy-communication-via-the-internet.

[3] http://www.businessinnovationfactory.com/summit/story/innovation-neuroscience-turning-thoughts-action.

[4] "A cochlear implant (CI) is a surgically implanted electronic device that provides a sense of sound to a person who is profoundly deaf or severely hard of hearing in both ears; as of 2014 they had been used experimentally tested in some people who had acquired deafness in one ear after learning how to speak. Cochlear implants bypass the normal hearing process; they have a microphone and some electronics that reside outside the skin, generally behind the ear, which transmits a signal to an array of electrodes placed in the cochlea, which stimulate the cochlear nerve." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cochlear_implant.

(Harari, 2017), is another approach to transform the body and eliminate or curtail instrumental education (while also probably creating a new one but I would argue on a smaller and smaller scale).[5]

Another way of curbing instrumental education is making it invisible by incorporating it into pragmatic or leisurely activities. For example, in an afterschool program at a local Latin American Community Center (LACC) in Delaware, where I worked with my undergraduate students, future teachers, for many years, I noticed an interesting problem related to instrumental education. The LACC staff and administration wanted children to learn fast and accurate typing but the children resisted. Several computer instructors had used many sophisticated typing teaching programs and computer educational games, but all of them had failed until Mr. Steve, a new computer instructor, arrived. He introduced a chat room for teenagers who chatted with their peers in California and Mexico and among each other. Often this chatting involved flirting among teens and required fast typing to make this leisurely activity fun and less embarrassing. Fast and accurate typing became a by-product of chat flirting and friendship (Matusov, 2009, ch. 10). In another example of learning as a by-product, moving to live in a foreign country—i.e., being thrown into a foreign language environment—may eliminate the need for instrumental education in this foreign language.

The Holy Grail of education is to create special environments and pragmatic and leisurely activities that eliminate the need for instrumental education via by-product, invisible learning, tricking the participants into instrumental education. This is how the majority of young children learn their native language and many other activities in their local culture. Russian educator Alexander Lobok wants to create a comprehensive conglomerate of playful activities and games to eliminate the need for deliberate instrumental learning of reading, writing, math, and science, so painfully common in conventional school education.

I remain skeptical about this pedagogical endeavor for several reasons (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). My primary objection is that in this pedagogical endeavor, the pragmatics and/or leisure are

[5] http://futurehumanevolution.com/expanding-human-capabilities-via-genetic-engineering.

hijacked and colonized by instrumental education and its goal. The participants play or engage in these educational gaming activities not to have leisurely fun, nor for self-realization, or for being together, or pragmatics but because it is useful or necessary for their instrumental education (self-selected education or imposed education).[6] If the students do not realize it initially, sooner or later, they will face it through their teacher's authority. It creates the fakeness of by-product learning. Genuine by-product learning is always subordinated to and never dominates the original activities. Thus, in the pedagogical endeavor of making instrumental education a by-product and invisible for a learner, leisure and pragmatics become another boring necessity of instrumental education. I believe that the genuine pedagogical successes of this approach are accidental and fragmented rather than systematic and comprehensive. I suspect that this gaming education may help some people to instrumentally learn something, sometimes, rather than help all people, to learn anything, and always. In sum, I think this approach can reduce some of the tediousness and alienation of instrumental education, but I doubt it can replace it.

Finally, there are efforts to optimize instrumental education itself by making it shorter in time, more effective, more intense, more accelerated, and more pleasurable (Hampel, 2018). This approach tries to use automatized, scientifically proven guidance, and scientifically proven structured learning for the optimization of instrumental education. It tries to study the psychological cognitive, physiological, and motivational principles of instructional learning to structure guidance and study. For example, in one study, a computer system monitored students' facial expressions to access their attention to the taught material and provided feedback to the teacher, "An attention-detection feedback module evaluated participants' attention span during the learning sessions and initiated a response to redirect the participants' attention when they became distracted. .... A positive correlation was found between learning improvement and attention, indicating that video-capture facial-recognition technology can be used to provide timely learning assistance and appropriate stimulation to enhance the educational benefits of e-learning" (Chen, 2012, p. 371).

[6] Even though some children may not initially notice the didactic focus of the activities, I argue that sooner or latter the logic of games will come in direct conflict with the logic of didactics behind the games. Usually, the teacher has more power to impose the didactic pragmatics over the play pragmatics.

In general, I support efforts for the optimization of instrumental education. My major reservation is that many current approaches view instrumental education very narrowly, as a good way of imposing preset curricular endpoints on the students, which nicely fits the conventional school practices of atomized alienated learning (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012). Scholars of instrumental learning “in the wild,” sociocultural and situated cognition scholars, demonstrated that instrumental learning in the wild is often ill-defined, open-ended, and holistic penetrating pragmatic, ontological, political, and social aspects of the targeted practice (Bowker & Star, 1999; Hutchins, 1995; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 2003; Suchman, 1987; Wenger, 1998). For example, educational anthropologist Jean Lave showed that even such a traditional practice as Liberian tailoring requires from its novices and their masters’ creative authorship of learning, guiding, practices and relationship in and out of practice—i.e., a community of practice (Lave, 2011; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Sociocultural scholars argue that creative authorship is an essential part of any practice, even a very rigid and mechanical one (Wenger, 1998), as well as a part of becoming a member of a community of practice. It requires transformation of the whole person rather than just self-contained knowledge and skills, as conventional schooling envisions.[7]

Technological Instrumental Education in a Leisure-Based Society

Elsewhere, I argued that conventional schooling involves technological instrumental education based on pattern recognition and pattern production processes (Matusov, 2020). Although it may also include a dialogic meaning-making process, the latter is subordinated to pattern recognition and production. I showed with the help of the empirical research on “talking science” by Jay Lemke (1990) that even the so-called conceptual learning in conventional schooling is mostly pattern recognition and pattern production. That is why in conventional school, a student may learn “successfully”—i.e., the student can repeat on demand and do well on tests—that “it is the Earth that rotates around the Sun” and that “all

[7] Of course, in reality, there is transformation of the whole person even in Education 1.0, despite the espoused claims of its proponents, as it is happened in any practice. For example, some children learn to act as reliable smart machine on the tests (and beyond), resist academic learning, learned to smuggle their genuine interests in school curriculum, or learned that they hate math.

movements are relative" without seeing any contradiction between them. From the second statement, it means that an alternative statement "the Sun rotates around the Earth" is no less valid and accurate than the first statement (see, Schneps, Sadler, & Crouse, 2003, for more discussion of this phenomenon).

Elsewhere (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012), my colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I argue that technological instrumental education contains two major types of learning: *alienated learning* and *closed participatory socialization*. Alienated learning involves a system of self-contained knowledge and skills taught to a student mostly through pattern recognition and pattern production (Matusov, 2020),

> The assumption of this approach to education is that students will learn this preset toolkit of the essential knowledge and skills, unrelated to the students' immediate goals and needs, which are often bracketed and delegitimized in the classroom. These essential knowledge and skills can then be applied later on in life. We call this approach of postponed desire Alienated Learning. In the Alienated Learning approach, both curriculum and instruction are preset by the teacher (and often by curriculum and instruction planners) before the teaching, unilaterally without seeking input on teaching by the students. (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012, pp. 159–160)

An alternative technological instrumental approach is closed participatory socialization. It involves participatory socialization of a student into a ready-made holistic practice mostly based on pattern recognition and pattern production. In contrast to alienated learning, here, the targeted patterns to recognize and produce are holistic, experiential, and relevant to the student. The closed participatory socialization approach often relies on collaborative instruction emergent in playful learning activities (see, Van Oers, 2012, as an example of the closed participatory approach to education). Often professional training is based on the closed participatory approach.

Technological instrumental education in conventional schooling, based on pattern recognition/production, prepares people to act as smart machines (Mitra, 2013, also see Chapter 3). Due to automatization, I and some other scholars (e.g., Bregman, 2016) expect that the need for people acting as smart machines will dramatically decrease (see Chapter 4), so the need for technological instrumental education will decrease as well. As the need for overall human labor will decrease, the need for technological instrumental education will also decrease.

However, I expect that there will be even more processes undermining technological instrumental education in a leisure-based society. In a leisure-based society, social and economic well-being will stop depending on the profitability of their jobs. Growing unconditional universal basic income will probably break the bond between human social self-worth (and well-being) and the economy. In turn, this will highly undermine social mobility and credentialism—the second pillar of technological instrumental education (after social efficiency) (Labaree, 1997).

Finally, as I argued in Chapter 4, I expect that the nature of the progressively shrinking jobs will also be changed in a leisure-based society. There will be less and less economic demand for smart machine-like labor and more and more economic demand in creative authorial labor. Technology makes technological instrumental education less and less necessary. A few decades ago, in US conventional schools, memorizing the names of state capitals—often without understanding the concept of a state capital—was ubiquitous. Now, with smartphone Internet literally under the fingers of nearly all people, the names of the state capitals are available on the Internet without a need to memorize them. Instead, creativity on demand, on social commission, shaped by instrumentalism, will prevail, although also on a limited scale, because of the demise of overall human labor—growing technological unemployment in a leisure-based society.

In a leisure-based society, I expect that a lot (but not all) of pedagogical support for technological instrumental learning will be moved online by providing step-by-step instructions and explanations like it has been happening now on the Khan academy,[8] WikiHow,[9] Wikipedia, and/or the "How to do," "How to make" YouTube channels.

Authorial Instrumental Education

The adjective "authorial instrumental" in this subtitle sounds like a misnomer. On the one hand, the term "authorial" refers to authorship, creativity, something outside-the-box, transcending the given. On the other hand, the term "instrumental" refers to something certain, reliable, and

[8] https://www.khanacademy.org/.

[9] http://www.wikihow.com/Main-Page.

given—a tool for achieving something else than it is. Creative labor is a good example of authorial instrumentalism. Creative labor is instrumental because it is based on a social commission demand to create an exchange value. At the same time, it is authorial because it transcends the given (see Chapters 3 and 4 for more discussion).

The Russian folk fairytale "Go I know not whither and fetch I know not what" (see Chapter 6) may help to reveal important features of authorial instrumentalism. In the fairytale, a Russian tsar tries to get rid of his royal hunter to marry the hunter's beautiful wife. The tsar gives dangerous missions to his royal hunter. However, the hunter manages to survive and fulfill the tsar's requests, with the wisdom and magic of his beautiful wife and his own bravery. Finally, the desperate tsar sends the annoying hunter for an impossible, I would argue, authorial instrumental, mission, "Go I know not whither and fetch I know not what," only to be defeated again by the wise and loving wife and the brave hunter.[10]

Similarly, many smartphone companies are working on a difficult, authorial instrumental, mission of invention, and production of the most profitable smartphone. As in the Russian fairytale, the designers, engineers, marketers, production organizers have to design not only a new smartphone with creative innovative functions and design but also new innovative technology that can support and produce these functions, its innovative production, its innovative marketing that has to create new desires in the consumers for the new smartphone (or whatever it may become) and so on. Many of these authorial instrumental efforts fail, like, for example, Apple's palm computer "Newton" serving as a personal digital assistant (PDA) in the early 1990s. Steve Ballmer, the former chief executive officer of Microsoft from January 2000 to February 2014, laughed at Apple's smartphone iPhone when it appeared in 2007 but he was wrong.[11]

The instrumentality of creative authorial labor is rooted in its focus on its *final service* for its profitability and consumers, while means for achieving it remain hugely undefined (see Chapter 3 for more discussion). Servitude to necessity is instrumentality. Again, the product is more

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Go_I_Know_Not_Whither_and_Fetch_I_Know_Not_What.

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eywi0h_Y5_U. Later Ballmer admitted that he was wrong https://www.macrumors.com/2016/11/07/former-microsoft-ceo-steve-ballmer-wrong-iphone/.

important than the process, its ontological value for the participating authors. It is still desirable for the economy to shorten the process of creative authorship as much as possible. Successful authorial instrumentalism usually involves an avalanche of inventions aiming at the creation of new desires in relevant people and of the conviction that the inventions are needed and working (Latour, 1987). A co-founder of Apple, Steve Jobs famously claimed that he did not follow consumers' desires; instead, he invented, discovered, and imposed them on the consumers, making them new types of consumers and people (Vallely, 2012) (see also, Glasser, 1972, for a discussion of this phenomenon). A successful authorial innovation has to answer a series of questions raised by its consumer, "Why the hell do I need it?! What exciting and useful things can I do with it? Why can't I live without it? Will it work for me? How will it change my being-in-the-world and is this change desirable for me? Will the diverse costs – financial, emotional, social, educational, time, energy, environmental, and so on – of getting, keeping, maintaining, and using it be worth it for me?" and so on (cf. Jean Lave's description and analysis of grocery shoppers' negotiations and decision-making, in Lave, 1988).

Authorial instrumentalism goes beyond technological instrumentalism because, in contrast to the latter, the former cannot be mainly based on pattern recognition and production. Rather, the former is based on dialogic meaning-making. As I discussed elsewhere (Matusov, 2020), meaning involves a relationship between an ontological, genuinely interested question and an answer that takes the question seriously. Although pattern recognition can be successful or unsuccessful (e.g., Amazon's Alexa can either successfully play a National Public Radio station upon my voice request or it cannot), the system producing the pattern is indifferent to the success or failure and does not define what constitutes success or failure and why. Similarly, high achieving students in conventional schooling can successfully produce the correct answers on all their exams based on their pattern recognition (Biesta, 2017). However, like Amazon's Alexa, they may not understand what constitutes their correctness, the limits of their correctness, what questions, inquiries, interests, and needs have pushed forward this knowledge, and why, nor do they know whether and why this knowledge should be important for them. Students in conventional schools are often not authors of their own education; instead, they are creative authors of their conformity,[12] resistance, minimax game,[13] and/or survival (Matusov, 2011).

In contrast to technological instrumental education, authorial instrumental education, like creative authorial labor, is based on authorship and creativity. However, this instrumental authorship emerges in response to a social commission demand—a social commission coming from either other people or from a student herself (or both). An example of such authorial instrumental education was my study in a Soviet computer science college in the late 1970s and early 1980s. My classmate, Matvey Sokolovsky, and I had semi-legitimate "free attendance" in our college—i.e., we were allowed to not attend lectures and seminars in our college, and there was no punishment by the college administration. During our free time, we were engaged in diverse self-studies of math, physics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, politics, Go, chess, Preferans, Bridge, literature, underground youth music, and other subjects of our interests. We read relevant books, participated in informal learning circles among peers, attended lectures by famous professors in other universities, and engaged in many informal discussions with available experts and amateurs. Some of these self-studies were results of choices that we created ourselves (e.g., a math circle at our college), some choices were emerging opportunities that we jumped onto (e.g., attending the underground Jewish People's University, see Szpiro, 2007). While some of our self-studies were transactional in their nature intertwining existing and created choices (e.g., my participation in the production of underground youth music journals, see Kushnir, Gurev, & Volkov, 1994).

When a semester ended in our college, we—a cohort of undergraduate students[14]—had to take oral exams for each of the 5–7 subjects taught during the semester. Usually, there were 3–4 days between the exams—this was time for my classmates and me to prepare. Soon in the program, our cohort peers refused to study with my friend and me. All exams were oral. Ahead of an exam, a professor gave us a list of 40 to 80 questions

[12] I.e., how to guess and please the teachers creatively.

[13] I.e., how to creatively put the minimum effort in studies while getting maximum educational credentials.

[14] In the USSR, undergraduate students were organized in cohorts, taking all classes together for five years until their graduation. There were no electives, all classes were mandatory.

that would be on an "exam ticket" (there were 3–5 questions on each ticket).

In contrast to many of our classmates, my friend's and my goal on the oral exam was not merely to demonstrate our knowledge of the course to our professors successfully[15] but to engage the professors in a professional discourse that could be authentically interesting for the professors. In our preparation for the exams, we focused on the limitations of the expected solutions and on how to problematize the course's concepts, problems, and solutions. Our classmates usually split the total number of questions equally among the preparation days, starting with the first questions on the list that they studied on the first day of their preparation. In contrast, my friend and I spent the entire first day, often lasting 10–12 hours, searching for subjectively abstracted core concepts, inquiries, and questions that provided us with the key authorial understanding of the entire course. By examining the concepts and problems in the lecture notes, which we often borrowed or copied from our classmates, who kindly allowed that, and in the textbooks, we asked ourselves why these concepts and problems had been introduced, what for, what issues they had tried to address. The key subjective concepts,[16] inquiries, and questions helped us deduce and infer all the questions, proofs, reasoning, and justifications that were required by the professor's list of the exam questions and problems. We made this deduction and inference in the remaining days of the preparation for the exam. Each of us had his own aha-moment for finding our own subjective key concept of the course. For example, I remember that I realized that the key idea of "The Theoretical Fundamentals of Electrical Technology" course that we had back then, was spreading and transforming electrical waves over wires and cables. As soon as it became clear to me, many exam questions became particular applied problems of math and physics, involving waves—a subject I had some limited familiarity with from my high school and independent autodidact studies. Similarly, understanding that the key concept of the "Digital

[15] Anthropologist Rebekah Nathan (2005) lived for a year in the freshman dorm in the United States, took 5 courses. She saw how grades and tests preoccupied everyone. Almost no one discussed ideas outside the classroom (thanks to Robert Hampel for directing me to this source).

[16] The extracting of key subjective concepts—the concepts constituting the gestalt of one's subjective understanding of the academic material—reminds of some teachers' preparation for their teaching. For example, "Spanish Exploration: 3 Gs—gold, God, glory" (Kauchak & Eggen, 1998, p. 65).

Machines" course, was the "triggers," helped me recognize that the exam questions were particular applied problems of Boolean logic, embedded into problems of support for computer programming. At the same time, my subjective key concepts could be different for my friends.

Often, we did not only deduce and infer the correct solution expected by our professor but also showed to him or her why this solution was limited and why it was not always true. Our emerging discussions with the professor during the oral exam often disrupted the boring routine of the professor's asking known-information questions and evaluating how wrong or right a particular student was. We engaged our professors as professionals, discussing professional issues they faced, as colleagues, and not as their students. It was a joint examination of the issues at hand, emerging from our exam questions and, then, deepening them. Some professors (and we) might lose a sense of time in these discussions and when the professors found out, they were both excited and upset because of that. They were excited because of the authentic ontological quality of our professional conversations during the exam. At the same time, they were upset that they "wasted" their exam time on us, which made their exam day work longer. Our classmates often did not mind because we put our professors in a good mood, and also it gave our classmates more time to prepare. Some professors suggested to us to come some other time to continue our interesting professional discussions—we often followed their advice. They recommended advanced books for us to read about their course (usually we read them) and apologized for a low level of their course, not suiting our deep educational and professional interests. Thus, they supported and promoted our free attendance based on our reputation as superb students. Our authorial educational instrumentalism was not a manipulation of our professors—at least, not only and not mainly,—but rather our way of survival as authorial learners in an educational system that imposed its curriculum on us.[17] We managed to engage our professors as collegial professionals rather than as gatekeepers of the correct knowledge. Of course, not all of our Soviet professors were interested in our transcending professional discussions during the exams and they tried to make us stay within the rigid framework of the exam questions. Nevertheless, our overall institutional academic success was evident in both of us being award honors diplomas.

[17] We both came from math high schools promoting authorial ontological education (Karp & Vogeli, 2010; Matusov, 2017).

In the United States, my authorial instrumental educational approach also worked well. All but one final assignment that I had in my graduate classes was writing an essay. Again, my goal was to become interesting to my American professors by transcending the essay questions and finding the limitations of the expected answers. That was not a manipulating student strategy but a deep authorial interest of mine, curbed by instrumental pragmatism of passing the exam. Instead of correct answers, known to the professor, I pleased my professor by engaging him or her in an unexpected interesting professional discourse. On some (but not all) of my assignments, I got 11 points out of 10 from my professors, reflecting the transcending nature of my assignment essays. I tried to promote genuine interest in my professors in me, in what I was going to say. This only failed once in one multiple-choice exam given by one of my psychology professors in my graduate school. I failed it by getting C- because often all provided choices were wrong in my view, forcing me to pick up an arbitrary "correct" choice. I convinced my professor to give me an essay exam and I got A +. He gave me B + for the course, with his apology that giving A, which I clearly disserved in his view, would have been unfair to my classmates who took the multiple-choice exam. He also agreed with me that many of the correct answers in his multiple-choice exams were conditionally correct but in his mind, that was too deep and beyond the educational goals of his course, as he told me.

My friend's and my authorial educational instrumentalism was different from our authorial ontological education that we pursued in our self-studies. For one, authorial ontological education is not based on pleasing others as its outcome. Secondly, an obvious aspect of the differences was that in our self-studies, we selected our curriculum ourselves while in our educational institutions, the curriculum was always defined for us, both in the USSR and in the United States. However, this is not what defines the major difference between authorial instrumental education and authorial ontological education.

Authorial instrumental education can also be self-assigned. For example, I charged myself with the authorial learning of the PHP computer language in order to adjust the online class platform Moodle and some of its plugins to my innovative pedagogy. I metaphorically called my PHP programming "voodoo programming" because my goal is often to hack the PHP code to reach a desired effect on Moodle, and not to study the PHP computer language conceptually and systematically. I am learning

PHP through the project of inventing my humanistic pedagogy and supporting it via the Moodle-based web. My project involving PHP learning is very authorial and creative but also instrumental. I would not mind if somebody else did it for me. When I find an existing Moodle plugin that does what I want to do—I am happy to save my time from PHP voodoo programming. This is quite different from my authorial ontological learning to discover/design the most humanistic pedagogy. It is learning about humanistic pedagogy that is an important existential part of my life—I do not want to shorten it because shortening it means shortening my life itself.

I expect that in a leisure-based society, authorial instrumental education will be both self-assigned and assigned by others with the growing prevalence of self-assigned authorial instrumental education. Authorial instrumental education may be prompted by necessities (e.g., job necessities, activity necessities) by supporting a student's main educational interests, involving authorial ontological education, and his or her peripheral educational interests. It can be project-based, organized as a learning circle or a study group, or can be part of an educational institution (online or face-to-face). Many online help forums provide support for self-assigned authorial instrumental education. However, I expect that authorial instrumental education will be subordinated to authorial non-instrumental education, which I am going to discuss in the next section. Similarly, while envisioning education in a leisure-based society, Barry Jones recommends that "education [has to be] a means of achieving self-knowledge, personal development, the strengthening of self-image and creativity, and effectual time use (including leisure studies [i.e., education for leisure[18]]), and place less emphasis on education for vocational or specialist purposes which can be picked up relatively quickly" (B. O. Jones, 1995, p. 247).

[18] Cf. "We suppose this would lead to a revival of what has become known as 'leisure studies': psychologists and sociologists would study, prescriptively as well as analytically, what people do with their time. Concomitantly, space and time themselves become objects both of knowledge and, in the more conventional science fiction sense, of personal and social exploration. Consequently, lifelong learning, travel, avocations, small business, and artisanship take on a new significance as they become possible for all people, not just the middle and upper classes" (Aronowitz & DiFazio, 1994, pp. 353–354). Of course, I would prefer more humanistic—i.e., dialogic study of education for leisure, rather than positivisticly as these authors seem to assume (Matusov et al. , 2019; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019).

Non-instrumental, Ontological, Intrinsic, Education in a Leisure-Based Society

I have already described non-instrumental, ontological, intrinsic education in Chapter 5 (for more examples and discussion of it, see, Matusov et al., 2017). This type of education is education that constitutes the participants' life and, thus, its shortening is undesirable for its participants because learning mistakes, learning frustrations, learning from hardships as well as learning excitements, learning discoveries, learning communities, learning catharsis constitute one's life from the one's perception. In this education, the process is more important than its outcomes,

> [Take the MLP[19]?] No, because the process is important. … I feel like I would be losing something, because the actual learning of something is interesting… Well the gradual interaction with some material, when you think about it every day, and start to view it differently. Immediately, now you don't know it, now you don't, you go through these stages and understand it completely differently, like something else. And moreover, when you're immediately there, you don't have the feeling that the material is something social, with that you lose some of the color, even some of the lines. Do you understand? So, when initially English was something foreign to me, it's important, because now I hear it through someone else's ear, as well as with my own. Maybe with mine not as well, as the carriers [of the language, i.e., native speakers], but on the other hand, a lot better with that of the other. It becomes a kind of like a stereo effect. (Sasha, Russia, adult, BS) (Matusov et al., 2017, p. 8)

In contrast to instrumental education, serving other spheres of practice (e.g., economy, nation-building, upward social mobility, mastery of a desired practice) for the student him/herself and/or the society, ontological education serves only itself. It is education for education's sake. That is why it is intrinsic. Its major outcome is to be an important part of the person's life valued by the person him/herself. Ontological education is eventful, existential, experiential, relational, and dialogic. It is based on an authorial meaning-making process.

[19] The MLP (see above), in this case for learning English.

Intrinsic ontological education is always and primarily a personal business, rather than societal or individual.[20] "Education is the discovery and drawing out of the best that is in a person" (de Grazia, 1962, pp. 360–361), and I would add, while critically examining what "the best" means and for whom. Similarly, British sociologist of leisure Denis Gabor suggested that education in a leisure-based society will need to develop in future generations of young people, who will experience lives of material comfort, self-generated creativity, and enthusiasm for life which he sees as characteristic of "Mozartian man." Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart "had a short, hard, and tragic life" but, unlike the "great tormented creators" in history, "his work owes nothing to his sufferings, everything to his innate rich and happy nature" (Gabor, 1964, p. 201). Of course, the main difference between a New Leisure Person and the New Soviet Man (as it was in the Soviet evtopia) is that becoming a New Leisure Person will be a choice of every person in a leisure-based society in contrast to the societal obligation as it was in the Soviet Union. In the former, non-participation and dissent will be legitimate, while in the latter, it was not.

Ontological education may have important instrumental implications and outcomes, but they are secondary to its intrinsic value for the participant. Ontological education may involve some instrumental education—technological and/or authorial—but these aspects are subordinated to the existential values of ontological education. For example, Sasha, a Russian participant of our research, experienced learning English as his ontological education. He benefited from this education by being able to read English literature and communicate with English speaking people. However, these instrumental benefits did not overweigh the existential value of the process of learning English.

[20] I distinguish the concept of "person" from the concept "individual." Individual is often viewed atomisticly, assuming that individual can exist and be formed self-sufficiently without other people. In contrast, person (my translation of the Russian concept of "lichnost'", личность), implies that people dialogically constitute each other through their unique (i.e., irreplaceable) and deeply interested address and reply to other people. For example, Russian philosopher of dialogism Mikhail Bakhtin argued that a person learns about him/herself by making sense of how other relevant people see him/her—i.e., in the person's reply to perceived attitudes of those people toward the person (Bakhtin, 1997; Nikulin, 2011). The uniqueness of each person is rooted in irreplaceability of the person's relationships with other relevant people (Biesta, 2017; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2018). Thus, the concept of person is outside of the individual-social continuum. It overcomes the atomism of the individual and the holism of the social.

Based on our findings, my colleagues and I came to the following pedagogical principles supporting non-instrumental, ontological, intrinsic education:

1. Focus on the process of education[21] and not so much (or not only) on education's outcomes, preset curricular endpoints;
2. Education focusing on students' here-and-now experiences, emerging demands, and interests;
3. Education viewed as transcending any space, time, and people;
4. Prioritization of self-initiated education;
5. Authorial personal transformative, becoming, [education] embedded in social relations;
6. A safe educational environment, in which students are not punished for their mistakes (no summative assessments, e.g., grading and credentials);
7. No forced education, without a student's consent;
8. Exposure to diverse and rich educational experiences;
9. Support of students' agency and voice; and
10. Students as the final authority for their own [education] and for defining their own education (cf. Matusov et al., 2017, pp. 17–18).

Currently, almost all educational institutions—conventional or innovative—violate these pedagogical principles of ontological education. Mostly, education is forced on students, the curriculum is forced on the students, instruction is forced on the students, grading is forced on the students, credentialism is forced on the students, pedagogy is forced on the students, and so on. The only known (limited) exception involves democratic schools (Greenberg, 1992; Neill, 1960; Rietmulder, 2009), some forms of homeschooling (Llewellyn, 1998), and a few progressive schools and programs (e.g., Manhattan County School, Yale University's "Scholar of the House"). However, even those exceptions are not free from outside and inside instrumental pressures, operating from the students and teachers/staff themselves. The external pressures of instrumentalism are coming from concerns about going to college and getting

[21] I replace the original term "learning" with "education" in this quote because in my view learning is a bit too narrow a term.

a good job (Deresiewicz, 2014). The internal pressures of instrumentalism coming from the students' and teachers'/staff's vision of education—particularly guidance—as instrumental. Thus, the founder of the democratic Sudbury Valley School (SVS), Dan Greenberg, even insists on the super-conventional instrumental nature of his math instruction in his school as soon as his students chose it voluntarily. In his version of voluntary education, as soon as students want to study something, they *must* submit themselves to whatever pedagogical regime is designed by their teacher. Of course, students may reject this instruction and the whole class offered by an adult and this rejection will be legitimate in a democratic school—but, at least from Greenberg's description, it sounds like a teacher's instruction is non-negotiable, "my way or the highway." Greenberg even brags that he uses a very old and very traditional arithmetic textbook for his SVS young students and imposes the most conventional pedagogical regime with a rigid timetable on them while the students enthusiastically accept it (Greenberg, 1991, pp. 15–17).

Greenberg's description of his SVS math instruction is uneventful. It is purely technological. There is no description of any depth of understanding or students' exciting inquiries and discoveries but rather rote memorization, rules, algorithms, drills, textbook exercises, quizzes, tests, and exams—the recognizable pedagogical attributes and means of the conventional education based on totalizing non-negotiable impositions. I have abstracted three related benefits of the SVS math instruction from Greenberg's description and discussion of his SVS math instruction that Greenberg values:

1. a higher speed of the SVS students' learning the preset curricular standards in comparison with similar math instruction in conventional schools,
2. the SVS students' high-level unconditional cooperation with the teacher's demands once the class is freely chosen, and
3. the SVS students' own intense study efforts, high engagement, and enthusiasm to study.

The students' own purposes for these academic studies do not seem important for Greenberg: they may decide to study because of their genuine interest in the subject because their friends go there because they want to attend a college and do well on tests because they want to get credentials and so on—it does not matter for Greenberg, their math teacher. But, as soon as they make their decision, they must submit themselves to the teacher's totalizing non-negotiable impositions. Greenberg mentions some SVS students who eventually became professional mathematicians but from his description it looks like they studied math mostly by themselves. The nature of their studies—how close in their self-studies these students followed Greenberg's math instruction, based on the totalizing non-negotiable impositions—was not clear for me, as a reader of his texts. Of course, other SVS teachers may teach math or other subjects differently, but that is true even in conventional schools. The issue is what is ideologically legitimate and defendable (Matusov, 2015b). In my judgment, Greenberg violates many pedagogical principles of ontological education listed above—all but, probably, 6 and 7.

Thus, in sum, it can be concluded that, at least, some democratic schools and homeschooling do not fully promote and pedagogically support ontological education. In our necessities-based society (or better to say, necessities-based civilization), technological instrumental education rules, leaving ontological education on the periphery of the educational institutions. At the same time, as my colleagues' and my research shows, people's experience of ontological education remains ubiquitous and near-universal—all but one (98%) of the 58 international participants of different ages, educational levels, and occupations reported experiencing it (Matusov et al., 2017). In our society, ontological education often occurs despite our formal educational institutions, not because of them. As on of our research participants noticed, "A lot of what influenced me sometimes [as a part of my ontological education] had nothing do to with what the teacher set-up to do; a lot for me are the marginal experiences that contribute to [my ontological] learning. [Ontological education] is all about the experience and not having a goal or destination [often set by conventional schooling]. It is all about other factors and your senses and texture and that is not something that I would like to experience in a [Magic Learning] pill" (Matusov, et al., 2017, p. 18).

Critical Ontological Education in a Leisure-Based Society

Elsewhere I critiqued ontological education for creative authorship for being non-critical. (Matusov, 2015a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012; Matusov, von Duyke, & Kayumova, 2016).

Not any authorship is good. Not any dialogic meaning-making is good. Not any community of practice is good. Not any ontology is good. Not any existentialism is good.

For example, at the end of the 1960s at Palo Alto, CA, a high school history teacher Ron Jones, the teacher of World History class, created a pedagogical experiment[22] (R. Jones, 1972). Ron Jones was highly dissatisfied with the dispassionate and desireless technological instrumental education (Alienated Learning) common in conventional schooling. Lecturing about Nazi Germany, Jones was asked the following questions apparently by a student, "How could the German populace claim ignorance of the slaughter of the Jewish people? How could the townspeople, railroad conductors, teachers, doctors, claim they knew nothing about concentration camps and human carnage? How can people who were neighbors and maybe even friends of the Jewish citizen say they weren't there when it happened?" Jones did not provide the answer. Instead, he decided to engage the students into a simulation of a totalitarian regime without informing students about that,

> On Monday, I introduced my sophomore history students to one of the experiences that characterized Nazi Germany. Discipline. I lectured about the beauty of discipline. How an athlete feels having worked hard and regularly to be successful at a sport. How a ballet dancer or painter works hard to perfect a movement. The dedicated patience of a scientist in pursuit of an Idea. it's discipline. That self-training. Control. The power of the will. The exchange of physical hardships for superior mental and physical facilities. The ultimate triumph.
>
> To experience the power of discipline, I invited, no I commanded the class to exercise and use a new seating posture; I described how proper sitting posture assists mandatory concentration and strengthens the will. In fact I instructed the class in a sitting posture. This posture started with feet flat on the floor, hands placed flat across the small of the back to force a straight alignment of the spine. "There can't you breath more easily? You're more alert. Don't you feel better." (R. Jones, 1972)

So, for teaching about Nazi Germany, he created a simulated totalitarian movement "The Third Wave." The teacher promoted the students' creative authorship and dialogic meaning-making. He was happy

[22] See also a well-done dramatization of this event in the German movie "The Wave" ("Die Welle") (Becker, Gansel, & Thorwarth, 2011).

to let the students transcend "imitation" of the historical Nazi regime and start a real neo-Nazi community of practice, which is always open-ended and transcendental by its nature. It was even therapeutic for some of the students,

> By the end of the third day I was exhausted. I was tearing apart. The balance between role playing and directed behavior became indistinguishable. Many of the students were completely into being Third Wave Members. They demanded strict obedience of the rules from other students and bullied those that took the experiment lightly. Others simply sunk into the activity and took self-assigned roles. I particularly remember Robert. Robert was big for his age and displayed very few academic skills. Oh, he tried harder than anyone I know to be successful. He handed in elaborate weekly reports copied word for word from the reference books in the library. Robert is like so many kids in school that don't excel or cause trouble. They aren't bright, they can't make the athletic teams, and don't strike out for attention. They are lost. invisible. The only reason I came to know Robert at all is that I found him eating lunch in my classroom. He always ate lunch alone.
>
> …
>
> By Thursday the class had swollen in size to over eighty students.… On Friday, the final day of the exercise,… over two hundred students were crammed into the room [where the Third Wave meeting was held]. (R. Jones, 1972)

The teacher was highly successful in socializing his students in a Nazi-like movement so they could not only feel it from inside their culturally prescribed roles but also creatively and legitimately transcend these roles and took over the practice as "full participants" (as educational anthropologist Jean Lave would probably desire for successful apprenticeship). The students' dramatic experiences were very existential. The teacher's pedagogy seemed to incorporate all 10 pedagogical principles of ontological education listed above. However, it is difficult to claim that Ron Jones provided good education for his students by creating a lively, vibrant, creative neo-Nazi educational community. Thus, it appears that in addition to the promotion of meaningful learning for students and newcomers, education must involve critical evaluation of their own values (including values of their education) and taking responsibility for one's own practice. While meaningfulness, emotional authentic experience, creativity, transcendence, agency, legitimate peripheral participation, existentialism (i.e., being-in-the-world), dialogue, communal engagement—are all probably necessary, they are not enough for defining good education, in my view.

I define *critical ontological intrinsic education* as *a leisurely pursuit of an examination of life, self, world, and society, including one's own education by considering and testing alternative ideas* (Matusov et al., 2017; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012, 2015, 2017a, 2017b). This definition reflects Socrates famous motto, "The unexamined life is not worth living." This type of education is doubly ontological. First, it is ontological because its critical examination focuses on the life (and other ontological aspects like self, society, world) in which the person participates. Critical ontological intrinsic education critically deconstructs meanings about life by juxtaposing them with alternative meanings available in the culture and testing them against each other in a free public critical dialogue to develop an informed authorial judgment. The informed authorial judgment-making is a process of self-realization and self-determination. Since all meanings have to be tested and are forever testable (Morson, 2004), this process of an informed authorial judgment is unfinalizable (Nikulin, 2010).

Critical ontological education is deconstructive. It helps people to liberate themselves from colonization of the cultures, in which they grew up and in which they (uncritically) socialize. This does not mean that through this educational deconstruction, people would reject their culture. Instead, after a critical examination, which is always incomplete and provisional, a person can freely accept, reject, or modify the cultural values, practices, and norms under the examination. Of course, the critical ontological education recognizes that it in itself expresses a particular cultural value. Thus, it has to turn its critical look of examination on itself: whether the unexamined life is always not worth living or whether the examined life is always worth living (Kukathas, 2001, 2003).

Second, critical ontological education is ontological because it constitutes the very fabric of the participants' life itself as any leisurely pursuit—its eventful process is more important than the temporary outcomes to which the participants arrive during their investigations. In contrast to ontological education for creative authorship, critical ontological education has its critical, investigative, examining, testing, and deconstructive focus. Critical ontological intrinsic education involves existential life events that the participant recognizes and appreciates as such. This focus can never be fully realized because critical ontological education and its critical dialogue, on which it is based, remains inherently unfinalizable.

That is why the ideas, approaches, and outcomes that the participants develop in critical dialogue are temporary and only arise as a by-product. Any particular critical dialogue is a fragment of Big Critical Dialogue that is unfolding with the history of humankind.

In the next chapter, I provide an example and analysis of critical ontological education.

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CHAPTER 9

Students and Teachers as Authors in a Bakhtinian Critical Dialogue

Without much introduction, I want to throw my readers into an interesting teaching case of authorial dialogic teaching and learning math in a first-grade classroom, and then reflect on the case and the concept of authorial teaching and learning embedded in the case, afterward. I hope that my point about a new vision of education, and the theoretical notions serving my argument, will emerge through this case and my reflection on it.

Math Drama: Is 2 + 2 Always 4?[1]

I was always interested in learning disabilities. When two of my undergraduate university education students, future teachers, invited me to visit their teaching practicum classroom to observe a first-grade boy in the U.S. state of Delaware with "math disability," I immediately accepted their invitation. Math disability! What was it about? My students told me that the boy had "a math logic disability" as he could not understand the simplest arithmetic calculation operations like addition and subtraction even with single digits, despite his teacher's exhaustive instruction. I was intrigued.

I arrived at the school around 10:30 a.m. and after some brief security procedures of signing in as a visitor from the university, I was directed

[1] This case and its description is borrowed from several papers: Matusov (2009) and Matusov and Marjanovic-Shane (2018a, 2018b).

E. Matusov, *Envisioning Education in a Post-Work Leisure-Based Society*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46373-1_9

to the first-grade classroom. My two students, preservice teachers, were already there waiting for me and the first-grade teacher nodded at me in acknowledgment as she was working with a group of children near a window. The classroom was full of sunlight. It was a rather spacious room for 19 students, who were sitting in clusters of four at individual desks facing each other. The children did not pay much attention to me apparently, perhaps being accustomed to visits by adult strangers. They were busy working on math worksheets that the teacher gave to them. The teacher was sitting next to one of the cluster groups away from my university students and me, discussing something with one of the children there. My undergraduate students pointed at a boy sitting at one of the desks in a cluster next to us. I moved a bit to stay in a close proximity to his desk cluster to observe the children's work and eavesdrop on their conversations.

The children of this cluster—two boys and two girls—worked silently and independently on their math problems on their worksheets at their own pace. The boy selected the next problem "1+4=", turned to the girl, sitting next to him and working on her problems, and silently showed her the problem on the worksheet with his two fingers. The girl briefly glanced at the written problem and replied, "Five." The boy nodded in appreciation, turned back to his desk, and carefully drew the correct number on his worksheet. He picked up the next problem in a column, "3+2=" with his fingers, and turned again to the girl. She glanced again and said, "The same." The boy nodded in appreciation, turned back to this desk, and drew the number five. The next problem was "2+2=."

I waited until the girl replied "four" and asked her, "How do you know that? How do you know *for sure* that two plus two equals four?" The other two kids looked at me with interest and so did the boy. The girl smiled self-assuredly and with the anticipation of triumph, as apparently, she heard this question before many times and was ready to shine with the correct answer expected by adults. She drew two lines on her own worksheet below the math problems she had to solve and then the other two lines, slowly counted them, and declared almost with triumph, "Four! Two and two is four."

I glanced at the boy—he looked perplexed. His perplexed look guided me to push forward, although without much direction as I was "fishing" to understand the boy's puzzlement. I replied to the girl, "Yes, two lines plus two lines is four lines. But, I didn't ask you about the lines. I asked you about two plus two." The boy turned to the girl as if it was he who was asking this question and not me. It was clear to me that my question articulated his puzzlement. I was on the right track.

My question did not perplex the girl, not a whit. She picked two pencils from her neat pencil case and then two more, placed the pencils in two groups on her desk, and counted the pencils, “Four.” She smiled at me victoriously.

I glanced at the boy. It was clear to me that the boy was not moved by her pencil reply. Again, I pursued my investigation, “Yes, four pencils. Two pencils plus two pencils is four pencils. I can see that. But I asked you about numbers, not pencils.” She stopped smiling and replied without any doubt, “It doesn’t matter. Two plus two is always four. It does not matter what you count.” The other two kids in the cluster were attentively listening to our conversation. The boy turned to me. It seemed to me that he was not satisfied with the girl’s answer, but I did not know how to challenge the girl further. I paused trying to gain some time but then I decided to improvise.

I asked the girl, “How do you know that it doesn’t matter what to count? What about Russian pencils? You know, I’m from another country that is called Russia. Can you hear how I speak? What about two Russian pencils and two Russian pencils?” The kids got animated when they heard about *Russian* pencils. The girl smiled again at me and replied, “Four!” She moved her fingers in the air as if counting the invisible Russian pencils. I continued, “But how do you know that? You haven’t seen Russian pencils!” She giggled as if we were playing a fun game, “It doesn’t matter! It’s four. Four Russian pencils.”

I asked, “What about *Martian* pencils?” The group exploded. The other girl started clapping, laughing, and exclaiming, “It doesn’t matter! It doesn’t matter! It’s four! It’s four! It’s four! Four *Martian* pencils!!!” The first girl also joined her with joy. The two boys started talking about a battle between Superheroes and Martian Aliens. I waited for a while and asked the girls, “How do you know that it’s four? I bet you all have never seen *Martian* pencils! What if Martian pencils are round like balls?!” The girls were giggling with joy, “It doesn’t matter! It doesn’t matter!” The first girl counted imaginary round ball-like Martian pencils in the air with her hands, “Two and two: one, two, three, FOUR!” The noise in our group attracted the attention of the rest of the class, but when I looked at the teacher, she smiled in apparent appreciation that the kids in my group enjoyed a discussion of math. Two of my university students who stayed behind me and observed attentively our conversation were smiling as well.

I lowered my voice and asked the girl with a mystified voice, "But what if Martian pencils are *liquid*?" The girls became almost hysterical with laugh, "*Liquid* pencils! Four!! It doesn't matter!" The first girl counted imaginary four pools of liquid Martian pencils, while the two boys were in the midst of their imaginary battle between the Superheroes and Martian Aliens gesticulating with their hands and making face grimaces.

I lowered my voice even more, almost to a whisper, and asked all kids slowly, "Ok, kids. What is two *hundred*… plus two *hundred*?" The boys stopped their imaginary battle immediately. The first boy, who, according to my university students, had "math logic disability," asked me to repeat the question. I did. The first girl replied with perplexity, "We didn't study such *big* numbers yet." I asked, "But you didn't study *Russian* and *Martian* pencils and you were still eager to provide answers. What stops you now?" She looked at me with surprise. There was some silence as the kids were apparently thinking and then the first girl broke the silence by saying without much enthusiasm, "Ah, I remember now. It's *three* hundred." "How do you know that?" I asked. "My mom told me," she answered. I did not reply but kept watching at the kids and waiting for them to comment.

Suddenly the boy, who was initially suspected of having "a math disability," said calmly, "It's *four* hundred." I asked him, "How do you know that?" Like the girl before, he drew two lines and then two more lines underneath them on his worksheet and counted them, "One hundred, two hundred, three hundred, four hundred." When he counted the last line, he circled all four lines with his pen in the air. The girl objected, "No! You can't draw one hundred with one line! One hundred has many-many lines! It's difficult to draw them and count them. We didn't study such big numbers!" The boy calmly replied, "It doesn't matter." The girl grabbed his worksheet, on which the boy drew his lines representing hundreds and started rapidly, almost violently, drawing many-many small lines without counting under each of his lines. She yelled with frustration when she finished, "These are hundreds. It's difficult to count them! See, how many of them there are!" The boy replied calmly with persistence, "It doesn't matter!" He circled her chaotic lines with circles and counted them, "One hundred, two hundred, three hundred, four hundred. It's four hundred." "No!"—Yelled the girl,—"You can't do it! You must count all these…" She was pointing at her chaotically drawn lines within the boy's four circles. The other boy joined the discussion, "No, you mustn't!"

The other girl kept silence, but she was perplexed as was the boy sitting next to her.

At this moment, the teacher started clapping loudly, gaining all the kids' attention. The lesson was over, and the kids were supposed to form a line to go for lunch. In the line, the discussion about adding two hundred and two hundred spread rapidly. The kids' opinions split. I could hear, "It doesn't matter!" "Yes, it does!" "Too big numbers," "Martian pencils," "Superheroes…"

When my two university students and I left the classroom, one of them exclaimed, "The boy is just a genius! I thought he had a math disability, but he was just a deep thinker. I thought that the girl was a very advanced learner, but she was just a shallow learner! We can't teach math through worksheet drills. We need to have deep math discussions with our students!" The other undergraduate student of mine asked me, "What the hell just happened?! Can somebody explain it to me, please?" I apologized to both of them as I had to run back to my office for a meeting, but I asked them to bring this event for our class discussion the next day, and they both promised to do that.

I went back to my office being rather satisfied with my improvisational dialogic teaching and my undergraduate students' reflections. I liked that I grabbed the kids' attention by creating an interesting and in-depth math discussion. I liked the fact that I apparently managed to recognize the boy's struggle with the mathematical idea of the universality of numbers: it does not matter what one counts—lines, pencils, Russian pencils, Martian pencils, or hundreds. I liked that the kids left the classroom, discussing math. I liked the "flip" in my students' assessment of the kids' learning: the advanced kid turned to be "a shallow learner," and the kid with math disabilities turned to be "a math genius." Many great scientists were "slow learners" in school, like, for example, Albert Einstein.[2] Their slowness was a sign of their deliberateness, their thoughtfulness not to follow, not to conform, to the procedural teaching imposed on them by their conventional teachers. I also liked that my students saw a link between teaching procedures of calculation—common in many schools—and students' shallow learning. Finally, I liked the pedagogical perplexity of my second university student, asking me, "What the hell just happened?!"

[2] http://www.albert-einstein.org/acticle_handicap.html.

Yet, during that day, the more time passed since the event in the classroom, the more a sense of dissatisfaction with my improvisational dialogic teaching was growing in me. I sensed that something was wrong, but it took me a few hours before I could realize what the problem was. The girl's voice that you cannot easily add big numbers penetrated me (cf. the notion of "penetrating discourse" in Bakhtin, 1999). I was always interested in math (see Matusov, 2017), and these types of issues have always grabbed my attention. For example, two infinities plus two infinities is one infinity and not four infinities: $2 + 2 = 1$! Well, infinity is not a number. But is it? Can you circle infinity like the first-grade boy circled a hundred? Also, it occurred to me that the liquid Martian pencils imagined by the girls as two drops plus two drops would probably form one big drop—one big Martian pencil,—when are combined together: again $2 + 2 = 1$.

I started thinking, but is it really true that two plus two always equals four regardless of what one counts? Does what one counts matter for the result? Rather quickly, I came to the following five paradoxical examples:

1. Two drops of water plus two drops of water equals one drop of water and not four: $2 + 2 = 1$ for water drops (Fig. 9.1).
2. Two animals (hungry cats) plus two animals (fat mice) equals two animals (two filled up, satisfied cats): $2 + 2 = 2$ for these animals (Fig. 9.2).

Fig. 9.1 $2 + 2 = 1$ (*Source* Picture by Ana Marjanovic-Shane, with permission by the artist)



Fig. 9.2 $2 + 2 = 2$ (*Source* Picture by Ana Marjanovic-Shane, with permission by the artist)

$$2H_2+2O_2=2H_2O+1O_2$$

Fig. 9.3 2 + 2 = 3 (*Source* Author)



Fig. 9.4 2 + 2 = 5 (*Source* Author)

3. Two molecules (of hydrogen) plus two molecules (of oxygen) equals three molecules (two molecules of water and one molecule of oxygen), 2 + 2 = 3 for this chemical reaction of molecules (Fig. 9.3).
4. Two triangles plus two triangles can be five triangles, 2 + 2 = 5 for the following triangles (the original small and one big) (Fig. 9.4).
5. Finally, two friends plus two friends equals uncertainty as there can be four friends, three friends, two friends, or even zero friends as a result.

I wish I could share these new ideas and puzzling examples with the first-grade children!

With all these examples, I started thinking that maybe the girl was not such a shallow learner, and the boy was not such a mathematical genius after all. This was another flip for me on the same day. It does not seem to be true that the result of addition does not depend on what objects are being added. Two and two big numbers do not always add to four. What might be great in what happened in the first-grade classroom was not necessarily the individual mind of a child, but rather it was all their minds involved in the in-depth and critical mathematical discussions.

Thus, I decided to focus my upcoming discussion of the event with my university students not so much on mathematical geniuses and shallow learners but on promoting deep pedagogical discussions among children around deep mathematical issues as probably the most desirable way of teaching. I decided to share my five examples above with my university education students, the future teachers, so they could appreciate the depth of math and how it could have been possible to continue the deep discussion that I started with the four kids in the first-grade classroom. After the excitement of my two students, I expected that the rest of my students would also become excited to hear about how little children could be involved in deep discussions about math.

However, my class did not go exactly as I had expected. After my two students presented the event described above, some of the students became perplexed, and some of them were excited. Although I noticed the difference, I did not explore it at the time. Instead, I raised the question for the class about which of the two children was more mathematically advanced learner: (a) the boy who was constantly asking the girl for the answer to his arithmetic problems or (b) the girl who asked her mom about the result of adding 200 + 200? Initially, the discussion went in an interesting but predictable direction for me. Most of my students agreed that the boy showed himself to be more sophisticated than the girl when he was able to understand that a hundred can be a new unit of count, as new one, and that it does not matter what you count: Martian pencils or hundreds as long as you are counting the same units.

I problematized this pedagogical issue even further by asking my students, future teachers, "Is it better for you, as a student, to reject a mathematical rule that you don't understand (but the teacher imposes on you) like apparently the boy did OR to conform to the adults' math rule without deep understanding of it, as the girl seemed to do?" The class erupted in discussions: many students were speaking at once, creating small discussion groups, or trying to address the whole class in vain as it was too noisy and chaotic. When the initial chaos subsided, I asked my students what kind of students they would prefer in their future classrooms: ones who would follow math rules and procedures to come reliably to the correct answer regardless of how well they understood them (like the girl) or ones who would refuse to follow math rules and procedures until they deeply understood them (like the boy).

I suggested voting on this choice, but one student raised her hand and said that it was a false choice. She insisted that good teachers should not throw kids in this situation at all by teaching them deep conceptual math and not procedures. To my surprise, some other students, future teachers, disagreed, saying that if we did not teach our students math procedures and rules, they would fail their standardized math tests based on testing students' procedural math knowledge. These students and their teachers would thus be punished by the school administration, the state, and the parents. In response to this challenge, some students suggested a compromise of teaching both: teaching procedural math knowledge first and then teaching deep conceptual knowledge. A student asked the class and me why standardized tests could not focus on testing deep conceptual knowledge. Nobody replied. And at this moment, I decided to make another conceptual "flip" and introduce my students to my paradoxical examples of when two plus two is not necessarily always four.

I told my students that I suspected that a genuine standardized test on the deep conceptual understanding might never be possible. My students quietly and carefully listened to my words. I said that the deep conceptual understanding unfolds and lives only in dialogue. But this dialogue never stops—it cannot be finished. Genuine understanding is bottomless (Bakhtin, 1986). It belongs to all its participants. I saw that my words made my students interested, mystified and yet not quite understanding of what I meant. I said, "Let's consider the boy and the girl one more time." We all agreed that in the end, the boy was more mathematically sophisticated than the girl because he could see the universality of numbers. He could add hundreds while the girl couldn't. He could probably add thousands and millions while the girl couldn't. The boy understood that it doesn't matter what you add: imaginary Martian pencils or hundreds—the result is the same: $2 + 2$ is always four regardless of what you add.

In contrast, the girl doubted that one could add big numbers so easily, arranging them in units. She agreed that one could easily count imaginary Martian pencils but not necessarily big numbers. We sided with the boy. "But are we really correct in doing that?!" And then I shared my addition examples of infinity, drops, hungry cats and fat mice, triangles, and friends.

My students were in shock. My paradoxical examples and the additional "flip" were shocking for all of them. However, as I remember, they were shocked about many different things: some were shocked by things contradictory to what some other students were shocked by. Here is a list of their shocks and objections that I remember:

1. Infinity is not a number because you cannot count it. Numbers are countable but infinities are not.

   My counterargument was that we can add uncountable quantities (e.g., water) that we represent with regular numbers (e.g., with pounds of mass or liters of volume). So why can't we add infinities and represent them with numbers?

My doubting students could not reply but continue doubting that adding infinities was a legitimate math operation.

2. Some of my students charged me with tricking them. They said that two plus two is always four, but I tricked them. They claimed that I was tacitly adding "apples and oranges"—like big and small triangles or cats and mice—and not the same objects. Only the same objects can be countable. But, they argued, I added different things: small drops of water but counted a big drop of water; cats and mice but counted "animals"; small triangles but counted both big and small triangles, and hydrogen and oxygen but counted molecules (they could not figure out my "trick" about friends but kept exploring it).

   My counterargument that we always count different things by abstracting some "sameness" quality in things was not convincing for them, as they could not come to terms with the idea that two plus two may indeed not be four for some objects.

   Many years after the class was over and these students became teachers themselves, one of them sent me an email with the subject, "2 + 2 is always 4! ☺",[3] when he wanted to remind me of our class. There was something deeply personal in their rejections of my paradoxical examples as if a rug had been violently taken from under their feet.

3. Some of my students became very excited about my examples, both about the new math horizon that opened up for them and about the new dialogic pedagogy that could open this new horizon. Thus, I remember that one of these students was able to make $2 + 2 = 9$ by adding two and two equal small rectangles to create one big rectangle carrying 8 diverse smaller rectangles inside. Another student tried to make $2 + 2 = -1$ (a negative number) or $2 + 2 = 0.5$ (a fraction) but she was not able to do that (at least not at that time).

   Some of them asked what a next "flip" might be and how to achieve it. My response to that was that future mathematical "flips" (i.e., unexpected new mathematical vistas) probably required us to

[3] The former student's email subject reminds me of the brave exclamation by Italian physicist Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), "And yet it moves!" that he supposedly made after being forced to recant his claims that the Earth moves around the immovable Sun, rather than the converse (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/And_yet_it_moves).

move deeper and deeper into a math practice and a critical math discourse with people who are interested in it. We discussed the difference between learning about math and doing math and tentatively came to the conclusion that there might not be a clear boundary between these two activities. Like professional mathematicians in their professional dialogue, *the teachers and students author their ideas, doubts, counter-examples to test their ideas against alternative ideas, expecting new exciting "flips."*

4. Yet, some of my students became *pedagogically* upset with my paradoxical examples with "2+2 is not always 4." They said that before the last examples, they had been leaning toward dialogic pedagogy that I demonstrated in the first-grade classroom because my dialogic teaching promoted a deep conceptual understanding in the boy and revealed a shallow procedural learning in the girl. They believed that any teaching, including dialogic teaching, *must serve* the emergence of certainty, *the correct certainty*, in all students. This is a rather common belief in conventional education. However, after my examples and the follow-up discussion, they firmly decided to teach mostly procedures and rules. This was because, they argued, teaching for the deep understanding would be very confusing for little children and for the teachers themselves. Also, they argued, the children's parents might get upset that their children became *too philosophical* while not demonstrating *practical mastery* of simple math. And, those children might not do well on standardized tests, which might reflect poorly on the teachers and the school. Finally, employers might become upset that their employees—the past students of deep math understanding—refused to follow the rules because they could not fully understand them. This criticism of my dialogic pedagogy provoked very interesting and important discussions about the purpose of math and of general education.
5. Lastly, one student shared her realization that she probably struggled with algebra because algebra mostly studied nonlinear relations among objects. But because she learned that $2 + 2$ is always four, it was very difficult for her to understand nonlinear math relations, for which $2 + 2$ is not 4.

   Her comment provoked the class to discuss the features of the objects, for which $2 + 2$ is always four. We came to the conclusion that these objects should be indifferent to and not interact with each

> other. Some students became excited to find exceptions from this rule, but some wanted to know what "indifferent" or "not interact" meant.

Like the first-grade class on Russian and Martian pencils, this undergraduate class for future teachers was very memorable and eventful. During the semester, the students and I returned to the themes of this discussion again and again. As I mentioned before, this discussion colored our class as such for many of my students. The education undergraduate students and the professor (me) authored their pedagogical and mathematical positions and values in their critical dialogue that transcended the classroom walls.

Authorship in Education

I define the notion of authorship as a person's generating interest in other people and/or him/herself through the person's contributions: questions, inquiries, puzzlement, responses, affirmations, attitudes, products, actions, and ethical deeds. Authorship generates interest in its relevant audience about its content and about the author, holistically as a unique, irreplaceable person (Nikulin, 2006). Authorship involves an encounter of, at least two, consciousnesses: (1) an addressing consciousness, explicitly or tacitly bidding for creativity: creating new questions, new actions, new ethical deeds, and (2) a responding consciousness, recognizing this creativity by raising interest in it and evaluating it (positively or negatively). The responding consciousness contributes to the authorship by recognizing its importance and providing its evaluation. Thus, authorship is always a novelty process for its participants, based on *double creativity*: (1) the creativity of a production of something new that did not exist before and (2) the creativity of recognition that something new has an important positive or negative value (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016). Elsewhere, I defined authorship as transcendence of the given recognized by others and/or self (Matusov, 2011).

The above case involved flows of authorship by the involved children, by the professor, and by his undergraduate students of education. For example, the authorship of the boy in the case above apparently involved: (1) his action of not following the rule-pattern of arithmetic addition and (2) my recognition that his action was not some sort of deficiency of math pattern recognition or a lack of conceptual understanding (i.e., "math disability"), but rather as his nonacceptance of the universality of the arithmetic addition until he could understand it himself. Similarly, the authorship of the girl involved: (1) her response of refusing to add two hundred and two hundred—her rejection of the arithmetic addition she knew and (2) my (later) recognition that her response was also not some kind of her lack of understanding of the arithmetic addition, but rather her intuitive questioning of the universality of the arithmetic addition. An example of my authorship involved: (1) me challenging the girl to add not lines or pencils but abstract numbers and (2) the boy recognizing that my challenge was apparently the core of his puzzlement about the arithmetic addition practiced in his classroom. An example of some of my students' authorship was: (1) them challenging me, their professor, that my dialogic teaching creates a confusion in students rather than clarity and (2) my recognition that they hit the core of the disagreement between dialogic and monologic educational philosophies and between our pedagogical values defining education itself.

Authorship is always problematic because its recognition can be challenged by others. Thus, I suspected that even some of the children, some of my undergraduate students, and even some readers did and do not buy that $2 + 2$ might not be 4 in some cases. They might see my reasoning as a mistake or a trick or a lack of my mathematical understanding rather than as my or the children's mathematical authorship. In addition, the authorship can be challenged by questioning who the author of the recognized novelty really was. For example, some readers might disagree with my recognition of the boy's puzzlement of the universality of the additive property or with my recognition of the girl's intuitively challenging of this universality for big numbers. These readers might challenge me that I was reading too much in the children's actions and responses: "Although your mathematical ideas might be interesting, these ideas were more yours than the children's." Since authorship is constituted by a bid for creativity and by recognition of this bid, authorship is always co-constructive. In a sense, there are always at least two coauthors: creating and recognizing, often without a clear boundary between them.

Authorship inherently involves evaluation of the novelty that arouses one's interest. When a novel contribution by a person generates an interest in me, I evaluate my interest, "Am I interested in this new thing? Am I indifferent to it? Do I like it or dislike it?" As my reflection pushes my evaluation further to explore why I like or dislike the person's authorship, my own authorial judgment emerges in a dialogue. For example, some of my students evaluated my authorial dialogic teaching negatively but some positively. Many of them did not stop at what and why initially aroused their interest, but pushed themselves further to articulate why they disliked my pedagogical authorship—e.g., because my authorial dialogic teaching brings confusion in children—or why they liked it—e.g., because it constantly deepens children's understanding of the academic material.

A dialogue does not only often spark a chain of the participants' authorship—one authorship provoking another authorship (both in the students and in the teacher), but also this dialogue often sparks a chain of participants' evaluations and even a chain of the participants' authorial judgments of each other's ideas. This flow of authorial judgments often sparks inquiries. Did the boy really have a math disability? Who was more mathematically advanced: the boy or the girl, when they responded differently to my problem of 200 + 200? Is it ethically and/or pedagogically good to compare students as "genius" and "shallow"? Is the arithmetic addition universal or not: is 2 + 2 always 4 or not? Is my authorial dialogic teaching pedagogically sound or not? Is the correct certainty the goal of education or is it constantly deepening students' math understanding or something else?

Finally, in this discussion, I am skipping the children's authorships, evaluations, authorial judgments, and possible inquiries about superheroes—a dialogue, parallel to the math dialogue, that I did not attend to well in the first-grade classroom. It is very common that a genuine dialogue often generates side dialogues, a phenomenon that the Russian philosopher of dialogism Bakhtin (1895–1975) called "heterodiscoursia" (*raznorechie*, разноречие). In authorial dialogic education, curriculum is always emergent, unexpected, and holistic, often going in many diverse directions.

Authorial Dialogic Education vs. Instrumental Education

Authorial dialogic education is education for promoting and supporting students' authorship in diverse academic subjects and beyond. What makes students or teachers authors in a classroom dialogue (and beyond) is them taking a stand on a position, which they are ready to defend and invest with their personal fate and reputation, "A person enters into dialogue as an integral voice. He participates in it not only with his thoughts [worldview] but with his fate and with his entire individuality" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 293). Thus, the boy was an author of rejecting adding numbers, when he had not understood the universality of addition. This rejection was not easy for him to be a student who was "behind" other students, whom my undergraduate students labeled as "math disabled." Some of his peers might look at him as being "stupid," his parents and teacher might be upset with him. It required some bravery from the boy to sustain this pressure. The girl was an author of refusing to add 200 and 200 because she doubted the universality of addition—she might pay for that as well with her reputation as being a good math student. Meanwhile, the boy was an author of adding 200 and 200 after he accepted the universality of addition—his math reputation might jump up as a result among his peers, the teacher, and his parents. I was an author of challenging the girl with adding Russian and Martian pencils and then with adding 200 and 200. I was an author of undermining the universality of addition. I was an author of authorial dialogic pedagogy focusing on a bottomless deepening of the meaning of mathematical knowledge and an undermining of emerging certainty, making me a particular teacher educator and scholar of education. My undergraduate students were authors of calling first the boy "mathematically disabled" and then "mathematical genius." Some of them were authors who challenged my authorial dialogic pedagogy and promoted their instrumental views on education to make students arrive at "the correct certainty." Some of the other students were authors of further mathematical exploration of the arithmetical and nonlinear additions and their boundaries. All of these authorships by my undergraduate students differently oriented them as particular future teachers.

Authorial dialogic education views all these authorships as legitimate and worth both supporting and challenging, regardless of how much they are (in)correct or whether the teacher (dis)agrees with them (see a description and analysis of a non-religious teacher supporting a Christian fundamentalist college student's critical essay on considering teaching the anti-evolutionary theory of "intelligent design" in a public school biology classroom in the US, Matusov, 2009, ch. 9). Authorial dialogic education is owned by their students-authors, who define its emerging curriculum and education itself, often with the help of their peers and teachers.

Currently, my colleagues and I distinguish two types of authorial dialogic education (Chapter 8). One type is education for promoting and supporting students' *creative authorship*, and the other type is education for promoting and supporting students' *critical authorship* (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). Authorship in dialogue has both a creative and a critical character, which can color the nature of dialogue. In some dialogues, the participants' authorship is more recognized and appreciated for its *creative* character; while in some other dialogues, the participants' authorship is more recognized and appreciated for its *critical* character.

I argue that education as a specific sphere of the existential human activity gravitates *toward a critical authorship* and *critical dialogue*. Promoting creative authorship is a type of socialization in the pragmatics of the targeted activities, common to all open-ended existential human activities like speaking, writing, doing science, engaging in arts, and so on. Sometimes, participants' creativity in such an open-ended activity becomes itself an important part of the activity's pragmatics, focusing on being different, being out of the box, authoring something NEW, never seen/heard or experienced before become a value in itself in these "communities of practice" (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). Children learn to speak by creatively socializing in the language of their local community. The conventional normativity of the children's language is a by-product of its pragmatics. Usually, their creative linguistic authorship, as the children emerging voice and agency, is usually recognized and supported by the adults and children around them. This open socialization, supporting newcomers' creative authorship, does not need education. Even when, this socialization is formalized, I am not sure it deserves the term "education." This open socialization accompanies any human activity and practice (Lave, 1992; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Traditionally, formal professional institutionalized socialization is often called "professional training." I want to reserve the notion of "education" for a distinct and existential sphere of the human being.

People are born into their local communities, local cultures, national societies, and the natural world. They perceive the social, cultural, and natural world as "normal," "natural," and given—i.e., unthinkable to be different and challenged unless they are faced something different and involve in dialogic reflection about the meaning of the differences. Education as a special and distinct sphere of the human being is aimed at challenging any cultural convention, any cultural norm, any nature, any truth, any value. I argue that this education—education as a special sphere of human existence—can only be authorial, dialogic, and *critical*. It aims at the liberation of people from being slaves to uncritically accepted cultural conventions, norms, nature, truths, and values.

In a speech at his trial, in a dialogue called Apology, Socrates argued that "the unexamined life is not worth living" (Plato & Riddell, 1973). Following Socrates' sentiment, I argue that genuine education involves students' examination of life, self, society, world, and education itself in a critical dialogue where alternative ideas and values collide with each other, where truth is tested and forever testable (Morson, 2004). This authorial education through critical dialogue has primarily a deconstructive function focusing on finding boundaries of truths and challenging these boundaries more and more in a never-ending critical dialogue among diverse authors—the more diverse, the deeper the examination will be. This type of education can never be completed, but rather it is an ongoing stance and way of being. The term "educated person" is a misnomer. Authorial education through critical dialogue allows educatees to assume ownership and responsibility of their life by critical examination of their own desires, visible and invisible cultural norms and values, and natural causes to become informed authors of these examined desires, norms, values, and causes. In this education, students have the unalienated right of freedom to explore 2 + 2 = 4, pedagogy, education, or superheroes in a critical dialogue at any depth they want. In this sense, the example from Chapter 2, where a third-grade girl tried to do a math homework to please her teacher was not an example of the authorial education. She had neither legitimate nor actual ownership of her own education.

Students must be viewed as authors of their own education because only the ownership of education allows students also to take ownership and responsibility of their life by freeing themselves from colonization by the uncritically accepted and socialized given—culture, society, psychology, tradition, biology, media, and nature—through critical examination of their life, self, society, world, and education itself. "Each individual is the highest authority on his or her personal existence" (Klag, 1994, p. 1)—the student's authority becomes informed through dialogic critical examination of authorial education.

Teachers must also be viewed as authors of their teaching and pedagogy because this is what makes teachers professionals. Professionalism is recognition of an expert's authorial judgment rooted in the expert's experiences of the practice and informed by the professional dialogue as uniquely representing the profession. The teacher's authorial judgment and authorial deed involve taking responsibility for these judgment and deed by the teacher's willingness to stand by and reply to challenges to the authorial judgment and deeds raised by others and the teacher him/herself.

In authorial education, the teacher's authorship is aimed at the promotion and support of students' own authorship of their unique educational journey.

In my judgment, past and modern conventional and most innovative schooling views educational *instrumentally* as a tool for skillful and knowledgeable engagement in economy, upward social mobility, democracy, social justice, societal cohesion, patriotism, nationalism, loyalty to the state, promoting health, assuring safety, development of a prosocial moral character, and so on (see Chapters 1 and 2). This education prioritizes cultural reproduction of the existing knowledge, skills, and values over cultural production of new ones; students' preparation for life over students' living life; students' equality/equity (sameness) over students' uniqueness; problem-solving over problem defining; the teacher's assignment over a student's own educational journey; and so on. Instrumental education tries to control the curriculum and impose it on all students. It aims at making all students arrive at certain curricular endpoints, preset by the society and/or by the teachers. It assumes that first, the students must acquire a fundamental toolkit of essential knowledge and skills through schooled education and only after that when education is completed, school alumni can engage in the authorship of their life. In conventional and most innovative schools, students' authorship is expected to be postponed for many formative years of their lives (Matusov, von Duyke, & Kayumova, 2016). Teachers' authorship is also often not appreciated by not allowing them to help their students to define their own curriculum and by scripting their instruction (which is often called "scripted curriculum" in the United States) to make this instruction "evidence-based," "research-driven," "teacher-proof," essentially de-professionalizing teachers, making them pedagogical technicians. The teachers' work and students' educational progress are judged on students' exams and tests, in which students' replies must be interchangeably certain and correct. To be a good student means to be a correct student. All good students must answer 4 when the problem of 2 + 2 is presented to them. Thus, in conventional instrumental education, to be a good student means for a student to lose his or her uniqueness as a human being. In his famous TED talk "Build a school in the cloud," Indian educator Sugata Mitra argues that the modern instrumental education is aimed at molding people into reliable smart machines, necessary for creating huge organizational bureaucracies of the industrial era (Mitra, 2013).

So, when a student replies "4" to the school test question "2+2=?" what does it mean? In conventional education, it means the student is correct; especially when, in addition, she or he can justify his/her answer correctly. In conventional education, students are replaceable, people are replaceable. There is little difference among students who correctly reply to the school test question "2+2=?" They constitute a group of those who know what two plus two is according to the school authority. Although students in this group may vary by what kind of correct explanations they can provide, these differences are educationally inconsequential. These students can all reliably arrive at the correct answer on a systematic and correct basis. The gist of this instrumental math education is that these students can act as a human–machine, a smart machine (e.g., a calculator). In contrast, the other group of students, who provide either a wrong answer, no answer at all, or cannot justify the right answer correctly, are students who cannot work as a reliable and correct human smart machine. One can measure which student belongs to which group or remain somehow in a grey area in-between.

In conventional education, students and education itself are measurable. Again, I agree with Sugata Mirta that the main goal of such instrumental education is to make all students into human smart machines that can reliably produce the correct answer or the correct solution to a presented question or problem. This instrumental education is essentially algorithmic: if X (question/problem) then Y (correct answer/solution). The justice problem for mainstream education is to make ALL students arrive at the preset curricular endpoints: no student is left behind in making all of them reliable multifunctional smart machines. This justice problem is a problem of equality in a broader sense, including equity.

Paraphrasing Russian psychologist and dialogic educator Alexander Lobok's critique of the mainstream psychology (Lobok, 2017, p. SIa:2), the problem with the conventional approach to education is that the human being, a student, is viewed as one who must possess certain well-defined skills, knowledge, views, and attitudes that can be measured by tests and exams. However, a human being is arguably the only "creature" in the Universe that is defined by a subjective cognizing the world of her or his own. The human being is the only creature who authors and redefines his/her own subjective lived experiences and feelings—a world, unique for each person. This is the world, which cannot possibly be viewed from outside, except for some of its outward objective artifact manifestations. If so, a question emerges: can and should a particular and unique human being with his/her particular and unique subjective cognizing world be a subject of homogenizing instrumental education? Can and should a particular student with his/her unique subjective world, subjective Cosmos, not overlapping with subjective cognizing worlds of all other people in principle, be a subject of educational test or exam?! My answer is it cannot and must not.

In contrast, from the authorial dialogic pedagogy illustrated above, providing "the correct" answer to an authority's question may be evidence of an authoritarian regime where a student has learned how to please the authority well, which may have little to do with genuine math and genuine education. Participation in genuine math practice and genuine math education means a student's engagement in critical unfinalizable mathematical discourse, where meaning is a relationship between genuine questions and serious answers and among other meanings, "Therefore, there can be neither a first nor a last meaning; it always exists among other meanings as a link in the chain of meaning, which in its totality is the only thing that can be real. In historical life, this chain continues infinitely, and therefore each individual link in it is renewed again and again, as though it were being reborn" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 146).

In authorial dialogic pedagogy, people are interested in each other and their ideas expecting to be surprised by their uniqueness and difference from each other. Nothing is replaceable and, thus, nothing is measurable: neither the meaning, nor people, nor education. Neither a correct nor an incorrect answer exists outside of the social context of the question. This context continues evolving and being evaluated. Correctness or incorrectness a solution to the problem 2 + 2 =? is always temporary until a next "flip" in meaning changes it: (in)correct for what and for whom? That makes people in dialogue poor machines because they are unreliable and non-systematic. They are always ready to creatively transcend any given meaning. People in dialogue are not replaceable and, thus, are unmeasurable. People are unique in their education, their emergent curriculum is unique, eventful, and unpredictable (Biesta, 2017; Lobok, 2014, 2017; Osberg & Biesta, 2008). To engage in human subjectivity, it is necessary to focus on the uniqueness and unfinalizability in human beings (Nancy, 1991; Nikulin, 2010). The goal of authorial dialogic pedagogy is for people to freely engage in examination of the self, life, society, world, including their own education in a (critical) dialogue, which may, if not must, include problematization of authorial dialogic critical pedagogy by the students (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019). Can the unexamined life be worth living while the examined life may not be worth living (Kukathas, 2003)? This question is very legitimate for authorial dialogic critical education. Genuine education is about people's self-actualization, self-transcendence, and self-realization and its recognition by other people. It is about a person's development of creative and critical voice in dialogue (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2018a).

Of course, as I discussed elsewhere (Matusov, 2011), in reality, conventional schools also involve, and all are even based on the participants' authorship. Authorship is existential and ubiquitous human need and activity, without which people feel a void, emptiness, meaninglessness, disrespect, and alienation. However, this authorship in conventional schools has several problems. First, both students' and teachers' authorship is illegitimate in conventional schools where standard, norm, and correctness rule ideologically. Thus, authorship has to be often smuggled in the classrooms by students and teachers.

Second, the content of the teachers' and students' authorship is often distorted and even harmful. Authorship in conventional instrumental schools is often authorship of conformity, resistance, subversion, and smuggling. Even students' conformity to the teacher's demands requires creativity and authorship from these conformist students: it is not easy for a student to guess what the teacher wants from him/her and how to please the teacher to the teacher's satisfaction (Matusov, 2011). Most of the authorship in conventional instrumental schools—authorship of students' conformity, resistance, students' smuggling other activities, students smuggling learning of their own interests, teachers' smuggling nonsanctioned curriculum and instruction—is arguably noneducational, if not even anti-educational.

Third, even when students and teachers are involved in critical academic authorship it is often either nonsupportive by the teachers or when supported, it is unsanctioned by the school. As one American elementary public school teacher told me when I visited her second-grade classroom, "In the era of the Educational Standards and Scripted Instruction, I have to smuggle genuine teaching in my classroom and protect genuine learning of my students." The problem with all these visible and invisible authorships is that they are often nonacademic, suppressed, unsupported, illegitimate, exploitative, and/or even harmful for students' and teachers' education and well-being.

Should Authorial Education Be Integrated with Instrumental Education?

Here, I want to challenge my vision of authorial education in critical dialogue by raising serious questions about it and trying honestly to address these questions by sharing my current views.

1. *Can the authorial dialogic in critical dialogue be combined with instrumental education? For example, can students be taught that 2 + 2 = 4 first and then, later, when they have learned it well, engage them in critical exploration of the limitations of arithmetic addition?*

My current answer to this interesting question is a "BIG NO" and a "small yes." First, let me explain why my answer is a "BIG NO." I argue that instrumental "education,"—i.e., education for making the students arrive at preset curricular endpoints like 2 + 2 = 4,—suppresses students' meaning-making and authorial agency. People can learn instrumentally through pattern recognition and pattern-production (Lemke, 1990; Matusov, 2020). However, as Bakhtin argued, meaning or sense-making is always a dialogic and authorial process. Meaning is situated in the ephemeral and unique dialogic relationship between an asked question of a person's genuine interest and a serious response to it (Bakhtin, 1986) rather than in any self-contained statement like "2+2=4." Yes, it might be possible to force the boy from the case above to reproduce patterns of the arithmetic addition by breaking his resistance to his doubts about the universality of arithmetic addition. As we saw, the boy could solve problems like 2 + 3 easily by himself as soon as he understood that "it does not matter what to add"—or, as Bakhtin would say, when "it does not matter what to add" has become an "internally persuasive" truth for the boy within open-ended critical dialogue (Bakhtin, 1991; Matusov & von Duyke, 2010). For the boy, the educational problem (i.e., curriculum) was not about learning to recognize and produce patterns but about addressing his deep doubts about the universality of arithmetic addition.

Similarly, it might be possible to force the girl to solve problems like 200 + 200 through pattern-recognition and pattern production by dismissing and suppressing her doubts about the universality of arithmetic addition for big numbers. Instrumental "education" cannot address students' doubts—it can only suppress students' doubts. It is because honestly addressing students' doubts requires recognition and legitimacy of the students' unique authorship and an open-ended, unfinalizable, critical dialogue. I argue that the main problem with instrumental "education" is that it is oppressive and suppressive of students' authorial dialogic meaning-making. That is why I am against mixing instrumental education with authorial dialogic critical education. This mixing makes a pedagogical "monster" out of the teacher—"half beast, half human"—who at times suppresses and at times promotes students' authorship and voice and critical dialogue in class (Matusov & Brobst, 2013, p. viii).

I also reply with a "small yes" because when instrumentality is subordinated to students' authorial dialogic meaning-making, it is legitimate in genuine education. In my view, instrumentality is important for authorial dialogic critical education for at least two major reasons. First, recognized patterns by the students can become provocations for critical meaning-making. Thus, when the boy's doubts about the universality of the arithmetic addition was removed in the critical dialogue, he could immediately recognize that the pattern of $2 + 2 = 4$ can be applied to $200 + 200 = 400$ because "it does not matter what to add": Martian pencils or hundreds. However, this pattern recognition did not work for the girl because, as I suspect, for her, the arithmetic addition was deeply based on counting; since she could not yet reliably count such big numbers of abstract objects like 200 or 400, she could not be sure what the result of $200 + 200$ might be. Her pattern recognition collapsed. The disagreement between the boy and the girl rose again to the level of authorial dialogic critical meaning-making. For the boy and the girl, the pattern recognition processes were important to generate their critical dialogue of authorial meaning-making, constituting their genuine math education.

Second, the instrumentality of pattern recognition and pattern production can allow participants to focus strategically on what they want to study. While the Bakhtinian scholar Gary Saul Morson justly points out that in genuine education, "Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable" (Morson, 2004, p. 319), this does not necessarily mean that everything has to be tested in critical dialogue at the same time or even at all. Educational instrumentality allows the participants, both the teacher and the students, to temporarily treat certain things as true, as "the correct certainty,"—to take them for granted—in order to test other things of their interest (Latour, 1987). For example, the fact that the children in the case above were (uncritically) socialized in the Arabic decimal system was not questioned by the participants in their classroom critical dialogue but was taken for granted. Not everything has to be problematized in a particular critical dialogue. Educational instrumentality helps to create the boundary of problematization in educational events.

2. *How can students learn important facts, important knowledge, and important skills in authorial dialogic critical education?*

My current answer to this important question is that instrumental learning is mostly a by-product in authorial dialogic critical education. Elsewhere I have described, analyzed, and discussed the teaching of the multiplication table in a blended first-and second-grade classroom in an innovative, progressive public school in the United States (Matusov, 2001, 2015). The children were given a 12 × 12 multiplication table and asked to find as many different patterns as possible there. For example, the children noticed many diverse symmetries in the multiplication table. Again, this pattern recognition exercise generated fruitful provocations for authorial dialogic critical meaning-making in the classroom. Some general questions emerged in the children about overall patterns that they discovered: is an offered pattern correct or not, why is it correct, is it a new pattern or a variation of an already recorded pattern, and so on. For example, children noticed a pattern of "adding twos" and "adding threes" in the table. Another child then suggested a pattern "adding by whatever number." This child's proposal generated a big, dramatically intense, discussion of whether "adding by whatever number" is a pattern at all and if so, whether it is a new pattern (Matusov, 2015). Expanding this critical authorial dialogue, some children came to new meta-patterns like "'Kids' is a meta-pattern for 'boys' and 'girls.' 'Tree' is a meta-pattern for 'leaves'" and "Friendship is a meta-pattern of the MT [Multiplication Table]" (Matusov, 2015, p. A81). As the children spent several weeks on this activity in the classroom and at their homes (there was no homework in the school unless the students "assigned" for themselves), the teacher and the parents noticed that the students "memorized" the 12 × 12 multiplication table much better than if they had used traditional methods of instrumental "education" like flashcards. Not only had the children had a lot of exposure to the multiplication table, but they also learned its "hidden" network of patterns. The huge network of interrelated multiplication table patterns, discovered by the children, allowed them quickly to recognize plausible and implausible answers and develop numerical contextualization. Thus, for example, $6 \times 6 = 35$ was immediately recognized as an impossible answer because, among other things, by then the children discovered and knew that multiplication by an even number always produces an even number, that 35 is divisible by 5 because it ends with 5 but the multipliers 6 do not, and that 35 is not divisible by 3 and by 9 ($3 + 5 = 8$ is not divisible by 3 and by 9), but both multipliers 6 are divisible by 3. This process of learning instrumentality through pragmatic pattern recognition and meaning-making is similar to young children learning their native language. In both cases, learning was a by-product of children's pragmatics, authorship, dialogue, and meaning-making.

3. *Why is instrumental education so ubiquitous and powerful? What is the truth behind instrumental education?*

First of all, let me start with a statement that authorial dialogic critical education, as I described here, must not always be prioritized. The first such situation that immediately comes to my mind is safety. For example, conditioning children not to eat poisonous mushrooms or not to try putting their fingers into a power outlet is super important for children's safety and survival, but I would not call this conditioning "education"—at best, it could be called "training." Similarly, on several occasions, while traveling South Africa, a country with left-sided driving rules, I was literally pulled away from the road by strangers to avoid getting hit by cars on the city streets of Pretoria. At the time, the last thing I needed was a critical dialogue about diverse traffic patterns in different countries. I did not need education! What I badly needed was to be treated as a physical object that could be pulled away from approaching cars. Socializing in safety is important but it is not education, in my view. Instrumental "education" can be useful for some of these activities and causes.

Second, in my view, the bitter truth of instrumental education is that since the human species evolved about 300,000 years ago, most humans have lived most of the time in the necessity-based reality and, later, in the necessity-based civilization. Most people spend most of their time, activities, efforts, and even creativity in addressing their necessity. Necessity demands predictability, reliability, and mutual replicability from humans. Necessity demands humans to act like smart machines. This is what instrumental education is for and, despite all its criticism, is good at. Pattern recognition and pattern production with limited meaning-making, subordinated to students' predictable arrival at preset curricular endpoints, are rather powerful pedagogical processes for making people predictably, reliably, and replaceably skillful and knowledgeable for functioning in the modern economy and in the modern society. Up to now, I believe we could not and cannot get away from instrumental education; somebody still has to deliver pizza or work on an assembly line. For these types of work and embedded hierarchical power relations, authorial dialogic critical education can be disruptive. The necessity-based civilization requires most humans to act as "smart machines" most of the time. Instrumental education aims at making people into reliable and powerful smart machines, functioning as reliable cogs within institutions, bureaucracies, and business enterprises.

However, the truth of instrumental education has severe limitations. The most fundamental limitation is that by becoming and acting as smart machines, we become alienated from our humanity, engaging in a practice that assaults our human dignity. Authorial agency of transcending the given—the biological given, the social given, the psychological given, the cultural given, the natural given—is our existential human destiny. Metaphorically speaking, "We must eat to live rather than live to eat." Addressing our needs and necessities must free us to live our human life beyond these needs and necessities rather than to subordinate our life to them (as it is mostly now).

4. *Will people in a post-work leisure-based society seek and engage in critical authorial education on their own without any pressure?*

In both educational institutional settings above, at the university and in the elementary school, students had the rather limited legitimacy for the ownership of their own education. Both classes—educational and math—were imposed on the students rather it was their choice. Still, the whole educational events focusing on the participants' critical authorship emerged for the students (and me) in response to their peer's inquiry about "a first-grade boy with math disability."

At the same time, imposed and forced education creates important spaces of genuine dialogic encounters for my students, children, and me. In the case of the elementary school, I managed to provoke them to genuinely, ontologically, engage in math of $2 + 2 = 4$. In both cases, the conventional institutional settings were both obstacles and opportunities for the authorial critical education.

Can critical authorial education blossom without imposed and forced institutional education? Can people seek actively and voluntarily critical authorial education? Our Magic Learning Pill study apparently demonstrated that people experience and value intrinsic education (Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017), but do people actively seek for it?

In Chapter 5, I listed 4 types of the genuine leisure that I expect to flourish in a post-work leisure-based society: (1) intrinsic play, (2) intrinsic education, (3) passionate endeavors, and (4) hanging out conversations among friends. Out of the four types, currently, in a highly necessities-based society, it seems much more visible that (some) people actively search for intrinsic play (in adults, see for example, Gee, 2003),[4] engage in passionate endeavors (Seabrook, 1989), and hang out in conversations with friends (Tannen, 2005). There is much less evidence that people search for intrinsic, especially, critical, authorial education.

It is possible that I can be wrong assuming that intrinsic education is a fundamental and existential human need. Alternatively, it is possible that a necessities-based society is strongly suppressing this fundamental existential human need for intrinsic education through its omnipresent institutionalized instrumental education, forcing people to work, and creating existential anxieties about people's survival. This remains an empirical question to be tested by the emergence of a post-work leisure-based society.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the Greek word "school" (σχολείο) originally meant "leisure" (σχολή) in Ancient Greece. Authorial dialogic critical education is a form of leisure. According to Aristotle, a free person is one who can live without much attending to the necessity (Arendt, 1958). For humanity to afford a full-scale authorial dialogic critical education, it must substantially free itself from the yoke of necessities both in ideologically and in reality, "But we haven't just been redefining what we mean by AI [Artificial Intelligence] — we've been redefining what it means to be human. Over the past 60 years, as mechanical processes have replicated behaviors and talents, we thought were unique to humans, we've had to change our minds about what sets us apart. As we invent more species

[4] My idea of intrinsic play is different from gaming which usually uses stable rules in contrast to intrinsic playing (cf. "the Virtual Utipia" or "the Utipia of Games," Danaher, 2019).

of AI, we will be forced to surrender more of what is supposedly unique about humans. Each step of surrender—we are not the only mind that can play chess, fly a plane, make music, or invent a mathematical law—will be painful and sad. We'll spend the next three decades—indeed, perhaps the next century—in a permanent identity crisis, continually asking ourselves what humans are good for" (Kelly, 2017, pp. 48–49). However, in the past, genuine, critical authorial, education as a form of leisure was available only for some free rich (male) Athenians. And this genuine education was based on slavery because it was slaves (and some non-slave Greek workers whom Aristotle did not consider as being free) who attended to the necessity of the Athenian rich.

Fortunately, we might be at the brink of this possibility without slavery. Robotization, automatization, and artificial intellect might soon create conditions for the economy to work without much need for human labor. Other spheres of human life might be automatized to a degree where attendance to our necessities might not take much time and effort from us (Chapter 4). As the American sci-fi writer William Gibson once said, "The future is already here—it's just not very evenly distributed." The realization of human destiny by developing and testing the practice of authorial dialogic critical education and spreading it among the willing might be a way to create this future now. In the following Conclusion, I will focus on institutional, pedagogical, and political ways of promoting diverse forms of education in a leisure-based society.

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CHAPTER 10

Conclusion: Organization of Education in a Post-work Leisure-Based Society

In the final chapter, I want to imagine and discuss a possible organization of education in a post-work leisure-based society. First of all, why should education in the Age of Leisure need to have any deliberate organization? Generally speaking, it probably does not necessarily need to have any deliberate organization. Many forms of non-organized education have been in existence since the dawn of the human race. Human babies learn to speak while learning many other cultural practices, through observation, eavesdropping, and participation without much special organization or deliberate design on the part of the adult society across diverse cultures[1] (Rogoff, 2003). I expect that this type of informal education will remain, if not broaden, in the Age of Leisure in a post-work society. Informal education can be expanded because eased from the burden of necessity, including the burden of jobs and by providing necessary goods and services for supporting the basic needs of life, people may have more opportunities, resources, and time to learn from each other in informal ways.

Still, I foresee a need for organized, designed, and institutionalized education in a post-work leisure-based society. First, in contrast to my example with a native language, people may not always be embedded in practices and ideas that they want to learn and study. Thus, they may need

[1] Of course, learning the native language is always shaped by cultural practices, expectations, and values. But they are not necessarily institutionalized by a deliberate organizational design.

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to organize themselves, their time, other people, and their environment to get access to the practices and ideas of their interests, which are not immediately available to them. A good example of this can be a desire to learn a foreign language that is not spoken in the place where the person, interested in studying it, lives. The person has to organize him/herself in deciding when, with whom, and how to study the foreign language. Please note that these issues are usually moot and non-existent for a baby who is thrown in a linguistic environment of his/her native language.

Second, a person may be interested in finding other people—i.e., educational peers—who have the same or similar educational interest and may want to study together, benefiting from an educational dialogue. This requires synchronization, collective decision-making, and organization of those people. A reading group, where people discuss books, can be a good example of that.

The third reason for the need to organize education is the need for an educator. Some people under certain circumstances may need a skillful, wise, and knowledgeable educator (or educators), who may help the learners to organize their educational experiences, facilitate their communication, and guide them as needed. Not all people want to be autodidacts—self-learners—all the time.

Fourth and finally, some educational experiences inherently require other people's help and/or engagement as well as expensive equipment or facilities. Learning by doing sophisticated scientific experiments or learning some athletic team games come to my mind as good examples. I expect that for these four reasons (and probably some others), organized education will prevail in the Age of Leisure in a post-work society.

I argue that the past and modern ways and principles behind the organization of education will become increasingly unsuitable for education in a post-work leisure-based society. Let me spell out a non-exhaustive list of reasons for my claim here.

Educational Institutionalism

Mainstream organized education has been based on institutionalism. Institutionalism is a belief that a practice can be meaningfully organized exclusively by a human mechanism—i.e., an institution—consisting of humans acting as smart machines according to some rules and procedures, often at the expense of the person with his/her authorial judgments, personal responsibility, and unique needs (Meyer & Rowan, 2006). Institutionalism shapes human cognition into decontextualism, formalism, theoriticism (Bakhtin, 1993), and modernism (Anderson, 1991).

There are the following five major assumptions and principles—pillars of modern (and past) organized mainstream education—that, I argue, will become increasingly at odds with the spirit of education in a post-work leisure-based society:

1. *Modern organized education is essentially* ***instrumental*** in its service to the economy, democracy, social cohesion, upward social mobility, patriotism, nationalism, social justice, crime prevention, public health, and so on. As I argued throughout my book, education in the Age of Leisure in a post-work society will be increasingly recognized as multi-purpose and a hybrid, involving diverse types of *intrinsic education* of education for education's sake as a human existential value and *instrumental education.* As in a post-work leisure-based society will progress and the necessity, survival, and needs will more and more give way to opportunities for self-realization, self-fulfillment, and self-transcendence, I expect that intrinsic education will more and more prevail over instrumental education. As Rutger Bregman wrote,

> After all, the more efficient our factories and our computers, the *less* efficient [i.e., less instrumental - EM] our … education needs to be; that is, the more time we have left to attend to the old and infirm and to organize education on a more personal scale. … When you're obsessed with efficiency and productivity, it's difficult to see the real value of education…. (Bregman, 2016)

On top of a shift in the educatees' educational desires, I expect that technological advances will shorten instrumental education through its intensification (e.g., computer-assisted writing made learning handwriting cursive obsolete as an absolutely necessary prerequisite for writing, while easing the need for learning spelling and grammar). Also, intrinsic education has its internal diversity of education for creative authorship and education for critical authorship as discussed in previous chapters. Thus, I expect organized education in a post-work leisure-based society will probably aim at diverse educational desires and goals while becoming oriented more and more toward intrinsic education and away from exclusively instrumental education as it is now.

2. *Modern organized education is viewed as* ***primarily a societal and institutional enterprise as opposed to a personal enterprise***. Currently, society and its educational institutions are in charge of defining, organizing, regulating, and judging organized education, rather than focusing primarily on making sure that everyone has resources for education. This is especially true for publicly funded education. Society is institutionalized and controlled by its ministries/departments of education and elected public school boards (in the USA) that define students' curriculum, instruction, organization of their education, when, where, and with whom to study, educational goals, quality of education, and so on. In private schools, colleges, universities, educational cooperatives, and homeschooling, learners are also often excluded from any decision-making about their education and, thus, from ownership of their education. Notable exceptions are some Democratic private schools (Greenberg, 1992; Neill, 1960; Rietmulder, 2019) and some homeschooling (Llewellyn, 1998). Often organized education is forced on its students by society via laws, by parents via social pressure, and by employers via credential requirements for job applications. Education is imposed on students rather than owned by them.

As I argued throughout the book (Chapters 3 and 4), the main reason for imposed organized education is rooted in the needs- and necessities-based society. This type of society (if not a type of civilization) requires *homo faber*, "the producing human being" (Arendt, 1958; Illich, 1983). *Homo faber* consists of a human smart machine, who can predictably and reliably accomplish tasks and solve problems preset by the authority, and the authority itself presetting instrumental goals for human smart machines. Modern instrumental organized education is aimed at the production of *homo faber*.

In contrast, in leisure-based society, I expect that people will mainly view themselves as *homo otium*, "the human being of leisure"—a person involved in self-realization, self-fulfillment, and self-transcendence. I expect that in post-work leisure-based society, organized education will be aimed at facilitating a *homo otium* to engage in diverse-goal education on the person's demand. It will be the person, and not the society or institution, who will define the goal of his/her education, its curriculum, instruction, and conditions and who will judge its quality (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016).

Rather, I argue that society must involve in making sure that people have enough resources for education, in a way these people define it. The educatee must assume ownership over his/her own (organized) education both as a form of leisure and as a type of his/her instrumental necessity for achieving the educatee's goals. Cooperatives and educational centers, labs, and schools can be formed to address the issue of shared educational resources need by diverse students for their diverse education. The issue of scarcity of educational resources must be addressed democratically based on the recognition of the principle that education is primarily a personal and not a societal enterprise. Organized education must transform from being mainly forced and imposed on educatees to being voluntary. As Ivan Illich argued,

> Two centuries ago, the United States led the world in a movement to disestablish the monopoly of a single church. Now we need the constitutional disestablishment of the monopoly of the school, and thereby of a system, which legally combines prejudice with discrimination [i.e., not allow capable people to work when they do not have school graduation credentials]. The first article of a bill of rights for a modern, humanist society would correspond to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "The State shall make no law with respect to the establishment of education." There shall be no ritual obligatory for all. (Illich, 1983, p. 7)

We would add that not only state government must not interfere in personal education but also state and private institutions as well as parents[2] (see Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016, for details).

[2] Parents can be agents of societal institutions. However, what is probably more important, the goals of parenting and educating can be in conflict with each other (Rietmulder, 2019). For example, parenting may legitimately focus on socializing their children in the practices providing the children with safety, well-being, and transmission of culture desired by the parents. In contrast, educating may focus on critical examination and deconstruction of these practices.

3. *Modern organized education has* ***a credentialized nature****.* Modern organized education is aimed at students' attainment of educational credentials: educational diplomas, degrees, credits, grade marks, promotions, certificates, licenses, and so on, which are consequential for acquiring and maintaining good jobs, moving to the next educational level, getting a higher social status, being taken seriously, getting prestige, and so on. A word of a Harvard University graduate is taken more seriously than a word of a San Jose California State University graduate, regardless of the word itself. Organized education constantly credentializes and ranks students and, thus, it turns education into a commodity for upward social mobility. Educational credit becomes more important for students, employers, and society than the educatee's educational process, educational experience, competence, achievements, mastery, motivation, potential, creativity, leadership, and so on (Bills, 2003; Caplan, 2018).

It is an interesting question why modern needs- and necessity-based society organizes its upward social mobility around educational credentials rather than around meritocracy of competence, mastery, motivation, potential, leadership, and creativity somehow demonstrated by a person.[3] It can be that educational credentials are easy and cheap (for employers and other stakeholders) "proxies" for the applicant's meritocratic job-related qualities. An illusion of meritocracy promoted by educational credentials may be more important than meritocracy itself (Caplan, 2018). However, there is no evidence that it is true that educational credentials are in any way good proxies for the relevant merits (Labaree, 1997, 2010). Being deeply instrumental itself, educational credentialism conflicts with educational instrumentalism of creating "human capital"—utilitarian practical skills and knowledge—for the economy or other spheres. Actually, educational credentials, as such, are at odds with any genuine education, instrumental or intrinsic, because they distract students from their learning, punish for their mistakes rather than use them to provide learning–teaching opportunities and disrupt the teacher–student relationship of trust so necessary for sensitive guidance.

[3] Although the latter can become important as well, when in a conflict, meritocracy has to fight an uphill battle against educational credentialism (Labaree, 1997, 2010).

I hypothesize that it can be that educational credentialism serves many other purposes for many other practices, and this makes educational credentialism so powerful and ubiquitous. Thus, internally to modern educational institutions, educational credentials (e.g., grade marks) often serve as external motivators for students' compliance with institutional demands—i.e., a "token economy" (Sidorkin, 2002).

> Education with its supporting system of compulsory and competitive schooling, all its carrots and sticks, its grades, diplomas, and credentials now seems to me perhaps the most authoritarian and dangerous of all the social inventions of mankind. It is the deepest foundation of the modern slave state, in which most people feel themselves to be nothing but producers, consumers, spectators, and 'fans,' driven more and more, in all parts of their lives, by greed, envy, and fear. My concern is not to improve 'education' but to do away with it, to end the ugly and antihuman business of people-shaping and to allow and help people to shape themselves. (Holt, 1976, p. 4)

My hypothesis is that it can be that the educational credential is *"a knot" imperfectly supporting many diverse activities, practices, and processes* in the modern needs- and necessity-based society such as: being an imperfect proxy for meritocracy, imperfectly sustaining existing class-based generational inequality, providing imperfect external motivators for students' studies, giving an imperfect appearance of fairness (and for institutions and companies avoiding being sued), and so on. Untying this knot of educational credentialism can be very difficult across all these relevant practices that benefit from this educational credentialism even if a replacement of educational credentialism may make sense for some or even all practices. Synchronization of all replacements can be an organizational and political nightmare in our necessity-based society.

Anyway, it is clear that credentialization of organized education distracts educatees from their education—instrumental or intrinsic. Educational credentials distract an educatee's attention from genuine learning to passing tests and exams, from dialogic meaning-making and understanding to pattern recognition and memorization (Matusov, 2020), from questioning and being interested in academic material to pleasing educational authorities and providing "the correct" answer, from educational creativity to educational conformity (Matusov, 2011a), from educatees' own authorship to the instructional credit, from educatees' own authorial judgment on what constitutes truth for them to authorized ready-made truths, from defining educatees' own goals and setting their own problems to follow the goals and problems preset and assigned by the institutional authorities, from educational dialogue to educational monologue, from educatees' own interest to obedience, from situational mastery to performance on demand, and so on (see Chapter 2, for an example of such distraction in conventional instrumental education).

Educational credentialism also disrupts the teacher–student relationship of trust, necessary for sensitive guidance. Under the institutional regime of educational credentialism, when a student makes a mistake, the teacher often punishes the student with a low grade rather than the student's mistake becoming an exciting teaching–learning opportunity for the teacher's guidance and the student's learning. In response, the student often learns to hide his/her subjectivity—what and how the student thinks and feels—from the teacher. Poet R. D. Laing nicely captures this vicious process in an internal dialogue by a student with a teacher. Since a student in a conventional school is afraid to be punished for being wrong and not knowing things the student might be supposed to know, they cover their ignorance from the teacher making the teacher's guidance very difficult.[4]

I expect that educational credentialism will be abandoned in post-work leisure-based society. As Illich argued, and I agree with him, "Learners should not be forced to submit to an obligatory curriculum, or to discrimination based on whether they possess a certificate or a diploma" (Illich, 1983, p. 33). He also wrote,

> …we need a law forbidding discrimination in hiring, voting, or admission to centers of learning based on previous attendance at some curriculum. This guarantee … would remove the present absurd discrimination in favor of the person who learns a given skill with the largest expenditure of public funds or what is equally likely has been able to obtain a diploma which has no relation to any useful skill or job. (Illich, 1983, p. 7)

When a practice needs a summative assessment of whether a job candidate is competent to perform the job's necessary functions, this assessment must be done outside of organized education. I expect *a firewall between organized education and any summative assessment of competence*

[4] From KNOTS by R. D. Laing, http://www.thepositivemind.com/poetry/RDlaing.htm.

in a post-work leisure-based society. Legitimate job credentialism must exclude (illegitimate) educational credentialism. It does not matter how a person learns necessary job functions and becomes competent—the only matter must be that a person is competent, as established outside of organized education. It is true that for a job, making errors can be very risky, unsafe, and costly. However, in education, mistake-making should be viewed as welcomed and safe, as one of the important sources of learning and critical, deconstructive, dialogue.

4. *Modern organized education usually attributes* ***only one legitimate well-defined educational goal to all students***. Modern educational institutions attribute only one educational goal to all students—the goal of achieving competence in a targeted practice. As I discussed above, this competence is redefined through educational credentials usually measured by tests and exams. However, in reality, the actual students may have and do have different, multiple, and dynamically changing educational goals.

Thus, some students may indeed come to their educational institution to acquire the institutional educational credentials, as the institution expected. Some other students may want to practice competence beyond and away from educational credentialism. Yet other students may want a simple exposure to the targeted practice (e.g., like "window-shoppers"). Some other students may want to engage in creative socialization in the targeted practice beyond competence—they can be passionate newcomers, who want to immediately jump into creative engagement into the targeted practice itself (e.g., like "jailbreaking" or "hacking" in technology). Some other students may see their education as a form of hobby of hanging around with people engaged in the targeted practice. Some other students may engage themselves in critical understanding, examination, and deconstruction of the targeted practice. For some educatees (not even students anymore), organized education can be a place where old-timers and professionals hang out to share their problems, solutions, frustrations, and excitements. There are probably some other possibilities for educatees' goals. All these educational goals and desires, except the first one, are suppressed and muzzled by educational credentialism in modern educational institutions, which impose educational credentialism as the only goal of education.

Furthermore, the nature of education can be different for different educatees at different times for different curricula. For some educatees, education can be transient, a trajectory from becoming to being. While for others, education can be a form of their being, without moving anywhere. These educational goals and desires can also be dynamic as the educatee may shift their interests. The boundary between educators and educatees may become sharpened, at times, and defused in other times in those complex educational processes involving diverse educational goals.

I envision that future organized education in a post-work leisure-based society will promote, facilitate, and legitimize all these possibilities for educatees' educational desires and their changes. What is illegitimate and unsupported now in organized education will be legitimate and organizationally supported then.

5. *Modern organized education often views learning and teaching* ***technologically, as poïesis***. Inspired by a medical model, modern institutionalized education strives for developing a database of codified learning difficulties and students' misconceptions along with effective pedagogical strategies (e.g., "best practices"), addressing these difficulties, tested by academic positivist research (see a debate on these efforts in the exchange of proponent David Hargreaves and opponent Martyn Hammersley: Hammersley, 1997; Hargreaves, 1996, 1997). Essentially, modern organized education views educators as mutually replaceable human smart machines while viewing educatees as raw material for these educators' pedagogical actions.

In contrast, I envision that future organized education in a post-work leisure-based society will see both learning and teaching as authorship (Matusov, 2011a), where educatees author their own education and educators author help for their educatees' educational authorship. Learning and teaching is an art—a conceptual art (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2018)—rather than technology. Learning and teaching are personal and unique. They are *praxis*, where goals emerge, are changed, and are owned by the participants. Unique educatees learn from unique educators and not from the standardized curriculum and standardized research-proofed teaching methods. Of course, any aspect of teaching that smart machines can do successfully must be delegated to these smart machines to liberate educators from mechanized labor. Efforts to robotize these aspects of teaching activity must be welcomed and supported.

I agree with educational philosopher Ivan Illich that authorial learning and authorial teaching can be fully recognized and supported only in a leisure-based society away from a necessity-based society of *homo faber*,

> We must first construct a society in which personal acts [i.e., unique authorial deeds – i.e., *postupki*, in Russian, – and unique authorial judgments] themselves reacquire a value higher than that of making things and manipulating people. In such a society exploratory, inventive, creative teaching would logically be counted among the most desirable forms of leisurely "unemployment." (Illich, 1983, p. 43)

Educational Institution in a Post-work Leisure-Based Society

So, how can institutions support education in a post-work leisure-based society? As I discussed here and throughout the book, there are at least two major problems with the institutionalization of education. First, institutions inherently strive to hijack the spirit and major mission of any practice they serve. Institutions are a human mechanism, a human aggregate, aiming at the reliable and predictable production of actions, procedural judgments, and solutions in response to necessities. It involves double servitude: (1) an institution is supposed to serve its targeted practice, it organizes, and (2) it serves to address the necessities, by which both the practice and the institution are constrained. As a human mechanism, an institution demands from its functionaries—i.e., institutional staff (i.e., bureaucrats)—to act like human smart machines subordinated to institutional authority. An institution often sees its own practice as *poiesis*, where the goals and the criteria for assessing quality are set in advance by the top institutional bureaucrats (i.e., "visionary administrators"). Since an institution often controls resources of the practice it serves, it has a lot of power to subdue and control the practice in the name of rationalization, efficiency, scarcity of resources, and necessity. From being an instrument and a servant of its practice, an institution becomes its master, which we find ubiquitously in our necessity-based and highly institutionalized societies. We live in a perverse historical time of institutional hegemony, institutionalism (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016; Foucault, 1995).

Of course, it is true that, at times, the urgencies of necessity, managed by the institution, may take over the goals and the spirit of the practice itself. Nevertheless, these moments must be exceptional rather than the rule as it is often now. The rest of the time, I would argue, the practice, its goals and spirit, must rule.

A genuinely good institution must constantly bow to the practice it serves. A genuinely good institutional bureaucrat is one who, through their practical, situational wisdom—what Aristotle (2000) called *phronêsis*—prioritizes the goals of the practice, which he or she serves institutionally, over institutional "needs"[5] and the necessity overall. In essence, a good institutional officer has to supervise the institutional rules (formal or informal),[6] which they enforce, and when necessary make authorial decisions of when to break these institutional rules (or, at least, renegotiate them) when these rules are situationally at odds with the spirit of the practice, the institutional rules are supposed to serve, based on the officer's conscience, *phronêsis*, and taking responsibility for their actions. Of course, this contradicts the idea of an institution as a reliable, predictable, human machinery and raises issues of possible bureaucratic corruption, arbitrariness, unfairness, discrimination, institutional discoordination, and so on. In my view, these tensions must be primarily addressed through a dialogic process of taking responsibility rather than just through a list of rules, laws, and regulations (cf. Bakhtin, 1993).

Currently, the position of a good institutional officer, described above, is either illegitimate or extremely limited in modern institutions. A genuinely good institutional officer—i.e., an officer with a strong sense of conscience to act in the spirit of the practice she or he is supposed to serve against all institutional pressures (Milgram, 1974)—is either reserved for

[5] I believe that people have needs, not institutions. However, at times, institutional participants become unconditional agents of their institutions, who literally feel their institution's needs. Institutions do not have needs, only people do,—it is a more a metaphor. However, institutions can induce needs in people, which are not the people's one, agentive needs. For example, a typical participant of Milgram's obedience experiment (Milgram, 1974) did not want to inflict pain on the "learner," but they did nevertheless, viewing their action as driven by the need coming from the "experiment of the effect of punishment on a learner's memory"—the institutional "need," see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOUEC5YXV8U.

[6] Institution—a human machinery—can be mechanical, rule-based, or organic, based on emergent dynamic patterns, which may or may not be stable, like in a self-organizing system. There are more mechanical institutions and more organic institutions. I wonder if mechanical institutionalism and organic institutionalism have to be considered as well.

heroic and/or subversive actions of institutional workers. I argue that these institutional pressures are mostly economic—a fear of losing a job and, thus, for the well-being of the institutional worker and his/her family—and ideological. The latter seems to involve a network of related ideologies prevalent in a modern necessity-based society: the ideology of necessity—i.e., necessity rules and justifies human affairs,—the ideology of authority—i.e., unconditional subordination to the authority is necessary (NB!) for life to carry on successfully (cf. Milgram, 1974), the ideology of rules—i.e., any authorial deviation from rules is always a form of corruption, and so on.

I agree with American revolutionary Thomas Paine that human dignity—a desire to do what one feels and thinks is right rather than what is necessary—can be promoted by an unconditional safety net, by unconditional welfare, and by critical public dialogue circulated openly and freely in the society (Marangos & King, 2006). I expect that in a post-work leisure-based society, these corrupting institutional pressures will be diminished by sufficient universal basic income, guaranteeing a good well-being unconditionally, by open public critique of the listed ideologies of institutionalism, by new cultural values of appreciating leisure, and by open and free public critical dialogues about what constitutes a good institutional bureaucrat, circulating in the society.

Second, institutions contradict the notion of genuine leisure (Chapter 5), which is especially important for non-instrumental, intrinsic, education and for the Age of Leisure in general. Life in the institution is mostly subordinated to necessity and bureaucrats are supposed to function mostly as human smart machines with a few creative managers and administrators, whose creative authorship is severely constrained by necessity and by the institutional hierarchy (see Chapter 6). Even at its best, an institution relies on people as *homo faber* and not as *homo otium*, i.e., people whose culture is dominating in the Leisure Age. In this sense, an institution is a *workplace*, like any other workplace. Thus, the life of the institution contradicts the life of leisure.

As with any work, I expect that the sphere of institutional human engagement will be shrunken by computerization, automatization, robotization, and artificial intellect in post-work leisure-based society. The remaining human work must be paid, although I expect that people will also volunteer to do it in their organized educational associations and establishments.

Students' Academic Freedoms in a Post-work Leisure-Based Society

As safeguards against an institution taking over the spirit of organized education in a post-work leisure-based society, I propose a list of multi-dimensional academic freedoms and rights of educatees. Elsewhere, my colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019) developed the organizational principles for organized education aimed at intrinsic education.[7] These principles are based on the following multidimensional academic freedoms and rights of educatees:

1. Curriculum: Freedom for educatees to decide what to learn;
2. Instruction: Freedom for educatees to decide how, when, where, and with whom to learn and ask for guidance;
3. Participation: Freedom for educatees to engage or disengage, freedom to learn or not to learn, freedom of a no-fault divorce from any teacher or learning community;
4. Valuation: Freedom for educatees to determine what is or is not important for the learner to study or to do, the quality, and the purpose of his/her education;
5. Ecology: A right for educatees to have access to and opportunity for a rich educational environment, pregnant with and supportive of diverse discourses, practices, and values;
6. Role: Freedom for educatees to define what kind of educatee they want to be in every particular situation and overall (e.g., a credential student, a self-responsible critical learner, an other-responsible critical learner, a creative learner, an autodidact, an apprentice).
7. Leisure: Freedom for educatees from necessities and needs such as hunger, sickness, concerns about shelter, concerns about safety, concerns about future well-being, and so on.

Of course, all these academic freedoms and rights have limitations, rooted in the given history, culture, human biology, economy, and so on. Educatees can choose only what is available for them as the basis of their

[7] The text below is heavily based on our chapter and is a revised version of it.

choice as well as the material for their creative transcendence of the available choices. Also, necessities cannot be eliminated in a leisure-based society, even though I expect that the cultural value of leisure will dominate over the cultural value of necessities, in the contrast to our day's situation. Even more, at times, necessities can be prioritized over leisure and interfere with the listed freedoms and rights. Still, these academic freedoms and rights provide aspirational guidelines for education in a leisure-based society. Let me zoom in on these freedoms and rights.

The *curricular* academic freedom involves a learner's right to pursue his/her own academic interests, questions, inquiries, needs, and passions. These interests, questions, inquiries, needs, and passions may preexist in the learner or emerge in an interaction with the teacher, peers, other people, texts, experiences, observations, activities, and so on. For example, in my undergraduate and graduate classes, I provide my students with Curricular Maps. At the beginning of a semester, a Curricular Map involves a list of topics that I have developed based on my own authorial judgments, on authorial judgments by colleagues teaching similar courses around the world (via their syllabi posted on the Internet), and my past students' interests. During the semester, my current students can and do amend the course's Curricular Map at any time. At the end of each class meeting, my students are engaged in selecting a topic for the next class. Often my students vote on the topics, but at times they want to decide by consensus, or by accepting several topics and splitting the class into smaller groups, or by asking me, their instructor, to make a choice for them, or by flipping a coin on several most popular topics of their choice. Also, students often try to convince their peers to join them in voting for the topic of their choice. Recently, I started experimenting by offering my students a list of themes (i.e., subtopics) within the chosen class topic to begin our discussion, which the students can always amend with their own themes.

The Curricular Map creates an image of the vast, rich, and growing field of study—representation of the rich and inexhaustible learning environment—for the students. This democratic process of selecting topics to study or themes to discuss promotes both students' activism and ownership of their own learning and education. It discursively and powerfully forms their educational desire, "I want to study/learn…" (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). In intrinsic education, the curriculum is always emerging, surprising, and, thus, cannot be preset.

In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, it is up to educational authorities to define and mandate curricular topics, themes, and their sequence, disabling students' educational activism, desire, and ownership. The curriculum is imposed on the students. Students do not have a legitimate right to define their curriculum often justified by their ignorance. Their educational desires are tabled until after school is over. Efforts are made to motivate students to engage in the school-imposed curriculum and/or to make the school-imposed curriculum attractive to the students, like, for example, in innovative progressive education (e.g., Dewey, 1902).

The *instructional* academic freedom involves a learner's right to organize his/her own study in whatever way may fit the learner. Classes, guidance, and learning activities cannot be imposed on the student but only offered and suggested by teachers or initiated by the students. The teacher's pedagogical and academic freedom for and authority of the teacher's authorial pedagogy must be subordinated to the student's freedom and authority and should be based on the student's consent. The student has a right to be the final authority to accept, reject, or modify these guiding offers, suggestions, or invitations by the teacher, which is somewhat similar to the modern patient–doctor and client–lawyer relationships. Students must have a right to choose or create their own classes, to choose or invite teachers or peers with whom to study. Like in the case of the Curricular Map, a teacher can develop a list of possible diverse, rich learning activities and projects that the students can choose from, modify, or amend with their own. Guidance cannot be imposed on the students by the teachers (or peers, or institutions) but can only be offered. Of course, the students can ask for guidance.

In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, classes, guidance, and learning activities are determined by school authorities and imposed on the students. Students' instructional choices are illegitimate there. This often leads to insensitive guidance that generates resistance in the students to which many teachers reply with oppression or bribing. It also often undermines the students' educational interests, desires, and confidence in their own educational aspirations and abilities.

The *participatory* academic freedom involves a learner's right to move freely, in and out, to and from learning activities and educational communities. The students' right of non-participation and disengagement must be respected and valued. The students' non-participation, disengagement, and divorce from activities and communities must be viewed as legitimate and not be punished, as it is often the case in many conventional and innovative schools. This right creates an opportunity for a self-correcting process in educational practice, where the students can vote with their feet when educational practice or guidance becomes insensitive for their educational (or other) needs or meaningless for them (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016).

In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, participation is mandatory and unconditional. Students' non-participation is viewed as illegitimate and punishable. It makes the educational practice insensitive and leaves it without feedback from the primary benefactor of the educational practice—the student him/herself. Using accountability, as a feedback loop, creates parasitic practices of summative assessments that undermine the trust between the teacher and the student and the educational process itself (Matusov, 2009; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Meacham, 2016). As Bryan Cohen puts it,

> I don't hate education. Rather I love education too much to accept our Orwellian substitute. What's Orwellian about the status quo? Most fundamentally, the idea of compulsory enlightenment. Educators routinely defend compulsion on the ground that few students want to explore ideas and culture. They're right about the students' tastes but forget a deeper truth: intrinsically valuable education requires eager students. Mandatory study of ideas and culture spoils the journey. (Caplan, 2018, p. 352)

The *valuative* academic freedom involves a learner's right to define the values, quality, and purpose of their own learning and education. In intrinsic education, the purpose, value, and quality of the educational activity emerge in the activity itself (i.e., "*praxis*" in the Aristotelian terms) and do not preexist the educational practice (i.e., "*poiesis*" in the Aristotelian terms). In *praxis*, the initial purpose, value, and quality of this activity are temporary and expected to be changed. An inherent part of intrinsic education itself is the self-defining of the students' educational values, goals, and qualities. Learners' realization of transformation of learners' educational goals, values, desires, and qualities in education can be called meta-learning. Of course, this practice does not guarantee a good education (good for what and for whom?), but it is open for it.

Finally, it is the learner, not the teacher, who is the primary and final authority for educational evaluation of the quality of the learner's work, setting educational purposes, and defining its educational values. The teacher does not have a right to see the student's work without the student's permission (Matusov et al., 2016).

In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, valuation is exclusively done by the school authority, which increasingly includes private testing companies. Often the quality of education is predefined as all students successfully arriving at curricular endpoints, preset by the society, school authorities, teachers, and testing agencies. The hidden curriculum of such schooling involves students learning how to please this school authority rather than to engage in genuine education.

The *ecological* right for a learner's education involves both the access to diverse resources and the legitimacy to pursue diverse practices, discourses, and values. Thus, for example, at the Latin American Community Center at Wilmington, Delaware, USA, a computer instructor, Mr. Steve Villanueva, has organized a Lego-Logo club for Latino/children of very diverse ages from 5-year old to 18-year old as a part of their after-school program (Matusov, 2009, ch. 10). The Club settings involved a computer room with some children playing computer games or engaging in other activities unrelated to the Lego-Logo Club.

Let me provide "a snapshot" of the activities there. In the center of the room, there were big desks with the Lego-Logo blocks and settings for robots designed by the children. Mr. Steve (as he is known in the community) was preparing the children for a national competition. This was an extremely rich and diverse learning environment. Some children were involved exclusively in engineering tasks of the robotics competition, some exclusively in programming the robots, some in in-between tasks, some were interested in the aesthetics of the robots, some were videotaping the work. However, some children were involved in robotics projects outside of the competition promoted by Mr. Steve (e.g., making robot-cars that could "dance" to music, like their favorite Latino wrestler Eddie Guerrero). A few very little children were sitting under the long desks with Lego-Logo settings and playing with small cars that they made out of Lego-Logo blocks. A few teenage girls were discussing romance and pregnancy symptoms. A few young boys were engaged in horse-playing and teasing. One boy who was engaged in an engineering task suddenly said that he was bored and wanted to go to play basketball. Mr. Steve commented that the boy should have left for basketball a half-hour before when his team had left.

The boy left and came back half an hour later. There were many separate, overlapping, and dynamically emerging and shifting discourses.

Children moved freely between the various activities and discourses. The learning environment was heterodiscursive affording very diverse activities and discourses (Matusov, 2011b). Everything was legitimate. At times, Steve or some of the children asked for help from those children who were not engaged in preparation for the competition, but they were free to move back to their activities after they helped (some did and some did not). All-in-all, the children loved to come to the Club and could come and work on their activities even when Steve was not with them for whatever reason (Matusov, 2009, ch. 10).

In contrast, in many conventional and some innovative schools, the learning environment is either sterile or highly limited, mono-discursive, and controlled by the teacher. The students are expected to be on-task or on a few tasks, well defined by the teacher (and if not, the teacher may be punished by the school administration). The tasks and subjects are purified from "contamination" by other discourses, practices, and values (often couched in terms of the moniker "best practice"). In a conventional classroom, a tomato is always a fruit, as defined by in the scientific practice of biology, and never a vegetable as defined by culinary practice.

The *role of* academic freedom involves a learner's right to define his/her own mode of participation in each particular area, educational activity, or topic. It is up to the learner to determine their own approaches to their own interests. A student may determine his/her overall educational goals as, for example, to become recognized by society or by a practice's experts as a competent and capable practitioner through receiving a license or certificate—i.e., to assume a role of a practice-based credential student.[8] In this case, the goal of education for a credential student is to pass some qualifying tests set by the practice's experts. It does not matter how the credential student will prepare for these qualifying tests: alone or with the help of somebody or by going to school. Passing the qualifying tests is the most important thing. By contrast, a student may want to be a good authorial professional, who learns in a community of other professionals as an apprentice. Alternatively, a student may want to engage in a critical dialogue about life, oneself, the world, and society. All these and other possibilities for students' roles in education must be available and legitimate. Also, there should be a possibility for a student to combine or shift between and among these roles. In contrast, in many conventional

[8] This is competence credentialism and not educational credentialism.

and some innovative schools, the legitimate role of the student is single and predefined by the school authorities mostly (but not always!) involving the role of a school-based credential student, who successfully jumps through all the hoops that the school sets for the students.

The *leisure* academic freedom based on the idea that education is a form of genuine leisure. The word "school" (σχολείο) in Greek means leisure (σχολή)—time that one can dedicate to examination oneself, of others, and of the world. The Greek notion of school does not seem institutional, as it is now, but rather it is a form of human condition—namely a special type of leisure (Arendt, 1958) among other types of leisure like: intrinsic play, passionate endeavors, and hanging out conversations among friends, see Chapter 5. Institutions can assess this condition when needed, but should not shape it. Aristotle argued that we should seek education for our children and ourselves "not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal and noble" (Aristotle & Barker, 1958, pp. viii, 3, 1–13). He viewed genuine, i.e., intrinsic education as a basic existential craving of a free citizen in a democratic society, a free citizen who does not work and whose basic needs are fulfilled. For Aristotle, instrumental education is mostly needed by those who are not free from labor and survival. Of course, in Ancient Greece, the intrinsic education of citizens, free from labor, and concerns of necessity, was possible through slavery and exploitation of women, peasants, and artisans. In our times, intrinsic education still remains a luxury that can be affordable for very few.

However, with the emergence of computerization, robotics, telecommunication, automatization, artificial intelligence, social media, things might change (Markoff, 2016). A time may be coming when fewer and fewer people will be needed to engage in the world economy. A few economists predicted the rise of the so-called technological unemployment (Gorz, 1989; Keynes, 2016; Marx, 1868). Although it is not necessarily guaranteed (see Blacker, 2013, for an alternative, dystopian, possibility), technological unemployment may lead to an emergence of a leisure-based society, in which a growing number of people do not need to work, while they are all receiving a growing universal income. In a post-work leisure-based society,[9] intrinsic education may come out of

[9] Of course, this type of leisure based society will never be based purely on leisure, but will also involve work for a decreasing number of people as I argued throughout the book.

the underground, be able to take root in the societal cultural psyche, and become a universal human right, while instrumental education may become subordinated to intrinsic education.

Authorial Dialogic Teachers in Instrumental Schools

Finally, I want to address what a teacher—who is attracted by authorial dialogic critical education but who finds him/herself working in a conventional, instrumental, educational institution—can do to survive institutionally while trying to practice authorial education.

Modern conventional schools and most innovative schools institutionalize soft or hard forms of instrumental education, which make the authorial dialogic critical education, described here, difficult for students and teachers. The soft and hard forms of instrumental education differ by a degree of freedom that students and teachers legitimately have for their authorship while making the students arrive at the preset curricular endpoints. In soft forms of institutionalization of instrumental education, instructional freedom is often allowed for the teachers, and there is usually more leeway for teachers' interpretation of curricular endpoints, preset and imposed on teachers and students. This difference is important and consequential for smuggling authorial dialogic critical education.

The following is an incomplete list of how modern schools institutionalize instrumental education:

1. Exclusion of students from decision-making about their own education: what to study, how to study, with whom, when, where, and whether (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019);
2. Educational curricular standards;
3. Summative assessments (grades, high stake exams);
4. Scripted instruction;
5. Forced nature of education—in the compulsory schooling, students do not choose to participate or not to participate in education but are forced in it (to some degree it is true to college education as well);
6. Standardization of education—in many schools and classrooms, what students must study (e.g., the Common Core State Standards in the United States) and even how teachers must teach (e.g.,

"scripted lessons," "evidence- and research-based instruction") are standardized;
7. Monopoly on educational philosophy and practice by the state, the nation, the school district, the school, or the teacher;
8. Deprofessionalization of teachers by viewing them as state servants or pedagogical technicians governed by educational research rather than authorial professional decision-makers serving their students primarily.

Of course, while promoting instrumental education, national school systems vary about degrees of freedom for students and teachers. For example, in Norway, in primary school (*Barneskole*, from age 6 to 13), no official grades or summative assessments are given; thus, Norwegian teachers and students have less pressure to conform to preset curricular endpoints in the classrooms. In the United States, there is a high diversity of schooling, and thus a diversity in governance and high degrees of freedom for teachers and students (such as public charter schools, private schools, and homeschooling). This diversity can create local opportunities for minimizing or even eliminating the institutional pressures for instrumental education.

Furthermore, in some national or local conditions, the imposed educational curricular standards can be general and vague, allowing a greater interpretation by the teachers, while in other conditions, this might be not the case. However, even in most hard forms of institutionalization of instrumental education, the efficiency of enforcement and the surveillance of compliance might greatly vary—thus, in some cases, giving academic freedoms of authorship to teachers if not *de jure*, but de facto. Finally, a teacher's own conviction of authorial dialogic critical education might inspire the teacher to search for ways to promote authorial dialogic critical education for his/her students as much as it is possible for the teacher's institutional and philosophical survival.

Based on many interviews with educational practitioners, inspired by Bakhtinian pedagogy for authorial dialogic critical education and who work in conventional schools, my colleagues and I abstracted the following ideas, approaches, and strategies for Bakhtinian educators' survival and thriving within pedagogically hostile institutional settings (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019, Chs. 2.5 and 4.3):

a. Inside of the classroom:

i. Promoting critical dialogues in the classroom that provoke, support, and examine students' authorial ideas as much as possible;
ii. Engaging students in decision-making, critical reflection, and ownership of their education;
iii. Recognizing the highest value of disagreements, dissensus, misunderstandings, puzzlements, questions, and problematization over agreements, consensus, certainty, norms, and correctness in education;
iv. Recognition of emerging dialogic events and teaching–learning moments in the classroom;
v. Providing alternative ideas, approaches, and arguments to engage students and yourself in testing their and your own dear ideas, while giving students the space for developing their ideas in dialogue with each other without you;
vi. Interpreting and reinterpreting the imposed curricular standards in the broadest possible way to legitimize students' authorial curriculum emerging in a critical classroom dialogue;

b. Outside of the classroom

i. Smuggling authorial dialogic critical education in your teaching as much as institutional survival allows it;
ii. Finding a job in an institution with the highest degree of freedom and support;
iii. Experimenting with authorial dialogic critical education, identifying and critically reflecting on its problems;
iv. Building networks of forums, discourses, and support with like-minded educators and scholars that promote critical and supportive reflections about actual practices of authorial dialogic critical education and their limitations;
v. Engaging in professional and public debates about the goals of education, their nature, and philosophies;
vi. Supporting educational reforms that aim at softening institutions of instrumental education;
vii. Demanding recognition of teacher professionalism for teachers' authorial professional decision-making (together with students)

regarding curriculum, instruction, goals of education, and educational philosophy from the society, from school administration, and from parents;

viii. Educational pluralism: supporting the academic rights of your colleagues to practice their educational philosophy even though you personally and professionally disagree with it.

* * *

In this book, I tried to envision education in a post-work leisure-based society. Of course, this is only one way to envision both education and post-work society. I tried to argue that my vision is both desirable and achievable against alternative visions and objections. However, this vision is not guaranteed but rather, it requires the political will of the people engaging in a dialogue. I treat my vision not as a blueprint for designing the future, but as a dialogic provocation to spur more dialogue-agreement and dialogue-disagreement that can guide our future actions. Ernst Bloch articulated "the utopia principle of hope" as a human dream that opens up "the horizon of the consciousness… toward possibility that has still not become" (Bloch, 1986, p. 7). I see critical authorial education in a post-work leisure-based society such a horizon and such a possibility.

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